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The end of the First World War in 1918 signalled the downfall of the old order in the Middle 
East by the virtual death of the Ottoman Empire, with its ancient social, economic and political 
system. The consolidation of Britain’s strategic, economic and political position in that region 
was bound to affect Kurdistan’s political future, given its determination to re-construct a new 
regional order. Indeed, by virtue of its control over most of the former Ottoman territories, Bri­
tain was able to play a leading part in the formation process of the modern Middle East, which 
witnessed the emergence of the so-called national states in Mesopotamia and Palestine. The 
main objective of this thesis is to understand Britain’s role in the re-partitioning of Kurdistan 
between Mesopotamia, Syria and Turkey by examining the evolution of its Kurdish policy and 
the various factors that re-shaped it.
Three major conclusions can be derived from the evolution of Britain’s position on the 
Kurdish question. The first conclusion is the supremacy of strategic considerations over eco­
nomic ones as the principal driving force behind Britain’s policy towards Kurdistan’s future. 
The second conclusion is that certain British officials on the ground played an important part in 
influencing the future of Kurdistan after the war. Between 1918 and 1920, Colon*J Wilson, in 
his capacity as the Civil Commissioner, and Major Noel, in his capacity as the most important 
British expert on Kurdish affairs, played a crucial part not only in colouring London’s views on 
the Kurdish question, but also in influencing the direction of political developments in South­
ern Kurdistan. In the following period, 1921-1923, Percy Cox, the new High Commissioner, 
played a crucial part in Southern Kurdistan’s incorporation into Iraq. Lastly, examination of Brit­
ish policy reveals that in none of its historical phases were Britain’s strategic interests compat- 
ible with the nationalist aspirations of the Kurds, unlike those of the ZionistySharifian national­
ist movements. There was always a clear contradiction between the requirements of a suc­
cessful British policy towards Turkey and Persia, and the political objectives of the Kurdish 
nationalist movement.
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With as much consistency as possible, I have used the system of transliteration adopted by the Inter­
national Journal of Middle East Studies for Arabic and Turkish. The only exceptions are those words 
which have become standard, such is ‘Sheikh’ and ‘Hussein’. The plural of Arabic words has been 
marked by an additional ‘s’ to the singular.
Eastern Kurdistan 
Northern Kurdistan 
Southern Kurdistan 
Western Kurdistan
Iran’s Kurdistan 
Turkey’s Kurdistan 
Iraq’s Kurdistan 
Syria’s Kurdistan
Amir: Prince (An Arab Term)
Hakim-i-Shar’ In charge Of Qadha (A Kurdish Term)
Hukmdar: Governor (A Kurdish Term)
Levies: Troops Of Assyrian Soldiers Led By British Officers (Later Included Arabs And Kurds)
Liwa: Largest Unit Of Local Administration In Iraq (Division)
Mudirliq: Sub-district
Mudir: Administrator Of A Mudirliq (Nahiah)
Mutassarif: Administrator Of A Liwa
Nahiya: Smallest Unit In Local Administration In Iraq (Mudirliq=Sub-district)
Qada: An Administrative Unit Between A Nahiah And A Liwa (District)
Qaimmaqam: Administrator Of A Qada
Senjaq: Largest Administrative Unit within A Wilayet (Liwa)
Wilayet: Main Administrative Unit In The Ottoman Empire (Province)
Wali: Administrator Of A Wilayet
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CAB Cabinet Records, Public Record Office, (PRO) Kew
Capt. Captain
CO Colonial Office Records, PRO
Col. Colonel
DBFP Documents On British Foreign Policy
Egy. Ex. Force Egypt Expeditionary Force
FO Foreign Office Records, PRO
GHQ General Headquarters
GOC General Officer Commanding
HMSO His Majesty’s Stationery Office
IDCM Interdepartmental Conference On Middle Eastern Affairs
HR Iraq Intelligence Report
10 India Office
L/P & s/ Political And Secret Files Of The India Office, Commonwealth Relations Office,
London 
Maj. Major
Mes.Ex.Force Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force 
MIR Mesopotamia Intelligence Report
PRO Public Record Office (Kew)
S/S Secretary Of State
TPC Turkish Petroleum Company
WO War Office Records, PRO
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Spanning nine eventful years, from the formation of the Bunsen Committee in April 1915 to 
the conclusion of the Lausanne agreement in July 1923, this thesis focuses on Britain’s 
secret diplomacy and its official policies towards British-controlled Kurdistan. These years are 
arguably the most fateful period in modern Kurdish history. They witnessed dramatic political 
developments that initially raised and then dashed Kurdish hopes for unity and indepen­
dence. Given its control of Southern Kurdistan and its leading role in the formation of the 
modern national states of the Middle East, the examination of Britain’s policy is central to any 
understanding of the Kurdish question in the period '1915-1923. Indeed, at the post-war 
peace conferences in Paris (1919-1920), San Remo (1920) and Lausanne (1922-1923), Bri­
tain was the most influential power in determining the outcome of the Turkish political and ter­
ritorial settlements, with which Kurdistan’s future was closely linked. For the first time, such 
international meetings considered the political future of the non-Turkish nationalities, such as 
the Kurds, the Arabs and the Armenians.
The central argument of this thesis is that Britain both explicitly and implicitly played a 
major part in the post-war re-partitioning of Kurdistan. Moreover, it will be argued that in the 
period 1918-1923, British officials on the ground played a critical part in influencing the direc­
tion of British Kurdish policy, as they not only prevented the evolution of an autonomous 
entity in British-controlled Kurdistan, but also paved the way for its incorporation into the Iraqi 
state in 1923. Throughout this thesis, emphasis is placed on identifying and examining the 
considerations that influenced Britain’s short and long-term objectives in all parts of Kurdistan 
during and after the First World War. These British considerations were of a strategic, econo­
mic and political nature, but as this thesis argues, the strategic considerations -notably the 
security of the sea and land-routes to the British Empire in the east- were of paramount impor­
tance. They influenced the nature of the different political schemes which were advocated by 
British policy makers for Kurdistan’s future.
British policy is analysed from three different perspectives: local, regional and interna­
tional. The first perspective illuminates the interactive relations between Britain’s imperial inter­
ests and the political aspirations of the Kurdish nationalist movement, particularly in the period 
1918-1923. These matters are the focus of chapters two and six, where British motives for the 
establishment and the destruction of the first and second Kurdish self-governments are ana­
lysed in depth. Secondly, like other nationality questions that surfaced in the post-war Middle
East -such as those of the Palestinians and the Jews- the Kurdish question was interconnec­
ted with both the Armenian and the Sharifian questions. Chapters four and seven focus on 
the effects of the separate political desires pf the Armenians and the Sharifian Arabs for the 
formation of their own national states on British policy towards Kurdish nationalist aspirations. 
Indeed, after the end of the First World War, the British became increasingly aware of the 
close connection between deciding Kurdistan’s future and the solution of both the Armenian 
question in the period 1918-1921 and the Mesopotamian question in the period 1921-1923. 
Thirdly, as a great power, Britain was determined to consolidate its position v/s-3-ws other rival 
powers in the post-war Middle East. Examination of the objectives of Britain’s Kurdish policy in 
chapters five and eight shows that they were partly defined in response to the policy objec­
tives of the other powers, especially France. This thesis explains how Kurdistan’s future was 
affected by the rivalry between Britain and France from 1918 to 1923, which manifested itself 
both in their agreement on directly controlling southern and western parts of Kurdistan, and in 
their disagreement over the future of the remainder of Kurdistan.
Indirect control, direct control, buffer state and unitary state represent different 
courses in British Kurdish policy between 1918 and 1923. These constitute the conceptual 
framework of the thesis. The concept of indirect control is used to describe the way in which 
the British exercised and consolidated their influence in Kurdistan through local Kurdish 
nationalists without making military, financial or political commitments. This indirect control took 
the shape of forming an autonomous Kurdish entity under the supervision of British officials in 
late October and early November 1918. The concept of direct control is used to describe the 
way in which British officials conducted the political, economic and security affairs of Southern 
Kurdistan after June 1919, without paying any attention to the wishes of local Kurds. The use 
of the concepts of direct and indirect control is essential to explaining the development of 
British policy in Southern Kurdistan in the period 1918-1920, while the concepts of buffer 
state and unitary state guide the analysis of British Kurdish policy in the mandate period 1921- 
1923. According to the concept of the buffer state -which was developed by Winston 
Churchill, the Colonial Secretary- Southern Kurdistan was to be formed as a separate entity 
from Mesopotamia in order to consolidate the security of the British position in the latter. The 
unitary state concept was advocated by Percy Cox, the British High Commissioner for Meso­
potamia, who advocated Southern Kurdistan’s incorporation into Mesopotamia in order to 
strengthen Britain’s positions in the newly-emerging Iraqi state.
The existing literature on modern Kurdish history is very limited in comparison to that 
on the history of other Middle Eastern nations. Most of the studies that have been carried out 
in the past seven years are mainly concerned with the present Kurdish question and its 
increasing effects on political stability in the Middle East following the end of the Cold War. 
Having said that, the historical debate among Kurdish and foreign scholars on Britain’s role in 
influencing Kurdistan’s post-war political future has traditionally been dominated by two con­
tentious issues. The first is concerned with the way in which Britain became interested in 
Kurdish affairs and the reasons for that interest. The second deals with the extent to which 
Britain and Kurdish nationalists were responsible for the non-materialisation of a Kurdish natio­
nal state after the end of the First World War.
The first British contacts with the Kurds go back to the Eighteenth Century, when Brit­
ish travellers and officials of the East India Company began to make journeys to various parts 
of Ottoman and Qajar Kurdistan. From the political point of view, Britain’s interest in Kurdish 
affairs began in the mid-Nineteenth Century and was manifest in several political develop­
ments which reflected the rise of Kurdish nationalism and its subsequent embodiment in the 
outbreak of several revolts. The same period witnessed, as Kemal Madhar Ahmad’s book Kur­
distan during the First World War demonstrates, 1 the evolution of Czarist Russia’s interest in 
the political, social and economic conditions in Kurdistan. The interferences of European 
Powers in Kurdistan’s affairs from the mid-Nineteenth Century onwards became “a permanent 
factor” in the modern Kurdish history.? In his examination of the Nineteenth Century Kurdish 
nationalist revolts, Nezan Kendal, a Kurdish scholar, speaks of British and French opposition 
to the Kurdish revolt of 1855 and underlines their fears concerning an independent Kurdistan 
under Russian influence. 3 Similarly, in his assessment of the Kurdish revolt of 1880-1881, 
Robert Olson, an American historian, underlines the antagonistic British attitude towards it.4 
Britain’s involvement in Kurdish affairs and its opposition towards the insurgent Kurds was pri­
marily based on strategic considerations, namely the maintenance of the unity of Ottoman 
Turkey and Qajar Persia. Britain feared that such revolts at the heart of Asia Minor and north-
1 * Kamal Madhar Ahmad, Kurdistan during the First World War, Translated by Ali Maher Ibrahim 
(London: Saqi Books, 1994).
2* Nezan Kendal, The Kurds: Current Position and Historical Background’ -in- Kurdish Culture and 
Identity, [ed.] Philip G. Kreyenbroek & Christine Allison (London: Zed Books, 1996), p. 13.
3* Nezan Kendal, The Kurds under the Ottoman Empire’ -in- A People without a Country, the Kurds and 
Kurdistan, (ed.) Gerard Chaliand, Translated by Michael Pallis (London: Zed Books, 1993), p.22.
4* Robert Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989) p.7.
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west Persia would cause the collapse of Ottoman Turkey and Qajar Persia or, at least, give 
Russia an opportunity to extend its influence southwards to the Persian Gulf, India and the 
Mediterranean Sea. Indeed, British records reveal that through senior diplomatic contacts, the 
British Foreign Office relentlessly endeavoured to bring about a modus vivendi between Con­
stantinople and Tehran in order to put down the Kurdish revolt of 1880-1881.5 The principal 
objective of British diplomacy was to pre-empt any direct Russian intervention in the affairs of 
Persia.
By the early Twentieth Century, British interest in Kurdistan entered a new phase 
when it acquired economic and political influence in what was perceived to be the most impor­
tant Kurdish area: the Mosul Wilayet (province). This noteworthy development was a conse­
quence of the steady decline in the power of the central Governments in Constantinople and 
Tehran. This intensified the rivalry among European powers over economic and political 
spheres of influence. The construction of the Baghdad Railway was a symbol of German politi­
cal and economic control over Ottoman Turkey which threatened British strategic and com­
mercial interests in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf. It was this development that gave stra­
tegic and economic importance to Southern Kurdistan by virtue of its overlooking the Meso­
potamian plain and containing potential oil sources. In his book British Policy in Mesopotamia, 
1903-1914, which gives a thorough examination of British interests in Mesopotamia before 
the First World War, Stuart Cohen illustrates how Southern Kurdistan (the Mosul Wilayet) 
became one of the regions where the British endeavoured to consolidate their position in the 
face of the threat posed by their German rival. 6 The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 
presented Britain with an opportunity to devise more direct means of expanding and consoli­
dating its future influence in Southern Kurdistan and Mesopotamia. Kemal Madhar Ahmad, a 
Kurdish historian, considers British interests in Kurdistan during the war to be primarily of an 
economic nature, namely controlling Kurdish oil.7 However, the recommendations of the 
1915 Bunsen Committee and the terms of the 1916 Sykes-Picot (Tripartite) agreement, in 
particular, illustrate that Britain’s interest in Southern Kurdistan was primarily strategic, and only 
secondarily economic, as seen in the consolidation of British control over the Persian Gulf and 
potential Kurdish oil fields. Such interests were clearly embodied in Britain’s acquisition of a
5* See ‘Correspondence Respecting the Kurdish Invasion of Persia  ^No.s 1,2,3 and 4,Parliamentary 
Papers, Vol.C, Year 1881.
6* Stuart A. Cohen, British Policy in Mesopotamia, 1903-1914 {London: Ithaca Press, 1976).
7* Ahmad, Kurdistan during the First World War, p.189.
11
sphere of influence in Southern Kurdistan under the Sykes-Picot agreement.s
The existing interpretations of the reasons why Britain extended its control to South­
ern Kurdistan at the end of the First World War and immediately after the signing of the 
Mudros armistice (30 October 1918) are contradictory. In his analysis of the British advance 
towards Southern Kurdistan, David McDowall suggests that Britain’s interest in that area was 
accidental, resulting from its occupation of Arab Mesopotamia. 9 By contrast, Ahmad, who 
argues that Britain had “long-term plans” in Kurdistan before the war, considers the British 
occupation of Southern Kurdistan to be a response to the outbreak of the October Revolu­
tion in Russia in 1917.1 0  In his view, “ the most important result of the October Revolution was 
to increase Britain’s interest in Kurdistan, now viewing it as a strategic buffer. 11
Central to any debate of the reasons why Britain decided to bring Southern Kurdistan 
under its control is the political impact of the dramatic changes that occurred before the end of 
the war, notably the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. The subsequent Russian 
withdrawal from the war and the entry of America into the war against Germany affected the 
Sykes-Picot agreement to the extent that it could no longer serve as a basis for a post-war 
Middle Eastern order without undergoing considerable modifications. The disappearance of 
Russia as a major player in that important region awakened the old rivalry between Britain and 
France over strategic, political and economic spheres of influence. In the short term, British 
control of Southern Kurdistan was dictated by the need to drive the Turks out of the area.The 
sudden Russian withdrawal left such a dangerous vacuum in Kurdistan that the British posi­
tion in Mesopotamia became increasingly vulnerable to Turkish counter-attacks. At the same 
time, the war conditions, as McDowall states, offered the British an ideal opportunity to extend 
their control to the French sphere in Southern Kurdistan, 12 which was now perceived to be 
strategically and economically important to the short and long term security of Mesopotamia.
When the war ended, Britain found itself in a strong position to determine Kurdistan’s 
future because it had under its control large Kurdish areas in Southern and Western Kurdi­
stan. Now Britain needed to frame a well-defined policy in accordance with the strategic, politi-
8* Political Department, India Office, Note on Kurdistan, 14 December 1918, F0371/3386, Public 
Record Office (PRO). This Note refers to the Lesser Zab River as the boundary between the British and 
French spheres of influence in Southern Kurdistan.
9* David McDowall, A Modem History of the Kurds, ( London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996) pp.117-118. 
10* Ahmad, Kurdistan during the First World War, pp. 105 & 187.
11 * Ahmad, Kurdistan during the First World War, p. 101.
12* McDowall, A Modem History of the Kurds, p.118.
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cal and economic realities on the ground. The extension of British control to southern and 
western parts of Kurdistan was welcomed by the majority of local Kurds, whpse towns and vil­
lages had been devastated by the war. The Allies’ wartime propaganda generated great 
expectations among the Kurds. Some Kurdish nationalists took the Russian side, such as 
Abdul Razaq Bedirkhan, a Kurdish prince, while some others attempted to establish political 
contacts with the British, such as General Cherif Pasha, a high-ranking Ottoman diplomat. 
Kurdish nationalists genuinely believed that if they persuaded the Allies, and particularly Bri­
tain, of their nationalist cause and the compatibility between British interests and Kurdish poli­
tical aspirations, an independent Kurdish state might emerge. Early British measures in Bri­
tish-controlled Kurdistan reinforced such Kurdish optimism, notably the establishment of an 
autonomous Kurdish entity in the British sphere of influence. The immediate aim was to 
assign local Kurdish leaders the task of restoring normal economic, social and administrative 
life under the supervision of British officials. In the absence of a clearly-defined policy towards 
Kurdistan’s post-war future and in view of London’s growing anxiety about military, political 
and financial commitments, the British authorities in Baghdad decided to experiment with the 
idea of Kurdish autonomy.
The co-operation of the Kurdish nationalist leaders with Britain has been subjected to 
some criticism. In his| article The Kurds under the Ottoman Empire, Kendal argues that the 
Kurds lost a unique opportunity to achieve a united Kurdistan, largely because their leaders 
pinned their hopes entirely on Britain and France. In his view, had Kurdish nationalists taken 
the initiative to establish a “national Kurdish state” and imposed it as a faitaccompii, the Allies 
would have been unable to reverse this development. 13 Given the weakness of the Kurdish 
nationalist movement and the inter-connection between the Kurdish question and the Turk­
ish political and territorial settlement, one can argue that without the material support of Britain, 
the nationalist Kurds were not capable of taking any major initiative to establish an indepen­
dent Kurdistan as a faitaccompii, as the failure of several Kurdish revolts in the period 1919- 
1925 illustrated. The issue, however, was further complicated by the fact that the settlement 
of the Kurdish question not only affected the Kurds but also the Armenians, the Turks, the 
Arabs and, above all, the imperial interests of Britain and France. Therefore, the establishment 
of an independent Kurdistan would have required appropriate internal, regional and interna­
tional conditions. In the case of the Arab territories, for instance, Britain, to some extent, was
13* Kendal, A People without a Country, pp.30-31.
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able to reconcile its strategic and economic interests with Arab nationalist aspirations through 
the establishment of several Arab states. But, the geopolitical position of Kurdistan and Bri­
tain’s acute financial problems at home -which made it unwilling to commit itself militarily or poli­
tically in Kurdistan- stood in the way of such reconciliation between British strategic interests 
and Kurdish nationalist aspirations. Moreover, Major Edward Noel, the British advisor to the 
Kurdish Government in 1918, was the only British official who considered such reconciliation 
to be viable, and he ultimately failed to persuade London.
It is widely accepted by Kurdish and foreign scholars, such as Ahmad, McDowall and 
Olson, that the Kurds lost an unprecedented opportunity to establish a state (or several 
states) prior to the Sevres treaty. They, however, disagree on the reasons why the Kurds 
failed to realise their aspirations. At the centre of this historical debate is Britain’s role in the 
post-war partition of Kurdistan. The main conclusion one draws from the writings of Kurdish 
scholars is that the “imperialist objectives of Britain’s policy towards Kurdistan had devasta­
ting effects on the future of Kurdistan and the Kurdish nationalist movement. It must, how­
ever, be remembered that Kurdish historical interpretation of British policy towards Kurdistan 
was, to a considerable extent, influenced by the Soviet point of view in that every political 
development or step taken by the Allies, particularly Britain, has been interpreted in the con­
text of the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution and the formation of the Soviet Union. The 
containment of Bolshevik Russia, in Ahmad’s view, was the reason why the Allies decided to 
turn part of Kurdistan into a buffer zone under the terms of the Sevres treaty (August 1 9 2 0 ) . 1 4  
Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, a Kurdish scholar, believes that Britain sought the creation of a 
“reactionary’ Kurdish state ruled by Kurdish feudalists. This would be in the form of a British 
protectorate and directed against Bolshevik Russia. 15
As the existing Kurdish approach to Britain’s Kurdish policy is ideological in nature, it 
tends to simplify the historical events of the period 1915-1923. One cannot deny the fact that 
the growing Bolshevik threat to British imperial interests in the Ottoman Empire and the Qajar 
Kingdom was an important factor that influenced Britain’s post-war Middle Eastern policy. Hav­
ing said that, evidence used in this thesis demonstrates that there were other interactive fac­
tors which particularly influenced Britain’s Kurdish policy, such as the post-war British-French
14* Ahmad, Kurdistan during the First World War, p. 197.
15* Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, Kurdistan and the Kurds Translated by Miriam JellinkovS (Prague: 
Publishing House of the Czechoslovakia Academy of Science, 1965) pp.47-8. It is worth noting that 
Ahmad finished his higher education in Moscow, while Ghassemlou lectured in Eastern Europe.
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rivalry, the revival of the Kurdish nationalist movement, the future of Armenia and the solution 
of the Sharifian-Mesopotamian question.
A totally different interpretation of British Kurdish policy from that of the Kurdish scho­
lars has been produced by McDowall. He shifts the blame for the failure of the Kurds to estab­
lish their own national state onto the Kurdish nationalist leaders. McDowall’s book A Modern 
History of the Kurds, portrays Britain’s partition of Kurdistan as a reflection of the existing eco­
nomic realities: “trade routes and grain-producing hinter lands” . 16 According to this interpreta­
tion, Britain acted realistically when it modified the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement by 
bringing Southern Kurdistan under its mandate in order to create a viable economic and 
administrative unit in Mesopotamia. McDowall agrees with the logic of the British authorities in 
Mesopotamia, that adopting ethnic boundaries between a separate Mesopotamia and a 
separate Kurdistan was “strategic and economic nonsense”. 17 At the same time, he holds the 
nationalist Kurds -and their disunity- responsible for the non-materialisation of a Kurdish state. 
In his view, Britain searched for one Kurdish leader in order to reach a solution for Northern 
Kurdistan’s future. But, “the failure of the Kurds to produce a credible leadership was 
undoubtedly a blow to British hopes”.is
The striking fact about McDowall’s interpretation of the relation between British policy 
and Kurdistan’s future is its close resemblance to Colonel Arnold Wilson’s account of the 
events given in his own book Mesopotamia 1917-1920: A Clash of Loyalties. This book has 
been described by Peter Sluglett as giving “a vivid picture of the working of the imperial 
mind'. 19 McDowall stops short of explaining the effects that British actions had on the deve­
lopment of the Kurdish nationalist movement, especially in Southern Kurdistan. He also 
makes no distinction between those Kurdish areas which were of prime importance to Britain, 
notably Southern Kurdistan, and those which were not, such as Northern Kurdistan. This the­
sis will, therefore, identify the Kurdish areas where British strategic, political and economic 
interests were located, and then highlight their interactive relations with the political aspira­
tions of the Kurdish nationalist movement.
Generally, in spite of its evident importance, the international aspect of the Kurdish 
question has received very little scholarly attention. Writers on the history of the Middle East
16* McDowall, A Modem History of the Kurds, pp.119,121.
17* Ibid, p. 121.
18* Ibid, p. 134.
19* Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 1914-1932, (London: Ithaca Press, 1976) p.333.
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have briefly examined the Kurdish question as a pawn in the game of power-politics played 
among the Great Powers in the aftermath of the First World War. There is, however, no sys­
tematic and comprehensive study in the existing literature of the international dimension of 
the Kurdish question and its place within the context of the British endeavours to establish a 
new regional order in the post-war Middle East. By undertaking such a task, this thesis aims to 
fill this distinct and explicit gap in the existing literature. This thesis, while underlining the 
importance of this critical period in modern Kurdish history, intends to contribute to the cur­
rent understanding of the historical roots of the Kurdish question, which has, from the late 
1980's and early 1990’s, once again unequivocally imposed itself upon the stage of interna­
tional politics.
Kurdistan A nd  <T#te Kurds: P a s t A nd P resent
The origin of Kurds has been a source of controversy as Arabs, Turks and Persians continu­
ally seek to prove that they are of Arab, Turkish and Iranian origins respectively. The Kurds, 
however, trace their origin to the Medes, an Indo-European tribe descended from Central 
Asia into Kurdistan, where they established a pre-lslamic dynasty between 614 and 550 
B.C.20 Most Kurds converted to Islam In the Seventh Century. In the following four centuries 
the Kurds played a prominent political part in the history of the Middle East. Sultan Saladin was 
one of those Kurds who has been renowned for his outstanding rule during the Mediaeval 
Crusades, when he led the Muslims against Richard Lion-Heart’s Christian forces. From the 
early Sixteenth Century onwards, the importance of Kurdistan’s geopolitical position as a 
natural buffer zone came to the fore, following the establishment of the Safavid Empire in Per­
sia, which entered into a long and a bloody struggle with the Ottoman Empire for control of 
the Middle East. Kurdistan is situated at the crossroads between the routes linking Asia to 
Europe and the Caucasus to Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean Sea, which make it one of 
the world’s most strategically sensitive region. Kendal convincingly argues that these factors 
helped facilitate “a series of great invasions which, across the centuries, destroyed the inter­
nal social and political process which would have led to the emergence of a united Kurdish 
political entity.*21 Moreover, Kurdistan is a country of extremely rugged mountains and 
enclosing valleys, descending to foothills and plains. Its inaccessibility has always made it a
20* Nader Entessar, Kurdish Ethonationalism, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), p. 3.
21* Kendal, The Kurds: Current Position and Historical Background’, -in- Kurdish Culture and Identity, 
[ed.] Philip G. Kreyenbroek & Christine Allison (London: Zed Books, 1996), p. 12.
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natural strategic buffer for the states of the region able to protect their heartland from outside 
invasions.
The first major partition of Kurdistan took place in 1515 following the defeat of the 
Safavids at the hands of the Ottomans. The latter extended their control to two thirds of Kurdi­
stan. However, the mountainous nature of most Kurdish areas made it extremely difficult for 
the Ottomans and Persians to directly control them. This factor, and the need of the Ottomans 
and Persians to enlist Kurdish support for their war efforts against each other, enabled several 
autonomous Emirates to emerge. In Ottoman Kurdistan, sixteen sovereign Kurdish Emirates 
were established which were recognised by Constantinople. For more than four centuries 
these Emirates had made the most of the irreconcilable differences between the Turks and 
the Persians in order to maintain their autonomous status.2 2  Yet, the very geopolitical position 
of Kurdistan, notably its being squeezed between two powerful states, eventually prevented 
these Kurdish Emirates from being transformed into much larger political entities, and by the 
mid-Nineteenth Century they had disappeared altogether. Kurdish nationalism began to take 
shape in reaction to the destruction of these autonomous Emirates by the Ottoman and Per­
sian authorities, who both perceived them as a major threat to their territorial unity. It expres­
sed itself in several bloody revolts led by the ousted Kurdish princes and influential religious 
leaders. Thus, the Kurdish nationalist movement came into being long before the emergence 
of the so-called national states in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, and not after (contrary to the 
argument of a Persian scholar, Nader Entessar).23 At present, the Kurds are fully aware that 
they form the third most populous nationality in the Middle East behind the Arabs and the 
Turks, and that they are the largest nationality in the world without a national state. These facts 
have made them even more determined to establish an autonomous or independent Kurdi­
stan.
It is not only ancient and modern Kurdish history that is controversial, but also Kurdish 
society, land and culture. The term ‘Kurdistan’, which means the land of the Kurds, has been 
used since the Twelfth Century, when a large province of that name was established during 
the Seljuk period. 24 This was, in Kendal’s view, early evidence of "the distinctive personality”
22* Maria T. O'Shea, The Question of Kurdistan and Iran’s International Borders’, -in- The Boundaries 
of Modem Iraq, [ed.] Keith McLachlan, (London: UCL Press, 1994), p. 15.
23* Entessar, Kurdish Ethonationalism, p. 1.
24* See entry on Kurds’ in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol.V, [ed.] W.C. Brice (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981), 
pp.438-485.
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of the Kurds,25  which Sanjar, the Seljuk ruler of Persia, recognised. At that time, the province 
of Kurdistan comprised the present Iranian and Iraqi Kurdistan. Under Ottoman rule, the Diyar- 
bekir Wilayet was called Kurdistan, while in Persia, Kurdistan was (and still is) a province, com­
prising one quarter of Eastern Kurdistan. Prince Sharaf Khan Badlisi, the famous Kurdish his­
torian of the Sixteenth Century, was the first person to define the geographical limits of a 
greater Kurdistan in his book Sharafname.26 There are several maps of Kurdistan in the Public 
Record Office (Kew Gardens), the oldest one going back to 1854. The existence of such spe­
cific maps, which were sketched by western travellers and scholars in the Nineteenth Century, 
demonstrates that Kurdistan had been recognised as being a distinctive geographical, cul­
tural and social concept long before the Allies would officially use it as such at the Paris peace 
conference (1919-1920). At present, Kurdistan consists of east and south-east Turkey 
(Northern Kurdistan), northern Iraq (Southern Kurdistan), north and north-west Iran (Eastern 
Kurdistan) and northern Syria (Western Kurdistan). In other words, Kurdish areas are directly 
contiguous with each other and stretch from the Taurus mountains in the west to the Persian 
plateau in the east, from Armenia in the north to the Mesopotamian plain in the south. Having
25* Nezan Kendal, The Kurds: Current Position and Historical Background’, p. 10.
26* Amir Sharaf Khan Bedlisi, Sharafname, [ed ] M. Abbasi (Tehran).
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said that, there is no official or approved demarcation of Kurdistan. The Turks and the Syrians 
not only refuse to use Kurdistan as a term, but also deny the existence of the Kurdish people, 
whereas Iran and Iraq have considerably reduced the size of the Kurdish areas under their 
control.
As in the case of Kurdistan’s geographical extent, the exact number of Kurds is very 
difficult to specify since Turkey, Syria and Persia do not separate the Kurds from the rest of 
the population in their official censuses. In Iraq, where the Government has to indicate the 
size of its Kurdish population because of its recognition of nominal Kurdish autonomy, the 
number of Kurds is considerably under-counted. Such Kurds as the Yazidis have been regis­
tered as Arabs, and the same criterion has been applied to all Kurds who live outside the so- 
called autonomous region. Martin Van Bruinessen calculates the number of Kurds to have 
been between 13,500,000 to 15,000,000 in the m id-1970’s.27 Kendal, who estimates the 
number of Kurds at 31,000,000 in the mid-1990’s, states that Turkish sources admitted the 
existence of around 15,000,000 Kurds in Turkey in 1992. He estimates the numbers of 
Kurds in Iran, Iraq and Syria at 8,000,000, 5,200,000, and 1,500,000 respectively. 28 It must 
be remembered that large Kurdish communities live outside Kurdistan. The Kurdish popula­
tion in Istanbul is estimated at 2,500,000.29 The Iraqi Government acknowledged the exis­
tence of 800,000 Kurds in Baghdad during its 1991 negotiations with the Kurdish nationalist 
leaders. There are sizable Kurdish communities in Western Europe, in places such as Swe­
den, Denmark, Norway, Britain, France, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland. The German 
authorities recently estimated the number of Kurds resident there to be 500,000, mostly 
immigrants from Northern Kurdistan.
The vast majority of those Kurds who have left Kurdistan were forced to do so. The 
economic and social policies of the central Governments have kept all parts of Kurdistan 
grossly under-developed, with high-level of unemployment and poverty, despite it being 
exceptionally wealthy in minerals and agriculture. This factor, and the continuing anti-Kurdish 
oppression and ongoing armed conflicts between the Kurdish nationalist movement and the 
states of the region, has forced many Kurds to leave their towns and villages and seek jobs or 
a new life in non-Kurdish regions as well as in Western Europe. Through these calculated
27* Martin Van Bruinessen, Agha, Sheikh and State, the Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan, 
(London& New Jersey: Zed Books, 1992), p. 15.
28* Nezan Kendal, The Kurds: Current Position and Historical Background’, pp.7-9.
29* Kendal, The Kurds: Current Position and Historical Background’.
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economic social and political policies, the central Governments of the region have been seek-
dL
ing to de-populate Kurdistan and de-ethnicise the Kurds, so as to createliomogeneous state 
where the Kurds would lose their own cultural identity and thus be assimilated by the domi­
nant nationality, i.e. Arabs, Persian or Turks. Having said that, there are still about 25,000,000 
Kurds living in partitioned Kurdistan.30 (Map one illustrates the area where the Kurds form the 
large majority of the population and also the administrative division of Kurdistan before 1914).
In spite of the on-going assimilation and integration policies consistently adopted by 
the central Governments, the Kurds still enjoy a distinctive national identity and national con­
sciousness which make them a nationality per se. Furthermore, Kurdistan asserts itself as a 
distinct social, cultural and political concept against the wishes of the central Governments. 
The most crucial component of Kurdish identity is Kurdish culture, even though it has not 
undergone striking development, given the absence of a national Kurdish state and the exis­
tence of an anti-Kurdish environment in the Middle East. As Philip Kreyenbroek and Christine 
Allison point out, the Kurds have, in general, "a valid and mature identity of their own”,31 con­
trary to the claims of the states where they live. It is remarkable that Kurdish culture has been 
able to survive decades of fanatic nationalist policies adopted by the central Governments, 
successive civil wars, large-scale deportations of the Kurdish population, massacres of civil­
ians and the premeditated destruction of the Kurdish countryside, especially in Southern Kur­
distan, where more than 4,000 villages and small towns were destroyed and more than 
180,000 civilians lives lost. Kendal argues that the lack of freedom of expression and the per­
secution of Northern Kurds in the towns under Turkish rule have made Kurdish culture take 
refuge in the privacy of family life and in the countryside, where Kurdish music, language, 
habits and customs have continued.3 2 This partly explain why many aspects of Kurdish culture 
are not in written form. Kreyenbroek and Allison list material culture, such as costume and arte­
facts, as an “essential element" of Kurdish cultural identity.3 3
Kurdish language is a vital part of Kurdish identity, and has survived the relentless 
anti-Kurdish cultural policies of the ultra-nationalist Governments of the region. Like the Per­
sian and Urdu languages, the Kurdish language belongs to the Indo-European family of lan­
guages, but has a distinct grammar, syntax and vocabulary of its own. It consists of different 
30* Kendal, The Kurds: Current Position and Historical Background’, p.9.
31* Philip Kreyenbroek & Christine Allison, ‘Introduction’ -in- Kurdish Culture and Identity, op. cit., p.1. 
See also David McDowall, The Kurds, (London: Minority Rights Group, Report No.23,1982), p.7.
32* Kendal, The Kurds: Current Position and Historical Background’, p.17.
33* Kreyenbroek & Allison, ‘Introduction’, p.4.
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Kurdish dialects, a fact which applies to many other languages such as Arabic and Persian. 
Generally speaking, the Kurdish language has developed little, and never become standar­
dised because the Kurds have not been given the opportunity for this by the states in which 
they live. However, there are two main literary languages in Kurdistan which have developed 
out of the two main Kurdish dialects: Kurmanji and Sorani. The first dialect is spoken by the 
greater number of Kurds in Northern and Western Kurdistan, the former Soviet Union, Leba­
non and Israel as well as by a substantial number of Kurds in Southern and Eastern Kurdistan. 
The second dialect is spoken by the majority of Kurds in Southern and Eastern Kurdistan. 
There are other much smaller dialects such as Gurani and Zaza. At present, Kurdish scholars 
are seeking to create a united written language based on the rich profusion of Kurdish dia­
lects. This being said, the absence of a united written language has not been a major obstacle 
in the way of the development of Kurdish culture or the evolution of a Kurdish national con­
sciousness. The rigorousness of the anti-Kurdish policies at cultural, political and economic 
levels by the central Governments have helped strengthen Kurdish national consciousness, 
and have motivated the Kurds more than ever to assert their autonomous cultural identity.
In terms of religion, the overwhelming majority of the Kurds are Sunni Muslims, while 
the Shi’i Kurds form a minority. Apart from the non-Muslim Kurds, such as the Yazidis, 
Christians and Jews, there are smaller religious groupings, notably the Alevis, Ahl-e Haqqs 
and Kakais, that combine features of ancient non-lslamic beliefs with some Shi’i beliefs. 34 The 
existence of these pre-lslamic elements in Kurdish culture, and most importantly, the fact that 
the Sunni Kurds belong to the Shafi'i school of Law (madhab) -which clearly separates them 
from their Turkish and Arab counterparts who are mostly Hanafi- has caused religion, as 
Kreyenbroek illustrates, to contribute to “a sense of Kurdish culture”.35 In the last five 
decades, religious and sectarian beliefs have not hindered the development of either the 
Kurdish nationalist movement or the Kurdish nationalist consciousness. In Eastern Kurdistan, 
where the Kurds are subjected to Shi’i-Persian rule, Sunni and Shi’i Kurds have exhibited no 
religious hostility towards each other.36 in Southern Kurdistan, many Christians, Yazidis and 
Shi’is are members of several Kurdish nationalist parties at leadership and rank and file levels.
What all the Kurds have in common is the social, economic and political inequalities 
they have experienced throughout this century. Such inequalities have given rise to a condi-
34* Philip G. Kreyenbroek, ‘Religion in Kurdistan’ -in- Kurdish Culture and Identity, op. cit., p.95.
35* Ibid, p.93.
36* Entessar, Kurdish Ethonationalism, p. 5.
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tion akin to internal colonialism. The annual income of a Kurd has always been far less than 
that of his Arab, Persian and Turkish counterparts. Illiteracy, poverty and unemployment are 
very high in Kurdistan compared with non-Kurdish regions. The same inequality applies to 
many other public services such as health, drinking water and electricity. While Kurdistan has 
an abundance of natural resources, such as oil, iron ore and fertile land, all industries are situa­
ted outside it.The policies of the central Governments have been designed to keep parti­
tioned Kurdistan economically and socially backward and totally dependent on the centre, 
with a view to consolidating their control over the Kurds, and thus, incapacitating the Kurdish 
nationalist movement. The Government of President Saddam Hussein has gone so far as to 
destroy the entire Kurdish countryside, annihilating tens of thousands of civilian Kurds, so as 
to resolve Iraq’s Kurdish problem once and for all. From the mid-1980's, the Turkish authori­
ties have started a similar process in Northern Kurdistan, where more than 1200 villages have 
been destroyed and hundreds of thousands of people have been force to leave their lands.
The ceaseless endeavours of the Turkish, Iraqi, Syrian and Iranian states to demon­
strate the non-existence of a distinctive Kurdish culture, so as to deny the existence of the 
Kurdish question, explains why asserting Kurdish cultural identity and developing Kurdish 
culture both lie at the heart of the political programmes of the Kurdish nationalist movement in 
all parts of Kurdistan. In the liberated areas of Southern Kurdistan, where a Kurdish administra­
tion has been established since 1991, there is an unprecedented cultural revival led by Kurd­
ish intellectuals, including writers, poets, artists, musicians and journals, who have been 
engaged in studying all aspects of Kurdish society and history. The operating educational 
system is based on the Kurdish language, and has created a Kurdish cultural life not subjec­
ted to the censorship of the pan-Arab Government in Baghdad. This cultural revival has also 
taken the form of re-building the Kurdish countryside, which is the most important source of 
Kurdish culture. Special emphasis is placed on the pre-lslamic aspects of Kurdish cultural 
identity, such as by re-integrating the Yazidi Kurds into Kurdish society. In Europe, where sev­
eral Kurdish cultural centres have been established, Kurdish intellectuals have begun “a 
renaissance”of Kurmanji literature'^ (as well as Sorani literature) through the publication of 
journals, magazines, books, the holding of art exhibitions and the founding of Kurdish radio 
and television satellite stations.
37* Joyce Blue, ‘Kurdish Written Literature’, -in- Kurdish Culture and Identity, op. cit., p.25.
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The term ‘Eastern Question’ has often been used to describe the problem of filling up the 
political vacuum created by the gradual disappearance of the Ottoman Empire not only from 
Europe, but also from North Africa and the modern Middle East. 1 In the decades before 1914, 
apart from Lord Salisbury who contemplated a large-scale partition of the Ottoman Empire dur­
ing his Premiership (1886-1892 and 1895-1902) ,2  British statesmen were consistent in pur­
suing the same policy towards the Eastern Question. This consisted of preserving the territor­
ial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the Qajar Kingdom insofar as their heartland was con­
cerned, and using them as bulwarks against Russian, and later German, expansionism. Cen­
tral to the British approach to Middle Eastern affairs was the security of India. Lord Curzon 
described the Suez Canal, Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf as “part of the maritime frontier 
of India" .3  To consolidate its control over the strategic sea-route to India, Britain made the 
most of the power vacuum resulting from the steady decline in the power of both the Ottoman 
Empire and the Qajar Kingdom by creating, and then consolidating, its strategic position along 
their coasts, notably the Persian Gulf and Sinai Peninsula. The outbreak of the First World War 
in 1914 forced Britain to re-consider its Middle Eastern policy in response to Turkey’s entry 
into the war in support of the Central Powers, i.e. Germany and Austria-Hungary. Britain and its 
main Allies, France and Russia, concluded several agreements to partition the Ottoman terri­
tories according to their own interests. Kurdistan was at the heart of such territorial re­
arrangements of the Ottoman Empire.
This chapter explores the historical background of Britain’s interest in the affairs of 
Ottoman and Qajar Kurdistan in the context of its Middle Eastern policy. It focuses on the Brit­
ish reaction to early Kurdish nationalist revolts as well as the policies of other Powers in the 
region. This chapter then proceeds to examine the effects of the outbreak of the First World 
War on British attitudes towards Kurdistan by focusing on the recommendations of the 1915 
Bunsen Committee and, most importantly, on the 1916 Sykes-Picpt (Tripartite) agreement.
1* J.A.R. Marriott, The Eastern Question, an Historical Study in European Diplomacy, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1958), pp.1-3.
2* Keith M. Wilson, Empire and Continent: Studies in British Foreign Policy from the 1880’s to the First 
World War, (London & New York: Mansell Publishing, 1982), p.18.
3* Marian Kent, Moguls and Mandarins: Oil, Imperialism and the Middle East in British Foreign Policy, 
1900-1940, (London: Frank Cass, 1993) p.11.
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These two developments reflected Britain’s pressing need to re-define its post-war strategic, 
political and economic interests in Ottoman Asia. Finally, this chapter analyses the military and 
political circumstances surrounding the extension of British control to the southern parts of 
Ottoman Kurdistan and how this set the stage for subsequent political developments.
Historical Background: The Position Of Kurdistan In Britain’s Ottoman And 
Persian Policies Before The First World War
i- <Che Nineteenth Century: tfritain And *ihe Rise O f Kurdish Rationalism
Britain’s views and reaction to the affairs of Kurdistan between the 1830's and 1914 were pri­
marily conditioned by strategic considerations, namely the preservation of the territorial integr­
ity of Turkey and Persia insofar as their heartland was concerned. In other words, the British 
Government was always in favour of consolidating the authority of the central governments in 
Constantinople and Tehran over Kurdish regions in east and south-east Turkey and north­
west Persia. The prevalence of political stability in these regions, Britain hoped, would thwart 
Russia’s attempts to extend its influence southwards by interfering in the internal affairs of 
Turkey and Persia. Britain’s desire for the maintenance of the status quo in the heartland of 
Turkey and Persia manifested itself in its hostile reaction to several Kurdish revolts and the 
existing autonomous Kurdish Emirates, for posing a serious threat to Ottoman and Qajar terri­
torial unity.
In 1826, Muhammad Pasha of Rowanduz, a Kurdish notable, declared the Kurdish 
regions of Mosul, Mardin and Jezirah-ibn-Omar independent of Ottoman rule. During his 
revolt, which lasted until 1837, Muhammad Pasha established contacts with Ibrahim Pasha, 
the son of Muhammad Ali, the Viceroy of Egypt, who threatened the very existence of Otto­
man rule. At the time, Britain took the diplomatic initiative by forming a common European 
stance in favour of maintaining Ottoman rule and against any such threats from within. In 1842, 
Prince Bedirkhan established the autonomous Kurdish Emirate of Botan in Jezirah-ibn-Omar 
and then extended his control to large parts of Kurdistan. Fearing for the disintegration of the 
Ottoman Empire, Britain as well as France exerted direct pressure on Constantinople to 
destroy the Kurdish Emirate. They used the issue of the Christian communities’ interests as 
an excuse to interfere in internal Ottoman affairs. Local Christians’ opposition to the Kurdish 
Emirate was, in Kendal’s view, a result of the anti-Kurdish activities of American and English
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missionaries. 4 Eventually, the combination of both British and French pressure and growing 
Ottoman fears led to the destruction of the Kurdish Emirate in 1847 in the interest of maintain­
ing the authority of the central government. During the Ottoman-Russian War of 1853-1856, a 
great Kurdish revolt broke out against the Ottomans with the support of local Christian com­
munities. Yazdan Shir, the leader of this revolt, attempted to co-ordinate his military efforts 
with the Russian armies. But he failed to establish a direct communication line with Russian 
forces. According to Ahmad, the Ottoman forces succeeded, with direct British support, in 
suppressing this revolt.s
The importance of the international factor in Kurdish affairs was first felt by Sheikh 
Ubeidullah of Neri, who was the most prominent religious and nationalist leader of his gener­
ation. The political events of 1880-1881 in Kurdistan show that he was well aware of the Eur­
opean and British suspicion of Kurdish nationalism, and how this could jeopardise his efforts 
to establish an independent Kurdistan. As soon as Ubeidullah declared his revolt in Septem­
ber 1880, he attempted to establish direct contacts with the European Powers, especially Bri­
tain, hoping to avoid incurring their hostility towards his nationalist aims. In one of his letters to 
the British General-Consul at Tabriz, Ubeidullah stated that
the object of his son being sent to Persia was in order to obtain redress for Kurdish grie­
vances; the Kurds, having been subjected to ill-usage at the hand of both Turkey and Persia; 
he and the other Chiefs of Kurdish tribes are now desirous of establishing Kurdistan upon a 
united and [an] independent basisfi
Ubeidullah’s intention was first to defeat the weaker side, Persia, and then turn against the 
stronger side, Turkey. The execution of these objectives also entailed the achievement of an 
alliance with the Christian communities living on both sides of the Ottoman-Persian frontiers. 7 
Ubeidullah continually reassured the European Powers of his political and religious inclina­
tion, emphasising that he was not anti-Christian or anti-European and that in an independent 
Kurdish state, he would “place Christians and Muslims on a footing of equality".e His emissary 
explained to the British Consul-General, William G. Abbott, in October 1880 that all he asked 
for was
the moral support of the European Powers, especially of England, for whom he had the great­
est friendship and regard. The Sheikh asked to be put on trial. If he failed to organise [an inde­
pendent and stable] Kurdistan, he then was prepared to be judged by the Tribunal of Europe
4* Kendal, A People Without A Country, p.21.
5* Ahmad, Kurdistan During The First World War, p.70.
6* Thomson to Granville, 30 October 1880, Inclosure No.22, Correspondence Respecting the Kurdish 
Invasion of Persia, Parliamentary Papers, Vol. C, No.5 Year 1881, p. 16.
7* Maj. Trotter to Mr. Goscher, 20 October 1880, ibid, p. 16.
8*lbid.
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and to abide by the consequences .9 
Influenced by the success of the Armenian nationalists in obtaining the sympathy of the Eur­
opean governments, Ubeidullah sought to internationalise the Kurdish question by putting it 
on the agenda of international conferences. He particularly appealed to Britain to look into the 
reasons for the Kurdish revolt in order to find a solutiomo. At the same time, he attempted to 
involve British officials on the ground in his contacts with the Persian governors in Eastern 
Kurdistan. 11
Despite all his efforts, Ubeidullah failed to get anything out of his contacts with, and 
appeals, to Britain. In his replay to Ubeidullah, Abbott stated that the British Government was 
in no way concerned in his dispute with Persia. He therefore declined to discuss the dispute 
with Ubeidullah, but stated that Britain was “ most anxious that peace and security should be 
maintained" within the Ottoman-Qajar borders. 12 The significance of Britain’s attitude towards 
the Kurdish revolt lay not so much in its unwillingness to study the Kurdish grievances as in its 
relentless efforts to bring the Ottoman and the Qajar governments together against the Kurd­
ish insurgency. British diplomacy focused on urging -and even pressurising- the Turks, via the 
British Ambassador at Constantinople, to reach an urgent understanding with the Shah(K\r\g) 
of Persia to suppress the Kurds by co-ordinating military campaigns on both sides of the Otto- 
man-Persian frontier. 13 in one of his telegrams, following the early manifestions of the British 
failure to bring the Turkish and Persian governments together, Ronald F. Thomson, the Brit­
ish Minister in Tehran, informed Earl Granville, the British Foreign Secretary, that he 
“continued to urge the Persian Government to co-operate with the Turkish authorities in main­
taining order amongst the Kurdish tribes residing in proximity to the Persian border”.14
Although there was no Russian complicity in the Kurdish revolt, Britain seemed to 
believe that any internal disturbance in the Kurdish areas in Turkey or Persia would give Rus­
sia a golden opportunity to weaken the two states. Such a prospect would enable Russia to 
expand its influence southwards and thus form a serious blow against British strategic inter­
ests. Ironically, the Kurdish revolt alarmed Russia even more than Britain. The former went so 
far as to accept the Shah's appeal for military assistance and to intervene directly against the 
revolt. Russia informed Britain that the Kurdish revolt also posed a direct threat to its own terri-
9* Extracts from Consul-General Abbott’s Diary, Enclosure 1, ibid, p.39.
10* Sheikh Ubeidullah to Dr. Cohran, Inclosure 2, ibid, p.47.
11* Ibid, p.38.
12* Ibid, p39.
13* Mr. Thomson to Earl Granville, 14 May 1880 & Earl Granville to Mr. Goschen, 1 July 1880, ibid, p.1. 
14* Mr. Thomson to Earl Granville, Tehran, 24 August 1880, ibid, p. 10.
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tory, where more than 44,000 Russian Kurds lived close to the Russian-Ottoman and Rus- 
sian-Persian frontiers, and to the Armenians, its local a ll ie s .1 5  Russian military preparations to 
intervene in support of the Persian Government against the Kurdish revolt, in turn, increased 
the anxiety of the British, who failed to persuade the Turkish and Persian governments to nor­
malise their bilateral relations or to co-ordinate temporarily their military efforts against the 
Kurds. Eventually, as soon as it became clear that the Persian forces were gaining the upper 
hand in the war with the Kurdish insurgents, Russia reassured Britain that it would not inter­
vene.^ However, to forestall “the recurrence of these disorders” in Kurdistan, Russia pro­
posed co-ordinated British-Russian efforts in the future, 17 but, Britain was not interested in 
any proposal that gave Russia the right to intervene in the internal affairs of Turkey and Persia.
The Ubeidullah revolt underlines the point that Britain adopted a less favourable 
approach to Kurdish aspirations than to those of the Armenians. Britain encouraged the Otto­
man and Qajar governments to deal with the Kurdish grievances by force, rather than by 
adopting political and administrative changes to alleviate Kurdish suffering. The British posi­
tion on the issue of reforms in Kurdistan was clearly expressed by the British Vice-Consul at 
Van, Emilius Clayton:
It seems unquestionable that autonomy or representative government would be at present tot­
ally out of place in these parts [i.e.Kurdish areas] and what is required is a strong executive in 
the hands of a capable man [i.e. Turkish governor] possessing the confidence of Europe. But,
I feel sure also that he will require to be assisted by European subordinates to some extent. 18
However, the outbreak of the Kurdish revolt in September 1880 brought to the attention of
some British officials on the ground, such as Maj. H. Trotter, the British Consul at Erzeraum,
the need to understand Kurdish suffering under Ottoman rule:
There is no doubt that in very many places the Kurds suffer more from misgovernment than the 
Christians do. They have no Consuls to look up to as their special protectors, no Bishops to 
telegraph sensational and often exaggerated accounts of their woes; in fact no one to look for 
[sic] for redress or protection... I can see no reason whatsoever why the sedentary Kurds 
should not be subjected to the same laws and institutions as the Christians. 19
This call for some modification of the British position on Kurdish affairs, through extending 
British and European protection of the Kurds under Ottoman rule, passed unheeded by the 
British Government. The latter still seemed to believe that any move in the direction of devolu­
tion was a step towards dismembering the Ottoman Empire and the Qajar Kingdom, thus giv-
15* Mr. Plunkett to Earl Granville, 8 November 1880 & I 7 November 1880, ibid, pp.18-19.
16* Earl Granville to Mr. Plunkett. 16 November 1880, ibid, p.24.
17* Earl Granville to the Earl of Dufferin, Foreign Office, 28 January 1881, ibid, p.75.
18* Vice-Consul at Van, Clayton to Maj. Troter, 11 July 1880, ibid, p.7.
19* Maj. Trotter to Mr. Goschen, 14 September 1880, ibid, p. 162.
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ing the Russians the sought-for opportunity to expand their strategic, political and economic 
influence southwards. The British encouraged those political and administrative reforms that 
principally strengthened the authority of central rule, while offering some improvements as far 
as the Christian subjects were concerned. The latter measures were designed to deprive 
Russia the opportunity of using Christians as an instrument of its expansionist foreign policy.
ii- T/te Early ^Twentieth Century: *£he intensification O f European Powers' 
Rivalry j for Political And Economic Spheres O f influence
In the early Twentieth Century, the Kurdish nationalist movement in Qajar Kurdistan, like that 
of Ottoman Kurdistan, confronted unfriendly British attitudes. During the Constitutional Revo­
lution of 1906, the Eastern Kurds played a notable part in supporting the Persian democratic 
movement. Like the remainder of the country, Kurdish cities and towns, such as Kermanshah, 
Saujbulaq, Senna and Saqiz, established their own Popular Councils (Anjumans) to take over 
the running of their own affairs from the representatives of the central government. 2 0  Many 
armed Kurds defended the Constitutional movement both against Russian and Turkish inter­
ventions. The disregard of Kurdish political aspirations by the leaders of the Constitutional 
movement disappointed the Kurds, who intensified their agitation for self-rule. The growing 
strength of the Kurdish nationalist movement that turned East Kurdistan into a state of con­
stant disorder and rebellion, and the explicit threat to foreign control over Persia by the Con­
stitutional movement, were the background against which Britain and Russia decided to trans­
form their relations from rivalry to rapprochement over Persian affairs. As a result, Britain and 
Russia concluded the agreement of 1907 to reconcile their respective interests in various 
parts of Persia. It was important, as Keith Robbins points out, that the India Office and the Gov­
ernment of India approved of the agreement since it directly affected India’s security.21 
The agreement stated that both countries had
for geographical and economic reason, a special interest in the maintenance of peace and 
order in certain provinces adjoining or in the neighbourhood of the Russian frontier... and the 
frontiers of Afghanistan and Baluchistan. [Both sides seek to avoid] all causes of conflict 
between their respective interests in the above-mentioned provinces of Persia.22
Britain and Russia divided Persia into three spheres of influence. Northern Persia, including
20* Ghassemlou, Kurdistan And The Kurds, p.43.
21* Keith Robbins, Politicians, Diplomacy and War in Modern British History, (London: the Hambledon 
Press, 1994), p.106
22* Convection between the UK and Russia, Relating to Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet, Signed at St. 
Petersburg, 31 August 1907, Treaty Series, No.34,1907, His Majesty’s Stationary Office (HMSO).
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most of Eastern Kurdistan, formed the Russian zone. Central Persia became a neutral zone, 
while southern Persia, which overlooked the Persian Gulf and adjoined the Indian frontier, 
was the British zone. Both sides undertook to respect each others strategic, political and eco­
nomic interests in their own respective spheres of influence. Four years later, in the face of 
the continuing political instability in Eastern Kurdistan and Persian Azerbaijan, coupled with 
frequent Turkish military incursions across the frontiers, Britain and Russia signed a new pro­
tocol on the Ottoman-Persian frontiers in 1911. Consequently, the Russians superseded the 
Turks as the occupying force in some unstable Kurdish and Azari areas. Noel Buxton, a British 
scholar and a liberal politician who closely observed the policies of the Great Powers towards 
the Kurdish and Armenian situation, wrote in 1913 that the 1907 agreement between Britain 
and Russia helped restore“public order” to North-West Persia, an aim which they shared with 
the Persian Government. He hoped that the Powers would take a similar step towards Otto­
man Kurdistan and Ottoman Armenia to restore political stability.23
The British-Russian agreement of 1907 was also aimed against Germany, the new 
powerful rival on the political stage of the Middle East. The growing German political and eco­
nomic influence in Ottoman Asia, especially after the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, caused 
the British to relegate to the background their rivalry with the Russians and to pay special 
attention to certain areas that linked with, or were close to, their strategic areas in the Middle 
East, such as the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. Ottoman Kurdistan and Mesopotamia were 
among the areas that took on new strategic, political and economic stature. Strategically, 
Southern Kurdistan became increasingly valuable to Britain because of it being both part of 
the land-route to India and overlooking Mesopotamia. This was clearly manifest in British reac­
tion to the construction of the Baghdad Railway, which was to cross Kurdistan. Britain was also 
alarmed by Russia’s agreement with Germany at Potsdam in 1910, whereby Russia was to 
build a railway line from Tehran to Khanaqin across Eastern Kurdistan, while Germany under­
took to link this line with the main Baghdad Railway Line. In response to these unwelcome 
developments for the British, calls were made for establishing British control over part of the 
Baghdad Railway Line, which linked Kirkuk to Kifri in Southern Kurdistan (see maptwo).24
There was also growing concern in official British circles, especially the Admiralty and
23* Noel Buxton, The Russians in Armenia’ The Nineteenth Century And After, Vol.IXXIV, July- 
December 1913, p. 1362. Noel was particularly interested in the affairs of the non-Turkish ethnic and 
religious minorities.
24* The 1907 Baghdad Railway Committee, 20 March 1907, F0371/12, PRO, p.10.
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the Foreign Office, about the future destination of the oil concessions in Southern Kurdistan 
and Mesopotamia, stemming from the construction of the Baghdad Railway Line. British inter­
est in oil was principally motivated by strategic rather than commercial considerations, even 
though private British companies pressed London for official support for their efforts to 
acquire oil concessions in the Middle East. In the early years of the Twentieth Century, most 
of the world’s oil supplies came from the United States and Mexico, the latter being under 
American domination. With the increasing use of oil by the British navy, the Admiralty per­
ceived as essential to Britain the need to secure its own access to oil sources away from for­
eign domination. Oil was becoming central to the Admiralty’s efforts to modernise the navy 
simply because it was far more economical and efficient than coal.25 Moreover, the German 
navy emerged as a major rival to the British navy and therefore it was vital for Britain to prevent 
Germany from monopolising all oil-related concessions in the Ottoman territories. Indeed, the 
German Baghdad Railway concession contained a close link between the construction of that 
railway and the right to carry out oil inspection in the surrounding areas. Against this back­
ground, and as the British were alive to the geological similarity between Southern Kurdistan
25* Kent, Moguls and Mandarins, pp.35-36.
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and the oil-bearing zone in neighbouring Persia, which was strong evidence of the existence 
of oil fields in the former, they began to exert pressure on Constantinople to grant British com­
panies oil concessions in the Mosul and Baghdad Wilayets. However, the only important Brit­
ish achievement in the oil sphere by 1914 was to secure 75% of the Turkish Petroleum Com­
pany, which searched for oil in Southern Kurdistan and the Baghdad Wilayet, leaving a mere 
25% of the shares to the Germans, who had obtained the original oil concession from the 
Ottoman authorities in 1903. By 1914, as a result of economic imperialism and the imposition 
of indirect political control by the European Powers, the Asiatic parts of the Ottoman Empire 
were practically turned into various economic and (implicitly) strategic-political zones of inter­
ests. In June, Britain and Germany temporarily reconciled their conflicting interests by signing 
an agreement to draw the boundaries of their commercial zones. Under this agreement, the 
southern part of Kurdistan fell into the German zone, whereas most of Mesopotamia came 
within the British zone. The agreement was short-lived as the First World War broke out two 
months later.
One of the important consequences of the construction of the Baghdad Railway 
Line, and the intense rivalry it created among the Powers, was to lend to Southern Kurdistan a 
new strategic and economic importance. The British policy of acquiring economic and political 
influence was in response to the policies of other Powers, and was still based on the idea of 
maintaining the territorial unity of Ottoman Turkey insofar as its heartland was concerned. Dur­
ing this period of European rivalry, the British had been engaged both secretly and publicly in 
gathering information, through missionaries, agents, travellers, scholars and diplomats, about 
Kurdistan’s social, economic and political conditions. This is not, however, to suggest that Bri­
tain was planning for -or thinking of- directly controlling the most important part of Kurdistan, 
but to emphasise the point that by the time the First World War broke out, Britain could not 
afford to adopt an indifferent position on Kurdish affairs, and that the direction of its imperial 
policy was bound to affect Kurdistan’s future.
The Position Of Kurdistan In Britain’s Imperial Schemes: From The Bunsen 
Committee To The Sykes-Picot (Tripartite) Agreement
i- <1he Recommendations Of<£he 1915 tfunsen Committee
The outbreak of the First World War and Turkey’s subsequent decision to enter the war 
against the Allies did not immediately alter the British stance on the issue of preserving Otto­
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man territorial integrity. J.C. Hurewitz points out how Britain did not yet consider the prospect 
of partitioning the Ottoman Empire, even though the war entered its tenth month.26 The 
reversal in British policy towards the Ottoman Empire took place a few months later, when Bri­
tain realised that its imperial strategy no longer depended on the territorial unity of the Otto­
man Empire or even Qajar Persia. This reversal manifested itself in the Constantinople agree­
ment (4 March-10 April 1915), the Hussein-McMahon understanding (July 1915- March 1916) 
and, most importantly, the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement. It became clear beyond doubt that 
the aim of Britain and its main Allies, France and Russia, was to dismember the Ottoman 
enemy, especially its non-Turkish Wilayets'm Mesopotamia, Greater Syria, Kurdistan and Arm­
enia. These striking developments stemmed from the war, and had direct and long term impli­
cations for Kurdistan’s future, as will be explored later.
The Constantinople agreement was initiated by Sergey Sazonov, the RussianForeign 
Minister.27 and contained diplomatic exchanges among Russia, Britain and France. Under the 
agreement, Britain recognised Russian claims to Constantinople and the Straits in exchange 
for extending its influence to the neutral zone in Persia and keeping the Muslim Holy Places 
and Arabia “independent Mussulman dominion” 28 France was to be compensated in Greater 
Syria, the Gulf of Alexandretta and Cilicia up to the Taurus mountain range. The Constantino­
ple agreement was an incomplete partition scheme for the Ottoman Empire and made no 
reference to the future of Anatolia, Kurdistan, Armenia ? and Mesopotamia. Moreover, Britain 
was under pressure from its Allies to formulate quickly its war aims and territorial ambitions in 
the Middle East.29 Against this background, Herbert Henry Asquith, the British Prime Mini­
ster, appointed an interdepartmental Committee in April 1915, so as to define post-war British 
interests in the Ottoman Empire, and to identify necessary measures to consolidate them by 
political means. Maurice de Bunsen, the Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign 
Office, chaired the Committee which included representatives from the Foreign, War and India 
Offices, the Board of Trade and the Admiralty. Lieutenant-Colonel Mark Sykes was the perso­
nal representative of Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, at the Committee. The
26* J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Vol. I, (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., 
1965), p.26.
27* Howard M. Sachar, The Emergence of the Middle East, 1914-1924, (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 
1969), p. 153.
28* Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, pp. 18-19.
29* Aaron S. Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World: the Cairo Conference of 1921, 
(London: the Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p.4.
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outbreak of war in the Middle East drew the India and War Offices into the policy-making pro­
cess insofar as it affected the future of the Ottoman territories. The main reason for this deve­
lopment was that the India Government provided and controlled the expeditionary force that 
invaded southern Mesopotamia in November 1914,30 with a view to consolidating British con­
trol over the Gulf region. By contrast, the War Office under Lord Kitchener was anxious over 
creating political conditions in the Middle East that would prevent a Turkish-Arab Coalition, 
and thus, help the Egyptian expeditionary force to defeat the Turks in Arabia and Greater 
Syria.
Having held thirteen meetings in the period between 12 April and 28 May 1915, the 
Bunsen Committee submitted its final report on 30 June. Its recommendations were never 
officially approved pr fully applied by the British Government. Nevertheless, apart from provi­
ding useful insights into British foreign policy thinking, the recommendations influenced, in 
one way or another, British post-war policy towards the Middle East and Kurdistan in particular. 
Therefore, it is necessary to examine its four proposed alternatives for the political and admin­
istrative future of Ottoman Wifayets and its implications for Ottoman Kurdistan. The report 
identified two main factors that imposed limitations on any future British policy towards Otto­
man Asia. Firstly, Britain had to take into consideration the aims and interests of its Allies, 
especially France and Russia, in post-war Ottoman territories. 31 Secondly, the British Govern­
ment had to strike a balance between imperial advantages, resulting from any re-drawing or 
modification of the political and economic conditions in Ottoman Asia, and imperial responsibi­
lities^  The latter factor was too great to ignore due to the huge size of the British Empire.
Based on Alternative A, which entailed the partition of the Ottoman Empire among 
Britain, France and Russia, the first scheme of the Bunsen Committee included British 
annexation of the largest part of Ottoman Kurdistan (see map three). The second largest part 
would be under “Special Administration”, i.e. not under the control of a single Power. The 
Baghdad Railway Line passed through these would-be British controlled areas of Kurdistan. 
Strategically, the British motive was to secure firm control over the Basra Wilayet, vital to the 
security of the Persian Gulf. In other words, to prevent other Powers from threatening its inter­
ests in the Basra Wilayet, Britain had to control the Baghdad Wilayet. Similarly, to establish firm 
control over the Baghdad Wilayet, Britain had to extend its direct control northwards where
30* Sachar, The Emergence of the Middle East, p.54.
31* Cabinet, Ad Hoc Committee (Secret) Report, Proceedings and Appendices of a Committee Appoin­
ted by the Prime Minister, 1915, British Desiderata in Turkey and in Asia’, CAB 27/1, PRO, Paragraph 7. 
32* Ibid, Paragraph 10.
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the rough mountains of Kurdistan could serve as natural strategic barriers against southwards 
expansionism by rival powers.33 Kurdistan, the report explained, offered both favourable 
weather conditions for “white British troops", and an “excellent source for recruits" from the 
native K u r d s .3 4  it is worth noting that the argument concerning the strategic value of Kurdistan 
reemerged following the war, when Col. Arnold Wilson, the future Acting Civil Commissioner, 
presented it as his rationale for replacing indirect British control with direct British administra­
tion in Southern Kurdistan. Between 1921 and 1923, the strategic argument was once more 
used to justify the incorporation of Southern Kurdistan into the newly-established Iraqi state.
Although the above mentioned Kurdish areas had less economic value
in comparison with its strategic importance, the report pointed out that:
oil again makes it desirable for us to carry our control on to Mosul, in the vicinity of which 
place, there are valuable wells, possession of which by another Power would be prejudicial to 
our interests.3 5
British control of the Kurdish areas was also necessary for the irrigation of Arab Mesopotamia 
and the existing river navigation system. Moreover, Kurdistan was considered by the India
33* Ibid, Paragraphs 21-22. 
34* Ibid, Paragraph 22.
35* Ibid, Paragraph 26.
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Map Four: The Bunsen Com­
mittee’s Second Scheme Of
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Government as being an essential part of any British scheme to revive the agriculture of Meso­
potamia and make it the granary of the Empire. In irrigation and river navigation, the British not 
only had pre-war concessionaires, but also inaugurated some schemes which made them 
even more concerned about consolidating their position in the country. 36 Following the war, 
the potential oil wealth of Southern Kurdistan and its economic value for British interests in 
Mesopotamia become one of the reasons for its inclusion in the British mandate over Meso­
potamia and its later incorporation into the Iraqi state. According to these strategic and econo­
mic considerations, Ottoman Kurdistan had to be partitioned. To achieve its strategic and eco­
nomic aims, Britain, the report remarked, should be prepared to adopt a second partition 
scheme (see map four). This would enable France to extend its territories from the Mediterra­
nean coast in the west to Urmia (East Kurdistan), with Britain giving up part of its share in Kurdi­
stan.37 Russia also had to be compensated by incorporating northern Persia and East Kurdi­
stan, which were already within its sphere of influence before the war.38 The latter conces­
sion, the report underlined, would make it more significant to Britain to establish firm control
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36* Ibid, Paragraphs 24, 27-29. 
37* Ibid, Paragraph 34.
38* Ibid, Paragraph 41.
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over Southern Kurdistan, with a view to preventing future Russian expansion southwards to 
Baghdad and B asra.39
Alternative B consisted of dividing Ottoman Asian territories into zones of interests 
under the domination of the European Powers (see map five) .40 Apart from giving Constanti­
nople to Russia, the Basra Wilayet to Britain and, perhaps, Smyrna to Greece, the rest of the 
Ottoman Empire was not to be dismembered. The British zone would include, as in the sec­
ond scheme of Alternative A, Southern Kurdistan and Mesopotamia. 41 British motives were 
the same as those in Alternative A. The French zone would include a sizable part of Northern 
Kurdistan. Britain and other European Powers might contemplate the idea of implementing 
certain social and administrative reforms within their respective zones in order to put an end to 
Ottoman maladministration. Such reforms might require the establishment of a “permanent 
international board’1.42 However, applying Alternative B, the report warned, might “easily lead 
to a condition o f anarchy1' in Kurdistan and Asia Minor, as a direct consequence of undermin-
39* Ibid, Paragraph 43.
40* Ibid, Paragraph 48.
41* Ibid, Paragraph 52.
42* Ibid, Paragraphs 62-64.
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ing the authority of the Ottoman Sultan.43
Alternative C was based on *the maintenance of an independent Ottoman Empire" as 
it existed. Under this scheme, Turkey would only cede the same above mentioned territories 
to Britain, Russia and Greece. It would have to apply an Armenian reform scheme on the lines 
adopted in 1914. The report did not recommend this alternative, fearing certain conse­
quences, such as consolidating the political and economic influences of Russia and France 
respectively, as well as the outbreak of rebellions within the unreformed Turkey. The latter 
development would practically result in unplanned partitions of the Ottoman Empire, which 
Britain had to avoid. 44 in other words, Britain opposed any spontaneous partition of Ottoman 
Asia and the emergence of new political and administrative entities, without giving prior con­
siderations to its implications for British strategic, political and economic interests.
Alternative D was based on the maintenance of an independent Ottoman Empire with 
a de-centralised system of administration. As “Turkey in Asia falls ethnically and historically into 
five great provinces- Anatolia, Armenia, Syria, Palestine and Iraq -Jez irah ",^  the report conclu­
ded, the Ottoman Government should adopt “a measure of devolution, which would satisfy 
the aspirations of the Arabs and Armenians to have a voice in the administration of their 
immediateaffaird .46 In case it failed, this scheme left the way open for the creation of “ several 
autonomous states": Turkey proper in Anatolia, an Armenian and an Arab federation under a 
nominal suzerainty of the Sultan (see map six) . 47 Furthermore, if the Ottoman Empire disinte­
grated, Britain would still be able to pursue its policy with regard to the Syria and Iraq-Jezirah 
Wilayets. Britain could declare them “independent states" under its protection, “annex" them, 
or declare them to be part of its “sphere of influence" according to the circumstances.48
While dismissing the first three alternatives, the report eventually recommended the 
last one because it would not compel Britain to assume any immediate or direct military 
responsibilities in the region. It also offered the ideal way to control the prospective disintegra­
tion of the Ottoman Empire in a manner that served to consolidated British strategic, political 
and economic interests. This alternative was seemingly based on the idea of self-rule for non- 
Turkish nationalities. Yet, it overlooked political aspirations of the Kurds, who, in Mark Sykes’
43* Ibid, Paragraph 67.
44* Ibid, Paragraphs 73-73.
45* Ibid, Paragraph 81.
46* Ibid, Paragraph 85.
47* Ibid, Paragraph 87.
48* Ibid, Paragraph 88.
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view, had no “sense of nationality" of any kind whatsoever:
A consolidated Kurdistan is an impossibility. There is no reason why the distribution of 
the Kurds should dictate frontiers or why [the] Kurds should be regarded as a people 
who required consolidation. 49
Thus, Alternative D meant a partition of Ottoman Kurdistan among new ethnic entities. North­
ern Kurdistan would be part of Armenia, while Southern Kurdistan would be within Iraq- 
Jezirah. Following the war, British officials in Mesopotamia advocated similar schemes by 
reiterating Mark Sykes’ argument.
ii- Tfie  Hussein-JVlcJVlahon Correspondence A nd  The  Sykes-P icot A g reem en t
Official contacts with Hussein, the Sharif of Mecca, were jointly initiated by the Foreign Office 
and the War Office in July 1915.50 Their immediate objective was to detach the Asian Arabs 
from their allegiance to the Sublime Porte, and enlist their support for British war efforts 
against Ottoman forces, whereas Hussein’s principal objective was to establish a great Arab 
state with Britain’s assistance. The India Office opposed the idea of enlisting Arab support 
49* Ibid, Appendix IX, Remarks on Sir A. Hirtzel’s Note by Lieut.-Col. Sir M. Sykes, 15 March 1915,
pp.100-101
50* Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Vol. I, p.47.
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because it feared that the ensuing political commitments might diametrically contradict post­
war British imperial interests, 51 notably the colonisation of Mesopotamia for the benefit of the 
Government of India. The formal correspondence between Henry McMahon, the British High 
Commissioner for Egypt, and Hussein, stretched out over an eight months period (14 July 
1915-10 March 1916) and consisted of ten letters. The first striking point in these letters is Bri­
tain’s abandonment of the principle of preserving Ottoman territorial integrity. At another level, 
it formed the beginning of Arab claims to a large segment of Ottoman Kurdistan. In this corre­
spondence, Sharif Hussein demanded the inclusion of a large portion of Ottoman Kurdistan 
into his future Arab state after the war (see map seven). The opening letter of the formal corre­
spondence contains Hussein’s proposal:
England [is] to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries, bounded on the north by 
Mersina and Adana up to the 37 latitude, on which degree fall Birijik, Mardin, Jezirah [ibn- 
Omar], Amadia up to the border of Persian
Initially, Britain viewed the question of the limits and boundaries of the would-be Arab state as
51* Ibid.
52* Letter No.1, From Amir Abdullah to Ronald Storrs, The Correspondence between Sir Henry 
McMahon, His Majesty’s High Commissioner at Cairo, and the Sharif Hussein of Mecca, July 1915- 
March 1916, Cmd 5957.
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“p re m a tu re ”,53 whereas Hussein insisted on discussing it first, arguing that “within these 
limits” he had not included places inhabited by "a foreign race”. 54  After accepting Hussein’s 
demands in principle, McMahon excluded such Arab areas as Alexandretta from the future 
Arab state, while not objecting to the inclusion of a large portion of Kurdistan into that state .55 
Hussein based his demands for the inclusion of the Mosul Wilayet within his future state on 
the historical and sentimental grounds that in the middle ages it had been part of the Arab- 
Islamic Empire and therefore had a special value for the Arabs. 56 The issue of the boundaries 
of the Arab state was significant because it was used later by Sharif Feisal (as King of Syria in 
1919 and as King of Iraq in 1921) as British acknowledgement of his legitimate demands for 
including Western Kurdistan in Syria and then Southern Kurdistan into Iraq.
Just one month before Hussein declared his revolt against Turkey, the Foreign Mini­
sters of Britain, France and Russia entered into a secret agreement, governing their own parti­
tion of the Ottoman Empire. Unlike the Constantinople agreement, the Sykes-Picot agree­
ment (26 April-23 October 1916), which is also known as the Tripartite agreement (following 
Russia’s entry into the negotiations between France and Britain), formed the most compre­
hensive scheme for the partition of the Ottoman Empire and represented a radical change in 
Britain’s interest in Kurdistan. It not only aimed to bring under British influence part of Kurdi­
stan but also to directly determine the future of the remainder of the region. These agree­
ments were the outcome of the exchange of eleven letters among the principal Allies: Britain, 
France and Russia. It constituted an urgent plan for the post-war political and territorial future 
of the Ottoman Empire. It was Britain that took the initiative, after the war lingered on in spite of 
Allied initial optimism about its early conclusion. In contrast to the Bunsen Committee’s recom­
mendations in favour of adopting the decentralisation option, the Sykes-Picot agreement was 
based on the partition of the Ottoman Empire. The territorial unity of the latter was no longer 
the cornerstone of British imperial strategy, which now focused on establishing direct and 
indirect British control in Mesopotamia and Southern Kurdistan with the aim of consolidating 
British authority over the important sea and land routes to India.
Points One, Two, Four and Nine in the French-British agreement particularly affected 
Kurdistan’s future. Point One consisted of a British-French undertaking to recognise and pro­
tect an independent Arab state or a confederation of Arab states under an Arab Chief in the
53* Letter No.2, From Sir Henry McMahon to Sharif Hussein, 30 August 1915, ibid.
54* Letter No.3, From Sharif Hussein, 9 September 1915, ibid.
55* Letter No.4, From Sir Henry McMahon, 24 October 1915, ibid.
56* Letter No.5, From Sharif Hussein, 5 November 1915, ibid.
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areas A and B. Point Two allowed France and Britain to create a "direct or indirect administra­
tion or control” . Point Four granted Britain, apart from the port of Haifa and Acre, "a given sup­
ply of water from the Tigris and Euphrates in the area A for area B”. In Point Nine France 
agreed not to enter any negotiation or cede its rights in the blue area to any third party, apart 
from the Arab state or confederation of Arab states. 57 Under the Tripartite agreement Russia 
was to "annex“the regions of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis up to a point subsequently 
to be determined on the littoral of the Black Sea to the west of Trebizond. Russia would also 
bring under its control "the region of Kurdistan to the south o f Van and Bitlis between Mush, 
Sert, the course of the Tigris, Jezirah-ibn-Omar, the crest-line of the mountains which domina­
ted Amadia and the region of Merga Van” (see map eight). Britain and Russia also agreed that 
“the frontier of the Arab state” would start from the region of Merga Van and follow the crest- 
line of the mountains, which divided the Ottoman and Persian Dominions.58 Britain and 
France in particular hoped that the spirit of their co-operation and consultation, which charac-
57* Grey to Cambon, 16 May 1916, Tripartite (Sykes-Picot) Agreement on the Partition of the Ottoman 
Empire: Britain, France and Russia, 26 April-23 October 1916, Documents on British Foreign Policy 
(DBFP), 1st series, Vol. IV, (ed) Woodward & Butler, p.24151.
58* Edward Grey to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London, 23 October 1916, ibid.
41
terised their agreement, would continue to govern their post-war bilateral relations.59
The main feature of these secret agreements was not only its disregard of the Kurdish 
question, but also its aim of further partitioning Kurdistan. Moreover, through turning South­
ern Kurdistan into French and British spheres of influence under nominal Arab rule, Mark 
Sykes sought to reconcile the claims of the French, the British and the Sharifians to the 
area60 in light of this, it can be said that Sykes-Picot underlined direct British interest in south­
ern parts of Kurdistan, contrary to what McDowall assumes. 61 In Point One of the French- 
British understanding, Area A, which belonged to the French sphere of influence, included 
the area west of the Lesser Zab River in Southern Kurdistan, whereas Area B, which 
belonged to the British sphere of influence, extended from the area east of the Lesser Zab 
River to the old Ottoman-Persian frontier. In Point Two, the French blue area of direct control 
included the western part of Northern Kurdistan. In Points One and Two of the British-Russian 
understanding, Russia was to annex the eastern part of Northern Kurdistan and a small strip of 
land in Southern Kurdistan. This and Point Nine of the French-British understanding revealed 
how the War Office was anxious, on military grounds, to avoid any direct contact with Russian 
territories. In this respect, the Bunsen Committee’s final report pointed out earlier that, if Rus­
sia became Britain’s neighbour in Mesopotamia, Britain should take into consideration, when 
making defensive arrangements for the new annexed territory, that Russia put“in the field in 
Manchuria an army exceeding three quarters of a million men”. 62 it clearly implied that Britain 
should avoid the prospect of creating a common British-Russian boundary when making new 
territorial arrangements in the Ottoman Empire. It was hoped, from the British viewpoint, that 
by turning Area A into a French sphere of influence and the blue area into French direct con­
trol, a barrier would be created against any future Russian expansion towards the south, 
where direct and indirect zones of British control existed.
Even though Britain included in its sphere of influence (i.e. Area B) the Kurdish area 
of Kirkuk, where oil was strongly suspected to exist, the Admiralty was still critical of the parti­
tion of the Mosul Wilayet between Britain and France. It wanted Britain to exclusively control 
the potential oil sources to the north and the south of the Lesser Zab River. In a Cabinet mem­
orandum, Admiral Edmond Slade reiterated the importance of oil to the Admiralty’s plans to
59* Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World, p.13.
60* Secret Memorandum for the War Department No.2522,5 January 1916, F0371/2767, PRO. 
61 * McDowall, A Modem History of the Kurds, p.117.
62* The Bunsen Committee.., op. cit., Paragraph 43.
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modernise its navy and the need to secure all oil rights in Mesopotamia and elsewhere.63 After 
all, oil considerations were what motivated the Admiralty, under Winston Churchill, to encour­
age the Indian Government to organise the Mesopotamian campaign at the start, so as to pro­
tect the oil fields of southern Persia.64 As the war dragged on, the Admiralty’s argument 
found support among other official circles in London, such as the Air Ministry and, most 
importantly, the Foreign Office. The war was a new factor that accentuated Britain’s need to 
obtain secure oil supplies under war conditions, and this could not be achieved unless Britain 
imposed its direct and indirect control over those areas which had potential oil sources, such 
as the Mosul Wilayet.
The British Occupation Of Southern Kurdistan, 1917-1918 
i- tfritain And Kurdish Affairs On <Che Eve of the Jirst World War
By the late Nineteenth Century, Kurdish nationalists became convinced that the way to realise 
their political aspirations was to internationalise their cause by acquiring the support of Eur­
opean Powers. As previously mentioned, Ubeidullah unsuccessfully attempted to establish 
contacts with the existing Powers, especially Britain. The outward orientation of the Kurdish 
nationalist movement was influenced by two factors. The first factor was that it encountered 
two powerful enemies: the Ottoman Empire and the Qajar Kingdom. The second factor was 
the very unfavourable geopolitical position of Kurdistan as a land-locked country, surrounded 
by its adversaries on all sides. In order for Kurdish nationalists to succeed in their struggle for 
national rights, they realised that outside help was needed. As far as this eventuality was con­
cerned, the Kurds had two options, reflecting the existing political and geographical circum­
stances: to seek the assistance of either Great Britain, the most liberal Power, or of Czarist 
Russia, the nearest geographical Power to Kurdistan. This is not, however, to suggest that 
Kurdish nationalists had a clear strategy towards the Powers, but to emphasise the point that 
there was general realisation among Kurdish nationalists that they needed to prevent any 
clash between Kurdish national aspirations and whatever interests the Powers might have in 
Kurdistan, and that they should make the most of any deterioration in international and regio­
nal relations.
In spite of many Kurdish efforts to obtain some form of outside support, none of the
63* Vice Admiral Edmond Slade, Memorandum on The Political Position in the Persian Gulf at end of the 
War (Cabinet Paper, G118) 31 October 1916, CAB21/119, PRO.
64* Kent, Moguls and Mandarins, p.24.
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Powers was willing to support the Kurds prior to the outbreak of the First World War, apart from 
Russia, whose geographical closeness to Kurdistan made it an important player in Kurdish 
affairs. With Russian assistance -in the form of arms and money- Prince Abdul Razaq Bedirk- 
han, a Kurdish nationalist and a former Ottoman diplomat, secretly organised an anti-Turkish 
movement, which included Kurdish officers of the Ottoman army and the tribes of the Bitlis, 
Van and Botan regions. His aim was the establishment of Kurdish rule under direct Russian 
protection.65 Buxton argued, after visiting Armenia in 1913, that Russia’s aim in sponsoring 
the Kurdish movement was to keep the Kurds from “making terms with the Turks or with the 
Christians so as to to keep up the excuse for possible intervention"66 in April 1913, an orga­
nised Kurdish revolt broke out in Northern Kurdistan under Abdul Razaq and spread to 
Southern Kurdistan. Other principal Kurdish nationalists of Eastern Kurdistan, such as Ismail 
Agha Simko (the head of the Shikak Kurds) and Said Taha (the grandson of Ubeidullah), took 
part in this revolt. It seems that the Kurdish nationalists hoped that the present Turkish military 
retreat in the Balkans in 1912-1913 and Kurdish appeals to the Armenians and other 
Christians to join the armed revolt -a step which also aimed to reassure the European Powers 
of their political intentions- would bring broader international support for the Kurdish cause. 
The British Consul in Mosul, who closely watched these developments, dismissed Turkish 
claim that the revolt was a Russian plot, emphasising its internal origin, which stemmed from 
the anti-Kurdish policies of the Young Turk Government.67 Following the failure of the Abdul 
Razaq movement, an unsuccessful revolt took place in Bitlis in Northern Kurdistan, which 
spread to Southern Kurdistan. The latter was the scene of another revolt by the Barzani Kurds 
which broke out in spring 1914. According to Madhar Ahmad, the leader of the Barzans, 
Abdul Salam asked for British and Russian assistance's in other parts of Southern Kurdistan, 
the Hamawands were in a state of continuous rebellion, while the Bajlan of the Khanaqin 
region and the Jaf tribes had serious friction with the Turkish Government.69
On the eve of the First World War, Sheikh Mahmud, the most influential nationalist fig­
ure in Southern Kurdistan, made his first contacts with European Powers via the Mixed Boun­
dary Commission, which attempted to resolve the outstanding boundary dispute between the
65* G. Lowther to Edward Grey, Pera, 9 December 1911, Enclosure 2 in No.1, from Acting Vice Consul 
Safrastian to Consul McGregor Bitlis, 17 November 1911, F0371/1263, PRO.
66* Noel Buxton, The Russians in Armenia’, pp.1362-1363.
67* G. Lowther to Edward Grey, Constantinople, 22 May & 8 August 1913, F0371/1773, PRO.
68* Ahmad, Kurdistan DyrlpgThe First World War, p.67.
69* Cox, Memorandum, 7  p^cqrp^ef 1918, FO371/3407, PRO.
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representatives. Mahmud hoped that with European aid he could drive the Turks out of 
Southern Kurdistan by force. 70 Only the Russians showed some interest in Mahmud’s propo­
sal and established contacts with him through their Consuls in Turkey and Persia. Yet nothing 
concrete came out of these contacts. A similar orientation was displayed by such principal 
Kurdish tribes in Southern Kurdistan as the Hamawand, Jaf and Dizai, who were prepared to 
call in Russian aid against the Turks. 71 In Eastern Kurdistan, political disorder was the prevail­
ing feature, as the power of the central government was rapidly declining. Thus, on the eve of 
the First World War, the opposition of the Kurdish nationalist movement to Turkish and Per­
sian rule was reaching an unprecedented degree throughout partitioned Kurdistan.
11- <Tfte Outbreak O f ‘The Jirst World War
It was not until the outbreak of the war that the Kurds believed the new conditions offered an 
ideal opportunity to realise their national aspirations with the aid of the Allies, who were at war 
with the Turks. In spring 1915, a Kurdish revolt broke out in Botan, while the Kurds of Dersim 
drove the Turks out of their region for a year. In summer 1917, Botan and Dersim revolted 
again, as well as Kharput. In August of the same year, Mardin and Diyarbekir revolted, followed 
by Bitlis. The common feature of these Kurdish revolts is the non-existence of outside sup­
port, apart from the revolt of August 1917, which enjoyed limited Russian support. The 
absence of outside support partly explained why these revolts failed, and this deepened the 
belief that Kurdish efforts would not succeed, unless outside support was secured for the 
Kurdish cause. The war offered such a prospect for those nationalist Kurds who lived in exile, 
such as Surreya Bedirkhan in Egypt and Cherif Pasha in Europe, both of whom established 
contacts with the British. Indeed, Cherif Pasha, who was a former Ottoman ambassador, was 
renowned for his opposition to the rule of the Young Turks.
The military necessity of weakening the Turkish enemy made the Russians resort to 
the Kurds’ support. Their action was also dictated by their territorial ambitions under the 
Sykes-Picot (Tripartite) agreement, whose terms placed the largest portion of Ottoman Kurdi­
stan under Russian control. However, Russian occupation policies of destroying, looting, 
mass killing and creating total anarchy in Kurdish towns and villages in all parts of Kurdistan
70* M.R. Hawar.The Leader Sheikh Mahmud and Southern State of Kurdistan, Vol.I, (London: Jaf 
Press, 1990) p. 184.
71 * Cox, Memorandum, 7 December 1918, F0371 /3407, PRO.
45
alienated the Kurds. The British watched very closely all developments in Kurdistan because 
of both their growing interest in the fate of the Turkish and Persian territories and their 
advance northward in Mesopotamia. Nevertheless, they displayed no interest whatsoever in 
making political arrangements with Kurdish leaders that would satisfy the immediate interests 
of both parties, as they did in Arabia, where the British materially supported the Arab revolt. 
British actions were confined to seeking the loyalty of certain Kurdish regions in Eastern Kur­
distan and were dictated by the need to maintain the security of British interests in the Persian 
Gulf and Persian oil fields, and to further keep open a direct land communication line with the 
Russian Allies in Eastern Kurdistan. The British were alarmed by a certain degree of success 
achieved by German agents, who turned some Kurds, such as the Sanjabi tribe, against the 
Russians. These Kurds were temporarily able to prevent the meeting of Russian forces with 
their British counterpart in Mesopotamia. The British thus remained uninvolved in Kurdish 
affairs in the first three years of the war:
Up until this period [the capture of Baghdad in March 1917} the [British] civil administration had 
little need to interest themselves in Kurdish affairs. It had been recognised, indeed, as early 
as 1914 that an eventual advance to Baghdad or even to Mosul might finally bring us into con­
tact with the Kurds, but so remote did this contingency appear that in December 1914, when 
General Cherif Pasha offered his services to the [British] force, in spite of being a man of 
standing and a bitter opponent of the new regime in Turkey, it was found necessary to refuse 
his offer, for even were there possibility of an advance to Baghdad at this period, there could 
be no chance of an extension of the movement beyond and such Kurdish communities which 
might be met with between Amarah and Baghdad were utterly insignificant.72
While stimulating leading Kurdish families in and around the city of Baghdad to ask for 
British protection of the Kurds in the manner of the French protection of Christian communi­
ties in Ottoman Asia, and for the establishment of a Kurdish confederation,73 the British occu­
pation of Baghdad had the effect of changing the attitudes of British officials on the ground 
towards the military and political value of Southern Kurdistan for the security of Mesopotamia:
With our occupation of Baghdad, followed by our advance up the [River] Diyala, problems con­
nected with Kurdistan assumed a new and vital interest for us, not only in connection with the 
wants of the immediate military situation, but owing to the increasing certainty that the Kurds 
would not only be neighbours during the period of the War but some of them permanent sub­
jects after it. The importance of securing their support and trust at this juncture could, there­
fore, scarcely be over-estimatedJa
British authorities on the ground became increasingly anxious about the negative 
effects of the brutal Russian policies in Eastern and Southern Kurdistan, which enormously 
72* ibid.
73* Political, Baghdad, to Secretary of State (S/S) for India (No.9915) 16 November 1918, AIR20/512, 
PRO.
74* Precis of Affairs in Southern Kurdistan during the First World War, Office of The Civil Commission, 
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benefited the Turks. The policies of Britain’s close ally, Russia, even seemed to affect its own 
prestige among the Kurds 75 who had made it clear earlier that they would not only welcome 
any Allied advance towards their regions, but would also rise against the Turks. 76 Percy Cox, 
the Chief Political Officer in Mesopotamia, who underlined the considerable value of the 
"good will" of Kurds to the British in Mesopotamia, 77  recommended the establishment of a 
Kurdish Bureau, so as to influence Southern Kurds with propaganda and money with a view 
to winning them over against the Turks. 78 Nevertheless, the British were unable to interfere in 
the affairs of those Kurdish areas which were under Russian military occupation. The military 
aspects of the Allied wartime agreements prohibited the British from interfering in the affairs of 
those areas which were occupied by the Russians, even though they were within the British 
spheres of influence. 79 Indeed, the British Government feared the prospect of having 
“serious frictions with the Russians” during the war, while it still needed them to continue the 
fight against the Turks in Kurdistan, so Therefore, the British Government rejected the idea of 
extending British control to certain important Kurdish areas, such as Badrah, Mandali, Qizil 
Robat and the Hamrin mountain range. The subsequent Russian evacuation of the Kurdish 
areas close to Baghdad and the return of the Turkish forces compelled the British to enter 
Southern Kurdistan in late 1917, hoping to maintain the security of Mesopotamia. Further­
more, the Bolshevik takeover and the subsequent Russian withdrawal from the war left a dan­
gerous military and political vacuum in Eastern and Southern Kurdistan and thus exposed the 
British presence in neighbouring areas. In other words, it was not in Britain’s initial plans to 
advance into Southern Kurdistan.
As soon as British forces began to advance northwards, prominent Kurds in most
parts of Southern Kurdistan such as Khanaqin, Kifri, Kirkuk and Sulaimaniya, expressed their
readiness to co-operate against the Turkish forces. Indeed, Col. Wilson , Cox’s successor,
reported on 15 October 1918 that the majority of Kurdish tribes to the east of the Lesser Zab
were “actively anti-Turk" and “anxious to throw off their allegiance to Turkey and to come under
British influence" 8 1  The manner in which the British advanced northwards and captured key
Kurdish towns such as Khanaqin, Kifri and Kirkuk, without confronting any real resistance, was
75* Cox, Baghdad, 18 May 1917, AIR20/504, PRO.
76* Precis of Affairs .., op. cit., p.3.
77* Cox, Memorandum, 7 December 1918, FO371/3407, PRO, p.6.
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partly due to the refusal of the Kurds to give any help to the Turks, either in terms of men or 
food supplies. Such locally powerful Kurdish tribes as the Dawadi and Talabani resisted all 
Turkish attempts to force them to hand over their supplies of food or to provide new recruits 
for the Turkish war efforts. The Hamawand Kurds, while denying the Turks, offered the British 
forces food supplies. To avoid Turkish pressure to supply food stuff, smaller and weaker 
Kurdish tribes such as those of Kifri, left the Turkish-controlled areas for British-controlled 
ones .82 A British memorandum attributed the failure of Turkish propaganda to mobilise the 
Kurds against the advancing British forces to the anti-Turkish attitudes of Kurdish religious 
leaders, who unanimously refused to preach “the Jihad” (a holy war), as demanded by the 
Turks. They proclaimed the war to be one of “ self-aggrandisemenf, and stated that the Turks 
were “ the hereditary enemies of the Kurds? .83 The general anti-Turkish attitudes of the Kurds 
played some part in forcing the Turks to retreat hastily from Southern Kurdistan, without put­
ting up any real resistance, as they had done in Mesopotamia.
Despite Russia’s brutal policies, the Kurds had not lost faith that the British would 
allow them to establish a form of Kurdish autonomy free of Turkish hegemony. Such Kurdish 
expectation was considerably stimulated by British war propaganda after the capture of Bagh­
dad in 1917. The British newspaper TigeyshteniRasti (Understanding The Truth), which was 
published in Kurdish, stated in its first issue on 12 January 1918, that
as soon as Great Britain wins the war... it will save all the nations of the World without excep­
tion, especially the Arab and Kurds of Mesopotamia and its neighbours, from unhappiness and 
bring them the joy of liberation, freedom and unity. The realisation of such sacred demands 
would be impossible without assistance from a just and [an] equitable government like that of 
Great Britain.84
Indeed, in their attempts to extend their political control to the remainder of Southern Kurdi­
stan, the British did not have to send any military force to occupy Kurdish towns and the coun­
tryside, where the Kurds had already taken the initiative by expelling the Turks, as was the 
case in Sulaimaniya, Keuisenjaq, Rania and Rowanduz.ss
Hi- Sheikh Jfiahmud And *€he British Advance towards Southern Kurdistan
In the context of explaining the extension of British influence to Southern Kurdistan, it is 
important to shed some light on Sheikh Mahmud, who played a considerable part in shaping
82* Precis of Affairs .., op. cit., p5.
83* Cox, Memorandum, 7 December 1918, FO371/3407, PRO, p.6.
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early British-Kurdish relations. By virtue of his outstanding religious position, his social posi­
tion as a landed aristocrat, and his outstanding role during the war, Mahmud was by far the 
most influential Kurdish figure in Southern Kurdistan during and after the war. 86 Mahmud’s 
efforts during this time turned the town of Sulaimaniya into an important centre for the Kurdish 
nationalist movement (a status which it still occupies). As previously mentioned, he approa­
ched the Russians before the war, hoping to mobilise the Kurds against the Turks. His disap­
pointment with the general attitudes of the Allies and his faith in the Young Turks’ promise of 
Kurdish autonomy made him mobilise some Kurdish forces to fight alongside the Turks at the 
early stages of the war.
It was not long before he withdrew his Kurdish forces from the war, having lost his faith 
in the Turks and their promises. However, he mobilised some Kurdish forces against the Rus­
sians in Eastern Kurdistan, where Russians had committed atrocities against local Kurdish 
population. This nationalist stance helped to create a notable popularity for Mahmud among 
the local Kurds in Eastern and Southern Kurdistan. 87 Like other Kurdish nationalists, Mahmud 
was well-informed of the important implications of the international developments associated 
with President Wilson’s Fourteen Points and the outbreak of the October Revolution in Rus­
sia, both of which had a great impact on the national aspirations of the non-Turkish nationali­
ties under the Ottoman Empire. After the Russian evacuation of areas in Southern Kurdistan, 
Mahmud, like other Kurdish notables, contacted the British authorities, with a view to expel­
ling the Turks from Kurdistan. He hoped to set up a Kurdish government under British super- 
vision.88 For this purpose, Mahmud dispatched two Kurdish notables to the British authorities, 
carrying a letter, in which he appealed to the British Government unot to exclude Kurdistan 
from the list of liberated peoples’’ .89 He also asked for British views on the expulsion of Turk­
ish forces from Southern Kurdistan.90 Without even awaiting the British advance, Mahmud 
took the initiative by holding a meeting -which was attended by all the notables of the Sulaima­
niya region- to determine the Kurdish future in light of the Turkish retreat. As a consequence, 
a Kurdish government came into being, and Mahmud was elected as its head.91
After the British occupation of Baghdad, the political and military value of winning the
86* Rafik Helmi, Memoirs, Vol.I, (Publication of Culture and Young, Baghdad, 1988), pp.35-6.
87* Ibid, p.50.
88* Ibid, p.5t.
89* Political, Baghdad, 1 November 1918, F0371/3407, PRO.
90* Ibid.
91* Precis Affairs.., op. cit., pp. 5-6.
49
Kurds over to the British or Turkish sides increased rapidly. The Kurds could not only provide 
fighters, but also supplies of food and information for the armies. This state of affairs, in turn, 
increased Mahmud’s stature and importance because of his being the most politically influen­
tial Kurdish figure in Southern Kurdistan. This also explains why the Turks, after their reoccu­
pation of Kirkuk and arrest of Mahmud for his contacts with the British, released him, hoping 
that he could again mobilise the Kurds against the British. 92 For this purpose, the Turks even 
installed him as the mayor of Sulaimaniya. Meanwhile, the British were alarmed by the new 
Turkish approach to the Kurdish situation, while the Turks were making considerable military 
advances in Eastern Kurdistan, where the pro-British forces of the Armenians and other 
Christians were retreating. All this, as British authorities in Mesopotamia noted, coincided with 
negative military developments in Europe:
The Turks, at this time, were able to make great poiiticai capital out of the German successes 
and the Allied retirement on the western front. The Turkish Commander, too, adopted a conci­
liatory attitude towards [Kurdish] tribes which bore good fruit... All this coupled with the dis­
trust engendered by our evacuation of Kirkuk... turned the political scales for the time being 
against us$ 3
Despite everything, Mahmud kept pinning his hopes on the British and as soon as the British 
reoccupied Kirkuk he not only resumed his direct contacts with them, but captured Turkish 
troops present in his district and declared the termination of Turkish rule. Other Kurdish 
regions followed suit, such as Rania and Keuisenjaq. At the same time, Kurdish notables invi­
ted the British authorities in Baghdad to send their political representatives to Southern Kurdi­
stan, so that an arrangement could be worked out to run the country. The fact that British 
penetration had barely begun in Southern Kurdistan when the Mudros armistice was signed 
on 30 October 1918, made Kurdish initiatives in expelling the remaining Turkish military and 
civilian officials, and declaring Kurdish allegiance to Britain, politically significant. By leaving a 
few Kurdish figures as their civilian representatives, backed by a small Turkish force in most of 
the unconquered Southern Kurdistan, the Turks sought to demonstrate that the region was 
legally under Turkish rule, unaffected by the armistice terms. By taking the British side and 
inviting British representatives to their own areas, the Kurds in effect brought most of South­
ern Kurdistan under British political control without resorting to military occupation.
The initial advance of British forces into Southern Kurdistan during the last stages of 
the war coincided with significant political and military developments, which immediately influ-
92* Helmi, Memoirs, Vol.I, pp.52-3. 
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enced the course of the events in the Middle East. One of these developments was the Rus­
sian withdrawal from the war and the subsequent Bolshevik publication and denunciation^ 
the Allies’ secret schemes to partition the Ottoman Empire and divide the Persian\Kingdom 
into spheres of influence. This unforeseen development had immediate and profound 
effects on the attitudes of British policy makers towards the political future of the Ottoman 
Empire. As previously mentioned, Britain had agreed to divide the Mosul IM/ayefwith France, 
so as to create "a wedge of French territory3’ between its own zone in Kurdistan and that of 
Russia.94 The temporary disappearance of Russia as a major player from the regional scene 
following the Bolshevik Revolution meant that the consolidation of Britain’s strategic interests 
no longer required the division of the Mosul Wilayet. Thus the idea of reconciling British and 
French interests in that Wilayet was abandoned in favour of sole British control. The modifica­
tion of the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement on the Mosul Wilayet seemed to be the ideal 
way to maintain the British position in Mesopotamia in the long term. Having entered Southern 
Kurdistan in the wake of the Russian departure, the British were in a very strong position to 
deprive the French of their sphere in the Mosul Wilayet.
The decision of the British Government to capture the town of Mosul, which would 
symbolise British control over all the Mosul Wilayet, was also motivated by oil considerations. 
At a meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet, just two months before the conclusion of the war 
with Turkey, Arthur Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, drew the attention of those present to the 
bright prospect for the development of oil in Mesopotamia, and called for a political settlement 
in Mesopotamia that would enable the British Empire to have secure oil sources. 95 Thus there 
was an urgent need to modify the Sykes-Picot agreement in a way that would enable Britain to 
establish its control over the Mosul Wilayet as a whole. Partly against this background, both 
Balfour and Lord Curzon stated in August 1918 that the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement 
were “out of date”, a position accepted by the Eastern Committee.9eThe latter was organised 
by the War Cabinet to specifically deal with issues relative to territories extending from India’s 
western frontier to the eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea. Lord Curzon chaired this 
Committee, whose principal members were, apart from Balfour, Edwin Montagu, the Secretary 
of State for India, and Henry Hughes Wilson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. It was at
94* Macdonogh to Nicholson, 6 January 1916, F0371/2767, PRO.
95* Imperial War Cabinet, 13 August 1918, CAB23/7, PRO.
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this point that the idea of a British advance towards the town of Mosul was raised and received 
the backing of Lloyd George, the new British Prime Minister.97 To achieve this aim, it was deci­
ded that Britain should control Mosul before the end of the war. Despite all their military 
efforts, the British were unable to achieve their aim as Turkey signed the Mudros armistice on 
30 October. But the armistice did not prevent the British forces from capturing the town of 
Mosul one week later. Examination of the terms of the Mudros armistice between Turkey and 
Britain shows that, while unequivocally providing for Turkish withdrawal from Eastern Kurdi­
stan, they said nothing about a similar step in Southern Kurdistan. 98 The term ‘Mesopotamia’, 
which was used in the text of the armistice agreement, was ambiguous. In other words, the 
agreement did not make clear whether Southern Kurdistan was part of Mesopotamia. This 
explains why the Turks continually insisted, following the war, that the British illegally con­
trolled the Mosul Wilayet and should therefore be returned to their control. Indeed, the ques­
tion of Mosul’s future became the main reason why Turkey refused to recognise the state of 
Iraq during the period 1921-1926.
The change in British attitudes towards the Sykes-Picot agreement could also be attri­
buted to other important political and military developments. The late entry of the United 
States into the war against Germany was also a factor that Britain could not overlook in its post­
war policy owing to American dislike of European colonialism, which prevented free trade and 
investment. With the absence of Russia from the regional scene, Britain found France repla­
cing Germany as its main challenger in its efforts to consolidate its political and economic inter­
ests in the newly emerging Middle East. It therefore needed to take urgent steps to contain 
expansion of French influence. At another level, the long duration of the war imposed unpre­
cedented economic, financial and political pressure on the British Government to cut down its 
military responsibilities and financial commitments, as well as putting into effect rapid demobili­
sation of its forces. As further expansion of the British Empire became an inconceivable 
option among British policy makers as well as the British public, Britain needed to review its 
wartime vision for the new Middle Eastern order.
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Conclusion
Examination of Kurdistan’s position in Britain’s Ottoman and Persian policies before and dur­
ing the First World War shows that Britain looked upon Kurdish affairs principally from a strate­
gic perspective and, secondly, from an oil perspective. As Britain’s strategic interests depen­
ded on maintaining the territorial unity of both the Ottoman Empire and the Qajar Kingdom, it 
opposed any internal force that sought to alter the status quo. Therefore, Kurdish nationalist 
agitation was in disharmony with British strategic and economic interests, as the Kurdish revolt 
of 1880-1881 illustrated. By the end of the first decade of the Twentieth Century, the British 
began to think of extending their political and economic influence to the heartland of the Otto­
man Empire, including southern parts of Kurdistan. This new orientation reflected both Bri­
tain’s intensive rivalry with other European Powers, especially Germany, and the steady decay 
that the Ottoman Empire and the Qajar Kingdom had undergone for the past six decades. 
When the First World War broke out, Britain worked towards re-drawing the political map of the 
Middle East, with a view to extending and consolidating its political and economic influence in 
vital areas of Ottoman Asia. The report of the Bunsen Committee, the Hussein-McMahon Cor­
respondence and the Sykes-Picot (Tripartite) agreement illustrated how Britain intended to 
partition Kurdistan.
At the end of the war, new strategic, political and economic considerations combined 
to force Britain to re-evaluate its post-war policy towards the future of the former Ottoman terri­
tories, such as Armenia, Kurdistan and Mesopotamia. With the Allied war-time agreements 
being out of date and in the wake of their unplanned occupation of Southern Kurdistan, the 
British did not have a concrete scheme for running the area, let alone deciding the long term 
future of Kurdistan in the context of a hew regional order in the Middle East. While awaiting 
the holding of the peace conference and the crystallisation of a definite policy towards Kurdi­
stan’s future, London authorised Col. Wilson to take administrative and political measures to 
ensure political stability, the consolidation of order and peace and the resumption of econo­
mic activities in British-controlled Kurdistan. London, however, made it clear that British offi­
cials on the ground should avoid taking measures that would increase or create new military, 
financial or political commitments in the area. As the following chapter will explain, the condi­
tions under which the British extended their control to Southern Kurdistan had immediate 
implications for their Kurdish policy on the ground. This policy played an important part in influ­
encing subsequent political developments in Southern Kurdistan between 1918 and 1923.
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Moreover, British control over Southern Kurdistan dragged Britain into the affairs of Northern 
and Bastern Kurdistan, as the security of its interests in Mesopotamia depended on political 
stability and order in the bordering areas outside its control.
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The administration of the new British acquisitions in Kurdistan and Mesopotamia was the 
responsibility of the India Office, while the Foreign Office retained overall supervision of policy 
until the time when the forthcoming peace conference would determine the future of these 
regions within the framework of the Turkish peace settlement. In the meantime, British policy 
on the ground, which played an important part in influencing the course of events in the 
absence of a well-defined British position on the Kurdish question, was conducted by Col. 
Wilson, in his capacity as the Acting Civil Commissioner and the Chief Political Officer. He was 
assisted in administrative and political matters by a number of political officers who not only 
conducted the local affairs in their divisions, but also put forward their own proposals regard­
ing the way in which their divisions should ideally be run. Local military authorities expressed 
their views insofar as they concerned internal security and strategic issues.
The primary task of the British authorities in Baghdad was to restore normal administra­
tive, economic and social life to Southern Kurdistan after the end of the First World War. This 
chapter explores the prevailing military and political conditions that influenced the decision to 
create an autonomous Kurdish entity under British political supervision in late October and 
early November 1918. British officials in London and the Middle East often referred to the 
autonomous entity as the Kurdish state, even though it was not fully independent. In summer 
1919, this state was disposed of, after the British suppressed a Kurdish rebellion. The political 
causes and consequences of this reversal in British policy towards Southern Kurdistan will be 
analysed in detail.
Indirect British Control And The Formation Of An Autonomous State In 
Southern Kurdistan: Circumstances And Objectives
In the initial stages of the British presence in Southern Kurdistan, British policy-making on the 
ground was conditioned by the lack of a sufficient army of occupation and adequate civilian 
administrators. 1 Britain’s political and military position was far from secure in an area that strate­
gically over looked the Mesopotamian plain to the south. Before the armistice of Mudros of 30 
October 1918, British penetration of Southern Kurdistan had hardly begun (see map nine). It 
was, therefore, necessary for the British authorities in Mesopotamia to seek continuity in the
1* W.R. Hay, Two Years In Kurdistan (London: Sifgwick & Jackson Ltd, 1921), p.6.
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goodwill of the Southern Kurds, who took the lead in liberating many of their towns from the 
Turks and simultaneously inviting British representatives to these free areas in order to help 
establish new political and administrative arrangements. This anti-Turkish and pro-British atti­
tude of the Southern Kurds facilitated the immediate British aim of re-establishing stability, 
without the need for expensive military or civilian administration.
It was also important for the British to maintain a favourable Kurdish attitude in order to 
rapidly reduce their existing military and financial commitments, while consolidating their politi­
cal influence throughout Southern Kurdistan. Initially, the British had no intention of expand­
ing their military occupation, when invited by Mahmud to enter important Kurdish areas:
Military occupation of [Southern Kurdistan] was quite out of the question, for, even after the 
defeat of the Turks, supply and other difficulties combined to make it impossible even to 
occupy with a garrison a point so near at hand and so important politically to us as Sulaima­
niya. The alternative of adopting purely political methods had, therefore, to be adopted, and it 
was realised that the best means to that end was the exploiting of the perfectly legitimate feel­
ing of Kurdish nationality which had long been making itself evident amongst the Southern 
Kurdish tribes.2
It was thus a logical option not to intervene directly, thereby confining the British role to provi­
ding political and administrative advice to the Kurds, who were allowed to conduct their own
2* Precis of Affair.., op. cit. p.9.
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administrative, economic and security affairs.
The existence of strong nationalist aspirations among the Kurds was the most impor­
tant factor influencing British policy making on the ground in its early stages. The advent of 
British forces in Southern Kurdistan was seen by the local Kurds as liberation from Turkish rule 
and an opportunity to have a say in the running of their own affairs. According to Percy Cox:
The idea of Kurdish autonomy, which had taken shape under the Constitutional Regime, was 
revived and greatly stimulated by the terms of our Baghdad Proclamation to the Arabs which 
showed a different attitude towards racial susceptibilities and aspirations from that which had 
been adopted by the Turks.z
Kurdish high expectations of what the British would do explains the warm reception given to 
Maj. Edward Noel by assembled Kurdish representatives from the countryside and towns at 
Sulaimaniya. 4 Noel was a British intelligence agent, who served in the Caucasus during the 
war and in north Persia in 1919. Col. Arnold Wilson appointed him Political Officer responsible 
for the supervision of Kurdish affairs on the spot.5
The decision of the British authorities in Baghdad to experiment with the idea of indir­
ect British control in the Kurdish part of Area B was based on advice from Noel, who saw it as a 
logical solution in the light of the state of affairs in Southern Kurdistan. In other words, the Brit­
ish authorities in Mesopotamia were not in a position either militarily or politically, to ignore the 
existence of nationalistic sentiments and Kurdish expectations of the Allies, particularly Bri­
tain. Mahmud and the nationalist circle in the Sulaimaniya region had started the process of 
forming a Kurdish government before the end of the war. They aimed to secure British 
respect for Kurdish wishes in the wake of the expulsion of the Turks. Apart from having faith in 
British promises, the crux of Mahmud’s approach was pragmatic. He Showed tangible willing­
ness to honour whatever interests Britain had in Southern Kurdistan, so that the Kurds, in 
return, could enjoy self-government. Unlike the Mesopotamian Arabs, the Southern Kurds 
sought to reconcile their interests with those of Britain in order to fill the political vacuum 
resulting from the Turkish departure.
Noel played a significant role in convincing British authorities in Mesopotamia of the 
viability of employing a political approach to consolidating British interests in the Kurdish 
areas. This political approach was based on respecting Kurdish nationalist aspirations. After 
his first visit to Sulaimaniya, he reported to Baghdad that the Kurdish nationalist movement “is
3* Ibid, p.4.
4* Political Officer, Sulaimaniya, to Political, Baghdad,16 November 1918, AIR20/512, PRO.
5* Political, Baghdad, to Political, Mosul, 20 November 1918, AIR20/512, PRO.
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so virile that I do not foresee much difficulty in creating [a] Kurdish state under our protection 
and with control by political officers over general policy, provided we take prompt and vigorous 
action now".6 Against this background, Noel was instructed to inform the Kurds that it was not 
Britain’s intention to impose upon them "an administration foreign to their habits and 
desires"J The outcome of both Noel’s understanding of Kurdish national aspirations, and 
Mahmud’s willingness to co-operate in such a way, formed the basis of British influence in 
Southern Kurdistan (see map ten). This took the shape of an autonomous Kurdish state: 
Kurdish government, judiciary, revenue and Levi (local military force). Mahmud was appointed 
by the British as Governor of the Kurdish Area B, extending from south of the Lesser Zab 
River to the old Ottoman-Persian frontier. He was assisted by two senior British officials, apart 
from Noel: Maj. Denials, who supervised the formation and the training of the Kurdish Levis 
and Col. Gordon Walker, who oversaw the revenue and the taxes. Later on, British officials in 
the Middle East and London associated this system of indirect control with Maj. Noel, as 
opposed to Col. Wilson’s policy of direct control. This British recognition of Mahmud’s author-
6* Political, Baghdad, 17 November 1918, AIR20/512, PRO.
7* political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, 31 October 1918, AIR20/512,PRO.
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ity took place just before the end of the war with the TUrkss and was in harmony with the elec­
tion of Mahmud by the Kurds as head of their government when the Turks had left Sulaima­
niya.
Noel’s choice of indirect British control offered several political and strategic advant­
ages. It was vital in keeping the Kurds on the British side and as a starting point for the pos­
sible expansion of British control to other Kurdish districts after the armistice. An unsympathe­
tic and hostile Southern Kurdistan could enable the Turks to return to these areas, either poli­
tically or militarily. Indeed, Noel’s initial task was to enlist “the sympathies of the Kurds by an 
encouragement to nationalist as opposed to Pan-lslamic sentiment”$ The return of Turkish 
rule would constitute a direct threat to British control in Mesopotamia, where the Turks were 
still plotting by inciting local people to expel the anti-Muslim enemy. British authorities thus 
had to avoid confronting both the Kurds and the Turks simultaneously. To achieve this, they 
had to restore political stability and facilitate the resumption of economic activity in Southern 
Kurdistan. In addition, indirect rule was politically useful for the containment of anti-British pro­
paganda by the Bolsheviks, whose ideological effects seemed to pose a real threat to British 
influence in Persia, Turkey and elsewhere in the Middle East. Under such circumstances, an 
autonomous Kurdish government was a commendable idea. It also portrayed Britain as being 
in line with President Wilson’s Fourteen Points, the basis of the Kurdish petition for national 
self-determination. Moreover, this respectable image also helped the British maintain good 
relations with Kurdish nationalist circles both in other parts of Kurdistan and in exile.
On a different level, British policy towards Southern Kurdistan was affected by the 
change in the international alignment of forces as a result of the war. The 1917 October Revo­
lution, and the Bolshevik denunciation of the secret agreements regarding the Ottoman 
Empire and the division of Persia into various spheres of influence between Britain and Czar- 
ist Russia, made the British dispense with the idea of establishing a French zone between 
their sphere and the Russians in Kurdistan. As soon as the war ended, the British worked 
quickly to bring the area they occupied under their political control. Whilst wanting the imposi­
tion of British political and military control simultaneously in Area A, London informed Wilson 
that it was hopeful of persuading Paris to "renounce its claims in the Mosul area”, strongly 
advising him that Paris should not feel that Britain had violated the terms of the Sykes-Picot
8* Precis of Affairs.., op. cit. p6.
9* E.W.L. Noel, Note -in- Colonial Office Minute No.4958, 22 July 1922, CO730/13, PRO.
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agreement.io This was just an early manifestation of a change in British views on the post-war 
political map of the former Ottoman territories. Excluding the French from Southern Kurdistan 
was mainly based on strategic considerations of British control in Mesopotamia, vital for both 
the security of the sea and land routes to India. In addition, international recognition of British 
control over the whole of the Mosul Wilayet would be required to exploit its economic poten­
tial. Therefore, it was necessary to revise or to drop the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement 
by convincing the French to give up their political sphere of influence in Area A.
By virtue of the apparently open-minded policy of an autonomous Kurdish govern­
ment under its political supervision, Britain was in a far stronger position to win over the sup­
port of local Kurds in Area A, who mistrusted the French because of their support for Christian 
communities. The Kurds did not desire to be under French control, at a time when being 
under British protection seemed to offer them a more promising future. Indeed, London was 
contemplating the adoption of indirect control in Area A in order to be part of an autonomous 
Kurdish state in Southern Kurdistan, while the much smaller Arab areas (i.e. the town of Mosul 
and the areas to the south) would be included in Mesopotamia. British authorities in Baghdad 
seemingly advocated a similar line, namely uniting Southern Kurdistan by eliminating the 
French zone. They went so far as to suggest the establishment of "a central Council of chiefs 
for Southern Kurdistan under British auspices* 11
As Far as Wilson was concerned, the adoption of the idea of self-determination for the 
Kurds seemed to offer him and the India Office a suitable means of thwarting any project to 
establish or to extend Arab rule to Southern Kurdistan as contained in the 1915 Sharif- 
McMahon Correspondence. This entailed the creation of de facto political and administrative 
arrangements with the help of local Kurds, the legitimacy of which neither the French nor 
Sharif Hussein could question. A memorandum by the India Office highlights the existence of 
such intentions:
it is clear that; as far, at least, as Southern Kurdistan was concerned, the people have exer­
cised the right o f“self-determination” and have elected (with certain exceptions) to form them­
selves into a separate “Confederation" under British guidance. This pronouncement and its for­
mal acceptance by the Civil Commissioner appear to rule out (at any rate, as regards the 
Southern Kurds) Col. Lawrence’s suggestion of central Arabo-Kurdish Kingdom. But, the diffi­
culty with France remains; and the recent developments in Kurdistan emphasise the necessity 
of securing revision, at least, of that part of the Sykes-Picot agreement, which relates to the 
Mosul district and the Upper Tigris Valley. The desire for unity manifested by the Kurds at 
Sulaimaniya renders it more than ever indefensible to partition their territory into three arbitrary 
zones. 12
10* S/S to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, Confidential, (undated) F0371/3386, PRO.
11* Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, 30 October 1918, AIR20/512, PRO.
12* J.E. Shuckburgh, India Office, Memorandum, 14 December 1918, F0371/3386, PRO.
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The establishment of an autonomous Kurdish entity in Southern Kurdistan was a product of a 
number of factors. Firstly, Britain was not in a position to make new military or financial commit­
ments following the war when there was a pressing need to demobilise its forces and cut 
down its military expenditure. Secondly, the consolidation of its position in Mesopotamia, 
whose strategic importance was closely linked with the security of the land and sea routes to 
India, required a peaceful and British-orientated Southern Kurdistan. Thirdly, Kurdish political 
aspirations could not be over looked in the early stages of British control over Southern Kurdi­
stan. Fourthly, such a policy could foil any anti-British propaganda war waged by the Turks and 
the Bolsheviks. Finally, an autonomous Southern Kurdistan, according to Wilson’s political 
calculations, could be a means, in the short-run, to thwart the attempts of the Sharifian follow­
ers to establish an Arab state by merging the three Wilayetsot Baghdad, Basra and Mosul.
The End Of The Autonomous Kurdish State: Circumstances And Objectives
i- <FJte A ttitu d es  O f g ritis h  O fficials On *€he ground
Wilson was known among British circles in London and the Middle East as a traditionalist
imperial official, 13 who firmly believed in turning the new conquered territories in Mesopotamia
and Kurdistan into outright colonies. His early desire for tight British political and economic
controls was evidently manifest in his first evaluation of the Kurdish areas, when demanding
their inclusion into British-administered Mesopotamia:
Politically as well as strategically, there is much to be said for adopting the line of Lesser Zab 
as the frontier of Iraq state including in the latter Altun Kupri, Sulaimaniya and Penjwin: the rich 
districts of Sulaimaniya and Halabjah are susceptible to great development and their products 
are essential to industries and general well-being of Iraq, viz. petroleum, coal, seed-wheat, 
gall nuts and tanned material and tobacco. The first two in particular, as HMG were aware, of 
great potential value.14
During his presence in Mesopotamia between 1918 and 1920, Wilson never expressed any 
sympathy towards Kurdish demands for self-government nor did he acknowledge the exis­
tence of Kurdish nationalist aspirations. Kurdish nationalists did not fail to see the difference 
between Wilson’s position and Noel’s regarding the Kurdish situation. In his memoirs, Rafik 
Helmi, who worked with the British as an interpreter, points out that Wilson did not hide his 
opposition to both the autonomous Kurdish state and the Mahmud leadership. 15 From Wil-
13* See, for instance, Foreign Office Minute on “the Administration Report on the Sulaimaniya division 
for Year 1919’, 23 July 1920, FO371/5069, PRO.
14* Political, Baghdad, 15 October 1918, F0371/3407, PRO:
15* Helmi, Memoirs, Vol.I, p.71.
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son’s viewpoint, as the Kurds were divided like the Arabs and could not rule themselves, Bri­
tain should impose a protectorate, where British officials would be responsible for the formula­
tion and implementation of policies.ie It is not surprising then that, once established, Wilson 
spared no time in discrediting the idea of Kurdish autonomy in his reports to London, and in 
arguing that British interests could be best served by bringing back the old Ottoman admin­
istrative arrangements. 17
Noel was the exception among the principal British officials in Southern Kurdistan, in 
that he strongly defended the policy of indirect rule, despite its defects. The remaining British 
officials were opposed to the scheme of an autonomous Southern Kurdistan. Such attitudes 
reflected their desire to have total control over the conduct of Kurdish affairs, as well as their 
personalities and beliefs. Moreover, all these officials and their assistants were recruited from 
the British army because of lack of civilian administrators. 18 This may explain the rigidity with 
which these officials approached Southern Kurdistan’s affairs. Helmi, for instance, describes 
Maj. E.B. Soane, Noel’s successor, as being very arrogant and rough in his treatment of local 
Kurds.19 As soon as Soane became the Political Officer of the Sulaimaniya division in 1919, 
he replaced most Kurdish officials with Indians, Persians and Arabs in order to get rid of the 
Kurdish characteristic of the administration.2 0 The Political Officer of the Mosul division, Col. 
G.E. Leachman, was also extremely suspicious of the Kurds because of his firm belief that 
they had committed atrocities against Christians during the war. His suspicion manifested itself 
in his heavy-handed treatment of the local Kurds and in his desire to displace them from his 
division.21 In his memoirs, Humphrey Bowman, who worked as a Director of Education in 
Mesopotamia, shows how Leachman’s sympathy with the Christian “plight” earned him a repu­
tation for severity towards local Kurds.2 2  Leachman was also renowned for his drastic mea­
sures among the Shi'i Arabs, who murdered him during the bloody uprising in Mesopotamia in 
1920. Col. J.H. Bill, Leachman’s successor, warned the British authorities that the use of 
Christian refugees against the local Kurds, as a means of consolidating British rule, would
16* Political, Baghdad, to Political, Sulaimaniya, 26 November 1918, AIR20/512, PRO.
17* Political, Baghdad, 7 December 1918, F0371/3386, PRO.
18* Hay, Two Years In Kurdistan, pp.5-6.
19* Helmi, Memoirs, Vol.I, p. 108.
20* Ibid, pp.77, 84-88.
21* Political, Mosul, to Noel, Rowanduz, 11 January 1919 & Political, Mosul, to Political, Baghdad, 18 
January 1919, AIR20/12, PRO.
22* Humphrey Bowman, Middie East Window (London & Toronto: Longmans & Green Co., 1942), p.241.
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result In unpleasant consequences. 23 Indeed, the first local Kurdish revolts against the British 
in the Mosul division were of a religious nature, and were mainly provoked by the resettlement 
of Christian refugees in Kurdish lands.
Given Leachman’s above attitudes towards the local Kurds in his division, it is not sur­
prising that he would firmly oppose the policy of indirect British control with which the autono­
mous Kurdish entity was associated. His opposition to Kurdish autonomy manifested itself 
during the Khushnaw affairs, which started in early January 1919, when Noel informed Wilson 
of the desire of the Khushnaw notables, who lived in the Mosul division, to merge their region 
with the autonomous Kurdish entity. 24 Having heard of Wilson’s initial approval of this propo­
sal, Leachman expressed his opposition and asked him to reverse his decision. 25 On learning 
of Leachman’s position, Noel sent a telegram to Wilson, protesting against the reversal of his 
early decision to expand the autonomous Kurdish entity to the Khushnaw region:
I see no reason why you should reverse your decision. Firstly, there is no strong reason 
[whyjwe should be bound by Turkish division of districts and even if we were, the tribe in ques­
tion was under Rowanduz from 1896 to 1914. Secondly, representatives of [the] tribe, which is 
On this side of [the] Zab, have come to see me and to express their desire to accept Sheikh 
Mahmud. Thirdly, [the] national movement, we [have started] is growing daily in strength. It 
contains [seeds] of natural and healthy development and., it may., attract and absorb all 
purely Kurdish elements, [which] will naturally prefer it to the hybrid form of administration at 
Mosul.zz
The Khushnaw affair constituted the first manifestation of the emerging division among British 
officials on the ground over the ideal system of control for the consolidation of British position 
in Southern Kurdistan.
Other British officials also expressed their opposition to the establishment of the 
autonomous Kurdish state and its enlargement. Capt. Stephen Longrigg,27 the Assistant 
Political Officer at Kirkuk, asked Wilson to remove the Kirkuk district from the control of the 
Kurdish authority in Sulaimaniya.28 On the eve of Mahmud’s revolt on 3 May 1919, the British 
Assistant Political Officer at Arbil warned against the dangerous effects of autonomous Kurd­
ish districts alongside the Arbil district. He even saw danger in establishing a looser form of dir­
ect control in Southern Kurdistan, such as giving Kurdish officials’ a nominal role in the admin-
23* J. H. Bill to Civil Commissioner, Memorandum on the Future of the Qaza of Amadia, 21 October 
1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
24* Noel, Rowanduz, to Political, Baghdad, 10 January 1919, AIR20/512, PRO.
25* Political, Mosul, to Political, Baghdad, 11 January 1919, AIR20/512, PRO.
26* Noel, Rowanduz, to Political, Baghdad, 12 January 1919, AIR20/512, PRO.
27* Later, S.H. Longrigg compiled two books on Iraq’s history based on the official British interpretation 
of events.
28* Administration Report of the Sulaimaniya Division for the Year 1919, FO371/5069, PRO, p.3.
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istration. He called for the rapid unification of all systems of control before it was too late to pre­
vent any demand for similar treatment, i.e. local autonomy. 29  This overwhelming support for 
direct British administration among British officials and the military authorities in Mesopotamia 
would considerably facilitate Wilson’s task of preventing the emergence of an autonomous 
Southern Kurdistan and erasing any sign of Kurdish self-government.
The imposition of direct control was a step by step process. It highlighted the contra­
diction between the British Government’s preference for an autonomous Southern Kurdi­
stan, either as one Kurdish state or as a group of states, and Wilson’s actual steps on the 
ground, which were aimed at bringing the country under direct British control. The timing of 
the reversal in the Kurdish policy is significant in that it came after Paris’s acceptance, in princi­
ple, of revising the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement (December 1918) by merging Area A 
with the British sphere in Southern Kurdistan. Soon Wilson retreated from the idea of uniting 
the administration of Southern Kurdistan on an indirect basis. Instead, he proposed the 
“partition" of Southern Kurdistan between the existing Kurdish autonomous entity and the 
directly-administered Mesopotamia. The lowland of Southern Kurdistan was to be attached to 
the British administration in Mesopotamia and the remaining high-land to the autonomous 
entity.30 His immediate step was to prevent Area A from being divided between the Kurdish 
autonomous state and a future Arab state, as London recommended. He reported that 
despite the absence of ethnic and religious homogeneity, public opinion in the Mosul division 
was in favour of "a single state” under direct British administration that would include Southern 
Kurdistan and the two Arab Wilayets, Baghdad and Basra.31
Wilson entrusted the task of re-organising the Mosul division on a direct control basis 
to Col. Leachman. As a result, during a period of six to seven months, two systems of control 
existed in Southern Kurdistan. The first was autonomous Kurdish government, situated 
between the Greater Zab and the old Ottoman-Persian frontier. The second was direct British 
administration that included Jabal Sinjar in the west and the Greater Zab River in the east. Hav­
ing created direct British administration in one part of Southern Kurdistan, Wilson’s next step 
was to extend direct British control over all Southern Kurdistan. Bowman’s visit to Sulaimaniya 
in April 1919 illustrates how Wilson’s decision to wind up the Kurdish Government was an 
open secret among British officials, and that the implementation of the new policy was a matter
29* Assistant Political Officer, Arbil, to Political Officer, Mosul, 3 May 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
30* A.J.Toynbee, Foreign Office Minute No.207981, 21 December 1918, F0371/3386, PRO.
31* Ibid.
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of time.3 2  This took the form of preventing the expansion of the autonomous Kurdish entity to 
include other Kurdish areas, such as Rowanduz and Khushnawati. At the same time, the 
policy of divide and rule was used to undermine the authority of the Kurdish Government. 
Certain tribes, especially those who had outstanding differences with Mahmud’s ancestors, 
were encouraged to express their dissatisfaction with his governorship in order to remove 
their areas from the autonomous entity.33 in his memoirs, Helmi points out how Capt. H. Bill - 
with whom he worked as an interpreter in Keuisenjaq- recorded all the details of tribal rivalry 
and personal enmity, especially those which concerned Mahmud.3 4
At the administrative level, Wilson appointed political officers and assistant political 
officers who were staunch advocates of direct control in Southern Kurdistan, such as Maj. 
Soane in Sulaimaniya, Maj. W.R. Hay35 in Arbil, and Capt. A.G. Rundle in Keuisenjaq. All of 
them worked quickly to increase their powers at the expense of the Kurdish Government. 
They explained their actions as having been forced on them by the unjust policies of the 
representatives of Kurdish rule. In the Keuisenjaq Qada [district], the Assistant Political Officer 
reported that he was "compelled to intervene” and administer its affairs in order to “prevent 
friction or injustice”. ^  In February 1919, the districts of Kirkuk and Kifri were separated from 
the Sulaimaniya division and were no longer included within the Kurdish autonomous entity. 
As a direct consequence of adopting such steps, the power of the Kurdish autonomous 
entity steadily declined, and the jurisdiction of the Kurdish Government was gradually restric­
ted, except at the heart of Kurdish nationalism: Sulaimaniya and its immediate neighbour­
hood. Later, this process continued to include the separation of the Rowanduz district from 
the Sulaimaniya division in June 1919, while Keuisenjaq was transferred to the newly-formed 
division of Arbil.37 This process of the political and administrative dismemberment of Southern 
Kurdistan was aimed at the further dispersal of the Southern Kurds, the forestalling of one 
central core in Sulaimaniya -which could have formed a basis for a larger national state- as well 
as pre-empting the emergence of a legitimate political leadership for the Southern Kurds.
32* Bowman, Middle East Window, p.228.
33* Helmi, Memoirs, Vol.I, p.78.
34* Ibid, pp.80-81.
35* See his diary: Two Years in Kurdistan op. cit.
36* Administration Report on Keuisenjaq.., op. cit.
37* The Administration Report on the Sulaimaniya division for Year 1919, F0371/5069, PRO, p.3.
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ii- gritish  Versus Kurdish in terp re tations O f *Che Kurdish S tate
The reasons for the establishment of the Kurdish state and its destruction were interpreted 
differently by Kurdish and British contemporaries. After the overthrow of the first Kurdish Gov­
ernment, Wilson downgraded its importance and distorted it as no more than a feudal system 
under the direct control of British officials. 38 He consistently used the term ‘confederation’ to 
define the autonomous Kurdish entity in his communications, implying that it was nothing 
more than a union among Kurdish tribes based on the willingness of all parties, and not an 
agreed political-administrative arrangement between the British and Mahmud. Maj. Soane 
described the Kurdish Government as a retrograde tribal system. Such descriptions of Kurd­
ish autonomy sought to pre-empt any criticism of the overthrow of the Kurdish Government, 
and avoid any responsibility for the subsequent political instability. Closer examination of the 
period contradicts Wilson and Soane’s claims. Mahmud was not a figurehead in the existing 
administration and did not want to be one as desired by Wilson. As governor of the autono­
mous Kurdish entity, he had the authority to run local affairs and to appoint Kurdish officials in 
different areas under his control. British officials, including Noel, had an advisory role and 
therefore did not control the government. In other words, the British exercised their influence 
through Mahmud, and Kurdish officials were directly responsible to him. For example,the 
administration report on the Qada of Keuisenjaq highlighted the fact that the Hakim-i-SharJ 
(local governor) in charge of this Qada was directly responsible to Mahmud, while a British 
assistant political officer was his adviser, not his superior, in terms of administrative issues. 39  
All the administration’s personnel were Kurdish. The Kurdish Government had its own military 
force (i.e. Kurdish levies), which was organised under Kurdish officers, who were totally loyal 
to Mahmud.4 0 Kurdish was the official language of the autonomous entity. Laws were mod­
ified in line with Kurdish custom. The Kurdish entity had its own budget and was based on a 
newly-established system of revenue collection and taxation, aimed at developing the area 
and improve the welfare of the Kurdish people, though the surplus was sent to the British 
authorities in Baghdad.
From the Kurdish point of view, the establishment of the Kurdish administration was 
not only a permanent arrangement, but also the nucleus of an independent Kurdish state that 
would ultimately include the whole of Southern Kurdistan. Moreover, it was not only a recogni-
38* Ibid, p9.
39* Administration Report on Keuisenjaq.., op. cit., p31.
40* Precis of Affairs.., op. cit., p16.
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tion of Mahmud’s authority as a national leader, but, most importantly, a recognition of South­
ern Kurdistan as having a different political and administrative status from British-controlled 
Mesopotamia. It is difficult to establish whether Noel informed the Kurdish side of the provi­
sional nature of the political and administrative arrangements relating to the establishment of 
the autonomous Kurdish entity. Kurdish contemporaries, such as Helmi and Mahmud’s bro­
ther, Sheikh Qadir, not only rejected this claim but also believed they had been promised an 
expansion of Kurdish self-government. What encouraged such an interpretation was British 
approval for merging new Kurdish areas, situated between the Greater and the Lesser Zab 
Rivers, with the Kurdish autonomous entity. Noel himself asked for Baghdad’s approval for 
uniting the remainder of Southern Kurdistan with the autonomous Kurdish entity. Certain 
areas in Eastern Kurdistan across the Persian frontier presented similar requests. The British 
authorities themselves admitted that they had suggested a “Kurdistan for the Kurds” under 
their protection leading to the establishment of a Kurdish entity. This proposal had 
attracted “real popularity”, and “all the neighbouring tribes had shown evident signs of their 
wish to join the Kurdish confederation".41 According to this state of affairs, the British agreed 
that
any Kurdish tribes from the Greater Zab to the Dyalah (other than those in Persian territory) 
who, of their [own] free will, accepted the leadership of Sheikh Mahmud, would be allowed to do 
so and the latter would have our moral support in controlling the above areas on behalf of the 
British Government.^
Southern Kurdistan was, according to Noel, “quiet and contented”43 during the few 
months of the Kurdish Government. Yet, it was this rapid consolidation of the Kurdish entity 
and the extension of the Mahmud Government’s influence to other Kurdish areas that 
appeared to precipitate Wilson’s action to put an end to this unwelcome, albeit successful, 
experiment. From December 1918 onward, Southern Kurdistan witnessed a gradual deter­
ioration in British-Kurdish relations. On the one hand, Wilson and his like-minded subordi­
nates saw it as necessary to contain the influence of the Kurdish Government and, on the 
other, Mahmud persistently asked for the expansion of his entity to include other Kurdish 
areas. Mahmud considered what he asked for as legitimate, given its compatibility with the 
desires of local Kurds and with British policy. On 1 December 1918, Wilson visited Sulaima­
niya, where he held a meeting with the Kurdish Government in the presence of 60 Kurdish
41* Ibid, p10 
42* Ibid.
43* E.W.L. Noel, Note -in- Colonial Office Minute No.4958,22 July 1922, CO730/13, PRO.
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notables from Southern and Eastern Kurdistan. At this meeting, the Kurdish side sought to 
obtain a promise from the British regarding the political future not only of Southern Kurdistan, 
but all parts of Kurdistan, i.e. a united and an independent Kurdistan under British 
protection. 44
In Helmi’s view, the demands for political unity under Mahmud, by both Eastern and 
Southern Kurdish notables, persuaded Wilson to overthrow him .45 in contrast, the British 
authorities in Baghdad regarded Mahmud’s actions and demands as a deviation from their 
past agreement. 46 Mahmud was now described as a tyrant, who had an unreliable and rebel­
lious background. His ambitions to extend his rule to undesirable areas, such as Arbil and the 
Mosul division and anti-Allies Kurds, turned Mahmud into a menace to the future peace of the 
country.47 Consequently, according to Wilson, steps had to be taken to prevent Mahmud’s 
influence from spreading to “regions where it was unnecessary or objectionable and where it 
offered a possible menace to peace in the future”as  To sum up Wilson’s attitudes towards 
Mahmud, it can be said that he agreed to the establishment of Kurdish self-government 
because of the relative vulnerability of the British position in Mesopotamia. He had, however, 
considered it to be no more than a temporary arrangement:
Without the full measure of co-operation and assistance which he [i.e. Mahmud] was then giv­
ing us, it would have been necessary to bring in a strong garrison which at the time was out of 
the question. From the political point of view, too, it was of great importance that we should 
maintain order in the area and, at the same time, [we] should avoid the appearance of using 
force for this purpose.49
As soon as it was realised that the Kurdish Government no longer needed to render 
service to the British, following the consolidation of their influence in Southern Kurdistan, Wil­
son not only removed Mahmud, but also wound up the whole autonomous entity. Wilson’s 
fears grew when indirect British control proved to be successful in achieving its aims in South­
ern Kurdistan, namely the establishment of peace and order, without entailing any military or 
financial commitments. He feared that, apart from encouraging London to expand indirect rule 
to the rest of the Kurdish area, a similar policy would be adopted towards the Arabs in Mesopo­
tamia. 50  Therefore, as soon as he had the military and political means to administer Southern
44* India Office, Political Department, 27 August 1919, F0371/4192, PRO, p.2.
45* Helmi, Memoirs, Vol.I, p.94.
46* Administration Report of the Sulaimaniya division.., op. cit.
47* Precis of Affairs.., op. cit., p15.
48*lbid.
49* Ibid, p. 12.
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Kurdistan on a direct basis, Wilson wasted no time in taking measures designed to overthrow
the autonomous Kurdish Government. According to Noel, the decision to end the Kurdish
Government was taken by Wilson alone, and implemented by his successor, Maj. Soane, with­
out prior consultations with the British officers who served in that govemment.51
The Imposition Of Direct British Rule And Its Impact On The Political Situa­
tion In Southern Kurdistan
Wilson’s step by step policy to undermine the Kurdish Government left Mahmud and the 
nationalist circle around him with no option but to revolt against the British authorities in Bagh­
dad, accusing them not only of going back on their previous promises, but of also destroying 
what the Kurds had achieved so far. His revolt was a spontaneous reaction against Wilson’s 
new policy of direct rule and had nothing to do with the anti-British activities of the Young 
Turks, as Briton C. Busch suggests.52  Wilson’s new policy was symbolised by the change in 
the British personnel who worked as advisers to the Kurdish Government. The revolt sought a 
restoration of the status quo ante, without aiming to terminate British influence or threaten 
their interests. Mahmud was aware that the defeat of the British was out of question, and 
hoped that the peace conference would recognise Kurdish nationalist aspirations. The revolt 
started on 22 May 1919, with the arrest of all British political and military officials in Sulaimaniya. 
It received support from certain Kurds from Eastern Kurdistan, who jointly captured the Halab- 
jah region, including the town itself. In spite of Mahmud’s apparent hope of negotiation and 
the absence of bloodshed by this point, Wilson adopted a military response, hoping to put an 
end, once and for all, to the autonomous Kurdish entity. He wanted to make sure that the 
breach between both sides would be permanent.
In spite of the suppression of the revolt and the arrest of its leader, Kurdish resistance 
to British direct rule did not die. The followers and sympathisers of Mahmud in Southern and 
Eastern Kurdistan continued their sporadic military activities. 53 Wilson’s policy of ending the 
autonomous Kurdish entity, and paving the way for the amalgamation of Southern Kurdistan 
and the directly-administered British Mesopotamia, received no support from the Kurdish
51* Ibid.
52* Briton C. Busch, Mudros to Lausanne: Britain’s Frontier in West Asia, 1918-1923 (New York: State 
University of New York Press, Albany, 1976), p.186.
53* In their first armed confrontation with Mahmud’s forces, the British were defeated. Soon, they orga­
nised a much stronger military campaign .which succeeded in suppressing the Kurdish revolt. Sheikh 
Mahmud was arrested injured. He was put on trial and ultimately sent to India where he served his sen­
tence.
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population, apart from what the British authorities described as “a few of the more enlightened 
members of the community” 54 The predominant political characteristic of the period after 
June 1919 was the prevalence instability and disorder, especially in the most mountainous 
areas .55 The policy of direct British control not only failed in Southern Kurdistan, but also in 
Arab Mesopotamia, where a bloody revolt broke out in 1920. As a result, some 426 British 
soldiers were killed, 615 were reported missing, prisoners or presumed dead, in addition to 
1,228 wounded.
Kurdish opposition to and resentment of direct British control was not confined to 
those areas which had been controlled by, or supported Mahmud’s Government, but also 
included other areas of Southern Kurdistan. In Arbil, the Dizai Kurds demanded political and 
administrative arrangements similar to those made south of the Lesser Zab River. The conse­
quent British cosmetic changes that left the structure of direct control intact, such as giving 
the Kurdish notables honorary ranks and some consultation on administrative matters,did not 
stop the unrest from spreading. In the Mosul division, the dispatched British officers found 
the local Kurds in such areas as Zakho and Aqra far more difficult to deal with than those in the 
southern districts near Sulaimaniya, when attempting to organise districts on a direct rule 
basis.se in early April 1919, the disturbances in Zakho culminated in the murder of its British 
Assistant Political Officer, Capt. C. Pearson. 57 An extract from the diary of the Political Officer 
at Arbil showed that the Surchis and the Barzans were actively anti-British. 58 Earlier, the Bar- 
zans sided with the Zibars in their anti-British revolt. It resulted in the murder of Col. Bill, Leach­
man’s successor as the Political Officer of the Mosul division, and Capt. K. Scott, the Assistant 
Political Officer at Aqra.59
What multiplied Kurdish anger against the British in the Mosul division was the latter’s 
support for the Christian minority at the expense of local Kurds, by resettling Christian refu­
gees from Persia in Kurdish territory and using them as a British instrument of control. This 
method of consolidating direct control through divide and rule was epitomised in Leachman’s 
actions in the Kurdish area in his division in Mosul. Indeed, there were very few British officials
54* Precis of Affairs.., op. cit., p.12.
55* Sulaimaniya Monthly Progress Report for the Month of August 1919, F0371/5070 & Administration 
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70
on the ground who did not believe in the viability of such methods to control the Southern 
Kurds. For instance, on the eve of the Amadia uprising, Col. Bill expressed his apprehension 
at implementing the Assyrian repatriation proposal,6o just days before his murder at the hands
of Kurdish rebels:
The only consideration, which would drive the [Kurdish] tribes into irreconcilable opposition, is 
the idea that we are going to support the Christians against the Muslims in every way... at the 
very moment, when we are trying to work out modus vivendi with the Muslims.01
Wilson argued differently in that the question of Christian repatriation had nothing to do with 
the outbreak of the Amadia uprising, which forced his subordinates to evacuate Aqra .62  He 
dismissed the idea that a Kurdish nationalist reaction was the main source of British troubles.63 
By contrast, Helmi attributed the widespread Kurdish resentment to the British heavy-handed 
policy, following Mahmud’s departure to lndia.64
Other British officials on the ground attributed unwelcome events, such as the Ama­
dia uprising in November 1919, to Turkish anti-Christian propaganda and to French pro- 
Christian propaganda, which raised enormous fears among the local Kurds. 65 Generally, they 
ascribed the change in Kurdish attitudes towards Britain to two factors. The first factor was the 
Kurds themselves: their “ordinary dislike of law", the “personal ambitions of their local leaders” 
and their internal differences. The second factor was external: the Kemalists’ activities among 
the Kurds such as exploiting their religious feelings and inter-tribal jealousy, ee the widespread 
Bolshevik doctrines imported from Persia and Turkey,67 and the return of Kurdish prisoners 
from India, who brought with them stories of how the British oppressed the Indians. 68 Kurdish 
opposition to the British -in the form of hit and run attacks as well as local rebellions- was not 
confined to Mosul and Sulaimaniya, but also western parts of Kurdistan, such as Jezirah-ibn- 
Omar. As the British authorities on the ground were unable to put an end to political instability 
in Southern Kurdistan, fears began to arise in London. The prospect of a general anti-British 
uprising among the Kurds would call into question the nature of all British commitments in Kur-
60* Foreign Office Minute No. 168555,8 January 1920, F0371/4193, PRO.
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distan.69 Partly because of this, there were calls in various official circles to formulate a clear- 
cut British policy towards Kurdistan’s future as quickly as possible.
The growing tension between the Southern Kurds and the British aroused the fears 
of Kurdish nationalist circles in Northern Kurdistan. They must have feared that this state of 
affairs in British-occupied Kurdistan might lead Britain to react unfavourably towards the Kurd­
ish question at the peace conference, and refuse to take a mandate for the whole of Kurdi­
stan. They probably feared that the Turks would benefit from the situation by winning over the 
resentful Kurds. However, they believed that the source of Britain’s troubles in occupied Kur­
distan lay in its policy on the ground. In the wake of the Aqra Incident, the Kurdish Indepen­
dence Committee in Northern Kurdistan informed the British Government of its opinion 
regarding the causes of the current disturbances in British occupied-Kurdistan, emphasising 
its Kurdish origins. It reminded the British that the same Kurdish tribes which had welcomed 
them now rebelled against them. The Committee attributed this largely to the behaviour of 
British officials, who ignored Kurdish nationalist feelings and customs, warning against the 
growing Kurdish enmity towards Britain and calling on the British to improve the situation. It 
recommended as a short term solution, while awaiting the independence of Kurdistan, the 
appointment of those British officials who were *well acquainted with the psychoiogy and 
character of the tribes” jo Similarly, Noel agreed that the reversal of British policy on the 
ground from sponsoring Kurdish nationalism to undermining it, as a method of maintaining 
British influence in Ottoman Kurdistan, was the main reason for the consequent British trou­
bles in Southern Kurdistan.71
Calls began to be made both by British officials on the ground and Kurdish notables 
for the return of indirect control via the establishment of a form of Kurdish autonomy. These 
stemmed from the growing realisation that there was an urgent need to contain the rapidly 
growing Kurdish resentment of British rule. Despite his firm belief in direct British rule, and 
having previously expressed strong reservations about Kurdish autonomy, 72 Maj. Soane 
regarded the re-establishment of a Kurdish governorship under Hamdi Beg Baban, a British- 
orientated Kurd, as the “most reasonabie” suggestion, and that “such a step is advisable soo­
ner or later to disarm propagandists”, namely, Mahmud's’ followers, who claimed that the Brit-
69* Parliamentary Question, No. 151967,14 November 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
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ish had backed down on their promises. 73 Other British assistant officers in Southern Kurdi­
stan, such as Capt. C.T. Beale, called on Wilson to consider the idea of introducing indirect 
British control in the Rowanduz region through the creation of a tiny Kurdish “state" to re­
establish peace and order, after the British failure to control it directly.7 4  This latter area was 
strategically important by virtue of its overlooking one of the main roads between Southern 
and Eastern Kurdistan. They nominated Said Taha as Kurdish Governor of that tiny Kurdish 
entity because of his influence in the area. Even Leachman endorsed the idea of installing 
Said Taha as Governor of such a tiny state in the Rowanduz district.75
The calls for the re-establishment of an autonomous Kurdish government in South­
ern Kurdistan were not confined to the nationalist circles in Sulaimaniya. Soon Wilson found 
that even those Kurdish notables whom he encouraged to turn against Mahmud’s Govern­
ment or to adopt a neutral stand, wanted Kurdish autonomy as a guarantee against Southern 
Kurdistan’s incorporation into a Mesopotamian state. In July 1920, a memorandum was signed 
by sixty two leading tribal leaders, as well as townsmen, in the Arbil and Sulaimaniya regions, in 
which they demanded that Kurdistan should be constituted as an independent state under 
British mandate7e in line with the British Government’s earlier promises. They also asked that 
Southern Kurdistan should have its own representative at the peace conference. 77  in March 
Capt C.A. Rundle reported that at his meetings with two pro-British notables, Mullah Mohmod 
Effendi, the Hakim-i-Shar1, and his deputy, Jamil Agha, the former “was very emphatic... in the 
opinion that Kurdish Hukmdar should be appointed" and that “the Hukmdar must have British 
support and advice”.™ They suggested that the proposed autonomous state should include 
“ail Kurdistan within the British mandatory area".™ Apart from bringing political stability back to 
Southern Kurdistan following the overthrow of Mahmud’s Government, the motives of these 
and other Kurdish notables seemed to be the growing Kurdish anxiety about the return of
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Turkish rule to Southern Kurdistan, or its inclusion in an Arab state in Mesopotamia.so These 
examples demonstrate that, despite increasing British political difficulties -such as the pro­
spect of military and financial commitments, and the dilemma of not being able to withdraw or 
to station troops permanently in Southern Kurdistan- Wilson remained adamant in his belief 
that direct control should continue, and that any autonomous Kurdish state, however limited 
its size and authority, should not be countenanced.
London’s Attitudes Towards The Affairs Of Southern Kurdistan
The most striking aspect of Wilson’s position on Kurdish affairs was his ability to pursue a 
policy remarkably different from what he suggested to the British Government. At one of the 
meetings of the Interdepartmental Conference of Middle Eastern affairs -which was held 
under the chairmanship of Lord Curzon to discuss the future administration of Mesopotamia 
(17 April 1919)- Wilson suggested that instead of establishing a united and autonomous Kur­
distan in the British-occupied Kurdish areas, Britain should set up a number of smaller autono­
mous Kurdish states: one in the Sulaimaniya region, the second in the Rowanduz region, the 
third in Amadia and the fourth in Jezirah-ibn-Omar, etc.si These autonomous states would be 
governed by local Kurdish notables, who would have as their advisers British officials sent by 
the British authorities of Mesopotamia. The conference agreed in principle that:
Wilson should be authorised to take steps for the creation of five provinces [as] suggested by 
Col. [Evelyn] Howell for Iraq.., and for an Arab province of Mosul, surrounded by a fringe of 
autonomous Kurdish states under Kurdish chiefs, with British political advisers.82
But Wilson never initiated such steps and instead, he set out to reorganise the administration 
of Southern Kurdistan on a direct control basis, and gave the destruction of the autonomous 
Kurdish entity an exceptional priority.
The following examination of the structure of British control in Southern Kurdistan 
undoubtedly shows that the area was being organised by Wlson on a direct control basis. 
Since December 1918, when it became clear that Area A would be transferred to a British 
sphere of influence, Wilson had devoted his efforts and time to the establishment of direct 
British control in Southern Kurdistan. This took two forms. The first was a tribal system, accord-
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ing to which each Kurdish tribe was viewed as a “political formation" under the nominal author­
ity of its chief (or chiefs), who w a r  selected by the British authorities according to his loyalty. 
British assistant political officers closely supervised these chiefs and through them British 
orders were put into practice. This form of direct administration was applied mostly to the 
mountainous sub-districts, such as Qala Diza, and certain powerful tribes, such as the Jaf and 
Pizhder, as well as remote Kurdish areas. The second form was more outright control via Brit­
ish officials. According to this administrative system, the Sulaimaniya division was divided into 
five districts: Sulaimaniya, Sharbezher, Chemchemal, Halabjah and Rania. Every district was 
under an assistant political officer. Their districts were subdivided into Mudirliqs (sub-districts) 
and administered by mudirs, who might be Kurdish. This system was applied mostly to the 
plain areas and towns, where the British could deploy their forces quickly in an emergency.
In May 1919, the Kurds also lost control over the Kurdish Levies, when they were 
brought under the command of British officers. The number of Kurdish officers decreased 
from thirty six under Kurdish self-government to nine. Moreover, Kurdish conscripts were for­
ced to take service under the British Government. 83 The Kirkuk division, which had been part 
of the Sulaimaniya division until February 1919, had closer British control. 84 Wilson began to 
establish the newly-created division of Arbil on a direct control line.es All Kurdish divisions 
were supposed to have a division council under close British control. Wilson and his subordi­
nates’ ultimate objective was to incorporate Southern Kurdistan, as a whole, into the British 
administration of Mesopotamia. In his comments on the administration report of the Sulaima­
niya division for the year 1919, Hubert Young of the Foreign Office describes Wilson’s above 
mentioned administrative steps as “a very illuminating account of the destruction of the steps 
originally taken to form an autonomous Kurdistan and the establishment of direct administra­
tion in its place”.ae it should be borne in mind that the structure of direct British rule in South­
ern Kurdistan was different from that of Mesopotamia due to the differences between the two 
regions in terms of British political control and geographical features. Moreover, whereas Lon­
don was far more directly involved in any decision regarding the political and administrative 
arrangements for Arab Mesopotamia, it allowed the British authorities in Baghdad to make
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decisions on the ground insofar as Southern Kurdistan was concerned. This state of affairs 
reflected the fact that London knew what would be the political future of Mesopotamia, unlike 
Southern Kurdistan, whose fate was still undecided upon.
As previously mentioned, Wilson’s reversal of Kurdish policy on the ground caused 
widespread political instability, and the British were forced to take punitive military operations 
and aerial bombardments of Kurdish villages. Far from consolidating British control, these 
actions resulted in the restoration of some Turkish influence in the Kurdish areas. These poli­
tical and military developments were naturally unwelcomed by the British Government. Apart 
from its opposition to new military and financial commitments, London was worried that Wil­
son’s policy of denying Kurdish national aspirations might turn Southern Kurdistan into a per­
manent threat to British interests in Mesopotamia as well as in Persia. Even the India Office, 
which up to this point favoured Southern Kurdistan’s subjection, questioned the advantages 
of Wilson’s attempts to impose direct control in such remote areas as Amadia, where British 
officers were being killed. 87 in August 1919, the India Office telegraphed Wilson regarding 
London’s general anxiety about the Kurdish situation. Apart from acute financial difficulties, 
and despite the uncertainty about Kurdistan’s future, Britain should establish neither direct 
administration nor effective military occupation, but loose political supervision, as the main 
method of securing its strategic interests in Kurdistan. The telegram reminded Wilson that the 
British Government:
hitherto supported policy of extending British influence to Southern Kurdistan because they 
believed that inhabitants themselves welcomed it. It was on this understanding that they sanc­
tioned your proposai to create., autonomous Kurdish States under Kurdish Chiefs with British 
political advisers.. It would now appear that belief was misplaced and that [the] inhabitants, far 
from welcoming British influence, are so actively hostile that strategic railway[s] are required 
to keep them in check. In these circumstances, might it not be [a] better course to withdraw 
our political officers, &c., and leave Kurds to their own devices? [The] alternative of maintain­
ing order by force among reluctant mountain tribesmen opens up [a] prospect of military com­
mitments, which HMG contemplates with gravest apprehension. Last thing they desire is to 
create a new North-West Frontier problem [as in India] on the north-eastern borders of Iraq.* 8
This telegram highlights the degree to which the British Government had mistakenly assumed 
that Wilson was reorganising Southern Kurdistan’s administration on the basis of autonomous 
Kurdish states. The reason for London’s confusion seemed to be the information he sent 
regarding the real nature of his steps on the ground. The British troubles in Southern Kurdi­
stan, as in Mesopotamia, exposed the shortcomings of direct rule: financially expensive, mili­
tarily hazardous and politically harmful.
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Yet British authorities in Mesopotamia attributed the reversal of their Kurdish policy to 
the fact that their original task of establishing "an independent Southern Kurdistan” under 
their auspices was impractical owing to “the backward and undeveloped state of the country, 
the lack of communications and the dissensions of the tribes”. Therefore, the administrative 
partition of Southern Kurdistan, and then its amalgamation with British-administered Mesopo­
tamia, was presented as a necessary and justifiable course of actions. 89 In the ensuing 
exchange of telegrams between Wilson and the India Office regarding Southern Kurdistan, 
the former continued to defend his Kurdish policy by disputing the claim that the Kurdish self- 
government was a viable alternative. He even argued that the Mahmud Government should 
not have been established in the first place:
[The] idea, embodied in President Wilson’s 14 points and confirmed in [the] Anglo-French 
declaration of 8 November, of substituting nationality, religion or race as [a] basis of govern­
ment in the Middle East in lieu of ‘ability and power to govern', has aroused [the] dormant ani­
mosities of [the] past hundred years. Coming, as it did, on top of acute misery arising out of 
war, it was eagerly adopted by every race and sect and interpreted according to their racial 
idiosyncrasies.so
The existence of widespread anti-British activities in Southern Kurdistan was reported 
in the British press at home9i and raised questions in the British parliament about the long­
term British policy in that region. 9 2  Wilson, however, continued to argue that the majority of 
the population welcomed the policy of direct rule, based not on “force but consent”. Kurdish 
people, according to Wilson, even demanded more British supervision after "a brief test of 
nationalist anarchy” under Mahmud. 93 To mitigate London’s fears of an increase in financial 
expenditure, Wilson argued that the economic wealth of Southern Kurdistan would not lead 
to increased British financial commitments, and that the prospects for the British administra­
tion would be even brighter because of the existence of oil fields and fertile wheat-growing 
land. He stressed that the overthrow of the Kurdish Government was the only way to foil the 
attempts of the “disorderly element” to control Southern Kurdistan; otherwise, Britain would 
be forced to make more military commitments to protect Kirkuk, Kifri and Arbil. Wilson wanted 
London’s proposal for an autonomous Southern Kurdistan to be submitted to strategic con­
siderations, and these should alone define the degree of British supervision. According to 
such considerations, Sulaimaniya, the core of Kurdish nationalism, had to come under far clo-
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ser British supervision than other Kurdish areas because of its geographical and military impor­
tance. Furthermore, Wilson argued that an autonomous Southern Kurdistan would have one 
consequence: total abandonment of the country. This policy would undermine British strate­
gic positions in the Baghdad and Basra Wilayets, incurring grave political instability.94 As a con­
sequence, Britain would be forced to make a far greater military and financial commitment than 
direct British control would require in Southern Kurdistan. Despite its failure, direct British con­
trol in Southern Kurdistan continued as a result of the influence of British officials on the 
ground. In this respect, a Foreign Office minute reveals how Soane could resist, in his capa­
city as a Political Officer, the application of a new British approach to Kurdish affairs by prevent­
ing the appointment of a Kurdish governor.95
One of the consequences of Wilson’s failure was the rejection by the British Govern­
ment of his proposal for the construction of a railway from Qizil Robat towards Kifri and Kirkuk. 
There were strong suspicions among British policy makers that Wilson wanted to use the rail­
way to consolidate direct British control and to suppress Kurdish revolts. Although Edwin 
Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, initially accepted Wilson’s scheme for the incorpora­
tion of Southern Kurdistan into British Mesopotamia on strategic grounds, 96 most of those 
British military and civilian officials who attended a meeting held at the India Office recommen­
ded the establishment of tiny Kurdish states: one in Sulaimaniya and one in Jezirah-ibn- 
Omar.97 But nothing along these lines materialised, as British official circles could not decide 
upon Southern Kurdistan’s long-term future beyond its inclusion in the British mandate for 
Mesopotamia.
The Consequences Of The Imposition Of Direct British Rule In Southern Kur­
distan For The Kurdish Question
The destruction of the Kurdish autonomous entity by the British authorities in Mesopotamia 
was not due to its failure to fulfil the tasks expected of it, namely establishing political stability, 
the re-activation of economic life, and above all, obtaining the friendship of the local Kurds. 
On all these levels, the Kurdish Government led by Mahmud was successful, without entailing
94* Civil Commissioner, Baghdad 13 February 1920, F0371/5070, PRO.
95* Foreign Office Minute No. 15161,3 December 1920, FO371/5069, PRO.
96* A. Hirtzel, India Office, 25 November 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
97* The meeting was chaired by Arthur Hirtzel, India Office Under Secretary, to discuss Wilson’ propo­
sals for the boundaries between Mesopotamia and Kurdistan, dated 27 November, No.14269. Minute of 
a Meeting Held at the India Office, 6 December 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
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military, political or financial commitments from Britain. Furthermore, it helped to consolidate 
British influence in an area that was growing in importance due to its geographical location. It 
connected the British to northern and north-west Persia, where the Bolshevik threat was 
growing, and it adjoined the French sphere of influence and areas where Britain could influ­
ence the course of political events, such as Armenia, Northern Kurdistan and Anatolia. In the 
light of this, the overthrow of Kurdish Government should be attributed not to its failure, but to 
its success and its immediate political implications. Wilson, who directly took charge of Kurdish 
affairs in June 1919, feared that the success of the Kurdish experiment would likely lead to 
the establishment of an autonomous state of Southern Kurdistan. At the same time, he 
feared that the two Arab Wilayets of Baghdad and Basra would follow suit, thereby terminating 
the direct control system overall Mesopotamia. His views were shared by the majority of local 
British military and civilian officials, and this explains why it was impossible to re-establish Kurd­
ish autonomy in British-controlled areas up until the formation of the second Mahmud Govern­
ment in the autumn of 1922.
The period 1919-20 was exceptionally important because direct British rule had dire 
consequences for the Kurds in terms of their subjection to new methods of control and losing 
an unprecedented opportunity to achieve their nationalist aspirations. Wilson and his like- 
minded civil and military officials set an example for the future, by developing the methods by 
which Southern Kurdistan could be kept under control, and be part of a Mesopotamian admin­
istration. Consequently, his successors would find it much easier to incorporate Southern 
Kurdistan into Mesopotamia, rather than establishing it as an autonomous or independent 
state. Examination of his reports between 1918 and 1920 shows that Wilson and his subordi­
nates distorted information regarding the actual size of Southern Kurdistan, the demographi- 
cal distribution of the Kurds, their political aspirations and economic links. For example, such 
Kurdish towns as Arbil and Kirkuk were not, Wilson reported, Kurdish but Turkish.98 The 
Kurds lived only in the mountainous areas and were commercially dependent upon their links 
with Arab Mesopotamia. They were divided into groups, one of which was ethnically Kurdish 
(i.e. tribes), the other of which was not Kurdish (i.e. those who belonged to no tribe at all). In 
addition, Wilson did not consider the Christian, Jewish and Yazidi Kurds to be Kurdish. To 
contain the Kurdish nationalist movement, Wilson and his subordinates revived old Turkish 
methods of divide and rule by encouraging localism and tribalism, which were institutionalised
98* Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 8 November 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.lt should be said many of the 
Kurdish population of Arbil spoke (and still speak) Turkish alongside Kurdish.
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within the system of direct rule.
From a military point of view, British military and civilian authorities in Mesopotamia 
were in agreement that such strategic Kurdish places as Amadia should be turned into settle­
ments for Assyrians, who had fled Persia. These Assyrians could be organised and used as a 
force to suppress Kurdish revolts. 99  The military authorities in Mesopotamia had for some time 
been planning to both use and urge the Assyrians to suppress the Kurdish revolts and to 
maintain British influence in Southern Kurdistan:
For generations the Assyrians had been fighting the Kurds... It will be much better to allow the 
commandant of the [ Assyrian] refugees at the camp at Baqubah to invite Malik Khoshaba... 
and other officers... to form three Drogin battalions or three thousand men to [serve]under a 
British commander for a while [in] Amadia. 0^0
Among other low-cost military measures that Wilson and the military called for to consolidate 
British positions in the mountainous parts of Southern Kurdistan, was the air force. 101 From 
then onward, the use of the Royal Air Force began to emerge as the ideal way of keeping 
Southern Kurdistan under British control. All these methods of control, used or advocated by 
Wilson and other like-minded officials in Mesopotamia, were incorporated into future British 
policy towards Southern Kurdistan, especially after the establishment of the Iraqi state.
The imposition of direct British rule and the disappearance of the autonomous entity 
had far reaching political effects on the Kurdish question. The suppression of Sheikh Mah­
mud and the nationalist circle that rallied around him resulted in the considerable undermining 
of the Kurdish nationalist movement in Southern Kurdistan. The importance of Sheikh Mah­
mud’s leadership for Southern Kurds was even conceded by the British authorities in Bagh­
dad:
with all his faults, he was at the time a considerable political asset. In Southern Kurdistan, for 
one who opposed his appointment, there were four others who welcomed it and this is a low 
proportion of dissent in a country where family ties and internecine feuds play so large a part...
The salient factor remained that Sheikh Mahmud was a power in the land and as such his 
appointment was a distinct asset in our dealings with the bulk of the tribes. 102
99* For example, Wilson suggested to Curzon that Britain should take advantage of the murder of a Brit­
ish official by local Kurds in order to settle Assyrian refugees within the armistice Line. This suggestion 
sought to create a pro-British basis among population. Letter From Young to Kidston, 15 September 
1919. F0371/4192, PRO.
100* Ex. Commander-in-Chief to General Officer Commanding, 5 August 1919, AIR20/513, PRO.
101* Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, February 1920, F0371/5067, PRO. British aerial bombardments of 
Kurdish civilian centres during 1919 were probably the first of their kind in modern history when they 
used to suppress local rebellions. For details on the role of the British air force in Kurdistan see David C. 
Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: the Royal Air Force, 1919-1939, (Manchester: 1990)
102* Precis of Affairs.., op. cit., p.13.
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In Eastern Kurdistan a number of Kurdish regions expressed their readiness to come under 
autonomous Kurdish rule and recognise Mahmud’s leadership. The absence of a Kurdish lea­
dership, as a political alternative to the rule of British officials, made the continuation of direct 
control inevitable in Southern Kurdistan, despite London’s uneasiness. This also had two 
other political implications. The first was that it paved the way for the incorporation of Southern 
Kurdistan into the British mandate over Mesopotamia, which represented a de facto partition 
of Ottoman Kurdistan. Secondly, when the state of Iraq was created by the British through 
merging the Baghdad and Basra Wilayets, Southern Kurdistan was, in comparison, falling 
behind in terms of political status, lacking both the bureaucracy and leadership to rally local 
Kurds. These factors made it easier for the British to concentrate on the success of one 
experiment, namely Arab rule in Baghdad and Basra, at the expense of other issues, includ­
ing the future of Southern Kurdistan.
Conclusion
The Allied victory in the First World War and the disintegration of the ancient Ottoman Empire 
symbolised the end of the old regional order in the Middle East. The process of re-drawing a 
new political map for the post-war Middle East seemed to offer the new nationalities, such as 
the Kurds, Arabs and Armenians, an unprecedented opportunity to realise their long-held 
political aspirations. The impact of the war re-vitalised the Kurdish nationalist movement in 
Ottoman and Qajar Kurdistan.British control of the southern parts of Kurdistan made the 
Kurds feel even more optimistic, as they perceived the British, in particular, to be their 
saviours from the Ottoman Turks. Indeed, the slogan of “Kurdistan for the Kurds", which was 
used to guide immediate British political and administrative measures in Southern Kurdistan 
after the war, was a very promising start.
The subsequent change in British policy, from indirect to direct control after June 
1919, illustrated how premature Kurdish optimism was. In the absence of a defined British 
policy towards Kurdistan’s future, British officials’ measures on the ground became an impor­
tant factor in influencing the subsequent political developments and the way London approa­
ched the Kurdish situation at the peace conference. By providing all the strategic, economic 
and political arguments for the need to consolidate British position in Mesopotamia, British 
officials, especially Wilson, influenced London’s decision to place Southern Kurdistan under
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the Mesopotamian mandate. In other words, Southern Kurdistan was not only prevented from 
becoming an autonomous entity, but politically detached from the remainder of Kurdistan. 
Ttuis was an early indication that the thinking of British policy makers was directed against the 
idea of a united Kurdistan, which Kurdish nationalists demanded.
The effects of suppressing Southern Kurdish nationalists and the winding up of their 
government transcended the boundaries of the British-controlled Southern Kurdistan. Such 
British actions helped to impede the development of Kurdish nationalist movement by dis­
rupting all attempts to co-ordinate Kurdish political efforts on a Kurdistan-wide basis. The 
absence of the nationalist leadership of Mahmud from the Kurdish political scene after June 
1919 partly explains the lack of political co-ordination between the efforts of the Southern and 
Northern Kurds at a very sensitive time, namely the deliberation of Kurdistan’s future at the 
peace conference. While In Southern Kurdistan Mahmud had engaged in preparing the way 
for an active role for the Southern Kurds at that conference. To this end, he worked towards 
granting General Cherif Pasha, the Kurdish representative at the peace conference, a man­
date in the form of a petition signed by influential Southern Kurds so that he could speak for 
both Southern and Northern Kurdistan. 103 Mahmud’s other efforts in the direction of a Kur­
distan-wide co-operation were frustrated, such as his endeavour to bring many parts of East­
ern Kurdistan under Kurdish rule. The British were determined to prevent any political cohe­
sion between Southern and Eastern Kurdistan in order not to undermine Persia’s territorial 
unity. In his memoirs, Rafik Helmi explains how the attempts of the British authorities in Bagh­
dad prevented a Kurdish delegation -sent by the Kurdish Government- from reaching Paris to 
join Cherif Pasha. 104 Mahmud himself could be partly blamed for the worsening of British- 
Kurdish relations in Southern Kurdistan, which culminated in his exile. He was over-optimistic, 
impatient and, in Helmi’s words, politically inexperienced when dealing with the British authori­
ties in Baghdad. 105 These characteristics manifested themselves in Mahmud’s unceasing 
pressure on the British to act swiftly to fulfil their promises about expanding Kurdish rule, 
before gaining full British confidence in his leadership and political intentions.
One of the main consequences of the above mentioned developments was that the 
Kurds had much less political weight, and were placed in a weaker position than they desired 
at the start of the peace conference’s deliberations on the future of Kurdistan. The Sheikh
103* Helmi, Memoirs,Vo\.\, pp. 19 & 65-66.
104* Ibid, pp.65-66.
105* Ibid, p.67.
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Mahmud affair made the British Government look less favourably upon the Kurds, whom it per­
ceived as troublesome people, who lacked reliable leaders. The termination of the experi­
ment of Kurdish autonomy undermined Noel’s efforts to secure London’s support for Kurdish 
nationalist aspirations at the peace conference, as the establishment of that government was 
associated with his approach to the Kurdish question. Perhaps the most negative conse­
quence of the disappearance of the autonomous Kurdish Government was that nationalist 
Kurdish circles in Kurdistan as well as those in exile could no longer refer to it as a symbol of 
their political and moral strength, nor as proof of their ability to operate an indigenous admin­
istration. In other words, they were no longer capable of using that government as an impor­
tant argument to support their claim for an independent Kurdistan under foreign supervision 
at the peace conference.
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When the Paris peace conference started its debate on the Turkish peace settlement in 
1919, the British Government had little knowledge about the Kurds, their affairs and aspira­
tions. In most Kurdish areas outside British-controlled Southern Kurdistan a dangerous politi­
cal vacuum emerged as a result of the steady decline in the power of the central governments 
in Constantinople and Tehran.This state of affairs enabled certain British officials serving in 
Kurdistan or in its neighbouring areas, notably Maj. Noel and Col. Wilson, to play an important 
part in influencing the attitudes of the British Government towards Kurdistan’s political future 
through their views and political schemes. Noel was the first British official who took charge of 
Kurdish affairs on the ground between November 1918 and June 1919, before being 
replaced by Wilson, who conducted Kurdish affairs in consultation with the British High Com­
missioner in Constantinople until December 1920. Their suggestions and views on the Kurd­
ish question were circulated among the Foreign, India and War Offices. They not only promp­
ted the contradictory comments and observations of the British High Commissions in Con­
stantinople and Cairo, but also formed the starting point for any debate on the Kurdish ques­
tion at the meetings of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affair, a body 
which was chaired by Lord Curzon and concerned with the future of the Ottoman Empire, 
especially its non-Turkish territories. Thus the analysis of Wilson’s and Noel’s perceptions of 
the Kurdish question helps to illuminate why the British Government began to pay more atten­
tion to the Kurds, and how the objectives of its Kurdish policy were defined within the Turkish 
peace settlement.
Colonel Wilson’s Attitudes Towards The Kurdish Question Between 1918 
And 1920
/- T/te genesis O f Wilson's thinking
Wilson was renowned among British officials in the Foreign and India Offices as an imperialist- 
orientated official, who considered the imposition of outright British control over local affairs as 
the only viable option to consolidate whatever British interests were at stake in Mesopotamia 
and Kurdistan. Indeed, during his three years, as the Acting Civil Commissioner for Mesopo­
tamia, he never attempted to prepare the foundation for an autonomous Southern Kurdistan,
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as London wished. Instead, he established direct British administration through eliminating
the existing autonomous Kurdish entity, and blocking all attempts to establish others. This
was contrary to what was generally assumed by some scholars, such as Liora Lukitz, that the
formula of indirect control was Wilson’s brain-child. 1 At a broader level, Wilson persistently
endeavoured to sever all political links between the Southern Kurds and the rest of the
Kurds, aiming at permanently detaching Southern Kurdistan from Ottoman Kurdistan. Initially,
Wilson considered the Kurdish question as only relevant to Northern Kurdistan. Insofar as
Southern Kurdistan was concerned, Wilson advocated its incorporation into British-
administrated Mesopotamia, hoping that Britain would present the incorporation arrangement
to the peace conference as a fait accompli. Wilson argued the case for Southern Kurdistan’s
incorporation into British-administrated Mesopotamia in the following terms:
For economic and for strategic reasons, and in order to secure to Iraqi's] state the advant­
age of a mountain tract, well wooded and capable of great development, it is desirable to 
include Sulaimaniya, Rania and Keuisenjaq within [the] limits of Mesopotamians] administra­
tions
Wilson asserted, when doubts were raised about the impracticability of direct control, that 
while indirect control could serve British interests with much less military and financial commit­
ment, the re-imposition of indirect control in Southern Kurdistan would endanger the British 
position throughout Mesopotamia:
The abandonment of Mosul, Erbil and Sulaimaniya divisions would so unfavourably affect 
our position in [the] Baghdad and Basra Wilayets as to render our position before long 
untenable without considerable reinforcement. These three Wilayets form an indivisible 
whole. The Mosul Wilayet has no natural economic connection with Turkey or Syria., and 
distrust and objections arising from our abandonment of Sulaimaniya, Erbil and Mosul divi­
sions and inevitable anarchy resulting from removal of external control in these, would have 
the gravest effect throughout the rest of Mesopotamia.3
In other words, Wilson considered Southern Kurdistan’s future as politically irrelevant to the 
remainder of Kurdistan. His viewpoint enjoyed the warmest support of the military authorities 
in Mesopotamia, 4 where he spent the period 1918-1920 urging London to accept his imple­
mented political and administrative measures in Southern Kurdistan as a permanent British 
policy, rather than a temporary one.
The centrality of Mesopotamia thus formed the cornerstone of Wilson’s approach to 
the political future of the Kurdish people. Whatever formula was adopted, Britain would parti-
1* Liora Lukitz, Iraq, the Research for National Identity, (London: Frank Cass, 1995), p.21. 
2* Political, Baghdad, Secret No.6666,13 June 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
3* Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 13 February 1920, F0371/5070, PRO.
4* Ibid.
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tion the Kurdish Wilayets of the Ottoman Empire, while keeping Eastern Kurdistan, as before, 
within the Qajar Kingdom. Wilson’s argument rested on the premise that, though the Kurds 
formed a nationality with strong nationalist feelings and separate identity, they were incapable 
of ruling themselves owing to their lack of “ leaderd, and their being “ widely scattered' and 
divided into a “hundred warring tribes. Given the Northern Kurds’ opposition to Turkish rule 
and their respect for and trust of Britain, Wilson argued that the introduction of some form of 
British rule in Northern Kurdistan offered “the best chance of a settled and prosperous coun­
try in the future”. Under the scheme, the Northern Kurds would have an “autonomous state" 
under close British protection and supervision. This solution was both “ feasible and in accor­
dance with justice and the aspirations of the people” .s Wilson’s scheme would have required 
Britain to either accept a separate British mandate for Northern Kurdistan or to territorially 
extend its Mesopotamian mandate. The structure of the proposed Kurdish state would be a 
confederation, consisting of several tiny entities under different nominal local rulers. These 
entities would be under a central administration, which might have a “ Kurdish figurehead1. 
The boundaries of this state would run as follows:
a little north of Jezirah-ibn-Omar, north of Nisibin, south of Mardin, north of Ras-al-Ain, along 
latitude 37 to Biridjik, thence north up the Euphrates and finally bending eastward and follow­
ing the boundaries of the Wilayets of Kharput (Mamuer-ul-Aziz) Bitlis and Van, thus exclud­
ing Erzinjan and Erzeraum, to the Persian frontier.6
In reality, Wilson’s scheme excluded vast Kurdish areas from the would-be Kurdish state, apart 
from Southern Kurdistan, which would be annexed by British-administrated Mesopotamia. 
Wilson, as Arnold Toynbee of the Foreign Office remarked, advocated from the very begin­
ning the idea of partitioning Ottoman Kurdistan between “a Kurdish federation and Iraq” j  and 
that the former should also come under some form of British controU One of the principal rea­
sons behind Wilson’s scheme for carving up Ottoman Kurdistan was strategic, i.e. turning 
Northern Kurdistan into a strong buffer to consolidate the security of Mesopotamia. The India 
Office and the Foreign Office did not support Wilson’s scheme because of the enormous mili­
tary, financial and political commitments it required. The partition of Kurdistan, however, 
remained an alternative proposal, especially if it was implemented in a way that strengthened 
the security of British position in Mesopotamia.
5* Precis of Affairs.., op. cit., p. 18.
6* Ibid, p. 19.
7* Toynbee, Foreign Office Minute No.207981,21 December 1918, F0371/3386, PRO.
8* J.E. Shuckburgh, Note on Kurdistan, India Office, 14 December 1918, F0371/3386, PRO.
86
if- Wilson's Conduct O f Kurdish A ffairs Outside tfritish-controlled Kurdistan
An examination of Wilson’s actual steps in Kurdish areas outside British control reveals that he 
endeavoured to transform his views into reality, especially after taking charge of Kurdish affairs 
in June 1919. The absence of a defined British policy towards Kurdistan, which could be attri­
buted to disagreement between Britain and France on many aspects of the Turkish peace 
settlement, and more importantly, the concentration of their diplomacy on much more vital 
European problems, made it possible for British officials on the ground to play a greater part in 
influencing the course of events in Kurdistan than they could under ordinary conditions. Wil­
son’s initiatives aimed at expanding British political influence in the western and central parts 
of Kurdistan, especially Jezirah-ibn-Omar and Rowanduz and its neighbouring areas, all of 
which were situated to the north of British-controlled Southern Kurdistan. 9 These initiatives 
were characterised by the non-existence of prior consultation with the British High Commis­
sion in Constantinople, as London had asked him to do. The foregoing Kurdish areas proved 
militarily difficult for the British to control directly, while simultaneously taking on growing stra­
tegic and political importance because they linked British-controlled Kurdistan with Northern 
and Eastern Kurdistan, 10 where Kemalist and Bolshevik threats were looming on the horizon. 
Moreover, Eastern Kurdistan was a continuing source of anxiety to the British authorities in 
Baghdad because of the ongoing bloody Kurdish revolt there led by Simko. This state of 
affairs, the British authorities in Mesopotamia feared, would help to increase political instability 
in Sulaimaniya and in Kurdish areas as far as Amadia.1 1 Wilson was anxious about the effects 
of the situation in Eastern Kurdistan on Southern Kurdistan and vice versa, if Britain was 
involved in the affairs of the former. When Noel sent his personal assistant to Eastern Kurdi­
stan on a fact-finding mission, Wilson criticised this initiative as “an Hl-advised adventure” , and 
ordered its conclusion. 12 However, Wilson was advised by Soane that he should exploit con­
tacts with Said Taha, Simko’s ally, so as to consolidate the security of the northern frontier of 
the British sphere in Southern Kurdistan. As a result, the aim of the discussion with Said Taha 
became not so much the stabilisation of the political situation in Eastern Kurdistan as extend­
ing British political control deeper into Ottoman Kurdistan. Having received the consent of
9* Simultaneously, his Political Officer, Leachman, sought to transfer the Jezirah District from the Dia- 
bekirtothe Mosul Wilayet. Diary of Maj. Noel On Special Duty, Nisibin, 17 April 1919, F0371/4192,
PRO.
10* Precis of Affairs.., op. cit., p. 14.
11 * Cox, Tehran, 26 August 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
12* Memorandum From the Office of Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to CGS.18 April, AIR20/512, PRO.
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Percy Cox, the temporary British Minister at Tehran, Wilson began to negotiate with Said Taha 
in the summer of 1919, with a view to countering what he called41 Turkish propaganda. Said 
Taha, who commanded notable influence, was asked to undertake, on behalf of the British 
Government, the administration of a region that included Rowanduz, Shamsdinan and other 
areas to the north.13
Creating a Kurdish state deep into Kurdistan clearly suggests that Wilson intended to 
use this wouid-be Kurdish state as a vehicle to expand British control at the expense of the 
Ottoman authorities. He urged the British High Commission in Constantinople to press the 
Ottoman Government to evacuate its garrison from Bashkala, Dize and Neri in July 1919.14 
This was a preliminary step towards demanding that the Turkish authorities should recognise 
these areas as under British control. Capt. C.T. Beale, the Assistant Political Officer for 
Rowanduz, had no doubt that this Kurdish state would be extended northwards to include 
such Kurdish area as Orman and Julamark. 15 Wilson’s failure to consult British officials in Con­
stantinople about his initiative in Kurdish areas outside British control was anxiously commen­
ted on by the Acting High Commissioner in Constantinople:
My inability to understand how far HMG have really got, is increased by discovery that 
authorities in Mesopotamia were in June [1919] within ace of conducting formal agreement 
with Sheikh Taha, [the] effect of which would have been to carve out of what as still Turkish 
territory small state ruled by that chieftain under British protection. 16
Eventually, the whole Said Taha affair came to nothing as Wilson wanted him to be no more 
than a figurehead, with all powers resting with his British advisers.
On another level, Wilson sought to exploit the vagueness of the term ‘Mesopotamia’ 
to push the northern boundary of British-administrated Mesopotamia deeper into Kurdistan. 
In response to the Secretary of State’s inquiry about the issue of defining the northern front­
ier of Mesopotamia, Wilson advocated the adoption of the “ watershecf of the Tigris and the 
Euphrates in Kurdistan as far as possible. This would grant Mesopotamia “ natural frontier 
which were politically “ impossible to dispute” and practically “easy to delimit'm  Here, Wilson 
took another independent initiative to turn his suggested northern frontier into a fait accompli. 
The opportunity presented itself when Col. Khurshid Bey, a former Kurdish commander of a
13* G.L.Bell, Northern Kurdistan, 8 March 1920, AIR20/512, PRO.
14* Political, Baghdad, to Political Rowanduz , 3 July 1919, AIR20/714, PRO.
15* Political, Rowanduz, to Political, Baghdad, 3 July 1919, AIR20/714, PRO.
16* Acting High Commissioner, Constantinople, to Prodrom, London, 8 September 1919, F0371/4192, 
PRO.
17* Political, Baghdad, 8 December 1918, F0371/3386, PRO.
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Hamidiah force and a Hakari chief, requested official British recognition of his acceptance of 
British instead of Turkish suzerainty.is Wilson promptly sent his approval, which included the 
following declaration:
Khurshid Bey has accepted the British Government in place of the former Turkish Govern­
ment.. If other Kurdish Chiefs and tribes living in the mountains of Kurdistan, the waters of 
which drain towards the Tigris and its tributaries, the Khabour and the two Zabs, wish to do 
likewise they should inform the political officer nearest to them. They may rest assured that 
their request will be favourably considered and transmitted to government. By this means, if 
God wills, the Kurds will be united under a just and benevolent government.19
Wilson’s justification for granting British protection to all local Kurdish chiefs and tribes was 
based both on geopolitical necessity and the desire of the local people. The Said Taha and 
Khurshid Bey affairs were a true expression of Wilson’s early desire for bringing new Kurdish 
areas under British control, and his determination to work independently of other concerned 
authorities to put into effect his views.
iii- Wilson's Scheme Jor Kurdistan's Juture Within ‘The Jram ework O f The Turk­
ish Peace Settlem ent
Given London’s decision to minimise its military, financial and political commitments as much 
as possible, and its desire not to precipitate French counter-measures in the form of creating 
their own political zone in Kurdistan, Wilson’s initiatives for expanding British influence in Kur­
distan were doomed to failure. In the face of the existing military and financial restrictions, 
which underlined the outdated nature of his approach to the Kurdish situation, Wilson aban­
doned the idea of forming tiny Kurdish entities under British supervision in favour of another 
scheme, the essence of which was to partition Ottoman Kurdistan. The southern parts would 
be attached to Mesopotamia, whereas the northern parts would remain, as before, under 
Turkish rule. The re-establishment of Turkish rule, Wilson hoped, would turn his original aim of 
partitioning Ottoman Kurdistan into a permanent reality. By contrast, the establishment of an 
independent state in Kurdistan, without close British supervision, would encourage the 
Southern Kurds to either join the new Kurdish state or to demand the establishment of their 
own state. In either case, British strategic and political positions would be undermined, not 
only in Arab Mesopotamia, but also in northern Persia, where the British-backed Persian Gov­
ernment encountered serious Bolshevik and local nationalist threats. All of this, in Wilson’s
18* Poldist, Keu, to Political, Baghdad, Priority, 1 February 1919, AIR20/512, PRO.
19* Political, Baghdad, to Civil Commissioner on tour at Mosul, Priority, 1 February 1919, AIR20/512, 
PRO.
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eyes, would result in huge increases in British military and financial commitments. Against this 
background, Wilson recommended in April 1919 that Britain should recognise the continua­
tion of Turkish rule in the six Kurdish-Armenian W ila y e ts s  in June, he stated that, if the North­
ern Kurdish state was not formed under British auspices, he would prefer the Armenians or 
Turks to be in control of the four Kurdish Wilayets,.i.e. Diyarbekir, Bitlis, Van and Kharput.21 In 
November, when replying to Curzon’s five recommendations for the British position on the 
future of the Kurdish question, Wilson disagreed with recommendation number five, which 
called for preventing the Turks from returning to Northern Kurdistan. He pointed out that the 
British were unable to drive the Turks out and that Noel’s opposition to the partitioning of 
Ottoman Kurdistan contradicted various British interests in Mesopotamia and Persia. He even 
went so far as to question Noel's belief that the Kurds would remain loyal to Britain in the 
future .22
Wilson’s criticism of Noel’s perceptions of, and recommendations for, Kurdish affairs 
culminated in his opposition to the suggestion of the Foreign Office’s nomination of Noel as a 
member to one of the two proposed international commissions at the Paris peace confer­
ence, which would deal with the nationality questions, including the Kurdish one:
/ regard Noel as being too deeply committed to individual Kurds [and] generally to a particu­
lar line of policy, to be entirely satisfactory representative of British interest in [the] pro­
posed commission.. I consider British representative on International Commission should, if 
possible, be foremost of wider experience and more judicial temperament. Liet. Col. Cunliffe 
Own, at present Director of Repatriation in Mesopotamia and formerly Military attache at 
Constantinople, who has acquired recently a close practical knowledge of questions con­
cerned with Assyrians, Chaldean and Armenian communities, would I venture to suggest, be 
a suitable British representative. He would have my entire confidences
It is self-evident from Wilson’s words that he feared Noel’s influence on the British position on 
the future of the Kurdish question at the peace conference. In spite of Wilson’s opposition to 
Noel’s appointment, and the request of the Viceroy of India to send Noel to Shiraz in Persia, 
neither Curzon,24 nor his subordinates at the Foreign Office such as Herbert Young and 
Robert Vansittart,25 were willing to dispense with the services of Noel because he was consid­
ered to be the only British official who had deep knowledge of Kurdish affairs. In evaluating 
Noel’s importance, Young admitted that he was "badly misjudged’ , and had he remained in
20* Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 22 October 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
21* Political, Baghdad, 13 June 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
22* Political, Baghdad, 27 November 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
23* Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 19 May 1920, F0371/5068, PRO.
24* Curzon, Foreign Office, 27 May 1920, FO371/5068, PRO.
25* Young, Foreign Office Minute No.4123,26 May 1920, FO371/5068, PRO.
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Southern Kurdistan in 1919, the Mahmud rising would not have happened in Southern Kurdi­
stan. In spite of this and other failures, and because of his responsibility for Kurdish affairs on 
the ground during a very sensitive period insofar as Kurdistan’s future was concerned, Wilson 
remained an important factor. He left behind a profound political and administrative legacy, 
which both directly and indirectly affected the future of the Kurdish question in the medium 
and long-run. His strategic argument about Southern Kurdistan’s importance to Mesopotamia 
played some part in influencing the British decision to partition Ottoman Kurdistan. His mea­
sures on the ground eliminated all traces of Kurdish autonomy, while paving the way for bring­
ing Southern Kurdistan under the British mandate over Mesopotamia. This development 
practically separated the fate of the Southern Kurds from that of the Northern and Eastern 
Kurds.
Major Noel's Approach To The Kurdish Question, 1918-1920 
/-  <r/ie genesis O f Joe l’s thinking
Despite being a sufficiently remote country, Kurdistan was still able, in Busch’s words, to 
“attract those imperial servants who always managed to appear on a troubled frontier to play an 
independent and important role” .2 6  One such outstanding British officials was Noel, whose 
approach and views on the Kurdish question were the exact antithesis to Wilson’s. In contrast 
to Wilson’s imperialist thinking and practices, Noel believed that the ideal method to safeguard 
British interests was to work with the rising Kurdish nationalist movement. In his view, Kurdi­
stan was important for Britain per se and not just a secondary concern subordinated to the 
security issue of Mesopotamia. Instead of separate solutions for each part of Kurdistan, Noel 
advocated an all-embracing British policy. In other words, the Kurdish question was, in Noel’s 
view, indivisible, and that Britain should not adopt contradictory solutions for each part of Kur­
distan, but a comprehensive solution (see map eleven). As soon as he took charge of Kurdish 
affairs in early November 1918, Noel put forward his first comprehensive scheme for the for­
mation of a separate and an autonomous Kurdistan. Under the scheme, a Kurdish confeder­
acy would be established, consisting of three Kurdish entities under British supervision and 
protection. Sulaimaniya would be the administrative centre of Southern Kurdistan, whereas 
Mosul and Diyarbekir would be the administrative centres of Western and Central Kurdistan 
respectively. Influential local Kurdish leaders, such as Sheikh Mahmud and Said Taha, would
26* Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, p. 183.
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Map Eleven, Major Noel’s Map 
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be expected to have political roles within the confederated Kurdish entities.27
B rita in , N o e l e m p h a s is e d , could  not b e  ind ifferen t to  th e  fa te  of K urd istan  b e c a u s e  o f
its e ffe c ts  on British s tra teg ic  an d  political in te re s ts  in th e  fo rm e r O tto m a n  Wilayets as w ell a s
P ers ia . T h e  re turn  of T u rk ish  ru le , o r th e  fo rm atio n  of a  g re a te r  A rm e n ia n  s ta te  at th e  e x p e n s e
of th e  K urds, w a s  bound  to  c re a te  an  u ns tab le  K urd istan  th a t it w ou ld  u n d erm in e  th e  p o s t-w a r
territoria l and  political re a rra n g e m e n ts  of O tto m a n  Asia. W h ile  tha t w a s  th e  ca s e , Britain had  an
u n p re c e d e n te d  opportu n ity  to  e x p a n d  its political in fluen ce  and  m a in ta in  its s tra teg ic  in te res ts
th rou gh  e n c o u ra g in g  th e  rising K urd ish  n ation a lis t m o v e m e n t to  a c h ie v e  its le g itim a te  political
aspirations. N o e l em p h a tic a lly  s ta ted  that:
[Kurdish] national movement is so virile that I do not foresee much difficulty in creating a Kurd­
ish state under our protection and with control by political officers over general policy, provi­
ded we take prompt and vigorous action now. [The Kurdish] movement is so strong (at all 
events here at Sulaimaniya) that I strongly advise immediate dispatch of qualified officers to 
assume direct charge of principal administrative services.
T h e  e s ta b lis h m e n t of a  c o n fe d e ra te d  K urd istan  u n d er British superv is ion  w as, in N o e l’s ey e s , 
an  ideal solution  in th e  w a k e  of th e  d is in teg ra tion  of th e  O tto m a n  E m pire . A p art from  estab lish -
27* Mesopotamia: Future Constitution, Enclosure N0 .8 , Political Officer, Sulaimaniya, Note on the Poli­
tical Status of Kurdistan, November 1918, F0371/4147, PRO.
28* Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, 17 November 1918, AIR20/512, PRO.
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ing the sought-after political stability in a very volatile Kurdistan, the establishment of a Kurdish 
state would keep other rival powers at bay, as well as facilitating the formation of a united Arm­
enia. Noel’s novel approach required an active British role without entailing heavy military and 
financial commitments. His views on Kurdish affairs contain a tangible moral dimension. To 
realise Britain’s vital strategic and political interests in the former Ottoman Wilayets, Noel advo­
cated methods that would mean Britain not abandoning its moral duties before the new natio­
nalities, such as the Kurds:
It should... be possible to find some formula which would assure the economic and strategic 
interests of Mesopotamia in these areas, without, however, irrevocably shutting the door on 
the legitimate Kurdish aspirations.29
Apart from his idealism and probable personal ambition to play a distinctive role matching that 
of T.E. Lawrence of Arabia during the war, Noel’s approach to the Kurdish question was 
mainly based on impersonal considerations. Firstly, following the war, Britain found itself 
incapable of committing itself militarily and financially in the newly-conquered areas, especially 
in the Middle East, due to the long duration of the war. The war had been costly for Britain in 
men and money, and led to popular opposition to new territorial annexations and colonial 
adventures. Secondly, Noel’s approach was a true reflection of profound changes on the 
international scene, resulting from the outbreak of the October Revolution and the declara­
tion of Wilson’s Fourteen Points in 1918, both of which had a direct impact on the political 
aspirations of the non-Turkish nationalities. Lastly, Noel relied on his experience as a British 
representative to the Government of the North-West Province, which operated as a buffer 
state to British India. Kurdistan could play a similar strategic role towards British Mesopotamia. 
Noel also built on his experiences in Persia and the Caucasus, where he witnessed how local 
nationalism was rapidly emerging as an important factor, influencing the shape of the region. It 
must be remembered that Noel’s views also took shape against the background of a success­
ful British experiment with the Sharifian Arabs during the war.
Noel, like Wilson, not only preached his views on the Kurdish question, but also 
attempted to put them into practice when he was in charge of Kurdish affairs on the ground 
between November 1918 and June 1919. In spite of the reservations of Wilson, who pre­
ferred Kurdistan to be a "British protectorate”,30 Noel, as soon as he became an adviser to 
Mahmud, fully backed and facilitated the application of indirect rule in the form of Kurdish auto-
29* E.W.C. Noel, Note on the Kurdish Situation, July 1919, F0371/4192, PRO, p.19. 
30* Political, Baghdad, to Political, Sulaimaniya , 26 November 1918, AIR20/512, PRO.
93
nomy under close British supervision. This formula, while satisfying Kurdish aspirations, would 
also consolidate British influence. Accordingly, Noel embarked on expanding the control of 
the Mahmud Government in Southern Kurdistan, and started with such remote Kurdish areas 
as Rowanduz and its surroundings.31 Noel justified his actions by the argument that the Kurds 
would achieve their independence anyway. Thus, Britain and the Powers would face Kurdish 
independence as "a fait accompli" which would be “very difficult to reverse".&  Noel probably 
exaggerated the intensity of Kurdish nationalist feelings, so as to persuade London to commit 
itself quickly to the Kurdish question. Prompt British action would prevent other Powers from 
exploiting Kurdish aspirations for their own ends, while Britain could guide the formation of a 
separate Kurdistan according to its interests.
Noel, while endeavouring to gather official support for his ideas, played some part in 
stimulating Kurdish nationalist feelings and encouraging Kurdish leaders to take political initia­
tives. He hoped to draw British attention to the Kurdish problem. For instance, he encour­
aged the Southern Kurds, led by Mahmud, to sign a declaration, the provisions of which he 
helped to formulate. The declaration requested the British Government to act as an 
“ intermediary on behalf of the Kurds in order to obtain a seat for a Kurdish representative at 
the forthcoming peace conference. 3 3  Noel thought of Cherif Pasha as a suitable Kurdish can­
didate to represent the Kurds at the peace conference. He described him as “ very well spo­
ken of in Southern Kurdistan" .34 Mahmud accepted Cherif Pasha as the Kurdish representa­
tive at the peace conference. To this end, he prepared, in Noel’s presence, a petition signed 
by Kurdish notables authorising him to speak to the Allies on behalf of the Southern Kurds. 35  
This Kurdistan-wide co-ordination, which Noel helped to initiate, came to an abrupt end, when 
Wilson carried out his reversal of Kurdish policy by terminating the experiment of Kurdish 
autonomy. London itself was suspicious of Kurdish intellectuals, especially those who lived in 
exile. Instead, it preferred to deal with local Kurdish leaders, probably because they had limi­
ted political ambitions, and could closely monitor their movements on the ground. Moreover, 
on the idea of giving a seat to a Kurdish representative, Toynbee commented, that it would 
“create a sharp precedent for Armenians, Zionists and other nationalities”.36
31* Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, 17 November 1918, AIR20/512, PRO.
32* Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, 28 November 1918, AIR20/512, PRO.
33* Political, Baghdad, 7 December 1918, F0371/3386, PRO.
34* Political, Baghdad, 12 November 41918, AIR20/512, PRO.
35* Helmi, Memoirs, Vol.I, pp.65-66.
36* Toynbee, Foreign Office Mirtute No.204299,14 December 1918, F0371/3386, PRO.
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As Noel viewed Kurdistan’s future as an indivisible question, he paid special attention 
to the deteriorating situation in Eastern Kurdistan, considering it as symptomatic of a general 
Kurdish problem. He hoped to initiate, as Wilson suspected, another movement in Eastern 
Kurdistan similar to that of Southern Kurdistan. The prospect of a “ radical solution” for the 
Kurdish question, to which Noel made emphatic reference, was intended to illustrate how 
London’s long-held principle of preserving Persian territorial integrity had become outdated. 
Political developments in Eastern Kurdistan at the end of the First World War illustrated that 
Kurdish notables were influenced by the Allied wartime propaganda in regard to liberating the 
oppressed nationalities. The Mukri Kurds of Saujbulaq placed before the British Consul at 
Kermanshah the idea of an “independent Kurdistan under British auspices” 37 in May 1918, 
Said Taha, who started to politically mobilise the Kurds living on both sides of the Ottoman- 
Qajar frontier, visited Wilson in Baghdad, where he pressed for British sponsorship of a united 
Kurdistan, including its Eastern part.38
The subsequent establishment of the Mahmud Government in Southern Kurdistan 
immediately after the end of the war created a strong impression among the Eastern Kurds 
that Britain sponsored Kurdish nationalist aspirations. Indeed, a number of Southern Kurds 
left Sulaimaniya for Eastern Kurdistan to propagate the idea of a united Kurdistan.39 Dele­
gates from Mariwan, Saqiz and Banah arrived at Sulaimaniya, where Noel waged an “active 
campaign for an independent Kurdistan” ,40 to express their wish to bring Eastern Kurdistan 
under both Kurdish rule and British protection. Against this background, Noel advised that:
it should be possible to get all [Eastern] Kurdish tribes to throw in their lot with us. From reli­
gious, racial and geographical standpoints, this would offer a radical solution of general pro­
blem in this area, and it would be much better to seize [the] bull by the horns now, when 
everything is in a state of flux, than to leave it simmering for future settlement.41
Meanwhile, Noel asserted that any British attempt to bolster up the authority of the Persian 
Government would have harmful effects on British relations with Southern Kurdistan.42
Noel took an unprecedented initiative by sending his assistant, Sher Jang, to Urmia, 
on a mission to Said Taha ,43 hoping to initiate political arrangements similar to those he had 
made in Southern Kurdistan. In other words, Noel sought an active British role in Eastern Kur- 
37* Precis of Affairs.., op. cit., p.7.
38* E.W.C. Noel, Note on the Kurdish Situation, July 1919, F0371/4192, PRO, p. 18.
39* Ibid.
40* Political, Baghdad, to Political, Mosul, 20 November 1918, AIR20/512, PRO.
41* Political, Baghdad, 12 December 1918, F0371/3386, PRO.
42* E.W.C. Noel, Note on the Kurdish Situation, July 1919, F0371/4192, PRO, p.18.
43* Noel, Rowanduz, to Political, Baghdad, 21 February 1919, AIR20/512, PRO.
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distan and along the Ottoman-Qajar frontiers, outside British-controlled Southern Kurdistan. 
In his report on Urmia, Sher Jang spoke of the existence of “ terrible famine and disorder" and 
stated that any British or American intervention would be welcomed as the only solution for re­
establishing order and peace. He revealed that pro-British feelings were generally strong.44 
Other British reports confirmed that the Kurdish rebellion in Urmia threatened to turn into “a 
general rising1, embracing the rest of Eastern Kurdistan.45 Simko, the leader of the Kurdish 
revolt, sought to re-establish close relations with the British authorities in Baghdad. 46 in early 
July, Simko and Said Taha expressed their desire to co-operate with the British regarding the 
protection and the repatriation of the Christians in north west Persia in return for British politi­
cal support.47 Largely because of the opposition of Wilson and British officials in Persia to any 
fostering of Eastern Kurds’ aspirations, their attempts to reach an understanding with Britain 
bore no fruit. Fearing anti-British reactions by the Persian authorities, neither London nor Brit­
ish officials in Persia were willing to even contemplate the establishment of direct contacts 
with Simko.
Maj. M.J. Ross, a Political Officer, expressed similar views to those of Noel on the
situation in Eastern Kurdistan. Ross investigated on the spot the existing instability in Urmia
and its surroundings. He concluded that the frontier, which separated Eastern from Northern
Kurdistan, was of an “arbitrary1 nature and it did not reflect the existing economic, ethnic and
geographical realities. Like Noel, he supported the idea of self-determination, not only
because Britain should morally respect this principle, but because
any attempt to coerce the Kurd to remain under the Persian Government, from which he is 
trying to free himself, will shake the core of our influence throughout those parts of Kurdi­
stan, where we are not prepared to support our authority with troops. 48
Unlike all other British officials in Persia and Mesopotamia, Ross argued that Britain should 
refrain from intervening against the efforts of the Eastern Kurds to join a united Kurdish state, 
a position which he did not consider as a breach of British pledges to Persia’s territorial unity. 
The following comment by Toynbee sheds light on the Persian dimension in Britain’s Kurdish 
policy:
This is a very serious problem. The Persian Kurds are inaccessible and beyond the control 
either of [British officials at] Tehran or Baghdad. We may prevent them from joining formally
44* General Headquarter, Mes.Ex. Force, to Political, Baghdad, 16 April 1919, AIR20/512, PRO.
45* Assistant Political Officer, Sennah, to Political, Baghdad, 16 April 1919, AIR20/512, PRO.
46* Political, Baghdad, to Prodrom, Tehran, 25 May 1919, AIR20/512, PRO.
47* Political, Baghdad, Addressed to Constantinople, 3 July 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
48* Maj. M.J. Ross, Note on Kurdish Claims to the Urmia District of Persia 8/9 July 1919, AIR20/512, 
PRO.
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the Ottoman-Kurdish confederation, but we cannot prevent them from seizing this occasion 
[i.e. formation of Kurdish autonomy] to throw off their allegiance to Persia. If they carry out 
their present intentions, we shall be placed in a very awkward position in regard to Persian 
integrity. We have virtually undertaken to respect it; yet action by us on the Turkish side 'of 
the frontier will have led to the breaking away from Persia of a considerable province.49
Ross’s above argument, apart from being opposed by the British officials in Mesopo­
tamia and Persia, was treated cautiously in London, where the prevailing orthodox 
approach was based on preserving Persian territorial integrity from both internal and 
external threats.
if- /Joel's / Jew Solution Jo t The Kurdish Question W ithin The Jram ework O f The 
Turkish Peace Settlem ent
Several developments affected Britain’s positive image among the Kurds. The delays of the 
peace conference, of which the Kurds had high hopes, left a negative impact on Kurdish poli­
tical inclinations.5o British policy on the ground particularly raised Kurdish fears. Kurdish natio­
nalists seemed to be confused by Britain’s real intentions in Kurdistan. On the one hand, Brit­
ish officials told Kurdish nationalist circles that Britain would not overlook Kurdish interests at 
the peace conference and should await its results. On the other hand, the implemented Brit­
ish policy on the ground enormously undermined the Kurdish nationalist movement by repla­
cing Kurdish autonomy with direct British control in Southern Kurdistan and adopting heavy- 
handed measures against those local Kurds who wanted autonomy. Signs of change in local 
Kurdish attitudes towards Britain were expressed in British officials’ telegrams. In Eastern Kur­
distan, the link between Kurdish nationalists and the anti-Christian movement in north-west 
Persia became closer than ever before.51 Percy Cox attributed the change in Kurdish atti­
tudes from pro-British to anti-British to the Eastern Kurds’ disappointment with the reversal of 
British policy in Southern Kurdistan, and the subsequent Mahmud revolt. 52 Similarly, the Brit­
ish Consul at Urmia noted that the Mahmud revolt, and its subsequent suppression by the 
British, began to orientate the Eastern Kurds towards the Turks for support, rather than the 
British.53 Noel himself repeatedly drew attention to the occurrence of developments, which 
were independent of -and not inspired by British officials. He had earlier warned that the
49* Foreign Office Minute No.206918,21 December 1918, F0371/3386, PRO.
50* Political Department, India Office, Mesopotamia: British Relations with Kurdistan, 27 August 1919, 
F0371/4192, PRO.
51 ‘ Political, Baghdad, 6 January 1919, F0371/4147, PRO.
52* Cox, Tehran, 26 August 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
53* Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, 25 August 1919, AIR20/714, PRO.
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establishment of direct British control in Southern Kurdistan could alienate the Northern 
Kurds, who viewed it “ as a prelude to British penetration at their expense” .54 He also attribu­
ted the emergence of anti-Christian and anti-British movements to the British policy of favour­
ing Christians on the ground.55
The speedy deterioration of the political situation in the Kurdish areas outside British 
control in spring and summer of 1919 was largely due to growing Kurdish fears of the impos­
ing of Armenian rule in Northern Kurdistan. The Turkish propaganda machine played some 
part in agitating the Kurds against the Europeans, who were thought to be conspiring against 
the Muslims. It was against this background that Noel was charged with an official mission to 
parts of Northern Kurdistan to prepare a final report on “ the political situation as between 
Kurds and Turkd' and regarding “the economic conditions” .56 But he was not charged with 
the task of establishing “a North Kurdish state” , similar to the one he had set up in British- 
controlled Southern Kurdistan, as Olson suggests.57 it was hoped that in light of Noel’s con­
clusions, important official circles, notably the Foreign Office and the India Office, would 
define their position on Kurdistan’s political future. The combined efforts of the Turkish Gov­
ernment, which was informed about Noel’s mission, 58 and Turkish nationalists led by Kemal, 
forced Noel to end his mission prematurely. The Noel mission was also affected by negative 
attitudes from British officials in Turkey, who refused to provide it with necessary political back­
ing. Adm. John De Robeck, Gough-Calthorpe’s successor as the High Commissioner, feared 
that the Noel mission, which included two Kurds who represented Kurdish nationalist circles 
in Constantinople, might give the Ottoman Government and the Kemalists “serious reasons 
to suspect that HMG were encouraging Kurds to act against the Turks'’ . 59 A British Political 
Officer in the Northern Area reported that Noel was “conducting a dangerous form of pro- 
Kurdish and anti-Turkish propaganda .60
In a memorandum, Noel'defended himself against accusations that his activities stimu-
54* Political, Baghdad, to Egyptian Force, Cairo, 28 April 1919, AIR20/714, PRO.
55* Noel, Aleppo, to Political, Baghdad, 2 August 1919, AIR20/714, PRO.
56*Political, Baghdad, to Egypt Force, 11 March 1919, AIR20/714, PRO. Noel made a short preliminary 
tour and then started on a more extended tour in such ares as Diyarbekir and Nisibin. He was accompa­
nied, with Foreign Office’s approval, by two Kurdish representatives to facilitate his task. IDCM, Secre­
tary’s Note, 6 September 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
57* Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, p.53.
58* De Robeck to Curzon, confidential, 20 December 1919, Enclosure No. 1, Mr. Ryan, Memorandum, 
F0371/4193, PRO.
59* High Commissioner, Constantinople, to General, Baghdad, 18 September 1919, F0371/4192, PRO. 
60* General Headquarter, Egypt, 27 September 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
98
lated the anti-British propaganda of Turkish nationalists. He argued that the anti-British atti­
tudes of the Turks already existed when he started his mission and attributed them to several 
reasons. Firstly, the establishment of Kurdish autonomy immediately after the war must have 
alarmed the Turks. Secondly, the British had recognised the Kurdish language and encour­
aged the tribal system in the British-controlled Kurdistan. Finally, there were frequent state­
ments made by the British Government to the Kurds, which emphasised that Britain would not 
lose sight of Kurdish interests at the peace conference. Noel mentioned, as concrete evi­
dence, the proclamation published by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, which referred to 
the “ Armenian and Kurdish interests as the two main factors in the country known as Kurdi­
stan and Armenia”. ei Evidence shows that the Turks were greatly alarmed by the Noel mission 
to Northern Kurdistan. Mustafa Kemal, the leader of the Turkish insurgents, considered the 
sending and subsequent failure of the mission as “a very important incident” in the Turkish 
national struggle, when he defeated ail British intrigues “under the cover of the indepen­
dence of the Kurds".62
For fear of invoking undesirable Turkish animosity, the Foreign Office ordered Noel to 
end his tour. However, Noel was able to put forward his conclusions regarding the political 
situation in Kurdistan. They emphasised the existence of “a very lively sense of Kurdish natio­
nality, antipathy to Turks, [and] great hatred of Government" in every area the mission visited. 
Noel dismissed the existence of any “ anti-British or pan-Islamic movement” among the Kurds 
east of Dterbekir. Being a British representative, Noel was met with “most cordial 
friendliness?&  Having failed to win London’s support for the establishment of a separate 
Kurdish confederacy, Noel seized the opportunity, which his mission gave him, to directly pre­
sent the Foreign Office his new scheme for Kurdistan’s future within the framework of the 
Turkish peace settlement. His scheme brought to their attention the hidden interconnection 
between the affairs of Armenia and Kurdistan. Accordingly, it endeavoured to reconcile Kurd­
ish and Armenian nationalist aspirations (see map twelve):
The collection of six Eastern Wilayets under one mandatory power and their sub-division into 
provinces or zones, of which the southern would be exclusively Kurdish, the northern exclus­
ively Armenian and the central zone mixed. Each zone would have its own local administration 
and self-government, which would be subject to some independent centre, either outside the 
six Wilayets or in the central zone. 64
61* Maj. Noel, Memorandum, December 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
62* Mustafa Kemal, A Speech Delivered by G. Mustafa Kemal, President of the Turkish Republic, Octo­
ber 1927(Leipzig: K.F. Koehler Publisher, 1929), pp.101-120 & 220.
63* Political, Baghdad, 26 September 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
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Map Twelve: Noel’sScheme 
For The Non-Turkish Wilayets
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N o e l’s s c h e m e  p ro vid ed  a  uniform  system  of a d m in is tra tion  fo r th e  th re e  zo n e s , w h ich  w ould  
b e  liab le  fo r m o d ification  in a c c o rd a n c e  w ith  th e  nationa l chara c te ris tic s  o f e a c h  n ation . K urd ­
ish an d  A rm e n ia n  w ou ld  b e  th e  offic ial la n g u a g e  of g o v e rn m e n t in th e  so u th ern  an d  north ern  
z o n e s  re s p e c tiv e ly  a n d  w ou ld  b e  ta u g h t in scho o ls . Both K u rd s  a n d  A rm e n ia n s  w ou ld  be  
rec ru ited  fo r th e  g e n d a rm e r ie  a n d  civil s e rv ic e  in th e  c e n tra l z o n e . N o e l h o p e d  th a t, a fte r  
app ly ing  th is  s c h e m e  fo r tw en ty  to  th irty  y ears , it w ou ld  be  p oss ib le  to ta k e  a  d ec is ion  on “ the 
future political status of the various nationalities". H e  did, h o w e v e r, e m p h a s is e  th e  n ee d  fo r “a  
single mandatory, backed by an army o f occupation” .65 in o th e r  w o rd s , N o e l ’s s c h e m e  
requ ired  B rita in  to b e  d irectly  an d  e ffec tive ly  invo lved  in its im p lem en ta tio n .
In th e  m e a n tim e , N o e l ad v is e d  London to  ta k e  into co n s id era tio n  th re e  es s en tia l c o n ­
d itions, w h e n  fra m in g  its fina l position  on th e  K urd ish  q u e s tio n . F irs tly , K u rd istan  sho u ld  b e  
f re e  from  T u rk is h  ru le. S eco n d ly , K urd istan  should  u n d erg o  no partition  and  fina lly , th e  s ou th ­
ern fro n tie rs  of K urd istan  "should follow, as nearly as possible, the ethnological line between 
Kurds and Arabs" .66 N o e l’s last po in t w a s  th e  e x a c t a n tith e s is  o f W ils o n ’s, w ho  w a n te d  th e  
s tra teg ic  and  e c o n o m ic  in te res ts  o f his a dm in is tra tion  in M e s o p o ta m ia  to  b e  th e  o n ly  criterion
65* E.W.C. Noel, Note on the Kurdish Situation, July 1919, F0371/4192, PRO, p. 18.
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for defining what territory belonged to Kurdistan and what territory belonged to Mesopotamia.
To overcome London’s fears about unwanted military and financial commitments and the
occurrence of anti-British political developments in Kurdistan, Noel sought to show that the
Kurds were strongly pro-British and that, even without British assistance and encouragement,
they could keep Turkish rule out of Kurdistan. He, however, warned that:
the partitioning of the country by [the] attachment of the richest part of it, viz., Southern 
Kurdistan to Mesopotamia, would afford an opportunity for anti-British nationalist agitation, 
which would result in [the] revival of Turkish influence and consequent insecurity on our bor­
ders, possibly reacting on the Persian road fir
To contain Kemalist propaganda and thwart their attempts to win over the Kurds, Noel sug­
gested the adoption of urgent steps, consisting of installing one of the Bedirkhans as gov­
ernor of Diarbekir, General Hamdi Pasha as General Officer Commanding the Tenth Corps and 
another Kurdish nationalist as Mutessarif (head of a division) of Mardin.68 Although failing to 
directly involve Britain in the affairs of Northern Kurdistan, Noel was able to highlight the impor­
tant point that the Kurds formed a nationality per se -as much as the Armenians did- and that 
in pursuing its own interests, Britain could not totally ignore the Kurds as a political factor in 
any Turkish peace settlement. Indeed, he demonstrated that the establishment of a united 
Armenian state would be very difficult to achieve, unless Britain satisfied Kurdish nationalist 
aspirations. In retrospective, Noel’s views and efforts played some part in internationalising 
the Kurdish question, as it was embodied in the terms of the 1920 Sevres Treaty.
The Reactions Of British Authorities In The Middle East To The Views Of Wil­
son And Noel On The Future Of Kurdistan
i-'the g ritish  High Commission S7n Cairo And Kurdish A ffairs
As a consequence of its growing realisation that the Kurdish question could no longer be 
ignored, London needed to define British interests in Kurdistan and devise a means of secur­
ing them within the general framework of the Turkish peace settlement. For these reasons, 
the contradictory views of Wilson and Noel on Kurdistan’s future became the focal point of a 
serious debate among British officials in the Middle East, notably the British High Commis­
sions in Cairo and Constantinople. British civilian and military authorities in Cairo became 
involved in the debate on the Kurdish question due to the occupation of some areas in West­
ern Kurdistan by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. These Kurdish areas were far smaller than
67* Ibid
68* Political, Baghdad, 29 September 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
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those which came under the control of the British Indian Army in Mesopotamia. Two centres 
emerged to conduct British military and administrative affairs in occupied Kurdistan: one in 
Baghdad and the other in Cairo. As a consequence, competition between the two centres to 
influence British policy towards the political future of Kurdistan surfaced. Even when Wilson 
was finally charged with the task of running Kurdish affairs on the ground in consultation with 
British officials at Constantinople, British Qfficials in Cairo continued to oppose Wilson’s views 
on Kurdish affairs. It must be remembered that the gap between Cairo and Baghdad already 
existed before the issue of Kurdistan’s future was under consideration. The High Commission 
in Cairo represented the so-called Native School, which advocated the policy of indirect Brit­
ish control through establishing a native administration under close British supervision. British 
authorities in Baghdad represented the so-called Imperial School,&  which firmly believed in 
direct British control as the ideal way to consolidate British position in Mesopotamia. Under 
these conditions, it was natural that the differences between Cairo and Baghdad extended to 
the issue of Kurdistan’s future.
The withdrawal of the Egyptian Expeditionary Forces from western Kurdish areas -a 
step aimed to bring these areas under French control- did not stop British officials in Cairo 
from their attempts to have some say insofar as Kurdistan’s future was concerned. Thus, the 
differences between Cairo and Baghdad over Kurdish affairs continued as before. Edmund 
Allenby, the British High Commissioner for Egypt, and his subordinates objected to Wilson’s 
plans for the partition of Kurdistan between British Mesopotamia and Turkey. Instead, they 
supported Noel’s scheme for ethnically defining clear-cut frontiers for a future Kurdistan. 
Noel’s views on Kurdish affairs were compatible with those of the High Commission in Cairo, 
which stated that the Kurds should have self-determination and Kurdistan should undergo no 
partition. In his telegram to the War Office, Allenby warned that Wilson’s idea of ignoring the 
ethnic boundaries between Kurdistan and Mesopotamia might precipitate some kind of trou­
ble:
The inclusion of Southern Kurdistan... in Mesopotamia would... mean friction with Kurds and 
might create a frontier country, which would necessitate permanent military expense. I, 
therefore, recommend that they be included in a Kurdish-Armenian provisional state as envi­
saged by Noel. I consider... that recognition of Kurdish nationality should be urged and that 
Kurds should be freed from fear of Armenian domination. They might be driven by this fear 
into the arms of GUP [i.e.Turkish nationalists], whereas they might prove strong bulwark 
against Jihad, if they are satisfied. If they combine with Armenians, they will strengthen 
Armenian positionjo
69* These terms were used by the Interdepartmental Conference of Middle Eastern Affairs (IDCM). 
IDCM, minute 37,13 April 1920, F0371/5068, PRO.
70* Commander-in-Chief, Egypt, to War Office, 12 September 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
102
Col. Arthur French, at the General Headquarter of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, held a 
similar view, namely that British Kurdish policy at the peace conference should focus on the 
recognition of Kurdish nationality in line with the idea of self-determination, and that Turkish 
rule should not be re-established in the Kurdish and Armenian Wilayets. French thus indir­
ectly opposed Wilson’s scheme for the partitioning of Ottoman Kurdistan and Southern Kurdi­
stan’s inclusion into Mesopotamia. He concluded that:
the more homogeneous the population of the future Mesopotamia, the simpler and more 
satisfactory will be the task of mandatory. Although the inclusion of these Kurdish districts 
[i.e. Southern Kurdistan] might add to the revenue, they would prove a source of weakness 
in every other wayji
In Persia, British officials held contradictory views to those of Cairo insofar as Eastern 
Kurdistan was concerned. They were opposed to any step that would undermine Persian ter­
ritorial unity. Their reports on Eastern Kurdistan’s affairs contained explicit opposition to the 
aims of Kurdish nationalists and tangible suspicion of the ongoing Kurdish revolt, especially 
its leader, Simko, whom they accused of murdering Mar Sham'un, the leader of the Assyrians 
in the Urmia region. Simko’s attempts to establish direct contacts with the British authorities in 
Mesopotamia met with opposition by these officials, who not only advised against negotia­
tions with him, but also called for British support for the Persian military efforts to establish 
peace and order by suppressing his revolt. The British consul in Tabriz, for instance, advised 
Cox not to respond to Simko’s attempts to establish contacts with Britain, warning that he was 
an opportunist, and that any British arrangement with the murderer of the religious leader of 
the Assyrians, Mar| Sham'un would be morally “wrong".72 In April 1919, when the Persian 
governor of Senna asked for British aeroplanes to defend the town against the attacks of the 
Kurdish rebels, 7 3  the British were not in a position to provide such help, as their aeroplanes 
were already occupied in north-west Persia.74 However, by February 1920, Britain and Persia 
were simultaneously conducting co-ordinated air and ground operations against the Kurdish 
revolt, with a view to forestalling “a recrudescence of grave disorder” in Eastern Kurdistan.75  
British and Persian co-operation was extended to include the suppression of those Kurds
71* Col. French, Cairo, Directory of Military Intelligence, 2 October 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
72* Tabriz to Tehran, April 1919, AIR20/512, PRO.
73* Assistant Political Officer, Sennah, to Political, Baghdad, 16 April 1919, AIR20/512, PRO.
74* General Headquarter, Mes.Ex.Force, to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 20 April 1919, AIR20/512, 
PRO.
75* Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, February 1920, F0371/5070, PRO.
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who continued their resistance to British rule in Southern Kurdistanje The importance of the 
views of these officials serving in Persia lay in their converging with, and reinforcement of, the 
long-held imperial belief that British strategic interests could be best served by preserving the 
territorial unity of a British orientated Persia. Therefore, it was necessary that the terms of the 
Turkish peace treaty on the Kurdish question should avoid any clause that might indirectly 
affect Eastern Kurdistan’s existing relations with Persia.
<7- T lie  B ritish High Commission Constantinople
The views of the British High Commission in Constantinople varied from one official to another 
and also from one period to another. However, there was a general realisation among British 
officials that Britain could not afford to ignore the Kurdish question when negotiating the Turk­
ish peace treaty. Adm. Somerset Gough-Calthorpe, the British High Commissioner until Sep­
tember 1919, agreed with Noel that Kurdish national aspirations did not contradict the British 
strategic interests of securing proper frontiers in Mesopotamia. 77  He, like Noel, preferred a 
swift British response to Northern Kurdistan’s political developments. Gough-Calthorpe 
informed the Foreign Office about the sincerity of the Kurdish nationalists’ desire for the 
suzerainty of the British, emphasising that this:
matter is one which has a very large political importance...[and] must be faced... It is most 
essential that the circumstances should be turned to the best advantage possible, and I 
cannot imagine any possible solution by which Mesopotamia will not be confided to a British 
mandate, while it is essential for the general prosperity and peace of Mesopotamia to have 
good relations with the Kurds.7*
Gough-Calthorpe, while considering the re-establishment of Turkish suzerainty over Kurdi­
stan as an “impracticable” solution, advised against British support for Armenian demands at 
the expense of the Kurds. 79 Although wanting Mesopotamia to have strategically important 
mountains in Kurdistan, he made it clear that Kurdish national aspirations should not be disre­
garded if Britain sought to consolidate both its strategic position and permanent political stabi­
lity along its Mesopotamian frontier. Thus, the Kurds could be valued in terms of being the fac­
tor that would thwart any future Turkish intrigues against Mesopotamia.so Rear-Adm. Richard
76* For example, two Kurdish nationalists were arrested by the Persian authorities and handed over to 
British authorities in Baghdad. Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 11 April 1920, F0371/5068, PRO.
77* Young, Foreign Office Minute No.101503,14 July 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
78* High Commissioner, Constantinople, to Foreign Office, Repeated to Political, Baghdad, 10 July 
1919, AIR20/714, PRO.
79* IDCM, 6 September 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
80* High Commissioner, Constantinople, to Political, Baghdad, 3 & 13 April 1919, AIR20/714, PRO.
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Webb, Gough-Calthorpe’s Assistant, went so far as to express unreserved endorsement of 
Noel’s scheme for the future of Kurdistan and Armenia, while rejecting Wilson’s stance. The 
observation of Capt. C.C. Woolley, a British officer on the ground, also confirmed Noel’s con­
clusions that Kurdish nationalism, which expressed itself in the form of a desire for separation 
from Turkish rule and for a British mandate, could not be easily ignored as a political factor.81
Adm. John De Robeck and his subordinates at the High Commission held different 
views from the British High Commission in Cairo. They all agreed that Britain should not iden­
tify itself with Kurdish national aspirations. While not wanting to lose Kurdish nationalist lea­
ders as a political card in case of emergency, they hoped to prevent the alienation of the Turk­
ish Government in Constantinople and further deterioration in British relations with the Kemal- 
ist forces. De Robeck, though acknowledging the depth and sincerity of the Kurdish national­
ist movement,82 did not consider the establishment of an independent Kurdistan as having 
any advantage to Britain. Therefore, he, while wishing to see no British interference, sug­
gested that uit should be left to the Kurds themselves to work out their own salvation and to 
disentangle themselves from the Turkd'.w Similarly, Thomas Hohler, a Political Officer who cri­
ticised Adm. Webb for preferring Noel’s scheme for the future of Kurdistan and Armenia to 
Wilson’s, opposed any British interference in Turkish internal affairs in support of the Kurds 
and Armenians for humanitarian or other reasons. Britain, according to him, "must deal with 
the Kurdish question almost exclusively from the Mesopotamian frontier” point of view.84 Hoh­
ler hoped that his approach would serve to put an end to the anti-British stance of the Kemal- 
ists, and enable Britain to have the Kurdish mountains as “a sound defensible frontier” for 
Mesopotamia.85 Hohler’s views were appreciated by Lord Curzon,se who did not want British 
policy to drive the Kemalists towards the Bolshevik side. Andrew Ryan, another Political Offi­
cer, offered a compromise scheme based on the establishment of a large Turkey in which 
Northern Kurdistan would enjoy autonomous status. The implementation of his scheme 
depended on bringing moderate Turks and Kurds together.87
81* Capt. Woolley, Note on Kurdish National Movement -in- Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 29 July 1919, 
AIR20/512, PRO.
82* De Robeck to Curzon, Confidential, 9 December 1919, F0371/93, PRO.
83* High Commissioner, Constantinople, 12 November 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
84* Hohler, Constantinople, to Clerk Kerr, 27 August 1919, DBFP, p.742.
85* An Account of a Conversation between Hohler and Brigadier-General McCoy, 14 October 1919, 
DBFP, pp.821-23:.
86* Ibid, Footnote 3, p.823.
87* De Robeck to Curzon, Confidential, 2 March 1920, FO371/5067, PRO.
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Conclusion
The Bolshevik Revolution and the entry of the United States into the First World War against 
Germany made it necessary to considerably modify the Sykes-Picot agreement, if it were to 
serve as the basis for the post-war territorial and political re-arrangements of Ottoman Asia. 
Consequently, London began to search for a new territorial and political settlement which 
would have to take into consideration new developments, such as the threat of Bolshevism 
and the rise of various nationalist movements in Turkey and Persia. Delay and indecision char­
acterised the way Britain identified its objectives in Kurdistan, and was largely due to its unpre­
paredness to deal with new issues, such as that of the Kurds. Furthermore, Kurdish affairs 
were mysterious to the British Government, as there were very little contacts with the Kurds 
before and during the First World War. When the war ended, Britain found itself unexpectedly 
in control of large Kurdish areas, whose importance for Mesopotamia’s security were steadily 
increasing. The contradictory views of Wilson and Noel on whether the Kurdish factor was 
politically important or not, initially caused a noticeable hesitation inside the Foreign Office and 
India Office. A Foreign Office minute, which was written a few weeks before the Allied negotia­
tion of the Turkish peace settlement, illustrates the continuing confusion about Kurdish 
affairs:
/ am not sure about Major Noel, for, after he had come and talked to us at length about Kurdi­
stan, his views and proposals were contradicted in every respect by Colonel Wilson
(Baghdad), who said he was wrong all round.88
Neither Noel nor Wilson were able to persuade London to adopt their schemes for a 
defined policy towards Kurdistan ahead of the Paris peace conference’s discussion of the 
Turkish settlement. Having said that, the contradictory views of Wilson and Noel, and the var­
ious comments and reactions they provoked among British officials in London and the Middle 
East, helped London to formulate a general line, according to which the British delegation in 
Paris was to negotiate Kurdistan’s future within the Turkish peace treaty. The general line 
itself reflected an amalgamation of the different views advocated by British officials in the Mid­
dle East, as the following points illustrate. Firstly, to protect its interests, Britain would not 
resort to force beyond its existing frontiers in Southern Kurdistan and Mesopotamia. These 
frontiers would be “as short as possible”. This meant that, apart from Southern Kurdistan, Bri­
tain would not commit itself militarily to implementing the terms of the Turkish peace treaty
88* Foreign Office Minute, Bolshevik Propaganda in the East, 7 January 1920, Reports and Papers 
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part One, From the Mid Nineteenth Century to the First World 
War, DBFP, p.20.
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regarding Northern Kurdistan and Armenia. Thus Northern Kurdistan, which was outside Brit­
ish political control, would be left to its own devices. Secondly, apart from Southern Kurdistan 
-which would be under the Mesopotamian mandate- Britain would not accept a Kurdistan-wide 
mandate for itself or for its Allies. This practically meant that Britain decided both to partition 
Ottoman Kurdistan as a means of protecting its strategic and economic interests, and to con­
fine the relevancy of the Kurdish question to Northern Kurdistan. Thirdly, the restoration of 
Turkish sovereignty over Kurdistan would not be allowed.89
Points One and Two met the wishes of British civilian and military authorities in Bagh­
dad, in that Southern Kurdistan should be kept under British control and mandate on strategic 
and economic grounds. The principle of non-interference in Turkish internal affairs through 
Northern Kurdistan, as the British High Commission in Constantinople advocated, was taken 
into account, especially when it converged with the views of Lord Curzon and Winston 
Churchill, the Secretary of State for War. The limited recognition of the Kurdish people as a 
nationality per se, and of limited Kurdish political aspirations, as implied in Point Three, reflec­
ted, to some degree, the views of Noel and the British authorities in Cairo. The most important 
principle emphasised by the general line was that of subordinating the solution of the Kurdish 
question to the requirements of British interests in Mesopotamia, Turkey and Persia. The 
foregoing analysis showed that British officials on the ground influenced not only the direc­
tion of political developments in the Kurdish areas, but also the course of debate on Kurdi­
stan’s future among British decision-makers. The role of British officials on the ground, insofar 
as they affected Kurdish affairs, became even more evident and decisive in the period 1921- 
1923, when Percy Cox, the new High Commissioner for Mesopotamia, thwarted all attempts 
to establish a separate Southern Kurdistan in favour of incorporating it into the Iraqi state.
89* S/S to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 22 November 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
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The secret agreements tor the partition of Ottoman Asia, which Britain and the Allies conclu­
ded during the First World War, completely ignored the interests of the non-Turkish nationali­
ties such as the Kurds and the Armenians. However, the sensational publication of the terms 
of these secret agreements by the Bolsheviks in 1917, and President Wilson’s announce­
ment of his Fourteen Points, which made a direct reference to the principle of self- 
determination for the non-Turkish nationalities, compelled Britain to re-consider its position on 
the future of the non-Turkish Wilayets. As Britain discovered after the war, deciding the politi­
cal future of the new nationalities was a complicated issue. One of the main reasons for this 
was that Armenian, Arab and Kurdish nationalists laid conflicting claims to the same Wilayetsas 
part of their future national states. For instance, Kurdish and Arab nationalists laid the same 
claims to the Mosul Wilayet, whereas Kurdish and Armenian nationalists laid equal claims to 
the Van, Bitlis and Diyarbekir Wilayets. These conflicting claims particularly came to light when 
the Allies began to discuss the future of Kurdistan, Armenia and Mesopotamia. Moreover, Bri­
tain needed to settle the question of the new nationalities in such a way that it could consoli­
date its strategic and economic interests in the (new) Middle East.This chapter examines how 
the search for a solution to the Armenian question, and the issue of fulfilling its wartime pro­
mises to the Sharifian Arabs, made Britain realise the extent to which the political and territorial 
settlement of the future of the non-Turkish territories in Kurdistan, Armenia and Mesopotamia 
were interconnected. This chapter assesses the conflicting political and territorial aspirations 
of the Kurds, Armenians and Arabs insofar as they affected British policy on the Kurdish ques­
tion.
Kurdish Nationalists, Britain And The Turkish Peace Settlement, 1919-1920
When the First World War ended there was no Kurdistan-wide nationalist organisation that 
could represent all the Kurds of Turkey and Persia. The pre-war political contacts, which were 
initiated by some Kurdish nationalists, such as Sheikh Salam of Barzan, the Bedirkhans, 
Sheikh Abdul Qadir (the son of Ubeidullah), Cherif Pasha and Sheikh Mahmud, 1 were inter­
rupted by the outbreak of the war. The absence of a united Kurdish front after the war wea­
kened the political efforts of Kurdish nationalists to effectively present the Kurdish cause at
1 * Ahmad, Kurdistan During The First World War, pp.63 & 67.
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the forthcoming peace conference. Having said that, the majority of Kurdish nationalist lea­
ders were united on the issue of securing Britain’s support for their political cause. Kurdish 
expectations of a positive British role in determining Kurdistan’s post-war future reflected two 
factors. Firstly, apart from having the strongest military presence in the Middle East close to 
Kurdistan, Britain, as a great power, had strategic, political and economic interests in the politi­
cal settlement of the non-Turkish territories. Accordingly, Kurdish nationalists sought to per­
suade Britain that their nationalist aspirations did not contradict its interests. In his early con­
tacts with British officials, Cherif Pasha sought to demonstrate that, if an autonomous Kurdi­
stan was established under British protection, it would perform “ the same function towards 
Mesopotamia as the North-West Frontier Province performed towards India” .2 Qadir told the 
British that an independent Kurdistan, under their protection, could be a formidable buffer 
against both the Kemalists and the Bolsheviks.3 In Cairo, other exiled Kurdish nationalists led 
by Surreya Bedirkhan, presented British authorities in Egypt with similar views. Secondly, Brit­
ish political propaganda during and after the war regarding the right to self-determination and 
the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish entity under British supervision in Southern 
Kurdistan roused high expectations among Kurdish political elites, and were interpreted as 
evidence of Britain’s willingness to support the political aspirations of the subjected nationali­
ties, including the Kurds.
These factors explain why Kurdish nationalists focused their political efforts in the per­
iod 1919-1920 on securing British support for the immediate establishment of an indepen­
dent Kurdish state under its protection. Their objective was to go to the peace conference 
with a fait accompli, rather than awaiting its final decision. The origin of such thinking among 
Kurdish nationalists went back to the war period when Cherif Pasha held talks with Percy Cox, 
the temporary British Minister in Tehran. The former urged the British to take the initiative in 
turning Southern Kurdistan into a working autonomous administration under their protection 
as well as announcing their intended policy towards the Kurdish question.4 Soon Cherif 
Pasha broadened his proposal to include the whole of Ottoman Kurdistan.s Other Kurdish 
leaders and political organisations, such as the Kurdish Committee in Cairo and Uplifting Kur­
distan, held more or less similar views. They, while welcoming any development that indicated
2* A.J. Toynbee, Foreign Office Minute No.174037,22 November 1918, FO 371/3407, PRO.
3* De Robeck to Curzon, 2 March 1920, Enclosure Noil, A. Ryan, Memorandum, 24 February 1920, 
FO371/5067, PRO.
4* Precis of Affairs.., op. cit., p.8.
5* Toynbee, Foreign Office Minute No.174037, 22 November 1918, FO 371/3407, PRO.
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British support for the Kurdish cause, persistently urged Britain to adopt a defined policy 
towards the Kurdish question before the peace conference could take its final decision.6
On a number of separate occasions and through various initiatives, Kurdish leaders 
sought to test out the real attitudes of the British towards the Kurdish question. Asking for 
British sponsorship of the Kurdish-Armenian agreement in December 1919 was one such 
initiative (as will be examined later). Qadir, in his conversation with T.B. Hohler, expressed his 
apprehension that in the absence of a defined British policy, certain Turkish political group­
ings might try to win over the Kurds through promising an autonomous Kurdistan under Turk­
ish protection. The price that the Kurds were expected to pay was to fight the Kemalists. 
Qadir, while showing his mistrust of the Turks and their promises, sought, in Hohler’s word, to
form his course absolutely in accord with Allies, but especially with England, for he considered 
that the fate of Kurdistan was intimately linked with the policy of Great Britain, much more so 
than with that of any other of the Allies, and he was anxious to do nothing which not have [sic] 
our entire assent and approvals
Cherif Pasha informed Britain that he was elected as the *head of the future Kurdish state”* 
and asked for the dispatch of a mixed commission to Kurdistan to confirm his claims.9 During 
the peace conference, he asked for British approval of his initiative in submitting a memoran­
dum on the Kurdish question, in which he asked for a British mandate for Kurdistan (see map 
thirteen) . 10
On all of these occasions, the British continually avoided any reaction that might lead 
to deep involvement in Kurdish affairs. It was not until late 1919 that Britain began to formulate 
several principles guiding its approach to the Kurdish question, such as rejecting any British 
or foreign mandate for Kurdistan and separating Eastern Kurdistan from Persia. On more dir­
ect issues concerning Kurdistan’s future, Britain waited on the course of debate at the peace 
conference before adopting its final position. It sought a Kurdish policy that took into consid­
eration the new political developments in the region, such as the rise of Kemalism and the 
aims of its former allies in the Turkish peace settlement. France, Britain’s strongest imperial
6* Policy, Cairo, to General, 6 August 1919, AIR 20/714 & the letter by the Kurdish Democratic Party to 
British High Commissioner, 31 August 1919, FO 371/4192 & Letters by the Kurdish Communities at Con­
stantinople and the Association for Uplifting Kurdistan to Lloyd George, March 1920, FO 371/5068,
PRO.
7* De Robeck to Curzon, Confidential, 9 December 1919, Enclosure No.1, T.B. Hohler, Memorandum, 8 
December 1919, FO 371/4193, PRO.
8* IDCM, Secretary’s Note, 6 September 1919, FO 371/4193, PRO.
9* Hubert Young, Foreign Office Minute No.111245,4 August 1919, FO 371/ 4192, PRO.
10* British Delegation, Paris, 12 October 1919, FO 371/93, PRO.
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Map Thirteen: Kurdish 
Nationalists’ Definition Of 
Kurdistan's Frontiers In 
1919
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rival, d e m a n d e d  te rrito ria l and  e c o n o m ic  c o m p e n s a tio n s  in K u rd istan  for th e  lo s s  of M osu l, 
w h e re a s  A m eric a  w a s  particu larly  in teres ted  in th e  A rm en ian  m a n d a te .
O n  th e  issu e  of es ta b lish in g  c lo s e  political re la tio n s  w ith  K urd ish  n ation a lis ts , British  
o ffic ia ls  in C o n s ta n tin o p le  a n d  B a g h d a d  e x p re s s e d  s tron g  re s e rv a tio n s . T h e y  p a rtic u la rly  
o p p o s e d  a n y  British e n c o u ra g e m e n t o f K urd ish  political e ffo rts  o r a  British re c o g n itio n  o f a  
un ited  K u rd is tan . S a tis fy in g  K urd ish  n ation a lis t a sp ira tio n s , th e y  b e lie v e d , w a s  of no u s e  to  
B rita in ’s s tra teg ic  in terests, a s  K urd ish  n ation a lis ts  w e re  a  m in or political fo rce . In th e ir rep orts  
to  th e  F o re ig n  O ffic e  and  th e  In d ia  O ffic e ,th e s e  o ffic ia ls  in c re a s in g ly  c ritic ised  th e  K urd ish  
n atio n a lis t m o v e m e n t and  its p rin c ip a l e x p o n e n ts , u n d ersco rin g  th e ir  d isunity , lack o f in flu ­
e n c e  a n d  leg itim acy , a s  w ell a s  sug gesting  th e y  w e re  o ut of tou ch  w ith  th e  rea lity  in K urd istan . 
S o m e  of th e ir re p o rts  d es c rib e d  K urd ish  n ation a lis ts  a s  o p p o rtu n is ts u  and  th e  K urd ish  n atio ­
nalist m o v e m e n t as  no m o re  th a n  trib a l ag ita tio ns , m o tiva te d  by  K urd ish  c h ie fs ’ fe a r  o f E u r­
o p e a n  re ta lia tio n  for th e  a lle g e d  w a r-tim e  m a s s a c re s  a g a in s t C h ris tian s . R y a n  a n d  H o h le r of 
th e  British H igh  C o m m iss io n  in C o n s tan tin o p le  re p e a te d ly  m a d e  it c le a r  to th e  Kurdish  n atio ­
na lis ts  th a t B rita in  o p p o s e d  a n y  a tte m p t to  p o litica lly  m o b ilis e  th e  Kurds, h o w e v e r p e a c e fu l
11* Precis of Affairs.., op. cit., p.17.
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and lawful the methods. Taking independent political initiatives in Kurdistan, in British eyes, 
was bound to have dangerous effects on British Interests, as the Mahmud affair in Southern 
Kurdistan had demonstrated earlier. A politically flammable Kurdistan could also draw the 
attention of hostile Powers to the Kurdish situation, especially Bolshevik Russia. Against this 
background, the British High Commission in Constantinople explicitly warned Kurdish leaders 
that political instability in Kurdistan would negatively influence Britain’s position on the Kurdish 
question at the peace conference. Thus, Kurdish leaders faced a dilemma. On the one hand, 
they felt that Britain questioned their political influence in Kurdistan and the strength of Kurd­
ish nationalist sentiment. On the other, when endeavouring to demonstrate the extent of 
their influence and the magnitude of the Kurdish nationalist movement, they were warned by 
British officials of dire consequences “ if they were found preparing a movement against Turks 
or any thing of that kintf. In other words, Kurdish nationalists should not arouse Turkish suspi­
cions through their political activities in Kurdistan. They should await the results of the peace 
conference.12
While that was the British position, the Turkish authorities, over whom Britain had firm 
control, began suppressive campaigns against Kurdish nationalists by dissolving their organi­
sations and committees, arresting Kurdish activists and breaking up their political meetings in 
Constantinople and throughout Kurdistan. The difference in the initial British position on 
Kurdish and Armenian affairs reflected three important factors: humane, strategic and political. 
Firstly, the Armenian question had a clear humane dimension, stemming from the Armenian 
massacres at the hands of the Ottoman authorities before and during the First World War. The 
massacres caused such public moral reaction in Europe and America that it was not possible 
to ignore Armenian nationalist aspirations. It was perceived that the creation of an indepen­
dent state was the only guarantee for the long-term safety of the Armenians. In this respect, 
the Armenian question was almost identical to the Jewish one. Here, the same moral consid­
erations stood behind Western support for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. 
Secondly, because of the geopolitical position of Armenia between the old Russian Empire 
and the Ottoman Empire, the Armenian question was of more strategic importance to Britain 
than the Kurdish one. In other words, Britain considered useful the creation of an indepen­
dent Armenian state as a strategic buffer against Bolshevik Russia. Lastly, there was no Kurd­
ish lobby to back or explain Kurdish political aspirations either in Europe or in America, as in
12* High Commission, Constantinople, 21 July 1919, FO 371/4192, PRO.
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the case of the Jews and the Armenians.
The last factor was an important one, given the unfamiliarity of the British Government 
with the complexity of the Kurdish question. Indeed, when the British Government asked for 
information about a suitable nationalist leader to talk to regarding Kurdish aspirations at the 
peace conference, British officials in Constantinople and Baghdad dismissed the existence of 
any acceptable Kurdish leader. They emphasised that there was neither a Kurdish question 
nor a Kurdish nationalist movement, and that the influence of those who claimed to represent 
the Kurdish cause was minimal among the Kurds. The reality of the Kurdish nationalist move­
ment was remarkably different from what was portrayed by these British officials. Apart from 
Simko, whose influence was mainly restricted to his own tribal confederation, the influence of 
such nationalist leaders as Qadir, the Bedirkhans and Mahmud, cut across many Kurdish 
regions. It was by no means confined to one tribe or confederation of tribes. These leaders, 
therefore, cannot be considered as tribal chiefs. Moreover, the Kurdish nationalist movement 
contained senior military and civilian figures as well as students, intellectuals and artisans. The 
main Kurdish nationalist organisation, the Kurdish Committee, which waged a political propa­
ganda campaign and mobilised Kurdish public opinion for a separate Kurdistan, had branches 
all over Northern and Western Kurdistan, such as those at Diyarbekir, Sairt, Saur, Mardin, 
Jezirah and Botan. It attracted to its ranks Kurdish civil servants, artisans and officers from the 
Ottoman army and the police. 13
The continuation of what seemed to the Kurds as undefined British policy towards 
Kurdistan’s future, especially after December 1919, was interpreted by Kurdish nationalists as 
a negative omen, they suspected a large scale re-partition of Kurdistan through secret arran­
gements. C.C. Garbett of the India Office, following his conversation with Kurdish leaders, sta­
ted that:
they understand not only that neither Great Britain nor France will accept the responsibility [for 
the mandate over Kurdistan], but that these Allies are contemplating such a partition of Kurd­
ish territory as will destroy the possibility of a united Kurdistan. 14
These nationalists, according to Garbett, had no option but to turn to the Young Turks 
because they preferred the prospect of “a united Kurdistan’' under the protection of a weak 
Turkey to a “permanent division” , with which they believed themselves threatened. 15 The two
13* Nasser Effendi, Notes on the Present Kurdish Situation, Mes.Ex.Force, 5 August 1919, AIR20/513, 
PRO.
14* C. Garbett, Memorandum on Kurdistan, 29 January 1920, FO 371/4193, PRO.
15*lbid.
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prospects of incurring anti-Kurdish reaction in London and the re-partitioning of Kurdistan 
were new factors which helped to divide Kurdish nationalists in Northern Kurdistan. Indeed, 
Cherif Pasha’s report of the rumours of the peace conference’s decision to divide Kurdistan 
between Britain and France caused, according to De Robeck, a political polarisation among 
Kurdish nationalist circles. On the one side, there were those Kurds who believed in the cap­
ability of the Kurdish nationalist movement to expel the Turks from Kurdistan and then make 
the peace conference recognise the liberated Kurdistan as a fait accompli. On the other side, 
Cherif Pasha, who did not believe that Kurdish nationalists were sufficiently strong, sought to 
forestall the imminent partition by reaching an agreement with the Ottoman authorities that 
would grant “autonomy for the whole of Kurdistan under Turkish sovere/gnf/ .16 Similarly, 
Qadir, while expressing his fears of French plans to partition Kurdistan, made it clear that he 
wanted a united Ottoman Kurdistan, even if this would entail the restriction of Kurdish political 
ambitions to local autonomy within Turkey.17
The sudden moderation in the political aims of Qadir, Cherif Pasha and some other 
Kurds expressed, firstly, their loss of faith in the peace conference as a means of achieving 
Kurdish nationalist aspirations, 18 and secondly, their opposition to re-partition of Kurdistan, 
which meant that the Kurds would emerge empty handed from the Turkish peace settlement. 
They, therefore, judged it necessary to reach -in advance- political arrangements with the 
Turkish authorities, before the peace conference could reach its decision on Kurdistan’s 
future. This would, at least, secure an autonomous and united Kurdistan within Turkey. In 
other words, it was the fear of the dismemberment of Kurdistan that was the reason for the 
moderate attitudes of certain Kurdish nationalists, rather than any religious loyalty to the Otto­
man Sultan, as British officials in Constantinople argued. After meeting a deputation from the 
nationalist Kurdish Club, Admiral Webb reported that the apparent manifestations of Kurdish 
“loyalty to the Turks were either fictitious or the result of direct pressure or, in some case, of 
uncertainty as to what support the Kurds could count on in their struggle to escape from the 
Turkish yoke". 19
Both British measures on the ground and the uncertainty about London’s real inten- 
16* De Robeck, Constantinople, 27 February 1920, FO371/5067, PRO.
17* De Robeck to Curzon, 2 March 1920, Enclosure No.1, A. Ryan, Memorandum, 24 February 1920, 
FO371/5067, PRO.
18* De Robeck to Curzon, Confidential, 9 December 1919, Enclosure No.1, T. B. Hohler, Memorandum,
8 December 1919, FO 371/4193, PRO.
19* Commission, Constantinople, 3 February 1920, FO371/5067, PRO.
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tion in Kurdistan in the period 1919-1920 had a negative impact on the political efforts of 
Kurdish nationalists. They exacerbated divisions and disunity inside the Kurdish nationalist 
movement. Gradually, pessimism replaced optimism, as the British stopped the process of the 
emergence of an autonomous Southern Kurdistan and prevented a direct political connec­
tion between Eastern and Southern Kurdistan. While warning Kurdish nationalists in Northern 
Kurdistan against unwarranted political activities, they tolerated the Ottoman authorities’ anti- 
Kurdish measures, such as the closing down of Kurdish newspapers and political organisa­
tions, as well as arresting their members.
Having said that, Britain could not completely ignore the Kurdish question owing to 
three factors. Firstly, the existence of the Kurdish nationalist movement could not be over­
looked as an important factor when settling the future of non-Turkish territories such as Arm­
enia, Mesopotamia and Syria. Secondly, by occupying the southern parts of Ottoman Kurdi­
stan, Britain faced the issue of how to deal with Kurdish nationalists. In other words, Britain 
had no choice but to be involved in the future of the Kurdish question within the framework of 
the Turkish peace settlement. Thirdly, the upsurge of Kurdish nationalism coincided with the 
growing threat posed by both the Kemalists and the Bolsheviks to British imperial interests in 
India, Persia and Mesopotamia. These anti-British forces would very likely make the most of 
the Kurdish situation if Britain ignored the Kurds. Britain, therefore, had to find a formula that 
while realising its own main objectives in Kurdistan, would not go beyond satisfying limited 
political aspirations in the form of granting local autonomy to part of Kurdistan.
The Development Of Britain’s Kurdish Policy In The Light Of The Political 
Aspirations Of The Armenians And Other Christians, 1918-1920
i- Early g ritish  Attitudes
Ever since the Nineteenth Century, the Great Powers had influenced the shaping of Kurdish- 
Armenian relations through their interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. On 
the one side, Russia used the Ottomans’ maltreatment of their Armenian subjects as an 
excuse to interfere in the affairs of the eastern Wilayets, whereas Muslim Kurds were consid­
ered an obstacle in the way of expanding Russian influence. It was in Russia’s interest that 
Armenian-Kurdish confrontation continued, as this would give it an opportunity to directly 
intervene in the matter. On the other side, the Ottomans sought, through the policy of divide 
and rule, and through stirring pan-lslamic sentiments in the eastern Wilayets, to turn the Kurds
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against the Armenians. This was the ideal way to stifle the growing Kurdish and Armenian 
nationalist movements simultaneously. In a sense, the Kurds and the Armenians fought each 
other on behalf of the Turks and the Russians. In the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century, 
Britain began to intervene directly in the affairs of the eastern Wilayets on moral and political 
grounds, through the protection of Christian Armenians against Muslim Kurds. This was done 
by pressuring the Turks to implement administrative reforms, and via the containment of Rus­
sian interference in Ottoman internal affairs through the Armenian question.
As the Kurdish revolt of 1880-1881 demonstrated, Kurdish nationalists became 
aware of the need to avoid the trap of fighting the Armenian Christians in the interest of the 
Muslim Turks, and of identifying Turkish rule as the real enemy of the Kurds. Although a similar 
realisation emerged among Armenian nationalists, they failed in their efforts to ally with Kurd­
ish nationalists largely because of strong Russian opposition. The failure of the Kurds and 
Armenians to bury their differences had considerable negative effects on the development of 
Kurdish and Armenian nationalist movements until 1919. When the First World War broke out, 
both Turkey and Russia were able to mobilise many Kurds and Christians respectively, caus­
ing atrocities throughout Ottoman Kurdistan, Ottoman Armenia and Eastern Kurdistan, where 
the main battlefields were situated. As a direct result of the war, tens of thousands of Kurds 
and Armenians died. In Southern Kurdistan, according to Amin Zaki, 300,000 Kurds lost their 
lives.20 According to W.R. Hay, only 20% of the original population of Rowanduz survived 
after the war.21 Robert Olson estimates total Kurdish deaths to be around 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 . 2 2  Given 
that, according to British estimations during the war, there were around 3,000,000 Kurds,23  
Kurdistan must have lost 20% of its population.
The Allied victory and British occupation of large Kurdish areas caused considerable 
alarm in several Kurdish areas, lest the Allies adopt a retribution policy against the Kurds. From 
the Kurdish viewpoint, the Allies were, after all, Christians, and bound to help their co­
religionists, as they had done in the past. The post-war public support of Europe and America 
for the Armenian cause was also interpreted by the Kurds as a prelude to the incorporation of
20* Muhammad Amin Zaki, Tarikh Al Kord We Kordstan Min Aqdam Al Osur Hatta Alan, (Cairo: Al Saateh 
Press, 1939), pp.274-275.
21* Hay, Two Years In Kurdistan, p. 192.
22* Olson, The Emergence Of Kurdish Nationalism, p.21.
23* British Desiderate in Turkey, op. cit., Appendix VI, Note by the Secretary, Political and Secret 
Department, India Office: “The Future Settlement of Eastern Turkey in Asia and Arabia”, 14 March 1915, 
p.83.
116
Map Fourteen: Armenians’ 
Claims to Kurdish Areas 
According To Their Proposed 
Map Of Armenia At The Paris 
Peace Conference In 1919
Ottoman-Persian
Frontier
Armenian Territorial 
Claims In Kurdistan
Lake Van
Mush
Van
Malatiya
Bitlis Lake Urmia
Diyarbekir
Irmii
Mardin Jezirah Hakari
Urfa
Mosul Rowanduz L -  
Arbil Sulaimanh Senna
Kirkuk
Kifri
Kermanshah
lanaqii
Ottoman Kurdistan into a Greater Armenian state. What intensified Kurdish fears even more 
was the propaganda campaign waged by some Armenian nationalists, claiming that the 
Christian Allies would bring the Kurds to justice for their wartime crimes against the Armenians. 
This anti-Kurdish propaganda campaign, which was supported by some Western missionaries 
-such as Reverent W.A. Wigram ,24 an Anglican British priest who lived in Urmia before and dur­
ing the war- succeeded in portraying the Kurds in Europe and America as murderers. The 
major motive behind the Armenians’ attempts to incriminate the Kurds as a whole was to per­
suade the Allies to incorporate Northern Kurdistan into the would-be Greater Armenian state 
(see map fourteen). Noel warned against any British involvement in "hostilities in Asia Minor”, 
which he attributed to “the fear cleverly fostered by the Armenians that the Allies are intent on 
supporting the domination of one Armenian over Muslims’'.25  Indeed, the project of creating a 
Greater Armenia was initially supported by the Allies, including Britain and America, between 
1914 and 1919.
Towards the end of the First World War, certain Kurds took the initiative and tried to
24* Reverend Wigram, Notes Regarding Kurds, Baghdad, 20 February 1919, AIR20/512, PRO.
25* Dairy of Maj. Noel, On Special Duty in Kurdistan, from June 14th to September 21st 1919, 
FO371/5068, PRO.
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improve Kurdish-Christian relations, while also inviting British officials to intervene in the mat­
ter. The Mukri Kurds, for instance, offered the British Consul at Kermanshah their solution for 
the Kurdish-Christian problem in Urmia, where the Kurds, on the one hand, and the Arm­
enians and Assyrians, on the other, bitterly fought each other. It involved two elements: a 
separate Eastern Kurdistan and direct British intervention to restore stability.26 Just before the 
end of the war, Cherif Pasha drew British attention to Turkish sponsorship of the hatred 
between Armenians and Kurds, arguing that:
the task now was to reconcile the two races, the Mohammedans in a large majority and the 
Armenians in a strong minority, both having an equal right to inhabit the same country. For 
establishing a basis of reconciliation, he considered a committee should be set up in London, 
and he suggested its immediate formation under the auspices of the British Government, first 
in Mesopotamia and, afterwards, in Kurdistan.27
Other Kurdish nationalists, such as Said Taha, asked for a British guarantee that Kurdistan 
would not come under Armenian or Assyrian rule.28 Taha and Simko kept the British informed 
of their willingness to co-operate regarding the Christian problem, if they would intervene poli­
tically to reconcile the views of all parties.
Initially, British officials on the ground paid no serious attention to either Kurdish fears 
or Kurdish factors in the settlement of the Armenian and Assyrian problems. In this respect, 
Wilson expressed his doubts about Cherif Pasha, whom he considered to be in no position to 
play any part in the Kurdish-Armenian question. 2 9  The pro-Christian measures adopted by 
certain British officials, such as Col. Leachman, were motivated by political as well as moral 
considerations. It was calculated that the cheapest way to consolidate British rule in some diffi­
cult Kurdish areas was to use the Christians as an instrument to control local Kurds. This policy 
was counterproductive. Instead of stability, it caused anti-British feelings and eventually led to 
the outbreak of local Kurdish revolts in the Mosul area and beyond, such as in Amadia, Jezirah 
and Nisibin. To suppress these revolts, British aeroplanes carried out bombing raids on a large 
scale against Kurdish villages, inflicting heavy casualties.30 All these developments helped to 
increase Kurdish suspicion of British intentions in Kurdistan. Noel criticised the pro-Christian 
orientation among some British officials: “our allowing ourselves to be used as a tool of Arm­
enian religious fanaticism and vindictiveness is greatly responsible for the anti-Christian and
26* Precis of Affairs.., op. cit., pp.7-8.
27* Ibid, p.8.
28* War Office, No.0152/5146,11 August 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
29* Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, 30 October 1918, AIR20/512, PRO. 
30* Precis of Affairs..,op. cit., p. 14.
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Anti-British movement in Kurdistan".31 Earlier, he warned that the adoption of a retaliatory 
policy against Kurdish civilians would lead to the formation of an anti-British front among the 
Muslims, which would involve London in “serious military responsibilities”.3 2 The political ambi­
tions of the Assyrians posed another danger to the Kurds because, like the Armenians, the 
Assyrians wanted the British to support and protect the unification of their nation and home­
land, i.e. the region Mosul-Jezirah-Bashkala-Urmia (see map f i f t e e n ) . 33
The unsympathetic attitudes of British officials on the ground were in harmony with 
early British schemes for the future of the Armenians and the Assyrians. Examination of these 
schemes shows that the existing Kurdish fears were justifiable and well-founded. According 
to Toynbee, Mark Sykes was thinking of establishing an entity similar to Lebanon in Hakari in 
Northern Kurdistan for the Ottoman Assyrians, who could forge a political and territorial union 
with their brothers in Urmia in Eastern Kurdistan. As for the Armenians, Sykes proposed to 
establish one independent Armenian state in Cilicia and another one in the eastern Wilayets. 
The latter would be based on equal status for all nationalities. The two states would eventually
31* Noel, Aleppo, to Political, Baghdad, 2 August 1919, AIR20/714, PRO.
32* Political, Baghdad, to Egyptian, Cairo, 24 April 1919, AIR20/714, PRO.
33* Headquarter Jelus Refugee Camp, to Political, Baghdad, 21 February 1919, AIR20/512, PRO.
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be amalgamated into one entity, including Northern Kurdistan. In his comment on Sykes’ 
scheme, Toynbee said that it would “give the Armenians immediate national self-government., 
but this might be unfortunate for the very large Turkish and Kurdish element in the population 
there".34 The origin of this scheme goes back to 1915 when Sykes suggested the creation of 
“Armenian buffer states" as well as an Assyrian entity in Asia Minor. 35 Sykes’ scheme was cir­
culated as a Foreign Office memorandum and was studied by the Eastern Committee of the 
British War Cabinet.36 Up until 1919, Britain, like America, was strongly inclined towards the 
establishment of a Greater Armenian state, 37 considering it -apart from being a moral duty- as a 
means of containing Pan-Tg^iranism, and as a barrier against Bolshevik aggression in the Mid­
dle East38 (see map sixteen). America wanted a large Armenian state largely on moral 
grounds, that is to protect Armenians from future massacre.39 It accepted, in principle, a
34* A.J. Toynbee, Foreign Office Minute No.174037, 25 November 1918, FO371/3407, PRO.
35* British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia, Appendix XV, Armenian Buffer States, Note by Lieut. Col. Mark 
Sykes, 15 March 1915, CAB27/1, PRO, pp. 114-115.
36* Eastern Committee, No.2525, November 1918, Cab 27/37, PRO.
37* Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia: From Versailles to London, 1919-1920, Vol.II, 
(London & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 265-266.
38* Eastern Committee, 40th & 43d Minutes (Annex), December 1918, Cab 27/24, PRO.
39* Hovannisian,The Republic of Armenia: From Versailles to London, 1919-1920, Vol.ll, pp.261-264.
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mandate for Armenia, and was directly involved in the delimitation of the future Armenian 
states (see map seventeen). This British and American thinking converged with that of the 
Armenian nationalists, who advocated the establishment of a Greater Armenia from the Cau­
cuses to the Mediterranean^ by incorporating most of Ottoman Kurdistan.
On another level, the Foreign Office and the India Office were thinking of making the
most of Assyrian political aspirations through the formation of an Assyrian entity, as suggested
earlier by Sykes, and based on uniting the Bashkala district in Northern Kurdistan with the
Urmia district in Eastern K u r d is t a n .42 This would benefit Britain in several ways. As Southern
Kurdistan proved to be an unsuitable place to resettle the Assyrian refugees because of firm
Kurdish resistance, Montagu found the solution in repatriating them to the Urmia district. Apart
from removing a heavy financial burden, which these refugees created for the Mesopotamian
administration, he hoped that:
the Persian Government might welcome a strong Christian settlement in this area as a bulwark 
against Kurdish aggression and that [it] might be prepared to grant a measure of local self- 
government to the Assyrians in return for some guarantee of military service.43 
40* Sachar, The Emergence of the Middle East, 1914-1924, pp.265, 353-356, 362.
41* Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia: From Versailles to London, 1919-1920, Vol.II, pp.261-264. 
42* Foreign Office Comment on Telegram No.1939,18 October 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
43* Hirtzel, India Office, 20 December 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
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Montagu’s proposal received the support of Hubert Young of the Foreign Office. 44 Having 
said that, there was a totally different approach to Montagu’s, presented by Maj. Ross, a Politi­
cal Officer. His views on the Kurdish-Assyrian problem were almost identical to those of Noel 
on the Kurdish-Armenian one, and the two officials deviated from the mainstream of official 
thinking. To Ross, the ideal approach to the Assyrian-Kurdish problem was to be based on 
the existing realities on the ground, rather than religious considerations. He therefore advoca­
ted the unification of the Kurdish districts of Bashkala and Urmia under Kurdish rule on demo­
graphic, economic, political and geographical grounds. To him, the Christians formed a minor­
ity in these districts, whereas satisfying the aspirations of the Kurdish majority would restore 
political stability, as Britain desired.45 But, as preserving Persian territorial integrity was vital to 
British strategic interests in India, such unorthodox views found no support among British offi­
cial either in Persia and Mesopotamia or in London. Instead, Britain sought through the treaty 
of Sevres to unite the above mentioned districts in order to establish an autonomous 
Christian entity under Persian sovereignty.
1/- T fie Resolution o f T lie  Armenian Question And *€he flew  g ritish  Position On 
Kurdistan's Juture
It did not take long for Britain to come face to face with the realities on the ground. Firstly, the 
Kurds formed the majority of the population in many areas claimed by the Christians. Secondly 
and most importantly, the establishment of a Greater Armenian state was not a politically viable 
option and was even a dangerous one due to the instability it would inevitably cause in Kurdi­
stan. To overcome the Kurdish obstacle, the Allies would either have to intervene militarily in 
order to establish the proposed Armenian state or satisfy some Kurdish political aspirations. 
Richard Hovannisian, an Armenian historian, argues that “the so-called Kurdish question” was 
invented by the Ottomans in order to prevent the solution of the Armenian question, and 
soon was sponsored by Britain in order to retreat from its promises to the Armenians. 46 By 
contrast, evidence shows that Britain became increasingly interested in the Kurdish situation 
because it wanted to facilitate the formation of an Armenian national state. Indeed, Britain,
44* Young, Memorandum No. 16443,10 January 1920, F0371/4193, PRO.
45* Maj. Ross, Note on Kurdish Claims to the Urmia District of Persia, Kurdish Bureau, 8/9 July 1919, 
AIR20/512, PRO.
46* Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia: From Versailles to London, 1919-1920, Vol.II, 
pp.442-447 & The Republic of Armenia: From London to Sevres, February-August 1920, Vol.II I, op. cit., 
pp. 61-71.
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while being unwilling to commit itself militarily to a Greater Armenia, observed with some appre­
hension continuing Turkish attempts to win the Kurds over by exploiting their growing fears of 
Allied-backed Armenian domination. 47 The prospect of a united Turkish-Kurdish front would 
place the Turks in a strong position to obstruct the implementation of the forthcoming Turkish 
peace settlement. To a certain degree, the Turks succeeded in playing on Kurdish fears of 
Armenian domination and this was due not to their encouragement of Kurdish nationalistic 
feelings, as Hovannisian argues, but to their appeal to the Islamic sentiment of all non-Turkish 
Muslims in the wake of the Greek occupation of Smyrna.
The change in British approach to the Kurdish situation was influenced by those Brit­
ish officials who provided first-hand information. They highlighted the real st^te of affairs in 
Ottoman Kurdistan and the implicit interconnections between the Armenian and Kurdish 
questions in any political scheme for the eastern Wilayets. In his tour of some Kurdish areas, 
Capt. C. Woolley of the British Military Intelligence reported how the local Kurds were extre­
mely apprehensive about the prospect of facing Armenian domination and Allied retribution.48 
Nasir Effendi, a British intelligence agent and himself Christian, warned that the formation of 
any Armenian state at the expense of the Kurds would result in an immediate Kurdish upris­
ing.49 Most importantly, Noel brought to London’s attention the fact that Kurds formed an 
overwhelming majority in many areas claimed by Armenian nationalists. In his opinion:
The chief difficulty of the [Kurdish-ArmenianJ problem lies in the fact that Armenian claims 
have gained such a hearing and hold on public opinion in Europe and more especially in Eng­
land and America, that it is now exceedingly difficult to reconcile the practical recognition of 
these claims with inexorable logic of facts. In other words, the alternative to facing the indigna­
tion of Lord Bryce and the Cocoa Press is to attempt to govern 10 Kurds with one Armenian.50
The signs of change in British attitudes towards the Kurds manifested itself in British- 
controlled Kurdish areas. It became vital to adopt conciliatory measures on the ground to con­
tain the alarming anti-British propaganda activities of the Kemalists and the Ottoman authori­
ties among the Kurds.51 In accordance with Noel’s recommendations, which received Lon­
don’s approval, Wilson issued a general amnesty to those Kurds who feared retribution for 
alleged wartime crimes. In addition, some Kurdish leaders were encouraged to visit the volatile
47* Calthorpe, Constantinople, to Curzon, 30 July 1919, DBFP, pp.704-705.
48* Woolley, the Kurdish National Movement, F0371/4192, PRO, pp.5-6.
49* Nasir Effendi, Notes on the Present Kurdish Situation, 5 August 1919, AIR20/513, PRO.
50* Noel, Note on the Kurdish Situation, July 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
51* Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, London (No.5353) 12 May 1919, AIR20/714 & S/S to QCr, Bagh­
dad, Priority, 5 June 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
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Kurdish areas in order to reassure their population of British good intentions.52
In his recommendations, Noel went further than adopting short term measures. He 
urged that to “undo the effects of the recent Turkish pan-lslamic propaganda”, Britain should 
give assurances to Kurdish leaders that areas where the Kurdish element was predominant 
would not come under Armenian domination. 53 The essence of Noel’s report from Northern 
Kurdistan, which he highlighted to official circles in London and the Middle East, was the inter­
connection between the solution of the Kurdish and the Armenian questions. In other words, 
meeting the national aspirations of the Kurds was essential for the successful realisation of 
the Allies’ principal aim of creating a national Armenian state. In June 1919, Noel reported from 
Diyarbekirthat:
here and in the adjacent parts of Kurdistan, Kurdish leaders are feeling very keenly the full 
publicity, which is being given in Europe to Armenian national claims while their case is com­
paratively a closed book. A restlessness also possesses them because decisions are being 
arrived at in Paris which vitally affect their future, while they themselves are idly sitting here.
This all tends to create a natural desire to cause local demonstrations with a view of bringing 
the Kurdistan question into the limelight and confronting the peace conference with a fait
accompli.54
By late 1919, the settlement of the Armenian question thus looked increasingly more compli­
cated to the British Government than it had earlier anticipated.
As Britain was interested in devising a solution for the Armenian question, the views 
of Noel in particular prompted a new political debate among various departments within the 
Government and British officials in the Middle East, as a result of which Britain began to pay far 
more attention to the Kurdish question. Arthur Hirtzel of the India Office recognised that Eur­
opean support for the creation of an independent Armenian state contradicted -as actual facts 
showed- the very principle of national self-determination on which it based its argument. 
Ignoring the Kurdish right to self-determination for the sake of Armenia, in his eyes, would jus­
tify any Kurdish resistance to future Armenian domination. 55  Montagu, the Secretary of State 
for India, acknowledged that “ the ultimate solution of the Kurdish problem must depend on a 
variety of factors, some of which” [such as the question of the extent and character of the pro­
posed Armenian state] “are still indeterminate" .56 Hirtzel further elaborated the position of the 
India Office on the Kurdish-Armenian problem. He did not, however, consider the formation of
52* Calthorpe, Constantinople, to Political, Baghdad, 1 May 1919 & Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, 
(No.5353) 12 May 1919, AIR20/714, PRO.
53* Noel, Constantinople, to Political, Baghdad, 10 July 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
54* Fivecav, Cairo, to Political. Baghdad , 14 June 1919, AIR20/512, PRO.
55* Hirtzel, Note, 7 August 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
56* Shuckburgh, India Office, 1 August 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
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Kurdish and Armenian states to be an ideal option and, instead, advocated a solution based 
on the British experience in India, i.e. adopting the lines of the Morley-Minto treatment of 
Indian Muslims. In other words, the Armenians would receive, like the Indian Muslims, a mea­
sure of political influence that was greater than that their number.57
Compared with Hirtzel’s, Noel’s solution of the Kurdish and Armenian questionswas 
based on equal British acknowledgement of both Kurdish and Armenian nationalist aspira­
tions. As it was very problematic to define the limits of Kurdistan and Armenia, owing to “ the 
dispersion of the populations” and "the ravaged state of the country”, the geographical rela­
tionship between the two countries should be determined by the two sides after restoring 
normality.58 Noel’s views received support from several British officials in the Middle East. 
Rear-Adm. Richard Webb -who rejected Wilson’s scheme for re-establishing Turkish authority 
over the non-Turkish Wilayets under some European supervision- backed Noel’s solution, 
viewing it as "the only way out of difficulty”.5 9  Col. French of the Egyptian Expeditionary 
Force, also endorsed Noel’s scheme for reflecting the ethnographical and political realities on 
the ground. Accordingly, he asked London to recognise Kurdish nationality and to do its 
utmost to avert a decision at the peace conference that would give Armenians unrestricted 
domination over areas where Kurds were predominant.60
111- The Term s O /T lie  Sevres tre a ty  On *Che Juture O f Kurdistan And Armenia
Examination of British attitudes at the peace conference leading up to the formulation of the 
Sevres terms reveals that they were characterised by unequal support for Kurdish and Arm­
enian nationalist aspirations. In terms of freedom from Turkish control, Kurdish interests were 
inferior to Armenian ones. This can partly be attributed to the sympathetic reaction of the 
Christian Powers to what they perceived to be the Armenian genocide under Ottoman rule, 
and to the fact that the Armenians fought on the Allied side against Turkey. The Armenians 
would enjoy the establishment of their independent state straight off, whereas the Northern 
Kurds would enjoy an ambiguous local autonomy, pending the proposed Allied commission’s 
final decision one year later. Moreover, in terms of the geographical size of their future enti­
ties, the Armenian state would include almost half of Northern Kurdistan, whereas the Kurdish
57* Hirtzel, Note, 7 August 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
58* Noel, Note on the Kurdish Question, 18 July 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
59* Webb, Constantinople, Very Urgent, 19 August 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
60* French, Egy.Ex.Force, Cairo, 2 October, F0371/4192, PRO.
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areas amounted to less than 20% of Ottoman Kurdistan’s actual size.
The need for positive British attitudes towards Kurdish nationalist aspirations can also 
toe attributed to independent developments, most notably the Kurdish-Armenian agreement 
of December 1919. The agreement was the culmination of Kurdish leaders’ efforts to improve 
Kurdish-Ohristian relations. They hoped to erase the long-held negative image of the Kurds in 
the Christian world and obtain more sympathetic European attitudes towards Kurdish national 
aspirations. Most importantly, they sought to prevent Turkish nationalists from using religion 
as an instrument of mobilising the Kurds against the Allies and local Christians. From Constan­
tinople, Noel reported that the heads of the Christian communities of Diyarbekir acknow­
ledged Kurdish leaders’ statements that they sought friendly relations with them. Kurdish 
nationalist circles in Constantinople also sought to get in touch with Said Taha and Simko, with 
a view to establishing the same friendly Kurdish-Christian relations in Eastern Kurdistan, espe­
cially in Urmia.6i In Cairo, the Kurdish Committee expressed the desire of the Kurds to live in 
harmony with those Armenians who might live in an independent Kurdistan, and also their will­
ingness to give them a share in the future government in proportion to their numbers. 62 As for 
the complicated issue of Kurdish and Armenian atrocities during the war, Kurdish nationalists 
welcomed a proposal at the peace conference to investigate both Kurdish and Armenian 
claims. Once Turkish rule was removed, Kurdish nationalists believed, peaceful coexistence 
could be easily achieved between the Kurds and Armenians. To cement such coexistence, 
they suggested the idea of a government according to the wishes of the majority in the non- 
Turkish Wilayets.M
The most important development in bilateral Kurdish-Armenian relations was the 
attempts of Kurdish nationalists to reach a political agreement with their Armenian counter­
parts on their conflicting territorial claims. They hoped to demonstrate to the Allies that the two 
nationalities could help solve their common problems and that they were not an impediment 
to re-shaping the future of the non-Turkish Wilayets. In December 1919, Kurdish and Arm­
enian nationalists presented a memorandum to the peace conference, signed by Boghos 
Nubar for Ottoman Armenia, Ohandjanian for the Armeniah Republic and Cherif Pasha for the 
Kurds. While emphasising the “identical interests and aspirations” of Kurdish and Armenian 
nations, the two parties demanded freedom from Turkey and asked the Allies for united and
61* Noel, Constantinople, to Political, Baghdad, 10 July 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
62* Policy, Cairo, to General, Baghdad, 6 August 1919, AIR20/714, PRO.
63* Woolley, the Kurdish National Movement, F0371/4192, PRO, p.6.
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independent states for Armenia and Kurdistan under one mandatory power. Both sides 
agreed that they would respept the conference’s decision on the delimitation of the Kurdish- 
Armenian frontier, while respecting the rights of minorities within the would-be states.64The 
wording of the agreement suggests that there was a mutual Kurdish-Armenian desire to pre­
vent Turkish nationalists from using religious differences as an instrument of hindering the 
implementation of a new Turkish peace settlement, and also of securing strong Allied support 
for Kurdish and Armenian political aspirations.
iv- gritish  Reaction To T he Kurdish-Armenian Agreement
The most important aspect of the Kurdish-Armenian agreement was the Allies’ reaction, espe­
cially that of Britain. Unlike France, Britain was initially in favour of any improvement in Kurdish- 
Armenian relations in the non-Turkish Wilayets. Indeed, Lord Curzon had earlier instructed 
British officials on the ground to encourage Kurdish-Armenian rapprochement.65 This would 
make it much easier for Britain to settle the future of the non-Turkish Wilayets. Having said 
that, Britain was not in favour of a Kurdish-Armenian agreement that had political and territorial 
dimensions. In other words, Britain did not want to lose its control over the re-shaping process 
of the new political map of the region. Indeed, the Kurdish-Armenian agreement had far- 
reaching implications for British political and strategic interests, not only in Armenia and Kurdi­
stan but also in the Middle East as a whole. Firstly, the implementation of the agreement 
would have meant that the representatives of the new nations, not the Powers, determined 
the political geography of an independent Kurdistan and Armenia according to the principle of 
ethnic distribution and, most importantly, self-determination. By contrast, Britain sought to 
establish strong strategic buffer states in Armenia and the remainder of Turkey against Bol­
shevik Russia. In addition, the implementation of the agreement would encourage Eastern 
Kurdistan to join an independent Kurdistan. This prospect meant the weakening of Persian 
territorial unity, which was the cornerstone of the British policy to pre-empt any expansion of 
Bolshevik influence southwards towards the Indian frontier, Mesopotamia and the Persian 
Gulf. Secondly, the application of the agreement would probably put an end to British control 
over Southern Kurdistan as a result of its re-unification with the remainder of Kurdistan. The 
growing strategic and economic value of this part of Kurdistan to British influence in Mesopo-
64* Political, to De Robeck, Constantinople, 10 December 1919, F0371/4193, PRO. 
65* Ibid.
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tamia made it necessary that Britain should keep the area under its control. Thirdly, the agree­
ment would set an example tor other new nationalities, who might demand a similar treatment 
from the Allies. Indeed, to pressurise the Allies, the Sharifians organised a Fertile Crescent- 
wide political campaign to mobilise the local Arabs in Syria, Palestine, Trans-Jordan and Arab 
Mesopotamia for the establishment of a united Arab state under Sharif Hussein. Finally, 
France would oppose any territorial re-arrangements of the Ottoman Empire that overlooked 
its political and economic interests. France particularly demanded territorial and economic 
compensations for the loss of its share in the Mosul Wilayet and was in no way willing to 
emerge empty-handed from the Turkish peace settlement.
For all the foregoing reasons, Britain did not support the Kurdish-Armenian agree­
ment. As soon as its terms became known, the Foreign Office and other British authorities 
shed doubts on the importance of the agreement, arguing that Cherif Pasha was “a self- 
appointed representative” with no authority to voice Kurdish opinion.66 in addition to Wilson, 
De Robeck -who had earlier voiced appreciation of the agreement as having a potentially great 
value-67 told Curzon that the agreement did not bring together the interests of the population 
of the eastern Wilayets.68 For him, Cherif Pasha represented no one but himself. 69 Before the 
Armenians, Britain made the issue of Cherif Pasha’s legitimacy as the spokesman of the Kurds 
the reason why it did not support the terms of the Kurdish-Armenian agreement. Ironically, 
British records show that all principal Kurdish nationalist circles recognised both Cherif Pasha 
as their representative and the agreement he made with the Armenians. Qadir, who suppor­
ted the agreement, told De Robeck that Cherif Pasha was the only representative for the 
Kurds.70 The deputation of the Kurdish Club told Admiral Webb, who himself questioned 
Cherif Pasha’s representative capacity, that he had been representing “the Kurds in Paris for 
nine or ten months and that no attempt had been made to disavow him by any section of the 
Kurdish nation at home" .71
Winning the support of the powers, especially Britain, was vital to the successful appli­
cation of the agreement. Hubert Young acknowledged that the application of the agreement 
terms required foreign interference in order to get the Turks out of Kurdish and Armenian
66* Ibid.
67* De Robeck to Curzon, Confidential, 9 December 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
68* High Commissioner, Constantinople, to Curzon, 8 January 1920, F0371/4193, PRO.
69. High Commissioner, Constantinople, 15 March 1920, FO371/5068, PRO.
70* De Robeck, Constantinople, 11 December 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
71* De Robeck, Constantinople, 3 February 1920, FO371/5067, PRO.
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areas, and that financial support from thd Allies was also required to realise its terms. 72 Britain’s 
rejection of the agreement, despite Kurdish appeals for effective British intervention in the 
matter, meant that it became merely a scrap of paper. But, it can be argued that had Britain 
supported the implementation of the Kurdish-Armenian agreement, and made it a basis for 
the settlement of the non-Turkish Wilayets at the peace conference, the Armenians and the 
Kurds would have established their own national state and relied on a united front to defeat 
any potential attack by the Kemalists. Unfortunately for both the Kurds and the Armenians, 
Britain and the Allies did not have the slightest intention of applying the idea of self- 
determination, as their strategic and economic interests conflicted with Kurdish and Armenian 
nationalist aspirations.
The Sharifian-Mesopotamian Factor And The British Policy Towards Southern 
Kurdistan, 1918-1920
i- British Occupation And <Zhe SJssue O f Defining Southern Kurdistan- 
JAesopotamia Relations
As in the Armenian case, the issues of geographically defining Ottoman Kurdistan and politic­
ally determining its future were interconnected with that of Mesopotamia. The awareness of 
British officials in London and the Middle East of the interconnection between Mesopotamia’s 
future and the Kurdish question was a result of continuous Sharifian claims to significant parts 
of Kurdistan as part of a future Arab state. The Sharifians justified their territorial demands by 
arguing that the claimed Kurdish areas were geographically, administratively and historically 
part of Mesopotamia, and therefore, demanded Britain recognised them as being Arab. By 
contrast, Kurdish nationalists, while rejecting any political or cultural association between Kur­
distan and Arab lands, paid no serious attention to the Sharifians, probably because they 
thought the latter were an insignificant factor. Perhaps the best way to understand whether 
the Sharifian claims were legitimate is through examining the economic, cultural and political 
characteristics of the three Wilayets'. Mosul, Baghdad and Basra.
As an ancient Greek term, ‘Mesopotamia’ literally means the land between the Rivers 
Euphrates and the Tigris, and was arbitrarily used by European orientalists, travellers and 
diplomats, when referring to Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. Administratively speaking, the Otto­
mans did not use the term Mesopotamia -or any other term- to collectively describe these 
three Wilayets. Indeed, while considering Mosul and Southern Kurdistan as a province within
72* Young, Foreign Office Minute No. 156272,29 November 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
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“ Turkey propet', the Turks viewed Baghdad and Basra as mere provinces of their Empire. 73 In 
1915, the India Office excluded Ottoman Kurdistan from the term ‘Mesopotamia’ because it 
possessed special ethnic and geographical characteristics, and defined the Hamrin moun­
tains and Jabal Sinjar as its southern and western boundaries respectively.74 Having said that, 
after their occupation of these three Ottoman Wilayets, the British found the term 
‘Mesopotamia’ to be, in practice, too ambiguous. They found it particularly difficult to agree on 
identifying Mesopotamia’s geographical limits, especially in the north and the north-west, as 
well as its political and cultural identity. For instance, the Naval Staff Intelligence Department 
produced a handbook on Mesopotamia’s geopolitical, economic, cultural and administrative 
characteristics. It gave a very broad definition of the term ‘Mesopotamia’, which included the 
central, western and southern parts of Ottoman Kurdistan.7 5  it also defined the term ‘Iraq’ as 
including the Baghdad and Basra Wilayets.76 Arthur Balfour defined Mesopotamia as 
"essentially the region watered by the Tigris and the Euphrates".77 Such a definition, placing 
most of Ottoman Kurdistan within Mesopotamia, was not adopted by Britain because it 
entailed extra military and political commitments far beyond its capabilities. Eventually, the sole 
criterion -according to which the British defined Mesopotamia- was the limits of British strategic 
and economic interests. In other words, to justify Southern Kurdistan’s incorporation into Arab 
Iraq in 1923, the British extended the geographical and political limits of Mesopotamia in an 
arbitrary manner and contrary to the existing economic, political and social realities in these 
Wilayets. The Americans, who initially sought to put forward their recommendations regarding 
the future of the non-Turkish Wilayets, excluded all Kurdish areas from the term
73* Garbett of the India Office drew the attention to the fact that distinction between the three Wilayets 
existed in the Ottoman law relating to land tenure. IDCM, Minute No.37, Secret, 13 April 1920, FO 
371/5068, PRO.
74* British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia, Appendix VI, the Future of Settlement of Eastern Turkey in 
Asia and in Arabia, Note by the Secretary, Political and Secret Department, 14 March 1915, CAB27/1, 
PRO, pp.83 & 86.
75* Naval Staff Intelligence Department, A Handbook of Mesopotamia, No.1, London, November 1918, 
pp. 9-30.
76* Ibid, pp.87-100.
77* Memorandum on Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia: Reflections of Foreign Secretary Arthur James 
Balfour, DBFP, vol.I, pp.340-349.
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‘Mesopotamia’.78 On the other hand, to the Ottomans79 and the Kurds the term ‘Iraq’ or ‘Arab 
Iraq’ meant Mesopotamia, where the Arabs lived. Following its formation in 1920-1921, the 
Arab Government and British qfficials on the ground extended the new political term ‘Iraq’ to 
include Southern Kurdistan, so it is worth noting that the final physical shape of the new Iraqi 
state, as it is at present, remained undecided until 1926, when Iraq and Turkey signed a boun­
dary agreement that finally placed Southern Kurdistan within Iraq by defining its northern bor­
ders.
Examination of the issue of political and geographical definition of Mesopotamia or 
the relations between the Baghdad, Basra and Mosul Wilayets is relevant to any understand­
ing of the evolution of the British position on Southern Kurdistan’s future. Under the Otto­
mans, the three Wilayets of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul, were distinct in terms of their ethnic 
and religious composition as well as their political, economic and cultural orientations. From 
the economic viewpoint, Southern Kurdistan had close relations with the heartland of the 
Ottoman Empire, Syria, Eastern Kurdistan and even Persian Azerbijan.si According to the 
Handbook of Mesopotamia, Mosul was "the chief collecting and distributing centre for the 
commerce with central Kurdistan" where raw goods were imported.82 Baghdad and the Shi'i 
holy towns of Karbala and Najaf had close economic relations with Persia. In contrast to the 
above areas, Basra had strong commercial relations, not with the neighbouring areas, but with 
India and overseas. The economic diversity of the three Wilayets was further accentuated by 
the use of Turkish, Persian and Indian coinage concurrently. Moreover, the Mosul Wilayet had 
a different valuation of Turkish currency from either Baghdad or Basra The weights and mea­
sures standards varied from one Wilayet to another. 83 From the sectarian viewpoint, the popu­
lation of the Mosul Wilayet were Sunni Muslims84 and that of Basra were mostly Shi'i. The
78* See for example (1) the recommendations of the American delegation at the peace conference,
D.H. Miller My Diary at the Paris Peace Conference, 1918-1919, Vol.Ill, (New York: 1928) & (2) the King- 
Crane Commission’s report on Mesopotamia, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relatbns of the United 
States: Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Vol.IV, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1948), 
pp.800-802. Having said that, the American wanted the surrounding Kurdish areas to be part of the Brit­
ish mandate over Mesopotamia on the grounds of irrigation and agriculture.
79* See for instance the Ottoman memorandum to the supreme council of the Paris peace conference, 
D.H. Miller, 16:479-84, op. cit.
80* Iraq replaced Mesopotamia as a term in the official British correspondence in the period 1921-1922. 
81* Naval Staff Intelligence Department, A Handbook of Mesopotamia.. op. cit. p.93.
82* Ibid.
83* Ibid, p. 143.
84* Sunni Kurds were different from their Arab counterparts in terms of their religious practices and Suf- 
ist rituals.
Baghdad Wilayet had a mixed population in which the | Shi'is; formed the majority. In terms of 
cultural orientation, the Sunni population was under Turkish influence, whereas the Shi'i 
population was influenced by Persian values and traditions. By contrast, the distinctive geo­
graphical features of the Kurdish areas made the Kurds less susceptible to Turkish or Persian 
culture. In terms of administrative arrangements, Constantinople conducted the affairs of 
these Wilayets separately through Walis [Governors], who were appointed by the Sultan as 
his political representatives.
Perhaps the political inclinations of the local elites are the most important criterion in 
attempting to unfold the real relations between the three Wilayets. The Kurdish nationalist 
movement never had any link with its Arab counterpart and, historically, it emerged both inde­
pendently and earlier. The Southern Kurds had totally different political aspirations from those 
of the Arabs in that they desired Kurdish independence. Among the Arabs, the Sunnis had 
different political aspirations from the| Shi'is . The former began to embrace Arab nationalism 
during the war, whereas the latter remained far more inclined towards religion. This may 
explain why many| Shi'is refused to become Ottoman subjects and, later, Iraqi subjects after 
the establishment of the Iraqi state in 1920-1921. The tiny Turkoman minority, which was also 
divided into Sunni and Shi'i sections, linked its interests with Turkish rule, under which they 
formed a privileged grouping. The Christian and Jewish communities were in favour of a form 
of European protection to end Ottoman-Muslim maltreatment. In other words, Mesopotamia 
lacked a united political, cultural and economic centre which could form a basis for a Mesopo­
tamia-wide nationalist movement, let alone a national state.
The issue of defining various relations between the areas where the Kurds lived and 
the areas where the Arabs lived is politically significant as British records of the period 1916- 
1923 show. In the period 1916-1920, for instance, official circles in London generally used 
the term Mesopotamia to mean the areas where the Arabs lived, from which Southern Kurdi­
stan was excluded. This definition had a clear political implication, in that the future of South­
ern Kurdistan was considered to be unconnected with that of Arab Mesopotamia, and there­
fore, would be determined independently. Meanwhile, by resorting to various economic, stra­
tegic and political arguments, British officials on the ground such as Wilson and Cox, kept 
seeking London’s approval for extending the term ‘Mesopotamia-lraq’ to include Southern 
Kurdistan. At the 1921 Cairo conference, for example, Cox insisted that Southern Kurdistan
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was an integral part of Iraq. 85 The political implication of this was also clear, namely that the 
future of Southern Kurdistan was inseparable from that of Mesopotamia. After the imposition 
of the British mandate, especially in the period 1920-1923, British officials on the ground 
were able to impose their definition of Mesopotamia by extending it to include Southern Kur­
distan. The main reason for this was the occupation policies of the British authorities that 
focused on making the three Wilayets politically and economically as homogeneous as pos­
sible.
i i-  P o st-w ar Sharifians* A ttem pts 'to  'translate 'th eir Claims Snto R eality
To legitimise their claim to Southern Kurdistan and other Kurdish areas in the period 1914- 
1920, the Sharifians argued that the Wilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra were, and should 
remain, part of one political and historical unit. Apart from the revival of Kurdish nationalism in 
Kurdistan itself, the continuing Sharifian claims to Southern Kurdistan helped to highlight its 
fate, especially in relation to the future of Mesopotamia. Moreover, the Sharifian movement for 
a greater Arab state was one of the factors that steadily influenced the shaping of British policy 
from 1918. Immediately after the end of the war, Allenby, the commander of the Egyptian 
Expeditionary Force, allowed Faisal, Sharif Hussein’s son, to set up a provisional Arab govern­
ment in Damascus, while awaiting the peace conference’s final decision on the future of non- 
Turkish Wilayets. Whereas the objective of the British in initiating this step was -apart from 
being in line with British promises to Sharif Hussein- to preempt French attempts to establish 
their own sphere of influence, Feisal sought to expand Sharifian rule as much as possible in 
the direction of Arab and non-Arab areas, the Fertile Crescent and Western and Southern 
Kurdistan. Despite the continuing efforts of Feisal and Sharif Hussein, neither London nor 
the British authorities in Baghdad wanted any Sharifian interference in Kurdish affairs, especi­
ally those of Southern Kurdistan. Sharif Hussein, who was accordingly informed of the British 
decision, promised in his statement to Mark Sykes not to concern himself with British plans for 
Southern Kurdistan’s future.86
Despite his undertaking, Sharif Hussein and his followers were determined to realise 
their claims on many Kurdish areas. For this purpose they continually worked to influence the 
Allies’ views on Kurdistan’s future both inside and outside of the Paris peace conference. In
85* Report on Middle East Conference Held in Cairo and Jerusalem, 12-30 March 1921, F0371/6343, 
PRO.
86* Toynbee, Foreign Office Minute No.174037, 22 November 1918, FO 371/3407, PRO.
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January 1919, Amir Faisal stated in his appeal to the Allies that the northern limits of the Arab 
country was the Alexandretta-Persia line, in accordance with the content of his father’s war­
time correspondence with the British.87 This meant that the proposed Arab state would 
include both Southern and Western Kurdistan. Immediately after being installed as ruler of 
Syria, Feisal asked the peace conference for the inclusion of the same Kurdish area into his 
country. At the same time as appealing to the peace conference, the Sharifians employed dif­
ferent tactics, such as reaching a bilateral arrangement with Britain, which would include 
Southern and Western Kurdistan in a British-sponsored Arab state. Between 1918 and early 
1919, Feisal, who was then the ruler of Syria, constantly attempted to persuade Britain to con­
clude a bilateral agreement, with a view to settling the political future of the three Wilayets of 
Baghdad, Basra and Mosul before the peace conference could make its decision. In other 
words, while using the peace conference as a means of obtaining Allied support for Arab terri­
torial claims, Feisal also sought to achieve them through a bilateral agreement with Britain, and 
present this to the conference as a fait accompli. In his efforts to establish as large an Arab 
state as possible, Feisal went so far as to play off Britain against France and vice versa. In April 
1921, the French told the British that Feisal sought their assistance to drive them out of the 
Mosul Wilayet,88 at the same time as he incited the British to contain French influence in the 
region.
The other method the Sharifians used to achieve their territorial objectives in Ottoman 
Kurdistan was to engage in secret activities among the Kurds. Their intention was to create an 
unbridgeable gap between the Kurds and British officials on the ground. By this, they hoped 
to forestall the emergence of an independent Kurdish state under British protection. The 
establishment of the first Kurdish Government in Sulaimaniya seemed to be the catalyst for 
Sharifian activities in Kurdistan. As soon as the First World War ended, Sharif Hussein sent his 
emissaries to different parts of Kurdistan, hoping to turn the Kurds against Britain by playing 
on their religious sentiments. His secret activities in Kurdistan were confirmed by Leachman, 
who referred to Sharif Hussein’s growing interest in Kurdish matters under his jurisdiction89 
and by Noel, who informed Baghdad of the activities of Sharifian agents among the Northern 
Kurds, with a view to turning them against Britain.90 The interferences of Sharif Hussein and
87* Amir Faisal’s Memorandum to the Supreme Council at the Paris Peace Conference, 1 January. Mill­
er, My Diary, Vol. IV, 297-9.
88* Lawrence to Colonial Office, 13 April 1921, C0730/18, PRO.
89* Memorandum from SSO, Mosul, to GHQ, 26 April 1919, AIR 20/512, PRO.
90* Political, Baghdad, to Egypt Force, Cairo, 29 April 1919, AIR 20/512, PRO.
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Feisal in Kurdish affairs extended to Eastern Kurdistan, where the British Consul in Urmia 
reported the arrival of “ emissaries from Damascus" in the Urmia district, with a view to stirring 
up local Kurds against Britain. The secret activities of Hussein and Feisal culminated in the 
establishment of covert contacts with the Young Turks, their former bitter enemy.
Sharif Hussein and Feisal were also behind the political programme of a Sunni Meso­
potamian clique, who advocated the establishment of Sharifian rule in Mesopotamia. Through 
the Syrian Congress and the Aleppo Committee, these Sunnis put forwards demands for the 
establishment of an Arab state in Mesopotamia, which would include not only Southern Kurdi­
stan but also the Kurdish Wilayet of Diyarbekir.91 They were also engaged in concerted politi­
cal and propaganda activities aiming at convincing both the British and the Southern Kurds of 
the viability of the Sharifian solution. In his conversation with Hubert Young, Nuri al-Sa'id, a 
Sunni figure and a future Prime Minister of Iraq, tried to convince his counterpart that:
not only the people of Mosul and Baghdad, but also the Kurds of Southern Kurdistan were 
anxious for Abdullah [Hussein’s eldest son] to be their Amir, provided that the British did not 
withdraw their advice and assistance.
In return for bringing Southern Kurdistan under Arab rule, he expressed the willingness of the 
“Baghdadis” in Damascus, who were Sunni followers of Feisal, to keep the Basra Wilayet 
under "a special administration and special British occupation" .92 In other words, Nuri al-Said 
was willing to leave an overwhelmingly Arab Wilayet under direct British control in exchange 
for placing Southern Kurdistan under Arab rule. While in London, Nuri al-Sa'id became quite 
aware of Britain’s growing dilemma of maintaining its influence without making any additional 
military and financial commitments. He seized the opportunity to put forward his own solution 
before the Inter-Departmental Conference of Middle Eastern Affairs (IDCM). It included South­
ern Kurdistan’s inclusion into Mesopotamia under a Sharifian ruler as a means of ending all 
British “troubles”. He tried to convince those present that the Southern Kurds would be 
“quite willing” to come under the rule of Sharif Abdullah, Feisal’s older brother, if Britain 
installed him as the head of an Arab government in Baghdad. 93 The Sharifians enjoyed the 
support of two British officials: Gertrude Bell and T.E. Lawrence, who were two strong advo­
cates of a Sharifian solution for Mesopotamia. The only noticeable difference between the
91 * The American Section of the International Commission on Mandates in Turkey, the King-Crane 
Report, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations of the United States, pp.780 & 782.
92* Young, Foreign Office Minute No. E2571,3 April 1920, FO 371/5068, PRO. Curzon read the Minute 
and approved of its inclusion in the agenda of IDCM.
93* IDCM, Minute 37,13 April 1920, FO 371/5068, PRO.
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two officials was that Lawrence recognised the distinction between the Mosul Wilayet, which 
was mainly Kurdish, and the Baghdad and Basra Wilayets, which were mainly Arab. He, unlike 
Bell, who advocated a united Mesopotamia under a Sharifian ruler,94 called for the formation of 
two separate Sharifian states in Mesopotamia, one of which would be a mixed Arab-Kurdish 
state.95
On another level, the Sunni Mesopotamians, who must have been alarmed by the 
prospect of the establishment of a Kurdish state by the forthcoming peace conference, 
attempted to dissuade the Southern Kurdish delegation of Sulaimaniya from going to Paris. 
Ja’afer Pasha and Naji Bey, the advocates of a united Mesopotamia under Sharifian rule, told 
the Kurdish delegation that:
Kurdish independence would not go down at all in Paris and that in view of the proximity of
Sulaimaniya and Kirkuk to Baghdad and Mosul, the Kurds had far better throw in their lot with
the Mesopotamian Arabs, who would certainly gain their independence very shortly#*
Having failed to persuade Britain to establish a united Syrian-Mesopotamian state under Fei­
sal, these Sunni officers declared Abdullah as king of Mesopotamia in March 1920, hoping to 
agitate the Arab Mesopotamians against the British administration. Generally speaking, the 
political and propaganda efforts of the Sharifians and their Sunni followers in Baghdad failed 
to convert London to the Sharifian solution for the Wilayets of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul 
within the framework of the Turkish peace settlement. This could be attributed to three impor­
tant factors. Firstly, the India Office and the Foreign Office believed that Southern Kurdistan 
was too important both in strategic and economic terms to the British presence in Mesopota­
mia and Persia to be abandoned either to the French or the Sharifians. Secondly, Col. Wilson, 
who was responsible for the Mesopotamian policy on the ground, firmly opposed any plan for 
Arab or Kurdish self-government. Thirdly, there was no popular support for the Sharifian 
cause among the Mesopotamian Arabs, let alone the Southern Kurds. But, the 1920 rising in 
Mesopotamia -which costed Britain huge losses in men and money- proved that direct British 
rule was a failure. One of its direct consequences was to bring the Sharifian solution to the 
fore as an ideal option to end existing British political, financial and military troubles in Mesopo­
tamia. Britain’s decision to establish an Arab government in Baghdad and its search for 
another kingdom for Feisal, whom the French expelled from Syria, enabled the Sharifians to 
became an increasingly important factor in influencing British policy towards Southern Kurdi-
94* Policy in Arabia, 20 November 1918, L.O.L/P. S/18/B297.
95* India Office, Political Department, Note on Kurdistan, 14 December 1918, FO 371/3386, PRO.
96* GSI, Mesopotamia, GHQ,17 May 1919, AIR 20/512, PRO.
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stan in the following years. As soon as the British installed him king of Arab Iraq in 1921, Feisal 
and his Sunni entourage resolutely resumed their campaign for a united Iraq including South­
ern Kurdistan.
Conclusion
Three main conclusions can be derived from examining British Kurdish policy in light of the 
development of the Kurdish nationalist movement, the Armenian question and the Sharifian- 
Mesopotamian factor. Firstly, despite the unquestioned supremacy of its own strategic, eco­
nomic and political interests, Britain’s Kurdish policy at the peace conference was to some 
extent conditioned by its attitudes towards the nationalist aspirations of the Kurds, Armenians 
and Sharifians. In other words, one cannot separate the evolution of British policy towards 
Kurdistan from its regional context. The search for a viable solution for the Armenian question, 
the impossibility of overlooking Kurdish nationalism as a sizable political force and the Shari­
fians’ territorial aspirations all put Kurdistan’s political future into the limelight. All these factors 
played an important part in elevating the Kurdish question to an international level, by releas­
ing it from its old local and narrow framework and then building it into the Turkish peace settle­
ment. Secondly, Britain unequally evaluated the territorial claims and political aspirations of 
these new nationalities according to its own strategic, economic and political calculations and, 
to some degree, its religious-moral concerns. Indeed, when the First World War ended, Britain 
was only thinking of solving the Armenian question, which received enormous public support 
in reaction to the Armenian massacres at the hands of the Ottoman authorities. In comparison 
with the Armenian question, the Kurdish one received no British attention either officially or 
unofficially.
The course of subsequent events in Kurdistan raised British policy makers’ aware­
ness that the solution of the new nationality question within the former Ottoman Empire was 
far more complicated than they had anticipated before-hand in terms of the strength of local 
nationalist movements, the existence of conflicting territorial claims and political aspirations as 
well as the demographic distribution of different ethnic communities. Thus, it became clear 
that the solution of one question could not be achieved in isolation of the other. For instance, 
Britain’s Armenian policy affected its policy towards Northern Kurdistan and vice versa, 
whereas Britain’s Sharifian-Mesopotamian policy particularly affected British attitudes towards
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Southern Kurdistan. The terms of the 1920 Servres treaty reflected all these interconnected 
issues, as will be examined in the next chapter. Finally, unlike the Sharifian-Mesopotamia fac­
tor, which had limited effects on British policy towards Southern Kurdistan in the period 1918- 
1920, the Armenian factor had considerable influence on British Kurdish policy at the peace 
conference, and thus, indirectly helped elevate the Kurdish question to a unprecedented 
international level. However, in the following period, 1921-1923, the effects of the Armenian 
question on British Kurdish policy evaporated, whereas the Sharifian-Mesopotamian factor 
became increasingly important in this period, which witnessed the establishment of the Iraqi 
state and then the incorporation of Southern Kurdistan into it.
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When the final session of the Paris peace conference ended on 21 January 1920, the future 
of the Ottoman Empire still remained unresolved because the Allies concentrated their diplo­
matic efforts largely on the European settlement and disagreed with each over the new Mid­
dle Eastern order. The Allies only agreed to the imposition of the mandate system as the poli­
tical means by which they would achieve their strategic and economic interests in the Middle 
East. However they could not settle important aspects of the mandate system such as the 
designation of the actual mandatories and the delimitation of the boundaries for the mandated 
territories.i This chapter discusses the strategic and economic factors that influenced the deli­
mitation of Britain’s direct and indirect interests in Kurdistan in relation to the boundaries of its 
Mesopotamian mandate, as well as the position of the Foreign, India and War Offices on the 
settlement of the Kurdish question as a whole.
The contradiction in British and French interests during the Allied discussion of var­
ious European and Middle Eastern issues in Paris produced acrimony rather than accord. In 
the meantime, the Allies consigned the entire question of the Middle East’s future to further 
consultation between the interested parties. Accordingly, the San Remo conference of April 
1920 was held amidst disagreement over such issues as the future of Constantinople, the 
Straits, Kurdistan, Greater Syria and Armenia. This chapter places its focus on the effects of 
the imperial rivalry between Britain and France on the Kurdish question that resulted in the 
partition of Kurdistan. It also interprets the terms of the Sevres treaty (August 1920) from a 
regional perspective, by shedding light on new factors that came into play in the post-war Mid­
dle East, such as the threat of Bolshevism and the rise of nationalism in Turkey and Persia.
Kurdistan’s Geopolitical And Economic Value And The Limits Of British Dir­
ect And Indirect Interest
Being a mountainous region, situated between the Ottoman Empire, Czarist Russia and Qajar 
Persia, Kurdistan enjoyed distinct geopolitical importance. In other words, Kurdish areas 
could be used both as natural strategic buffers to defend the heartland of Turkey and Persia 
and as bridges through which they could extend their territorial control to other areas. The
1 * Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World, p. 2.
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Turkish-Persian conflicts in the Seventeenth, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries illustrate 
how holding Kurdistan was crucial to the maintenance of the security of the Ottoman Empire 
and the Persian Kingdom. The apparently tolerant attitudes by Constantinople and Tehran 
towards the existence of autonomous Kurdish Emirates within their respective parts of Kurdi­
stan largely reflected their desire to consolidate the security of their frontiers, and simultan­
eously, extend their rule to other Kurdish areas outside their control. To Russia, as the India 
Office observed in March 1915, Kurdistan was "the only pass” through which it could reach 
the Mediterranean Sea. To any Power that was in control of the Mesopotamian plains, Kurdi­
stan would be "a standing menace” if it came under the influence of another hostile Power.2  
Kurdistan’s strategic importance was accentuated by the unstable political conditions result­
ing from the First World War: the rise of local nationalism, the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, 
the decay of the Qajar Kingdom, British-French rivalry for direct and indirect spheres of influ­
ence and the growing threat of Bolshevism. As soon the war ended, various attempts were 
made by the French, Arabs, Turks, Armenians and Persians to acquire as much strategic 
Kurdish territory as possible.The British did not lose sight of the fact that the peculiarity of Kur­
distan lay in its geopolitical position:
The Kurdish question was of great interest to HMG and was the object of close study. We were 
interested in it, in the present, because the Kurds were an important element on both sides of 
our military frontier north of Baghdad, and one of the most important, if not the most important, 
just beyond the territories occupied by us.. We should have a permanent interest in the Kurds 
in the future also because whatever else happened, we had a future in Mesopotamia.3
Britain became particularly interested in the fate of Southern Kurdistan, perceiving it 
as being as strategically important to Mesopotamia as the North-West Frontier Province was to 
the Indian Empire. In addition, Southern Kurdistan contained potential oil sources vital for the 
British navy. Following its capture of Mosul, Britain focused its early diplomatic efforts on mod­
ifying the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement by transforming the ensuing de facto British 
control over the region into a permanent one. By virtue of its military control over the Mosul 
Wilayet, and France’s need for its support against Germany in Europe, Britain was in a very 
strong position to press France to agree to a boundary revision of the terms of the Sykes- 
Picot agreement. On 1 December 1918, Lloyd George persuaded George Clemenceau, the
2* British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia, Appendix VI, The Future of Settlement of Eastern Turkey in Asia 
and Arabia, Note by the Secretary, Political and Secret Department, India Office, 14 March, CAB27/1, 
PRO, p.86.
3* De Robeck to Curzon, Confidential, 20 December 1919, Enclosure No.1, Ryan, Memorandum, 27 
November 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
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French Premier, to give up France’s territorial share in the Mosul Wilayet in exchange for oil. 
This oral agreement was built into the 1919 Long-Berenger agreement that gave France 50% 
share in the TPC. However, Lloyd George annulled this agreement because of his disagree­
ment with the French over the size of Syria. Now he wanted -as Lord Curzon had advocated 
from the start- the territorial delimitation of French and British spheres by the peace confer­
ence and the placing of the Mosul Wilayet under a British mandate, before discussing oil mat­
ters. Eventually, the Long-Berenger agreement was modified and, consequently, France 
obtained a 25% share in TPC.4
Apart from its strategic importance and the potential oil and other mineral wealth, Kur­
distan had the water-heads of two important rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates. These rivers 
were vital fpr the revival of agriculture in Mesopotamia. Realising such a project was one of the 
main reasons why the India Office and the Government of India supported the idea of coloniz­
ing the country during the war. The importance of water also partly explains why Balfour was 
anxious about defining the geographical limits of Britain’s Mesopotamian mandate in such a 
way that London could avoid unnecessary political complications over water issues; other­
wise, it might be forced to reluctantly interfere in areas outside its existing spheres of control. 
Thus, soon after the British occupation of Mesopotamia and Southern Kurdistan, two early 
British considerations in Kurdistan took shape: the need to avoid making any river a political 
frontier for British spheres of control and to prevent rival Powers from extending their control 
to the water sources:
[In the conquered areas] fertility is in proportion to irrigation. If, therefore, for other reasons a 
river is anywhere taken as frontier, elaborate provisions will have to be made by treaty for divi­
ding the water between the cultivators on its two banks who (by supposition) are under differ­
ent mandatories .5
By extending its control to the whole of the Mosul Wilayet, Britain partly achieved its aim of not 
turning rivers into political frontiers. Instead, it sought to use the old Ottoman provincial boun­
daries of the Mosul Witayetto define its sphere of control. The attainment of the second aim of 
securing the water sources was out of Britain’s reach due to military and financial restrictions 
imposed by the First World War. Britain thus confined its control to the strategically and econo­
mically vital part of Kurdistan: Southern Kurdistan.
Having identified the boundaries of its sphere of control, Britain now proceeded to
4* Joshua C. Bay Ison, Territorial Allocations by Imperial Rivalry: The Humane Legacy in the Near East, 
[University of Chicago, Department of Geography, Research Paper No. 22,1987], p.93.
5* Memorandum on Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia: Reflections of Foreign Secretary Arthur James 
Balfour, 11 August 1919, DBFP, Vol.I, pp.340-349.
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define, firstly, its position on the political future of the remainder of the Kurdish areas outside 
its control, i.e. Northern and Eastern Kurdistan. Secondly, Britain needed to define its strate­
gic, political and economic interests in Kurdistan in light of both the territorial and political 
aspirations of the Armenians, Persians and Arabs and the growing threat of Bolshevism and 
French rivalry in the Middle East. In other words, Britain sought to incorporate its objectives in 
Kurdistan into its broader Middle Eastern policy. Initially, Britain had two options, either to 
impose its own political arrangements for Kurdistan and then to go to the peace conference 
with a fait accompli or await the peace conference’s debates on the issue. Having said that, 
the absence of a well-defined Kurdish policy during and after the Paris peace conference did 
not prevent British officials on the ground from adopting a number of political and administra­
tive measures in British-controlled Southern Kurdistan. Although these were carried out on 
an initially temporary basis, they were built into both the Sevres terms on Kurdistan’s future 
and into the provisions of the British Mesopotamian mandate.
The Crystallisation Of British Objectives In Kurdistan
British policy on the future of the Middle East was worked out at the meeting of the Eastern 
Committee, which concluded its works in December 1918. Lloyd George, who headed a coali­
tion Government of Liberals and Conservatives, dominated the early British-French negotia­
tions on the Middle East and was in a broad agreement with the Eastern Committee and the 
Foreign Office.e This resulted in Britain’s acquisition of the French share of the Mosul Wilayet. 
From 1919 onwords, the meetings of the IDCM -chaired by Lord Curzon- extensively discus­
sed the future of Kurdistan and Mesopotamia. At these meetings representatives from the 
Foreign, India and War Offices, and the Air Ministry, the Treasury and the Board of Trade were 
present. From time to time, British officials who served in the Middle East, such as Col. Wilson, 
Gen. Allenby and Maj. Noel, also attended the IDCM meetings, offering their views and recom­
mendations.
When the war between the Allies and Turkey ended in October 1918, neither the 
Foreign Office nor the India Office paid any attention to the Kurds. However, the rise of the 
Kurdish nationalist movement and the reports of certain British officials, notably Maj. Noel and 
Capt. Woolley, shed light on the existence of the Kurdish question and underlined the need
6* Christopher M. Andrew, ‘France, Britain and the Peace Settlement: A Reconsideration’, -in- The 
Great Powers in the Middle east, 1919-1939, (Ed) Uriel Dann, (London & New York: Holmes & Meir,
1988), pp. 158-159.
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to settle it within the framework of the Turkish peace settlement. Thus, it was necessary, from 
the British Government’s viewpoint, tp formulate a clear policy towards the future of Kurdistan. 
The Foreign Office and India Office, which were directly involved in Kurdish affairs, studied all 
the views and the proposals that came from British official circles in the Middle East, such as 
the British High Commissions in Constantinople and Cairo, the Civil Commission in Baghdad 
and the British Embassy in Tehran, so as to define Britain’s ultimate position on the Kurdish 
question.
Apart from being united on the issue of keeping Eastern Kurdistan within Persia, the 
striking point about the attitudes of the Foreign and India Offices towards the Kurdish ques­
tion was their changeability. As the records of the meetings of the IDCM reveal, these atti­
tudes were altered by the passage of time and in accordance with new developments in Turk­
ey, Persia and the Caucasus. Curzon highlighted the difficulty of reaching a definite British 
position on the Kurdish question at the meetings of the IDCM. He pointed out that the IDCM 
arrived at “ diametrically opposite conclusions at each of its meetings: the establishment of 
autonomous Kurdish states around the borders otthe Mosul Wilayet, the division of Ottoman 
Kurdistan between Britain and France, and the leaving of the Kurds to their own devices.7 In 
terms of motivations, the India Office was primarily concerned with the security of India, which 
required the protection of Persian territorial integrity and the consolidation of the British posi­
tion in Mesopotamia. The Foreign Office viewed Kurdistan’s future from a wider perspective, 
including its concern for the political future of Armenia, the growing Bolshevik menace, 
French territorial ambitions and the rise of nationalist movements in Persia and Turkey. The 
existence of these diverse concerns among British official circles and the state of flux in the 
political situation in the Middle East were partly responsible for London’s hesitation in defining 
the objectives of its Kurdish policy until April 1920.
In terms of defining the limits of British influence, the India Office initially confined its
concerns primarily to Southern Kurdistan, which was considered to be of strategic, economic
and political importance for the viability of the Mesopotamian administration:
The importance to Great Britain of Kurdistan lay in the fact that the power paramount in this 
country will command the strategic approaches to Mesopotamia and control the water supply 
of the eastern affluent of the Tigris, on which the irrigation of Mesopotamia largely depends. 
Moreover, a settled and friendly Kurdistan is essential to the peace of upper Mesopotamia, 
while the country will be a valuable recruiting ground for military purposes. The low-lying 
regions bordering on Mesopotamia contain oil-fields and other natural resources. The districts 
of Sulaimaniya and Halabjah are reported to be susceptible of great development; their pro­
ducts include petroleum, coal and tobacco. Oil is also found in the neighbourhood of Tuz Khur- 
matu on the road between Kifri and Kirkuk and at Chia Surkh in the extreme south-east corner 
7* Ibid.
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of the areafi
During the existence of the first Kurdish Government under Mahmud, the India Office desired 
an autonomous Southern Kurdistan in the form of several small states under British direction^ 
as an ideal arrangement, if Britain was unable -for financial reasons- to commit itself militarily. 
Arthur Hirtzel, the India Office Under-Secretary, who suggested the establishment of an 
“independent Southern Kurdistan” with its own separate administration and revenue, feared 
that the return of Turkish rule to the remainder of Kurdistan would make it an “unpleasant 
neighbour” to both the new Iraqi state and the Armenian Kingdom.10 This probably explains 
why the India Office showed some interest in the idea of extending British mandatory control 
to those Kurdish areas which were situated to the south of Armenia, 11 if the latter came under 
the American mandate.
America’s refusal to take the Armenian mandate forced British policy makers to recon­
sider their attitudes towards all aspects of the Turkish peace settlement. Now, Montagu sup­
ported, with some reservations, Wilson’s proposals for the partition of Ottoman Kurdistan 
between Turkey and Mesopotamia. Montagu also called for the establishment of a tiny Kurd­
ish state in Botan (Jezirah) under British protection, with a view to strengthening Mosul’s stra­
tegic defences. 12 He opposed any British withdrawal from strategically and economically 
important areas in Southern Kurdistan, such as Khaniqin, Kirkuk and Z a k h o .1 3  However, at the 
meeting of the IDCM in April 1920, Montagu returned to the idea of transforming Southern 
Kurdistan into an independent frontier region on the lines of the North-West Province of 
India. 14 He even accepted the idea of allowing Southern Kurdistan to join Northern Kurdistan 
at some time in the future, if the Kurds so wanted.
Like the India Office, the Foreign Office initially evaluated Kurdistan’s future from the 
angle of consolidating Britain’s strategic and economic position in Mesopotamia. It also con­
templated the establishment of a separate Southern Kurdistan. But unlike the India Office, 
the Foreign Office desired very little British involvement in the Kurdish areas, from which Brit­
ish forces should be evacuated. The separate Southern Kurdistan would include all areas to
8* Political Department, India Office, Note on Kurdistan, 14 December 1918, F0371/3386, PRO.
9* Briton Cooper Busch, Mudros to Lausanne: Britain’s Frontier in West Asia, 1918-1923, (New York: 
State University of New York Press, 1976), p.370.
10* Shuckburgh, 1 August 1919, F0371/4192.
11* British Delegation, Paris, 12 October 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
12* A. Hirtzel, India Office Recommendations on Kurdistan, 8 April 1920, FO371/5068, PRO.
13* Ibid.
14* IDCM , Minute No.3713 April 1920, FO371/5068, PRO.
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the east of the Tigris, whereas other areas to the west of the Tigris, which formed the smallest 
part of the Mosul Wilayet, would be incorporated into a future Arab state. 15 in the light of the 
desires of the Foreign Office and the India Office, the British authorities in Baghdad were 
instructed to treat Southern Kurdistan as an autonomous and a separate country from Meso­
potamia. The idea of an autonomous Southern Kurdistan with loose British control reflected 
the anxiety of the Foreign Office about stretching Britain’s military and financial commitments. 
Hubert Young of the Foreign Office even suggested restricting British interference to the 
establishment of a line of posts in certain Kurdish areas to protect the strategic land route to 
northern Persia, i.e. a line of communications between Baghdad and Hamadan across South­
ern and Eastern Kurdistan. His suggestion included the appointment of political liaison offi­
cers responsible to the British authorities in Baghdad, is Young’s scheme represented a mid­
dle course between total British withdrawal and undertaking a political responsibility for South­
ern Kurdistan. It would enable Britain to both assist Persia and protect the northern frontier of 
Mesopotamia from any potential Bolshevik threat
In late 1919, however the Foreign Office under the new Foreign Secretary, Lord Cur­
zon, moved in the opposite direction from the idea of establishing an autonomous Southern 
Kurdistan before the peace conference took its final decision. Curzon now considered retain­
ing British control over Southern Kurdistan (through incorporating it into the Mesopotamian 
mandate) to be necessary on both strategic and economic grounds. Indeed, by the late 1919, 
a general consensus emerged among British circles in London and the Middle East that 
Southern Kurdistan should be under British control. Britain’s first major step in that direction 
was taken when France agreed in principle to transfer its territorial share of the Mosul Wilayet 
to Britain. This step, and subsequent French acquisition of Jezirah-ibn-Omar and the basin of 
the River Khabour one year later, practically marked the first post-war partition of Ottoman Kur­
distan. This partition was built into the formula of the mandate system to administer the former 
Ottoman Wilayets in the Middle East. The League of Nations placed the southern parts of Kur­
distan under Britain’s Mesopotamian mandate and the western parts of Kurdistan under 
France’s Syrian mandate. In other words, a de facto partition of Kurdistan took place long 
before becoming the cornerstone of the Sevres terms on Kurdistan’s future. Having said that, 
it was not yet decided what would be the nature of the political relations between Southern
15* Toynbee, Foreign Office Minute No.174037,22 November 1918, FO371/3407 & No. 146, 7 January 
1919, F0371/4147, PRO.
16* Young, Foreign Office Memorandum No. 164430,10 January 1920, F0371/4193, PRO.
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Kurdistan and Mesopotamia in the long run. Britain could not decide whether the establish­
ment of a separate Southern Kurdistan was the best solution, and thus, preferred to wait and 
see.
As to the remainder of Ottoman Kurdistan, the Foreign Office initially contemplated 
the idea of forming a Kurdish state or confederation of Kurdish states. Against the back­
ground of acute financial problems and strong domestic opposition to new military involve­
ments, the IDCM decided in November 1919 that Britain would not accept a mandate for Kur­
distan or carry out military activities beyond the frontier of the British sphere in Mesopotamia 
and Southern Kurdistan. The imperative of not turning Northern Kurdistan into a British politi­
cal responsibility became stronger in the wake of America’s refusal to be directly involved in 
the Turkish peace settlement through the acceptance of an Armenian mandate. The principle 
of no British political or military commitments in Northern Kurdistan considerably influenced 
the British position on the Kurdish question at the San Remo conference. Having said that, 
the Foreign Office did not agree that Britain should leave Northern Kurdistan to its own 
devices, as Robeck suggested. 17 George J. Kidston of the Foreign Office highlighted Bri­
tain’s need for the friendship of the Kurds in light of the growing Bolshevik threat.1 8  To win the 
Kurds over, he and Eyre Crowe advocated the recognition of Kurdish nationality and indepen­
dence. 19 Britain, although agreeing in principle that the Northern Kurds should work out their 
own salvation, could not afford to see instability in Northern Kurdistan, which posed a con­
stant threat to its position in Mesopotamia, given the growing Kemalist and Bolshevik menace 
from the north. Therefore, it became desirable to influence the Kurdish situation in the 
immediate future by satisfying some Kurdish aspirations for autonomy.
When the San Remo conference started, Britain still had no clear cut position on 
Northern Kurdistan’s future, apart from reaching the conclusion that the acceptance of a man­
date for Kurdistan was inconceivable. Between February and April 1920, a series of extraordi­
nary changes took place in the British position on Northern Kurdistan’s future. On 20 Febr­
uary 1920, Curzon, who headed the British delegation at the conference, stated that both 
France and Britain agreed that Northern Kurdistan would be independent, either as a single 
state or as a federation of autonomous states. He even rejected “a provisional statement to
17* Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, p.371.
18* Letter From Kidston to Crowe, Paris, 28 November 1919, DBFP, Vol. IV, P.909. 
19* Letter From Crowe, Paris, to Kidston, 1 December 1919, DBFP, Vol.IV, p.913.
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the effect that Kurdistan should remain under the sovereignty of Turkef .2 0  On 26 February, 
Lloyd George referred to Northern Kurdistan as part of those non-Turkish regions which 
would be separated from the Ottoman Empire. He described this as one of the principles 
which guided the negotiations inside the Allied Council. On 6 March, Curzon informed De 
Robeck that it was contemplated that Northern Kurdistan should be severed from the Otto­
man Empire and secure its independence. However, he highlighted the need for full exami­
nation of the means of achieving this aim. 2 1 Twenty days later, Curzon again talked of a separ­
ate autonomous Kurdistan:
The policy at which we are aiming in the [Turkish] peace treaty., with regard to Kurdistan, is 
neither a single protectorate for England or France, nor a divided protectorate, nor a group of 
states under European protection, but an autonomous Kurdistan severed from Turkey and not 
even under Turkish suzerainty.22
Nevertheless, Britain eventually decided not to grant Northern Kurdistan its immediate inde­
pendence, but temporary local autonomy within Turkey.
The sudden change of heart among British policy makers in the short period March- 
April 1920 must have reflected Britain’s fear of unwanted military and political involvement in 
Northern Kurdistan, or even the loosening of control over Southern Kurdistan. Moreover, as 
Curzon remarked, leaving the Northern Kurds under Turkish protection was an ideal option, 
given the British desire to forestall French attempts to extend their political control to Northern 
Kurdistan.23 Young quickly noticed the change in the British position and how the Turkish 
peace treaty confined itself to the severance of “ liberated area?, which were occupied by Bri­
tain and France, and the treatment of what was left as part of Turkey.24 At the meeting of the 
IDCM on 13 April, the last meeting before the conclusion of Sevres,25 Curzon pointed out that 
the conference had swung round to the idea of leaving the Northern Kurds under Turkish 
rule. On 19 April 1920, he stated that it was no longer desirable, as had been thought before, 
to detach the remainder of Kurdistan from Turkey, but rather it should be made autonomous
20* British Secretary’s Note Of Allied conference, London, 20 February 1920, DBFP, Vol. VII, p. 159. 
21* Foreign Office Telegram to De Robeck, Constantinople, Very Urgent, 6 March 1920, F0371/5067, 
PRO.
22* Curzon to de Robeck, Constantinople, Confidential, 26 March 1920, FO371/5067, PRO.
23* British Secretary’s Note Of Allied Conference, San Remo, 19 April 1920, DBFP, Vol. VIII, p.43.
24* Young, Foreign Office Minute No.2432,30 March 1920, FO371/5068, PRO.
25* This meeting was perhaps the most important one in defining the final British position on the Kurdish 
question at the peace conference. The meeting was chaired by Curzon, the Foreign Secretary. In addi­
tion to Montagu, the State Secretary for India, high-level representatives of all concerned British cir­
cles, such as the Foreign, India, War Offices, the Treasury and the Air ministry, attended the meeting. 
IDCM, Minute No.3713 April 1920, FO371/5068, PRO.
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on a local basis. He attributed this change to the disunity of the Kurds and their inability to 
maintain what they would obtain from the peace conference in the absence of the backing of 
a Great Power. Such was the position of the British Government when the Sevres terms on 
the Kurdish question were formulated in April 1920. In light of this, one should distinguish - 
when interpreting the Sevres terms On Kurdistan- the intention of the Allies, notably Britain, 
from the wordihg of these terms, as the following jpageswill illustrate.
The Implications Of The Sevres Terms In Light Of British Objectives
A few aspects of the Sevres treaty, such as those regarding Armenia and Kurdistan, were not 
implemented because of the growing strength of Turkish nationalists led by Mustafa Kemal, a 
former army Commander. Nevertheless, two principal conclusions can be derived from the 
SOvres terms on the Kurdish question. Firstly, these terms were formulated by the British and 
largely expressed their short and long-term objectives in Kurdistan. The French efforts were 
confined to extracting as many economic and territorial concessions as possible. Secondly, 
the Sevres treaty contained articles neither the British nor the French were willing to imple­
ment, notably Articles 62 and 64. These articles granted autonomy to those Kurds who lived 
in the Diyarbekir Wilayet and in part of the Bitlis and Van Wilayets. This local autonomy would 
be elevated to independence one year later, if an Allied commission agreed that the Kurds 
were qualified to have their own state. These articles also referred to possible partial reunifica­
tion of Ottoman Kurdistan, i.e. British-controlled Southern Kurdistan and the would-be auto­
nomous Kurdistan. The course of discussion at various interdepartmental meetings in Lon­
don and the bilateral negotiations between British and French policy-makers illustrates that 
the British Government did not ever really believe that Articles 62 or 64 were feasible. Mon­
tagu questioned Britain's ability to create a Kurdish zone free of Turkish rule to the north of 
British-controlled Southern Kurdistan, in view of its unwillingness to commit itself militarily to 
the maintenance of Mesopotamia’s security.26 Curzon doubted the viability of creating an 
autonomous Kurdistan, given Britain’s decision not to intervene or to take direct responsibility 
for the implementation of the Sevres terms on Kurdistan. He told the French that the Kurds 
themselves felt “they could not maintain their existence without the backing of a Great 
Power", and that in the absence of British and French protection, they preferred the idea of 
leaving themselves “under the protection of the Turks” .27 Olson holds that by 1920, it was
26* IDCM , Minute No.3713 April 1920, F0371/5068, PRO.
27* British Secretary Note.., San Remo, 19 April 1920, DBFP, Vol. VIII, p.43.
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highly unlikely that Britain would push for the implementation of Article 62, given the growing 
strength of Kemalist forces.28 in other words, Britain did not expect to see the emergence of a 
Kurdish state in Northern Kurdistan. It was not accidental that Britain opposed any League of 
Nations’ role in Kurdish affairs and made sure that no Kurdish representative could speak on 
behalf of the Kurds at the San Remo conference, unlike other nationalities such as the Arm­
enians.
It is true that the last paragraph of Article 64 provided for a possible reunification of the 
would-be Kurdish state and Southern Kurdistan. However, the evidence clearly shows that 
the British were not really willing to let Southern Kurdistan join a future Kurdish state. During 
the Allied negotiations, Curzon was emphatic in his views that the Southern Kurds did not 
want to be removed from the Mosul WilayeU9 and, by implication, from the British Mesopota­
mian mandate. As Ghassemlou asserts, Britain sought through Sevres to turn Southern Kur­
distan into a special British domain. 30 Southern Kurdistan increasingly became strategically 
too important to the British position in Mesopotamia to be allowed to go its own way. Other­
wise, Britain would not have resorted to diplomatic efforts and the making of territorial and eco­
nomic bargains, so that it could persuade France to accept the inclusion of Southern Kurdi­
stan in its Mesopotamian mandate some time before the determination of the Kurdish ques­
tion. Indeed, the inclusion of Southern Kurdistan in the British Mesopotamian mandate was 
later built into Sections I and VII of the Sevres Treaty. The question is why did the British insert 
this paragraph into Article 64, if they had no intention of implementing it? The likely explana­
tion is that the British sought to give the impression that their control over Southern Kurdistan 
was of a temporary nature and thus there would be no need to adopt a Kurdistan-wide territor­
ial, economic and political partition, as the French persistently demanded. The minute of one 
of the IDCM’s meetings illustrates how Curzon
had been doing his best to fend Mr. Berthelot [the French representative] off this area [i.e. 
Western Kurdistan], and the argument he had employed was that we were ourselves [the Brit- 
ish] proposing to clear out of Southern Kurdistan. He feared that we would awaken opposition, 
if we now went to San Remo and said that we had abandoned this intention.31
In other words, by arguing that Southern Kurdistan had the right to join a future Kurdish state, 
Britain endeavoured to contain the expansion of French political influence deeper into Kurdi­
stan, i.e. Kurdish areas situated between Armenia, Syria, Persia and British-controlled South- 
28* Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, p.54.
29* British Secretary’s Note.., San Remo, 19 & 23 April 1920, DBFP, Vol. VIII, pp.44 & 133.
30* Ghassemlou, Kurdistan and the Kurds, p.48.
31* IDCM, Minute No.3713 April 1920, FO371/5068, PRO.
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ern Kurdistan, In his analysis of British-French imperial rivalry, Christopher M. Andrew high­
lights how Britain disguised its imperial ambition in the Middle East beneath what he calls “the 
newly fashionable cloak of self-determination".32 Indeed, in one post-war memorandum, Bal­
four stated that the Sykes-Picot agreement disregarded “the modern notions of nationality" 
and how to deal with the new nationalities such as the Kurds, the Arabs and the Jews .33
Moreover, Britain hoped to avoid the alienation of Kurdish nationalists in Northern 
Kurdistan at a time when the political situation seemed in a state of flux. The rise of Turkish 
and Persian nationalist movements, coupled with the steady Bolshevik advance towards the 
Caucasus and north Persia, formed a serious threat to British strategic positions from India to 
the Mediterranean Sea. Under such conditions, Britain did not want to face political instability 
in Southern Kurdistan, especially when the Kemalists were determined to recover as much 
Ottoman territory as possible, particularly in Kurdistan and Armenia. Therefore, Britain made 
sure that the Southern Kurds understood that bringing Southern Kurdistan under the Meso­
potamian mandate would not contradict their interests. Examination of the terms of the Meso­
potamian mandate and post-Sevres British policy illustrates that Britain still had not decided on 
the long-term future of Southern Kurdistan, that is to say, whether it would be established as 
an autonomous Kurdish state (or a states) or as a permanent part of British Mesopotamia. 
Nevertheless, what can be safely deduced is that it was not in the British plan to allow South­
ern Kurdistan to join a Kurdish state.
Close examination of Articles 62 and 64 also reveals further striking implications. The 
Kurdistan that the Sevres treaty referred to formed no more that 20% of the actual size of 
Ottoman Kurdistan, and less than 15% if Eastern Kurdistan was taken into consideration (see 
see map eighteen). In other words, these articles, which were concerned with Kurdish auto­
nomy and independence, did not affect the majority of the Kurdish areas.The Sevres treaty 
symbolised, in practice, the pre-war partition and the post-war partition of Kurdistan between 
Anatolia, French Syria, British Mesopotamia, Persia and the proposed Armenian state. It is lit­
tle wonder that the content of the Sevres treaty on the Kurdish question, which was made 
public in August 1920, was unwelcome in Kurdish nationalist circles both in Kurdistan and in 
exile. Pessimistic rather than optimistic feelings spread among nationalists as the Kurdish
32* Andrew, ‘France, Britain and the Peace Settlement’, p. 159.
33* Memorandum On Syria, Palestine And Mesopotamia: Reflections Of Foreign Secretary A. J. Bal­
four, 11 August 1919, DBFP, Vol.IV, pp.340-349.
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Map Eighteen: The Partition Of 
Ottoman Kurdistan Under The 
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question became more complicated because of the new large-scale partition.
It seems that the British Government preferred the existence of a tiny autonomous 
Kurdish entity within a British-orientated Turkey, an alternative which Busch considerd to be 
based on interdepartmental consideration. 34 Such a Turkey, along with an independent Arm­
enia, could serve as buffer states against Bolshevik Russia following British military withdrawal 
from the Caucasus. On the eve of the San Remo conference, De Robeck warned against a 
Bolshevik advance in northern Persia and the Caucasus as well as the prospect of an anti- 
British alliance between the Bolsheviks and the Kemalists.35 Churchill himself shared such 
apprehensions and therefore opposed the adoption of any harsh Turkish peace settlement 
by the peace conference.36 He and Curzon recommended no severance of non-Turkish 
Wilayets of the Ottoman Empire, other than the Arab ones. They also drew attention to the 
fact that other Powers, especially France and America would benefit both politically and eco­
nomically from any Turkish resistance to the imposition of a harsh peace settlement. Montagu 
opposed harsh treatment of the defeated Turks, fearing its likely negative effects on the atti-
34* Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, p.371.
35* J. De Robeck to the Secretary of State of Admiralty, 18 March 1920, F0371/5046, PRO. 
36* Kent, Moguls and Mandarins, p. 101.
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tudes of Indian Muslims towards Britain. 37 He, therefore, recommended the soft treatment of 
Turkey by adopting a peace settlement similar to the Bulgarian one.
French Imperial Interests And Britain’s Kurdish Policy
It was with France that Britain largely conducted the first phase of its post-war diplomacy on the 
future of the Ottoman Empire. 38 According to Andrew, France’s initial strategy under Georges 
Clemenceau was to make concessions to Britain outside Europe, so as to gain “ leverage “ 
when the peace conference turned to discuss the future of the Rhineland.39 in other words, 
Clemenceau was prepared to sacrifice the Middle East to Britain in return for maintaining 
French security vis-a-vis Germany. This explains why Clemenceau was willing to give up 
France’s share of the Mosul Wilayet and accept British control over Palestine. In contrast, Brit­
ish policy makers, as L.C.B. Seaman points out, were in agreement that Britain’s responsibili­
ties to its Empire and Commonwealth, which had been increased as a result of the war, made 
military involvement in Europe totally unpalatable.40 The consolidation of the British position in 
the Middle East and the containment of Bolshevik threat were now Britain’s two main 
priorities.41 Moreover, Britain did not trust France in Europe, and was in favour of a balance of 
power that ensured that no power, including France, dominated the Continent. 4 2  With Ameri­
ca’s support, Britain ensured that Germany was not dismembered as much as France desired, 
and that the strategic Rhineland, though demilitarised by the Versailles treaty, remained Ger­
man contrary to France’s wishes. Thus the European settlement at the Paris peace confer­
ence poisoned the bilateral relations between Britain and France and had considerable influ­
ence over the subsequent settlement of the future of the Ottoman Empire at the San Remo 
conference.
The Ottoman Empire was already divided into various economic spheres of influence 
among the European Powers when the First World War broke out in 1914. The war offered 
France an unprecedented opportunity to consolidate its interests and influence in these
37* Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, pp.79 & 84.
38* Kent, Moguls and Mandarins, p. 100.
39* Andrew, ‘France, Britain and the Peace Settlement’, p. 159.
40* L.C.B. Seaman, Post-Victorian Britain, 1902-1951, (London: University Paperbacks, 1967), 
pp.127-129.
41* Ibid.
42* Sally Marks, The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe, 1918-1933, (London: 
MacMillan,1976), p2.
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Ottoman territories. Indeed, France became a key player in concluding several secret agree­
ments, one of which was particularly concerned with Ottoman Kurdistan’s post-war future, i.e. 
the Sykes-Picot agreement. With the disappearance of Czarist Russia as a major player in 
determining the future of the Ottoman Empire, France pressed Britain for a large scale parti­
tion of Ottoman Kurdistan, based on their wartime agreements. Similarly, in the absence of 
German rivalry, Britain increasingly perceived France as a serious obstacle in the way of con­
structing a post-war Middle Eastern order. In the Eastern Committee, Curzon identified France 
as the power whom Britain had most to fear in the future. 43  This then was the setting for the 
contradictory British and French policies towards Kurdistan after the war.
One of the earliest British attempts to hold back French territorial ambitions in Kurdi­
stan was Mark Sykes’ proposal for the establishment of a Kurdish Emirate, which would 
include Mosul. Frangois Georges-Picot, the representative of the French Government, rejec­
ted the plan on the grounds that it was "contrary to French interests” and sacrificed people 
such as the Chaldeans and Nestorians, who were “traditionally protected by the French"m He 
emphasised that the French Government wanted Mosul to be in its sphere of influence 
according to the Sykes-Picot agreement. 45  One of Britain’s early manoeuvres to prevent the 
emergence of political vacuums in Kurdistan and Armenia, where France could step in, was to 
persuade America to accept a mandate for Armenia.46 Unlike France, America was not a rival 
colonial power, and therefore, constituted a far lesser threat to British imperial interests in the 
Middle East. In other words, Britain sought to replace France with America as its “junior” part­
ner in redrawing the new political map of the Middle East. 47 Resorting to American power was 
also necessitated by the over-extension of British imperial responsibilities as well as the Bol­
shevik takeover in Russia. The British Government hoped that, if America took the Armenian 
mandate and Britain brought under its mandate Kurdish areas situated between Armenia and 
Mesopotamia, France’s ambitions to extend its political and economic control deeper into Kur­
distan would be frustrated. 48 Indeed, the British delegation at the Paris peace conference 
confirmed France’s intention to bring under its mandate Kurdish areas situated between Arm-
43* Eastern Committee Minute 40,2 December 1918, CAB27/14.
44* IDCM, Secretary Note: Situation in Kurdistan, 6 September 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
45* G.L. Bell, Northern Kurdistan. 8 March 1920, AIR 20/513, PRO.
46* War Cabinet Minutes No.457 & 459,13 & 15 August 1918, CAB23/43, PRO.
47* Barry Rubin, ‘America as Junior Partner: Anglo-American Relations in the Middle East, 1919-1939’, - 
in- The Great Powers in the Middle east, 1919-1939, op. cit., pp.241 -242.
48* Ibid & William Stivers, Supremacy and Oil: Iraq, Turkey and the Anglo-American World Order, 1918- 
1930, (London& Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), p.30.
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enia and Mesopotamia.49 America’s rejection of the League of Nations’ covenant, and its sub­
sequent refusal to take the Armenian mandate in late 1919 as a result of the opposition of the 
Congress,50  changed the political landscape. These developments brought France to the 
fore as a major player in determining the future of the non-Turkish Wilayets.
Unable now to extend its Mesopotamian mandate to Northern Kurdistan, Britain was 
in no position to resist France’s persistent demand for territorial re-arrangements in Kurdistan. 
Stephen Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, told Curzon that
America having disappeared from the scene as a factor in the settlement of the East, and all 
chances of an American mandate for any portion of the Turkish Empire having., vanished, 
there remained only two parties [France and Britain], whose interests had seriously to be com 
sidered and reconciled.51
Pichon made clear that he was authorised by his Government to enter into confidential discus­
sion with the British as soon as possible to determine the future of non-Turkish Wilayets.sz Bri­
tain had three options for the future of the Kurdish areas to the north of British-controlled 
Southern Kurdistan. The first option was to partition these Kurdish areas between Britain and 
France. This was inconceivable to Britain for it entailed extra military and financial commit­
ments. The second option was to immediately declare these areas an independent state. This 
option would certainly meet French opposition, as was the case in the past. France always 
suspected that Britain Would benefit politically and economically from establishing a Kurdish 
state, as the Kurdish nationalists were clearly British-orientated in their political outlook. The 
final option was to re-establish Turkish rule over those Kurdish areas which might enjoy local 
autonomy in order to satisfy some Kurdish political aspirations.
In contrast, the French approach to the future of Kurdistan was very straightforward 
and revolved around one idea: its partition between France and Britain. France displayed a 
more notable consistency in its attitudes towards the Kurdish situation than Britain, probably 
because it knew what economic and political benefits could be gained from the partition of 
Kurdistan. Indeed, since the end of the First World War, France had pressed for territorial re­
arrangements in Ottoman Kurdistan, based on the Sykes-Picot agreement. As Britain conti­
nued to resist the implementation of that agreement, France presented a new partition plan in
49* Crowe, British Delegation, Paris, to Curzon, 12 October 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
50* Stivers, Supremacy and Oil: Iraq, Turkey and the Anglo-American World Order, 1918-1930, pp.44- 
45.
51* Curzon, Memorandum, 12 November 1919, FO406/41, PRO.
52* Curzon’s Record of a Conversation with the French Foreign Minister, 12 November 1919, DBFP, Vol. 
IV, pp.879-81.
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late 1919. Philippe Berthelot, the Chief Secretary for Political and Commercial Affairs in the 
French Foreign Office, argued that, as the Kurds were “ divided into tribes and clans” and as 
they, like the Arabs, had “hardly ever been united into a national state”, France and Britain 
should divide Ottoman Kurdistan among themselves. This solution, he stated, was temporary, 
necessitated by the “geographical situation” and “natural wealth” of the country and pending 
the peace conference’s final decision on the Kurdish question. Berthelot’s plan provided for 
the establishment of a federal organisation in Kurdistan under French and British control. The 
authority of the Turkish Sultan would be nominal, while a number of local elective councils 
would be established under French and British supervision. The French plan confined the 
political geography of Kurdistan to the Diyarbekir Wilayet and the southern portion of the Bitlis 
and Van Wilayets. The British felt that Berthelot’s plan was not temporary, but a permanent ter­
ritorial and political division of Ottoman Kurdistan, with a view to granting France considerable 
political and economic spheres of control. Accordingly, Curzon rejected the French plan, 
arguing its unfeasibility on political and technical grounds. Firstly, the Kurds would oppose it. 
Secondly, apart from the boundaries of Southern Kurdistan, it would be difficult, Curzon 
argued, to define the boundaries of the remainder of Kurdistan. 53
On the other hand, France too was anxious about the extent of Britain's imperial ambi­
tions in Kurdistan. As it was clear that Kurdish nationalists were British-orientated, France was 
suspicious of any scheme that provided for a separate Kurdistan. Such French fears surfaced 
when Curzon put forward what he called “the outlines of a general policy which would sup­
posedly guide British and French approaches to Kurdish affairs, pending the peace confer­
ence’s final decision. The most important points were the following: firstly, there would be no 
British or French or British-French mandate for Kurdistan as a whole, except those parts which 
came under British and French mandates over Mesopotamia and Syria respectively. Second­
ly, Turkish rule should not continue in Kurdistan “even in a nominal form” . Thirdly, the Kurdish 
question could not be considered in isolation of the issue of Armenia, as the Kurds were cap­
able of making “a workable arrangement with both the Armenians and Assyrians. Fourthly, 
the Kurds should be allowed to decide whether they would form “a single state or a number of 
small loosely-knit aread'. Fifthly, it was preferable not to have British or French advisers in Kur­
distan, though the Kurds would be given a guarantee against “ Turkish aggression” . Finally, it 
was desirable not to create “a frontier problenf for Mesopotamia in Kurdistan akin to the one
53* Ibid.
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which Britain confronted in lndia.5 4  These outlines partly reflected the military and financial 
restrictions that prevented Britain from accepting a separate mandate for Ottoman Kurdistan 
or partitioning it with France. In other words, these outlines sought to restrain France from 
extending its mandatory control to additional Kurdish areas. It seems that Britain raised the 
issue of an independent Kurdistan, so as to make France abandon the idea of a large-scale 
partition. Indeed, France, suspecting ulterior British motives behind the establishment of a 
separate Kurdistan, changed its position, when Berthelot insisted on amending the synopsis 
of the Turkish peace treaty so that the remainder of Kurdistan would come under Ottoman 
sovereignty.55
In the end, leaving the Northern Kurds to their own devices -as to whether they wan­
ted to separate from or remain within Turkey- emerged as the ideal solution under the circum­
stances. On the one side, the French vetoed a separate Kurdistan and, on the other, the Brit­
ish vetoed a Kurdistan-wide partition. It also became necessary that Britain should relegate to 
the background the idea of an autonomous state in Southern Kurdistan lest France demand 
the establishment of a parallel Kurdish state in Northern Kurdistan under its control. Curzon 
highlighted this latter point at the IDCM meeting of 13 April 1920, when making reference to 
the interconnection between political developments in Southern Kurdistan and those of 
Northern Kurdistan.se
Having failed to persuade the British to jointly partition Northern Kurdistan, the French 
insisted on obtaining some economic and territorial compensations. Berthelot explained to 
the British how their zone in Kurdistan had “mineral resources of much greater value" than 
that of the French zone in Cilicia. 57 The French sought British assurance that their economic 
interests would be secured in the settlement of the Kurdish question, and this eventually 
became their precondition for accepting the British draft terms on the Kurdish settlement.ss 
Accordingly the Sevres terms on Kurdistan satisfied some French economic ambitions when 
recognising their special interests in those Kurdish areas situated between Anatolia and 
Southern Kurdistan, on the one side, and Armenia and Syria, on the other (see mafJj Eighteen ) 
France also sought to bring new Kurdish areas under its control, in addition to Jezirah-ibn- 
Omar. Berthelot belatedly raised the issue of Kurdistan’s boundaries in the Turkish peace set-
54* IDCM, Second Additional Note on the Situation in Kurdistan, 10 January 1920, F0371/ 4193, PRO.
55* British Secretary’s Note.., London, 20 February 1920, DBFP, Vol. VII, p. 159.
56* IDCM, Minute No.3713 April 1920, F0371/5068, PRO.
57* British Secretary Note.., London, 26 February 1920, DBFP, Vol. VII, p.258.
58* British Secretary’s Note.., San Remo, 21 & 23 April 1920, DBFP, Vol. VIII, pp.77 &133.
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tlement when criticising the British decision to place them to the east of the Euphrates. 59 This 
was a clear indication that he wanted to extend French mandatory control to some Kurdish 
areas in that direction. Eventually, a bilateral French-British agreement at San Remo satisfied 
the minimum of France’s territorial ambitions. The Sevres treaty finalised the partition of Kurdi­
stan by giving France Urfa, Mardin and Nisibin.
To avoid future inter-Allied rivalries in Kurdistan, be they of a political or economic 
nature, the Allies also concluded on 23 April 1920 what is known as the Tripartite
agreement.eo
In the event of the Imperial Ottoman Government, or, in the circumstances provided for in 
paragraph 3 of the preamble, the Kurdish Government, being desirous of obtaining external 
assistance in the local administration, or police of the areas, in which the special interests of 
Great Britain, France and Italy are respectively recognised, the contracting Powers will not 
dispute the preferential claim of the Power, whose speciai interests in such areas are recog­
nised, to supply such assistance. This assistance shall be specially directed towards enhan­
cing the protection offered to racial, religious or linguistic minorities in such areas. 61
Examination of post-Sevres relations among the Allies illustrates that, in spite of all these 
agreements to reconcile differences in their strategic, economic and political interests, neither 
France nor Britain stopped in its attempts to undermine the position of each other in Kurdi­
stan. This rivalry was intensified when the Kemalists forced France to give up about half of its 
territorial gains in Kurdistan to Turkey. This development was interpreted by many civilian and 
military officials in Mesopotamia as a deliberate French attempt to encourage the Kemalists to 
invade Southern Kurdistan.
Persian Territorial Ambitions And Britain’s Kurdish Policy
The 1917 Bolshevik Revolution ended a ten year understanding between Russia and Britain 
over Persian affairs, and revived the old rivalry between the two Powers over this question. 
Such a rivalry now took on an additional ideological dimension, i.e. the struggle between com­
munism and capitalism. From 1919 onwards, British Persian policy suffered from serious set­
backs. In May 1920, the Bolsheviks occupied north Persia, and with their help, the anti-British 
Persian nationalists established the Soviet Republic of Gilan. Apart from the ongoing Kurdish 
revolt in Eastern Kurdistan, other nationalist movements emerged that posed a threat to Per-
59* British Secretary’s Note.., San Remo, 21 April 1920, DBFP, Vol. VIII: No. 8, p.77.
60* This agreement and the Sevres treaty were simultaneously signed by Turkey and the Allies in Paris 
on 10 August 1920.
61* DBFP, Vol. VIII:Appendix A, to No.13, Draft of Tripartite Agreement, 23 April 1920, DBFP, Vol. VIII, 
pp. 141.
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sian territorial unity. One of these nationalist movements appeared in Persian Azerbijan, and 
was as much anti-British as it was anti-central Government.62 These internal and external 
threats to Persian territorial unity greatly alarmed Britain, whose strategic interests were closely 
linked with the unity of Persia. Curzon once defined Britain’s task in Persia as assisting it in 
remaining united so that it “should not be left to herself and allowed to rot into picturesque 
deca f .63 in other words, through containing internal and external threats and strengthening 
Persian unity and the power of the central Government in Tehran, Britain could consolidate 
the security of its positions in India, the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia. 64 Britain’s opposition 
to a separate Eastern Kurdistan stemmed from its fears that it would lead to the disintegration 
of the Qajar Kingdom.
The complications in post-war Middle Eastern affairs were not only caused by the con­
tradiction between the political, economic and strategic interests of the Great Powers, but also 
by the territorial claims of the new nationalities as well as the existing states in the region. Qajar 
Persia, for instance, had its own territorial ambitions, even though it was itself facing the pro­
spect of territorial disintegration. Its territorial ambitions consisted of annexing vast territories - 
mainly from the Ottoman Empire and Russia- as compensation for the alleged damages 
caused by the Ottoman and Russian armies in Persia during the war.es The Persian Govern­
ment hoped that, with the help of Britain and America, it could get a seat at the peace confer­
ence, so as to persuade the Allies to radically rectify Persia’s western, northern and eastern 
frontiers in its favour.ee Insofar as Kurdistan was concerned, the Shah of Persia demanded the 
unification of its Ottoman and Persian parts under his rule. 67 Interestingly enough, Persian 
nationalist opposition pronounced similar territorial demands. Britain, while refusing to allow 
Persia to attend the peace conference or support its “preposterous territorial claims, was will­
ing to back “moderate Persian demands for rectifying its western frontier,ee i.e. the old Otto- 
man-Persian frontiers in Kurdistan.
62* Nasrollah Saifpour Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia, 1917-1923: Anglo-Russia Politics in Iran 
(New York: Russell F. Moore, 1952), pp.144-254.
63* Ibid.
64* Curzon, Memorandum on the Persian agreement, 9 August 1919, DBFP, Vol. IV: No.710, p.1121. 
65* Ishtiaq Ahmad, Anglo-lranian Relations, 1905-1919, (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1974), 
pp.314-318.
66* Curzon to Cox, Tehran, 28 November 1919, DBFP, Vol. IV, pp.1245-9.
67* Curzon to Earl of Derby, Paris, 25 October 1919, DBFP, Vol. IV, p.1214.
68* Curzon to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 19 December 1919 & 5 January 1920, DBFP, Vol. 
IV, pp. 1273-4.
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The problem of delimitating the Ottoman-Persian frontiers in Kurdish areas was an old 
one. On the eve of the First World War, the problem was under the consideration of an inter­
national commission, consisting of British and Russian representatives. The outbreak of the 
war prevented the implementations of its recommendations for a moderate modification of the 
Ottoman-Persian frontier. Following the war, the British -because of their concern for the 
security of their position in Southern Kurdistan and Persia- paid attention to these unstable 
frontiers, over which neither the Turks nor Persians had effective control. Mark Sykes sought 
a radical solution to end the existing instability in Urmia in Eastern Kurdistan, where the pro- 
Allied Christian communities lived. His solution was not to detach the area from Persia, but to
transfer Turkish Kurdistan to Persian sovereignty on the condition that the Urmia district 
should be united with it administratively, and that the whole should form an autonomous pro- 
vince with foreign assistance in its administration. This would (a) secure an effective recon­
struction of the Urmia (b) unite the Nestorians on both sides of the frontier (c) satisfy long­
standing Persian claims on the former Turko-Persian frontier., and (d) safeguard our position 
strategically in Mesopotamia.69
The application of this solution was not practical due to the strength of Kurdish nationalist 
movement on both sides of the Ottoman-Persian frontier and Britain’s unwillingness to com­
mit itself either politically or militarily. But, one main aspect of Sykes’ approach, which linked 
the issue of the Assyrians and other Christian minorities with that of rectifying the Ottoman- 
Persian frontiers in Kurdistan, drew the attention of the British Government.
When many Assyrians and other Christians were made to leave Persian territory dur­
ing the war and enter Mesopotamia, the British military authorities suggested their resettle­
ment in Southern Kurdistan by displacing anti-British Kurds from their villages. This solution 
seemed undesirable because of its financial cost and the fact it helped intensify local troubles. 
In early 1920, Wilson suggested another solution to the question of the Christian refugees, 
whom he described as a financial burden on his Mesopotamian administration. It entailed their 
repatriation to an area in Ottoman Kurdistan close to the Persian frontier. Then Persia’s control 
would be extended to that area by means of rectifying the existing frontier in its favour. In this 
manner, Wilson argued, these Christians would be freed from Turkish rule and cease to be a 
heavy financial burden on the British administration in Mesopotamia .70 Such a view was also 
backed by the India Office and the Foreign Office. Curzon stated that the British were all 
“anxioud to repatriate the Christians, and searched for the appropriate means to achieve it in 
a manner that would not incur political complications. In his view, it was the Kurds with whom
69* Toynbee, Foreign Office Minute No. 174037,22 November 1918, FO371/3407, PRO.
70* IDCM, Minute No.3713 April 1920, FO371/5068, PRO.
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the Persian Government should discuss the issue of rectifying the frontier in Kurdistan. His 
motive was to sidestep any Turkish opposition to the rectification of the frontiers. Accordingly, 
the Sevres terms provided that the Persian Government would negotiate with the Kurds, not 
the Turks, with a view to securing the rectification of the frontier. The striking thing about the 
Sevres terms on the issue of defining the southern frontiers of Armenia with Kurdistan was 
that the Armenians would negotiate with the Turks, not the Kurds, even though that issue 
concerned the would-be autonomous Kurdish entity.
On the other hand, the issue of Persian territorial claims presented Britain with an
opportunity to realise several objectives. Article 62 of the Sevres treaty stated that
the scheme [of autonomy] shall contain full safeguards for the protection of the Assyro- 
Chaldeans and other racial or religious minorities within these areas, and with this object a 
commission composed of British, French, Italian, Persian and Kurdish representatives shall 
visit the spot to examine and decide what rectifications, if any, should be made in the the Turk­
ish frontier where, under the provisions of the present Treaty, that frontier coincided with that 
of Persia.
The implementation of Article 62 would have far-reaching political and strategic implications 
insofar as Britain and Persia were concerned. Firstly, it had the effect of perpetuating Turkish- 
Persian frontier problems. This meant the pre-empting of any attempt to form an anti-British 
and a pan-lslamic movement by the Kemalists. It is worth noting that the Kemalists still used 
Islamic sentiment to mobilise the Muslims of different ethnic background for their cause and to 
forge regional allies against Western domination. Moreover, the Kemalists’ efforts converged 
with those of the Bolsheviks, who waged a comprehensive anti-British propaganda campaign 
among Muslim nationalities. British officials in London and on the ground were greatly alarmed 
by the ongoing anti-British and pan-lslamic propaganda in Persia, 71 where the Muslims formed 
an absolute majority. Secondly, the rectification of the frontiers in Persia’s favour, the British 
hoped, would encourage the Persian Government to effectively extend its authority to these 
areas where Kurdish rebels threatened its territorial unity.7 2  Thirdly, on moral ground, Britain 
found it difficult to escape from its responsibility towards these Christian communities, who 
had supported the Allies during the war. Yet it wished to solve the Assyrian problem as 
cheaply as possible,73 without making any political commitment. Like the British authorities in 
Baghdad, Curzon, who constantly referred to the Assyrians as a heavy financial burden on the
71* Commander Luke to Admiral Webb, 25 December 1919, Enclosure 1, DBFP, Vol. IV, pp.1001-1003. 
& Ryan, Memorandum, Constantinople, 29 December 1919, Enclosure 2 in No.647, DBFP, Vol. IV, 
pp.1003-1005.
72* Curzon to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 5 January 1920, DBFP, Vol. IV, p.1248.
73* British Secretary’s Note.., San Remo, 19 April 1920, DBFP, Vol. VIII, p.44.
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Mesopotamian administration, viewed the re-adjustment of the Ottoman-Persian frontier as a 
practical solution. Lastly, the construction of the Assyrian settlement and the extension of 
Persian rule to the mutinous Kurdish areas would create a stable zone close to the northern 
frontiers of the British sphere in Southern Kurdistan. In other words, the readjustment of the 
Ottoman-Persian frontier would simultaneously strengthen and shorten Britain’s strategic 
defensive line vis-it-vis future Turkish and Bolshevik attacks across Kurdistan. These various 
considerations demonstrate that Britain’s willingness to support the Persian claim in the direc­
tion of Kurdistan was calculated, and was not coincidental or done out of sympathy.
Conclusion
Both Britain’s diplomacy and the Kurdish policy on the ground considerably influenced the 
development of the Kurdish question and its settlement at the San Remo conference in 
1920. Indeed, when the First World War ended, the British were in control of vital Turkish 
areas, notably the Bosphorus and Constantinople. Their forces -and those of their Allies, 
such as France, Italy and Greece- directly or indirectly controlled most of the Turkish and non- 
Turkish Wilayets. British forces were also present in southern and northern Persia. The Otto­
man army was in the process of rapid disintegration and the Qajar army was suffering from the 
same fate. The authorities of the central Governments in Constantinople and Tehran were so 
weak that they lost control over remote regions, especially in Kurdistan. In various parts of Kur­
distan, Kurdish nationalists, who emerged to fill the existing political vacuum, were politically or 
militarily engaged in activities aimed at realising Kurdish nationalist aspirations. Under such 
conditions, Britain was in a strong position to create a Kurdish state, if it so wanted. It was 
unfortunate for the Kurdish nationalists that British strategic, economic and political interests 
did not require the establishment of a Kurdish national state in the period 1918-1920. This 
disharmony between British interests and Kurdish nationalist aspirations can, to a consider­
able degree, explain why the Kurds emerged stateless in the wake of the collapse of the Otto­
man Empire, and also why Kurdistan was re-partitioned. The one positive aspect of the 
Sevres treaty, from a Kurdish viewpoint, as Ghassemlou points out, was that Kurdish rights 
had been mentioned by an international treaty for the first time .74
The forgoing survey of the evolution of Britain’s Kurdish policy and the crystallisation 
of its various Objectives in Kurdistan after the First World War highlighted two main points.
74* Ghassemlou, Kurdistan and the Kurds, p.42.
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Firstly, there was a pressing need for Britain to define its interests and the limits of its political 
influence in Kurdistan. Such a definition was conditioned by Britain military and financial capa­
bilities, which became severely restricted as a result of the First World War. Priority was given 
to the security of the British strategic position in Mesopotamia, and this considerably influ­
enced the direction of British policy towards Kurdistan. One of its important consequences 
was to bring Southern Kurdistan under the British mandate of Mesopotamia, which represen­
ted the de facto partition of Ottoman Kurdistan even before the peace conference could take 
its final decision on the settlement of the Kurdish question. Secondly, Britain also approa­
ched the settlement of the Kurdish question from regional and international perspectives. 
The revival of imperial rivalry with France, the growing threat of Bolshevism, the uncertainty 
about the future of both Turkey proper and Armenia and the importance of Persian territorial 
unity influenced, in various degrees, British Kurdish policy and ultimately the terms of the 
Sevres treaty on Kurdistan.
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An urgent need emerged in late 1920 for the winding up of the system of divided control 
between the Foreign, India and War Offices in the Middle East. This was a direct conse­
quence of both the failure of direct British control in the mandated regions such as Mesopota­
mia, where a bloody rising broke out in mid-1920, and the huge financial cost of the admin­
istration and the defence of the mandated regions in the Middle East. These two factors were 
the focus of Britain’s newspapers criticisms. Soon these criticisms were carried over into parlia­
mentary debate, in which the entire Mesopotamian policy came under severe attack. The par­
liamentary debate provided, in Klieman’s words, “the final stimulus” for phange in policy mak­
ing process and policy direction. 1 Eventually, the British Cabinet decided on entrusting the 
Colonial Office -through the newly-formed Middle East Department- with the responsibility for 
policy making and administration, as well as all civil and military expenditure. 2 Central to the 
new changes was the policy of indirect control based on the formation of a native administra­
tion under British supervision in Mesopotamia, with a view to ending its huge financial bur­
dens on Britain.
These changes in both the policy making process and policy direction insofar as they 
affected the Middle East, had great a impact on Southern Kurdistan’s future. The analysis of 
this chapter is primarily focused on the role of Percy Cox, the new High Commissioner for 
Mesopotamia, and Winston Churchill, the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, with whom 
the two contradictory alternatives of the incorporation and the separation of Southern Kurdi­
stan were associated respectively. Crucial to their approaches to the Kurdish situation was Bri­
tain’s need for a new political formula that would accommodate two important objectives: first­
ly, the consolidation of the British position in Mesopotamia and Southern Kurdistan in the 
long-term, and secondly, the containment of the growing Kemalist threat to Mesopotamia at 
the same time as withdrawing the British imperial garrison from the latter.
1 * Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World, pp.84-85 & 87.
2* Recommendations of the Prime Minister’s Interdepartmental Committee, C.P.2545,7 February 1921, 
CAB21/186, PRO.
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The Emergence Of Two British Policy Alternatives At The 1921 Cairo Confer­
ence: Separate Entities Versus Unitary State
The Cairo conference opened on 12 March 1921 and lasted until the end of the same month. 
Forty civilian and military experts on British policy in Middle East attended its meetings. The 
participants were divided into groups to conduct the agenda of the conference: a Political 
Committee and a Military and Financial Committee. The Political Committee, headed by 
Chufchill, discussed three interconnected issues: the political future of Mesopotamia, the 
immediate reduction of military commitments and Britain’s future relations with Mesopotamia 
under the mandate. The discussion of these issues brought to the fore the future of South­
ern Kurdistan, which came under special consideration at the final meeting of the Political 
Committee. From the very beginning two distinct and contradictory political alternatives for 
Southern Kurdistan’s future came to the surface among the members of the Political Commit­
tee. On the one side, Cox with the support of his Oriental Secretary, Gertrude Bell, approa­
ched the issue of Southern Kurdistan’s future from an Arab viewpoint by supporting the terri­
torial claims of the Sharifian family and their Sunni followers in Mesopotamia. Cox asserted that 
Southern Kurdistan was an integral part of Iraq and that the Southern Kurds were aware of 
being economically linked with Iraq. Apart from Sulaimaniya, both Cox and Bell argued that all 
Southern Kurds wanted to join Iraq. To reinforce his point, Cox advocated that the revenue, 
which came from the Kurdish areas, was not enough to cover the cost of their administration. 3 
Before the Cairo conference, Cox had opposed Montagu’s idea for the appointment of a 
Kurdish governor for Southern Kurdistan.4
Cox and Bell’s argument that the Southern Kurds would accept Arab rule, and that 
Southern Kurdistan could not economically sustain itself, diametrically contradicted the pre­
vious information that both Wilson and Noel had provided. Despite their differences on Kurd­
ish affairs, Wilson and Noel agreed that the Southern Kurds would unanimously reject the 
idea of Arab rule. Moreover, the evidence that Wilson always represented as a justification for 
his attempt to incorporate the Kurdish areas into British-administered Mesopotamia was the 
economic richness of Southern Kurdistan in comparison with Arab Mesopotamia. He had 
always emphatically referred to the latter as having considerable surplus in wheat production, 
lumber, fruits, tobacco and most importantly, potential oil wealth. Indeed, Southern Kurdistan,
3* Report on Middle East Conference Held in Cairo and Jerusalem, 12-30 March 1921, F0371/6343, 
PRO.
4* S/S for India to High Commissioner, Baghdad, 27 October 1920 & High Commissioner, Mesopotamia, 
17 November 1920, FO371/5069, PRO.
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unlike British-administrated Mesopotamia, had not been a heavy financial burden on Britain. 
Most British expenditure focused on the construction of railways, roads, ports, dams, bridges 
and other facilities in Mesopotamia, rather than Southern Kurdistan.
In contrast to Cox and Bell’s views, Hubert Young, who became the Assistant Secre­
tary to the newly-established Middle East Department, argued that Southern Kurdistan 
should be immediately established as a separate state, so as to function as a strategic buffer 
against any future Kemalist threat to Iraq. He was supported not only by Noel, who attended 
the conference as the only expert on Kurdish affairs, but also by Churchill, who expressed his 
fears about ignoring Kurdish sentiment and the oppression of the Kurdish minority by a Shari- 
fian ruler with the support of his Arab army.5 He underlined the principle that London would 
not force the Southern Kurds into joining Arab Iraq or overlook their nationalist aspirations. 
Moreover, Churchill, like Noel, did not wish to see a strong Arab state that might encourage 
Feisal to weaken the British hold over Mesopotamia. When the conference ended, it became 
clear that four out of the seven British officials who attended the conference were in favour of 
the alternative of a separate Southern Kurdistan not subordinate to Arab rule. They were 
Churchill, Young, Noel and T. E. Lawrence, who acted as the Political Adviser to the Middle 
East Department. By contrast, Cox and Bell were the only two officials who favoured the alter­
native of Southern Kurdistan’s incorporation into Iraq. Thus the conference did not abandon 
the idea of a separate Southern Kurdistan, as McDowall believes, e On the contrary, it empha­
tically rejected the incorporation alternative, unless the Southern Kurds were to ask for it.
The Cairo conference laid down a clear-cut principle not to force Southern Kurdistan 
to join the Iraqi state. Most importantly, it decided to keep Southern Kurdistan a separate 
country in order to function as a strategic buffer for Mesopotamia, until such a time when the 
Southern Kurds or their representatives would determine their own political future. In the light 
of the Cairo decisions, Churchill raised an important question as to whether Britain needed to 
insert a special provision into its draft mandate over Mesopotamia. Against this background, 
the Legal Adviser to the Colonial Office entered into informal consultation with the Assistant 
Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office. Their final recommendation resulted in modifying the 
terms of the Mesopotamian mandate, in spite of Cox’s opposition:
Article 16 of the Mesopotamian mandate would read thereafter:
Nothing in this mandate shall prevent the mandatory from establishing such an autonomous
5* Report on Middle East Conference Held in Cairo and Jerusalem, 12-30 March 1921, F0371/6343, 
PRO.
6* McDowall, A Modem History of the Kurds, p. 151.
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system of administration for the predominantly Kurdish areas in the northern portion of Meso­
potamia, as may consider suitable. 7
The position of the Colonial Office was mainly dictated by its fears that the imposition 
of Arab rule over reluctant Southern Kurds might increase political instability and thus force 
Britain to make undesirable political and military commitments towards the security of Mesopo­
tamia. These British fears were steadily growing due to what seemed to be a Kemalist drive 
southwards towards Mesopotamia. In these circumstances, any Kurdish resistance to the 
incorporation of Southern Kurdistan into Iraq would most likely result in a Kemalist-Kurdish 
alliance against Britain and Arab Iraq. As a result, Britain would have to stop the withdrawal of 
its imperial garrison to protect Iraq, which was the central objective of the new policy of indirect 
control. By contrast, as the records of the conference show, the alternative of keeping South­
ern Kurdistan out of Iraq would enable Britain to put into effect its plans for the withdrawal of its 
forces and end its heavy financial responsibilities in Mesopotamia. Churchill hoped that British 
officers would supervise the formation of inexpensive Kurdish military units to replace the 
existing British garrison, with a view to taking a full responsibility for the defence of Mesopota- 
mias He had no faith in the Arab army’s ability to defend Mesopotamia from the Kemalists, and 
reiterated to Cox the military value of the Kurdish military units for the defence of Mesopota- 
mia9 Moreover, the reinforcement of a Kurdish sense of nationality by the establishment of 
Kurdish autonomous rule would help restore stability to Southern Kurdistan.
In light of these considerations, Churchill informed the British Prime Minister, Lloyd 
George, of a general line that would temporarily guide the Colonial Office’s Kurdish policy, 
which was that while awaiting the expiration of the year allowed by Article 5 of the Sevres trea­
ty, the affairs of Southern Kurdistan would continue to be directly conducted by the High 
Commissioner, not by the provisional Arab Government in Baghdad. Lloyd George, who was 
anxious about the Kemalist activities in Kurdistan, approved of what the Cairo conference 
recommended. 10 It became clear that the British Government favoured the concept of a buffer 
state, and expected it to be central to British policy towards Southern Kurdistan after the Cairo 
conference.11
7* Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World, p. 123.
8* Report on Middle East Conference Held in Cairo and Jerusalem, 12-30 March 1921, F0371/6343, 
PRO.
9* Churchill to Cox, 18 June 1921, CO730/2, PRO.
10* Message from Prime Minister to Churchill, 22 March 1921, F0371/6342, PRO.
11* Young, Colonial Office Minute of 20 June 1923 & H. Read, Colonial Office Minute of 21 June 1923, 
C0730/40, PRO.
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Cox’s Kurdish Policy In the Wake of The Cairo Conference
Although the Cairo conference recommended a separate Southern Kurdistan in the shape of 
a buffer zone, the Colonial Office did not instruct the British authorities in Mesopotamia to 
implement it immediately, as was the case with the formation of the Arab state in Mesopotamia. 
The reason for this lack of concrete instructions could be attributed to the fact that the Colo­
nial Office focused much of its attention and time on the organisation process of the Arab 
state and Feisal’s candidature for the Iraqi throne. This state of affairs enabled Cox to ignore 
the initiation of any step towards Kurdish autonomy. Instead, he suggested various schemes 
for Southern Kurdistan’s incorporation into the Iraqi state based on several economic, finan­
cial and political arguments. No sooner had the Cairo conference ended than Cox criticised 
the economic implications of Southern Kurdistan’s separation for the future of Mesopotamia. 
He and his subordinates argued that the economic links between the Kurdish districts of the 
Mosul division and the Arab town of Mosul were so close that the local Kurds would not wel­
come any administrative separation that would lead to the erection of "a customs barrier”. 
Instead of separation, they preferred to turn these Kurdish districts into a subliwa 
(subdivision), that would be politically, financially and judicially subjected to Baghdad. 12 Cox 
extended the economic aspect of his argument to other Kurdish districts, arguing that "the 
leaders of Kurdish opinion” were fully aware of Southern Kurdistan’s economic and industrial 
connection with Arab Iraq, and of the inconveniences which its separation from Iraq might 
involve.1 3  Having said that, the British authorities acknowledged that the people of Sulaima- 
niya wanted nothing to do with Arab rule whatever the economic consequences might be.14  
Apart from the economic factor, Cox sought to prove to Churchill that Southern Kurdi­
stan’s incorporation into Iraq was the only viable political and administrative option. He devised 
a complicated scheme for Kurdish autonomy within the Arab Iraqi state in May 1921, a step 
which clearly contradicted Cairo’s general line. The Kurdish districts of the Mosul division 
would form a subliwa under a British assistant Mutassarif, the existing British Qaimmaqam 
would be replaced by a Kurd or a Kurdish-speaking Arab. The division would be financially and 
judicially subjected to the national Government at Baghdad and would send its representa­
tives to the National Assembly. The High Commissioner would appoint their administrators in
12* Mesopotamian Intelligence Report (MIR), No.12,1 May 1921, CO730/2, PRO.
13* MIR, No. 13,15 May 1921, CO730/2, PRO.
14* High Commissioner’s Communique No.13 to the Provisional Majlis of the Mosul Wilayet -in- MIR,
No. 14,1 June 1921, F0371/6352, PRO.
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consultation with local authorities. In other words, the Kurdish districts of Dohuk, Zakho, Aqra, 
Zibar and Amadia would come under mixed British-lraqi control and be officially part of Iraq. As 
for Arbil, Rowanduz and Keuisenjaq, British officials would control their administration, 
whereas the appointment of junior officials would be made according to Kurdish wishes. 
Thus, these Kurdish areas, though being part of Iraq, would remain under British control. Cox 
left out of his scheme other important Kurdish areas in the Kirkuk division^ which would be dir­
ectly ruled by the Arab Government in Baghdad. The remainder of Southern Kurdistan, not­
ably Sulaimaniya and its surrounding areas, would have a mixed British-Kurdish administrative 
control. The High Commissioner would appoint the Mutassarif, whose right was to appeal dir­
ectly to him, while the Qaimmaqam would be Kurdish.15
The existence of superficial safeguards against any Arab oppression -such as the pre­
sence of British officials in local administration in Southern Kurdistan- failed to moderate the 
fears of the Kurds about the prospect of being under Arab rule. British official reports on Kurd­
ish reactions to Cox’s scheme suggested limited successes even among the local councils, 
which were formed by the British in the districts of Aqra and Zakho. In other Kurdish areas, 
where many Kurds were given an opportunity to freely express their opinion, the vast majority 
opposed any form of subordination to Arab rule. The people of the Sulaimaniya division over­
whelmingly rejected Arab rule through a plebiscite taken on Cox’s communique. In Sulaima­
niya town, where the right to vote rested on property qualification and therefore was limited, 
only 32 out of 190 people were in favour of inclusion into Iraq. In other areas, where the right 
to vote was unrestricted, people were decisively opposed to inclusion in Iraq. In Sulaimaniya 
district, only 32 out of 6,000 people voted for inclusion. In Sharbezher, people unanimously 
voted against Arab rule, and only one section of the Jaf among the Kurdish tribes was in 
favour of inclusion. ie Cox reported to the Colonial Office that the reactions of the leaders of 
Kurdish communities to his communique was positive, except in Sulaimaniya. But the results 
of the subsequent election of Feisal to Iraq’s throne contradicted Cox’s report of the Kurdish 
situation, when the majority of the Kurds rejected the extension of Arab rule to Southern Kur­
distan (detailed in the following chapter).
What really mattered for the success of the new British policy, in Cox’s view, was Arab 
public opinion . 17 The Kurds had neither a sense of nationality nor political reliability. As he
15* MIR, No.13,15 May 1921, CO730/2, PRO.
16* MIR, No. 14,1 June 1921, F0371/6352, PRO.
17* High Commissioner For Mesopotamia to S/S for the Colonies, 20 April, C0730/1, PRO.
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found no sizable support among Kurdish notables for his incorporation alternative, Cox exclu­
ded them from any discussion concerning their future, in marked contrast to his treatment of 
the Arabs. Instead of negotiating with the Southern Kurds, whose fate was under considera­
tion, Cox discussed with the Arab Council of State in Baghdad the solution for the Kurdish 
problem. Meanwhile, he purged the British personnel in Southern Kurdistan of those officials 
who advocated a separate Southern Kurdistan, notably Soane, who turned into a protagonist 
of Southern Kurdistan’s political separation. Although he was replaced by Goldsmith immedia­
tely after the Cairo conference, Soane continued to provide the Colonial Office with a picture 
of Kurdish attitudes towards Arab rule contrary to the one drawn by Cox. In this way, Cox cre­
ated unanimous support among his subordinates for his position on Kurdish affairs. Indeed, 
when arguing the case against the establishment of a separate Southern Kurdistan, Cox con­
stantly made references to the absolute agreement among his Kurdish experts on the ground 
that Southern Kurdistan, including Sulaimaniya, should be made part of Iraq on political and 
financial grounds.is
The most revealing aspect of Cox’s scheme was its political and administrative dis­
memberment of Southern Kurdistan. Like his predecessor, Wilson, Cox was never willing to 
consider the Kurdish areas as constituting one concrete unit even within the Iraqi state. Keep­
ing an autonomous Sulaimaniya outside Iraq was, in Cox’s views, an encouragement to the 
remainder of the Kurdish areas to demand the same treatment. Thus, his whole scheme for 
the incorporation of Southern Kurdistan into Iraq would collapse. Cox feared that as soon as 
the Kurds witnessed the re-emergence of a nationalist leader and a nationalist stronghold, 
they would turn against the authority of Baghdad. It was precisely this prospect that Cox was 
to face in the autumn of 1922, when Mahmud formed his second Government (as will be 
examined later). Cox justified to Churchill his desire to bring Sulaimaniya under Arab rule, 
despite the unquestionable opposition of its population, by underlining the dangers it posed 
to the unity of Mesopotamia itself:
It will be realised by you that the picture would be somewhat spoilt if Sulaimaniya alone was 
to stand out. Customs barrier involved by that solution would be a chronic source of diffi­
culty and if Sulaimaniya was allowed to separate, Basra and other communities [i.e. Turko­
man, Jewish and Christian] would want to follow suit and it would be difficult to argue with 
them. 19
To reassure Churchill of the success of his incorporation alternative, Cox argued that some
18* High Commissioner for Mesopotamia to S/S for the Colonies, 5 June 1921 & MIR, No.13,15 May 
1921, C0730/2, PRO.
19* High Commissioner for Mesopotamia to S/S for the Colonies, 5 June 1921, CO730/2, PRO.
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formal British insurance to Sulaimaniya, such as a three-year joint British-Kurdish administra­
tion, would make the latter change its attitude towards rejecting Iraqi rule.20
Having been informed of the incompatibility of his approach to the future of Southern 
Kurdistan with the general line formulated by the Cairo conference, Cox stated that he had 
come back from the conference with the impression that the Colonial Office favoured his 
incorporation alternative.21 But the records of the conference show that the balance of opi­
nion was clearly in favour of the separation alternative, and that its recommendations were not 
ambiguous or open to contradictory interpretation. On the one side, there would be an Arab 
state created by merging the Baghdad and Basra Wilayets under a Sharifian ruler, and on the 
other, there would be a separate Southern Kurdistan. The latter would function as a buffer 
entity to protect Iraq from Kemalist Turkey. It is difficult to imagine that Cox misinterpreted the 
Cairo recommendations, especially when he himself was entrusted with the implementation of 
British policy on the ground. Young’s Colonial Office minutes of 20/21 June 1923 clearly sug­
gest that Cox consciously “turned down” Cairo’s recommendations for the establishment of a 
Kurdish buffer state.22 Cox’s subsequent actions clearly indicate that he was determined to 
prepare the ground for the incorporation of Southern Kurdistan into Iraq regardless of Kurdish 
wishes. Indeed, after being informed of the incompatibility of his suggestions with the Colo­
nial Office’s position on Kurdish affairs, Cox went on to propose another complicated scheme 
for the future of Southern Kurdistan; the essence of which was its political and administrative 
dismemberment with the view to bringing it under Arab rule. Firstly, while the Kurdish areas to 
the north of the two Zabs (the five Kurdish districts of Amadia, Dohuk, Aqra, Zakho and Sinjar) 
would be, for the time being, within Iraq, they would have the right to reconsider their fate 
sometime in the future. Secondly, the sub-mountainous areas situated between the two Zab 
Rivers, including Arbil, would be within Iraq. Thirdly, the mountainous districts that were situa­
ted between the two Zab Rivers such as Rowanduz and Rania, would be under Cox’s control. 
These districts might be united with the Sulaimaniya division to form a separate province out­
side Iraq. Finally, the remainder of the Kurdish areas, which would be temporarily incorporated 
into Iraq, might join the Kurdish province after the expiration of three years.23
20* Ibid.
21 * High Commissioner for Mesopotamia to S/S for the Colonies, 21 June 1921, F0371/6346, PRO. 
22* Young, Colonial Office Minute of 20 June 1923 & H. Read, Colonial Office Minute of 21 June 1923, 
C0730/40, PRO.
23* High Commissioner for Mesopotamia to S/S for the Colonies, 21 June 1921, F0371/6346, PRO.
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Churchill’s Approach To The Question Of Southern Kurdistan’s Future
The most important evidence suggesting that the Cairo recommendations became a guide for 
Britain’s policy towards Southern Kurdistan was Churchill’s statements in the House of Com­
mons, where he shed light on Britain’s future relationship with both Southern Kurdistan and 
Iraq. As the Kurds did not *appreciate the prospect of being ruled by an Arab government", 
Churchill asserted, Cox would continue to directly administer the affairs of Southern Kurdi­
stan. In his capacity as the High Commissioner for Mesopotamia, Cox would perform "a dual 
function"towards Southern Kurdistan and Iraq.24 Churchill was optimistic that under British 
supervision and intervention, the Southern Kurds would accept union with Arab Iraq in the 
future. Yet, the word “union”, in this case, meant a type of confederated relationship between 
Southern Kurdistan and Iraq. Therefore, it should not be equated with such concepts as 
incorporation or unitary state:
I want to make it quite clear that we are developing, as it were, a principle of home rule for 
Southern Kurdistan within the general area of Mesopotamia, at the same time that we are 
developing the general self-government of Mesopotamia.25
In other words, there would be two entities with differing political status, which would be uni­
ted in terms of their economic and strategic interests but politically and administratively separ­
ate. With British advice and support and under the High Commissioner’s supervision, the 
Southern Kurds would conduct their own political-administrative affairs, local policing and 
defence, without being under Feisal’s rule. Just four days after his speech in the House of 
Commons, Churchill asserted to Cox that the aim was to keep Southern Kurdistan “just as dis­
tinct from Arab countries as Nepal from India”.26
Up until October 1922, when Churchill lost his position as the Colonial Secretary in 
the wake of the collapse of Lloyd George’s coalition Government, he continued to repeat his 
commitment to the principle that London would not force the Southern Kurds to join the Iraqi 
state against their wishes. Meanwhile, none of Cox’s proposals for a partial and temporary 
incorporation of Southern Kurdistan into Iraq received the approval of Churchill, who continu­
ally recommended a clear-cut political and administrative distinction between Southern Kurdi­
stan and lraq .27 The former would be under the British High Commissioner’s direct supervi-
24* Middle East, Government Policy, 14 June, House of Commons. Robert Rhodes James, Winston S. 
Churchill, His Complete Speeches, 1897-1963, Vol.lll, 1914-22. (Chelsea House Publishers, London & 
New York 1974), pp.3104-3105.
25* Ibid.
26* Churchill to Cox, 18 June 1921, CO730/2, PRO.
27* Colonial Office Minute No.31558,23 June 1921, C0730/2, PRO.
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sion, while the latter would be under Arab rule. 28 Churchill also questioned all the strategic, 
political and economic aspects of Cox’s argument. In terms of ethnic distribution, which Cox 
used as proof of the impracticability of the separation alternative, Churchill -with the help of 
Noel, Soane and Young- was able to point out that there was no serious difficulty in drawing 
the boundaries between Southern Kurdistan and Arab Mesopotamia. Moreover, Churchill 
included all the areas which Cox claimed to be non-Kurdish -such as Kirkuk, Kifri and Arbil- in 
his Kurdish buffer scheme. Churchill resorted to Maj. Soane and Capt. Longrigg when draw­
ing the ethnic boundaries of Southern Kurdistan. The ethnic factor had a central position in 
Churchill’s strategic argument, insofar as he believed the creation of a separate Kurdish entity 
was the best way of containing the Kemalist threat. Cox’s argument that the ethnic separation 
would give Iraq strategically inferior and indefensible frontiers, 29 would lose its value as South­
ern Kurdistan and Iraq would remain under the British mandate. Moreover, with British help 
and supervision, Southern Kurdistan would function as a strategic buffer for Iraq against 
future Kemalist threats. In other words, the Southern Kurds and the Arabs had the same stra­
tegic interests, i.e. the containment of Kemalist territorial ambitions. It was then in Iraq’s inter­
est that Southern Kurdistan stayed separate.
As for the economic aspect of Cox’s argument that the incorporation of Southern Kur­
distan was a necessity, the political and administrative separation suggested by Churchill 
would not prevent the Arabs and the Southern Kurds from making a close economic union in 
the same way that they had similar strategic interests. Unlike Cox, who considered the separa­
tion alternative as harmful for British influence in Iraq because the Arabs would resent the idea 
of a separate Southern Kurdistan, Churchill believed that the incorporation of Southern Kurdi­
stan into Iraq would excessively strengthen the Arabs. A separate Southern Kurdistan was 
then, in Churchill’s view, a useful political move, if Britain was to retain a strong hold over Iraq. 
For all these strategic and political reasons, he insisted that the British policy of setting up a 
separate Southern Kurdistan should never “be deflected either by Arab pressure of by other 
causes”. 30
As previously examined, Churchill’s position was to keep separate the political and 
administrative affairs of Southern Kurdistan from those of Arab Iraq before Feisal’s arrival in
28* S/S for the Colonies to High Commissioner for Mesopotamia, 24 June 1921, F0371/6346, PRO.
29* High Commissioner for Mesopotamia to S/S for the Colonies, Part One: 24 June & Part Two: 5 July 
1921, F0371/6346, PRO.
30* S/S for the Colonies to High Commissioner for Mesopotamia, 13 June 1921, CO730/2, PRO.
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Baghdad, and that British officials would remain the only link between the two countries. 
Churchill thought this step would ensure that Britain would be able to prevent the Arabs from 
interfering in Kurdish affairs.31 However, the arrival of Feisal and the issue of his election to the 
Iraqi throne changed the political situation. The exchange of views on the political future of 
Southern Kurdistan between the Colonial Office and the British authorities in Mesopotamia 
was suspended. To prevent the Kurdish issue from becoming an obstacle in the way of instal­
ling Feisal as king of Iraq, the Colonial Office postponed not only the drawing of the ethnic 
boundaries between Southern Kurdistan and Arab Mesopotamia, but also the political future 
of the form er .32 Moreover, Churchill, who had so far rejected all of Cox’s incorporation 
schemes, moderated his position when agreeing to the participation of the Southern Kurds in 
the forthcoming referendum on Feisal’s candidature for the Iraqi throne. He, however, re­
emphasised his adherence to "the principle of not putting the Arabs over the Kurds”33 and 
that the latter should be informed that they were free to take part in the referendum, without 
compromising their interests. As can be seen, a paradox emerged as a result of the Colonial 
Office’s adherence to the principle of not placing the Southern Kurds under Arab rule and the 
idea of allowing them to take part in the referendum. The probable explanation of this paradox 
is that Churchill hoped that the referendum would help clarify the real attitudes of the Kurds 
towards Feisal and Arab rule.
For Cox, the participation of the Southern Kurds in the referendum offered an ideal 
opportunity to demonstrate that Southern Kurdistan would definitely vote in favour of his 
incorporation scheme, and thus the issue of its future would be decided once and for all. Cox 
and Feisal were optimistic that they would be able to persuade the Southern Kurds to vote in 
favour of inclusion in Iraq. Helmi perceived the business of Feisal’s election as a British 
attempt to settle the Kurdish problem by bringing Southern Kurdistan under Arab rule. 3 4  in 
spite of all Cox’s efforts and those of his subordinates in the Kurdish areas, the vast majority of 
Southern Kurds refused to vote in favour of Feisal as their King and Iraq as their state (see 
chapter seven for the details on Feisal’s election). Cox’s failure to persuade Southern Kurdi­
stan to join Iraq, coupled with the growing political instability in the Kurdish areas, brought to
31 * S/S for the Colonies to High Commissioner for Mesopotamia, 9 June 1921, CO730/2, PRO.
32* Colonial Office Minute No.31558,23 June 1921, CO730/2 & S/S for the Colonies to High Commissio­
ner, Priority, 9 July 1921, F0371/6552, PRO.
33* Churchill to Cox, 9 July 1921 -in- Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol.IV: Companion Part 3, 
Documents, April 1921-November 1922, (London: Heinman, 1977), p. 1548.
34* Helmi, Memoirs, Vol.ll, pp.345-6.
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the fore the separation alternative. After the referendum, the Colonial Office directly inter­
fered in Kurdish policy, when it decided to allow the Kurdish nationalists to re-establish a sec­
ond Kurdish government. Despite Cox’s firm opposition, Mahmud was brought back from his 
exile in India. On his return to Kurdistan Mahmud was accompanied by Maj. Noel, whom 
Churchill sent so as to facilitate the implementation of the new measures.
The Establishment Of The Second Kurdish Government In Autumn 1922: Cir­
cumstances And Objectives
Neither the declaration of the Sevres terms nor the subsequent British policy on the ground 
helped to stabilise the political situation in Southern Kurdistan. The mountainous regions of 
Rowanduz, Sulaimaniya, Barzan and Aqra in particular were the scene of growing disorder. 
The British authorities in Mesopotamia were constantly engaged in carrying out ground and air 
operations to suppress local rebellions among the Barzani, Surchi, Zibar and Khushnaw 
Kurds.ss To recover former Ottoman territories, the Kemalists made the most of the existing 
instability by providing arms and officers to the Kurdish insurgents and by organising political 
societies to wage an anti-British propaganda campaign throughout Southern Kurdistan and 
Arab Mesopotamia. Meanwhile, a broad political movement took shape in Sulaimaniya, and 
this spread to other Kurdish areas such as Halabjah, Kifri and Kirkuk. It demanded that the Brit­
ish release and bring back Mahmud to Southern Kurdistan. 36 At the same time, some of Mah­
mud’s followers were still engaged in military activities directed against the British. The 
description given by Kurdish contemporaries, such as Rafik Helmi, of the British position in 
Southern Kurdistan in that period was far worse than the reports of the British authorities in 
Mesopotamia,37 which suggested that the change in British policy on the ground was 
unavoidable.
Cox confined the reasons for British troubles in Southern Kurdistan to Kemalist pro­
paganda activities among the Kurds,38 rather than Kurdish resentment of, and opposition to, 
his policy. Political unrest and Kurdish uneasiness were especially intensified by the formation 
of an Arab state in the Baghdad and Basra Wilayets. A Kurdish notable told the British Assis­
tant Political Officer for Chemchemal, where demands for the return of Mahmud to Southern
35* MIR, No. 16,1 July 1921 F0371/6352 & NO.20,1 September 1921 F0371/6353 & No.9,1 May 1922 
& No.11,1 June 1922, F0371/7771,PR0.
36* MIR, No.23,15 October 1921, F0371/6353 & No.8,15 April 1922, F0371/7771.PR0.
37* Helmi, Memoirs, Vol.ll, pp.565-80.
38* High Commissioner for Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 1 February 1922, FO371/7780.PRO.
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Kurdistan were made, that:
the policy of the British Government had been dangerously inconsistent. The British had 
denied to the Kurds their racial aspirations and, while carrying Feisal and the Iraqi Govern­
ment on their shoulders, showed no inclination to do the same for Sheikh Mahmud and Kurdi­
stan. If HBMG was not ready to play the part expected of it, the Kurds must bring peacefully 
pressure to bear; otherwise, there would be no alternative but anarchy fostered by Turkish
propaganda.39
Broadly speaking, Southern Kurdistan’s political instability stemmed from various worries and 
reflected different wishes. Firstly, there were those Kurds who were afraid of the imposition of 
Arab rule over Southern Kurdistan. To forestall such a prospect they sought concrete British 
guarantees that the status quo would not change, i.e. British administration. Secondly, there 
were those Kurds who were suspicious of Britain’s political intentions in Southern Kurdistan 
and therefore wanted to keep both the British and Arabs out of their locality. They perceived 
their co-operation with the Kemalists as no more than a means to achieve that end. As a last 
option, they preferred Turkish rule rather than Arab rule, believing that the devil you know is 
better than the devil you do not know. Thirdly, and most importantly, there were those Kurd­
ish nationalists who wanted nothing but the establishment of a separate Kurdish administra­
tion, with or without British supervision.
The existing political instability and the prospect of its development into a general 
anti-British revolt in Southern Kurdistan alarmed the Colonial Office, especially as Britain was 
determined to withdraw its imperial garrison from Mesopotamia as soon as possible. What 
intensified British fears even more was the Kemalists’ absolute determination to undo the 
terms of the Sevres treaty on Kurdistan and Armenia. Having scored important victories 
against both the Greeks and the Armenians, the Kemalists were now able to focus their politi­
cal and military efforts on Southern Kurdistan, where they provided some Kurdish insurgents 
with arms and officers. 4 0 This enabled the Kemalists to penetrate deeply into Southern Kurdi­
stan, to such an extent that their officers, who accompanied the Kurdish rebels, were seen in 
many important Kurdish districts such as Rowanduz, Rania and Keuisenjaq. Moreover, the 
Kemalists seemed to be in a far stronger political position than the British to win over the 
Southern Kurds, given the recognition of their National Pact on Kurdish autonomy. The Great 
National Assembly of the Kemalists undertook to establish an autonomous administration for 
*the dignitaries of the Kurdish nation“ in harmony with their national custom. The Kurds would 
choose a Governor General, Assistant Governor-General and an Inspector, and they would
39* Iraq Intelligence Report (HR), No.12,15 June 1922, F0371/7771, PRO.
40* High Commissioner for Mesopotamia to S/S for the Colonies, 26 August 1921, F0371/6346, PRO.
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freely elect a Kurdish National Assembly for the eastern Wilayets.u
Naturally, the Kemalists’ Kurdish policy alarmed the British because of its political
effects on the Southern Kurds. Lloyd George was alive to the danger, and had earlier drawn
Churchill’s attention to the fact that any British decision on Southern Kurdistan’s future should
take into account the Kemalists’ attempts to “seduce Southern Kurds into co-operation with
their northerly brethren with a view to incorporation in Anatolia’s state ”.42 British reports on the
Kemalist activities in Southern Kurdistan increasingly contained unwelcome news:
The Kurdish situation is extremely delicate. It is, at least, a possible, if not probable theory 
that the Turks, still intending to attack Iraq in the spring, are deliberately working to drive 
wedge between the Kurds and ourselves. We know that Turkey is prepared to grant consid­
erable local autonomy to [Northern] Kurdistan. We know that the Kurds themselves are 
working for some independence under the protection of some power a*
Against this background, the Colonial Office repeatedly instructed Cox about the need to 
reassure the Southern Kurds that London would not place them under Arab rule against their 
will, and that he should conduct Kurdish affairs according to local wishes. This explains why 
the administration of Southern Kurdistan remained separate and unaffected by the rapid poli­
tical developments taking place in Arab Mesopotamian. Moreover, Kurdish bodies were for­
med by the Southern Kurds to conduct their own local affairs, and in such Kurdish districts as 
Kifri and Keuisenjaq councils were set up to run local affairs.44 in December 1921, the Sulai­
maniya division formed its own elective council, presided over by Maj. Goldsmith and contain­
ing Kurdish representatives from four Kurdish districts: Halabjah, Sharbezher, Chemchemal 
and Rania. The council was responsible for the conduct of financial, economic, educational 
and other local affairs.45
Nevertheless, the British needed to adopt further measures if they were to turn the 
situation in Southern Kurdistan in their favour. The nationalist followers of Mahmud, who were 
still unsatisfied by the modest administrative changes in Sulaimaniya, were very active, and 
focused their efforts on two fronts: the political and the military. Firstly, they organised a broad 
political movement as well as a propaganda campaign for the return of Mahmud to Southern 
Kurdistan. Three Kurdish petitions for the return of Mahmud were signed by Kurdish notables 
from the Sulaimaniya division. 46 Similar petitions were signed by other Kurdish notables from
41* Rumbold to Curzon, 29 March 1922, F0371/7781, PRO.
42* Message From Prime Minister to Mr. Churchill, No.193,22 March 1921, F0371/6342, PRO.
43* Baghdad, News Summary For Period Ended 21 December 1921, CO730/8, PRO.
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45* Residency, Baghdad, 7 December 1921, CO730/8, PRO.
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Kirkuk and Kifri. These petitions conveyed a clear message to the British authorities that, if the 
latter sought Kurdish support and wished to restore Kurdish confidence, they should bring 
back Mahmud and Kurdish self-government. Secondly, the followers of Mahmud intensified 
their military activities. The Hamawand Kurds killed Capt. S.S. Bond, the Assistant Political 
Officer at Chemchemal, and Capt. R.K. Makant.47 Mahmud Dizli’s attacks in the Halabjah 
region resulted in the murder of Capt. Fitzgibbon, as well as the killing and the disappearance 
of twenty other officers.48 These developments indirectly enhanced the political position of 
certain Kurdish nationalists, whose brand of nationalism was essentially anti-Kemalist. Given 
the increasing deterioration in the political and military situation in Southern Kurdistan, the 
British could not afford to lose these Kurdish nationalists as a means of containing the grow­
ing Kemalist threat. These nationalists, led by General Kurd Mustafa Pasha, established their 
own organisation, the Independent Kurdistan Society, and published their own newspaper, 
the Call of Kurdistan, to mobilise the Kurds for an independent Southern Kurdistan. At the 
same time, they worked towards persuading the British to support their political efforts as the 
ideal way of containing the growing political influence of the Kemalists, and o f further pre­
empting a general anti-British revolt in Southern Kurdistan.4 9
By the middle of 1922, the Colonial Office realised the difficulty of ignoring the grow­
ing demand for the return of Mahmud, given the absence of peace with Kemalist Turkey and 
the failure of Cox to persuade the Southern Kurds to join Iraq. Under such circumstances, 
Mahmud emerged once again as the only person who could mobilise the Southern Kurds 
under a nationalist banner against the Kemalists and restore stability, as he had done 
between the autumn of 1918 and the spring of 1919. In the House of Commons, Churchill 
reassured British parliamentarians, who expressed their opposition to any military commitment 
in Southern Kurdistan, that the British Government did not have “the slightest intention” of 
getting itself entangled in any serious way in that country. He simultaneously re-emphasised 
not only his position that the Southern Kurds would not be forced to come under Feisal’s rule, 
but also his great anxiety to study Kurdish wishes and “to develop any local variant of the self- 
government, which has been given to Iraq, that may command itself to them”.so Initially, Cur- 
zon supported the idea of encouraging Kurdish nationalism in Southern Kurdistan as a barrier
47* High Commissioner of Iraq to Colonial Office, 22 June 1922, F0371/7781, PRO.
48* High Commissioner to S/S for the Colonies, 14 January 1922, FO371/7780, PRO.
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against Kemalist intrigues.51 Noel’s testimony was important as he emphasised that the pre­
vious experiment of Kurdish self-government under Mahmud was successful in providing 
political stability, without making military and financial commitments. 52  Maj. Soane and other 
former officers acknowledged that the Southern Kurds did not wish to be under Arab rule, 
and that their separation from the Arabs was a logical option. Ultimately, the Colonial Office 
overlooked Cox’s firm opposition, and Mahmud returned to Sulaimaniya, where he formed a 
second Kurdish Government. Thus by the middle of 1922, British fear of further deterioration 
in the Kurdish situation helped to tip the balance in favour of Churchill’s separation alternative.
Cox And The Formation Of The Second Kurdish Government
The return of Mahmud to Sulaimaniya did not mean that London finally adopted the separa­
tion alternative. Southern Kurdistan’s future still depended on whether the idea of satisfying 
Kurdish nationalist aspirations through the re-establishment of a Kurdish government was the 
ideal way to thwart Kemalist threats, maintain stability in the Kurdish areas and facilitate the 
withdrawal of the Imperial garrison. In practice, as it turned out later, the Kurdish situation pri­
marily depended on the attitudes of Cox and like-minded subordinates towards the Kurdish 
Government. Cox acknowledged, according to Young, that "the Cairo policy was the best 
after all“.53 Yet, the evidence suggests otherwise. On the eve of Mahmud’s return, Cox 
endeavoured to dissuade the Colonial Office from the idea of re-introducing Kurdish self- 
government in Southern Kurdistan, warning against the dire consequences of such a policy:
In contrast with [the] Iraqis, whose objects generally were patriotic and constitutional,
Sheikh Mahmud was actuated mainly by personal and dynastic considerations. Of this, 
there is sufficient proof in the fact that in spite of his pan-lslamic preaching of Jihad, his 
supporters were only the few hirelings he could attract by pay... I think, it would be unwise to 
give Sheikh Mahmud his liberty until political future is more assured. It may not be fully real­
ised that our policy is more truly in interest of Kurdish nationalism that Sheikh Mahmud’s for, 
whereas we are working with some success for a constitution, which though oligarchical in 
its present stage, is developing towards democracy. Sheikh Mahmud is identified with a 
policy of absolutism and he himself is feared as a feudal baron of the worst type. Even if he 
were only set at large in India, I think, it would have an unsettling effect just now. 54
In his examination of Cox’s position on the Kurdish situation, Olson shows how he delibera­
tely delayed his response to Churchill for two months, when the latter queried Mahmud’s 
return to Southern Kurdistan.55
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Cox also argued that despite the existence of strong Kurdish feelings against incor­
poration in the Iraqi state and "a general desire for a national ruler”, it was "impossible” to 
select a Kurd because not all the Kurds would recognise him as ruler. Furthermore, without 
granting him strong British protection, Southern Kurdistan would sink into a state of chaos.56 
He described the attitudes of those Kurds who demanded Mahmud’s return as not reflecting 
of the wishes of the Kurdish people. The latter, he argued, were e\Xher“definitely opposed to 
Sheikh Mahmud or... indifferent”.&  in other words, although Cox was forced by the results of 
the referendum of 1921 to acknowledge the Kurdish rejection of Arab rule, he still believed 
that the incorporation of Southern Kurdistan into Iraq was the only option, given the non­
existence of an eligible Kurdish leader. Cox focused his efforts on hindering Mahmud’s 
endeavours to establish a workable Kurdish administration in Sulaimaniya and extend its juris­
diction to other Kurdish areas, hoping that he might dissuade the Colonial Office from its posi­
tion. As a High Commissioner, Cox was in a position to take ad hoc decisions if the Kurdish 
situation so required. Therefore, he remained the most important factor in determining the fail­
ure or success of the new experiment in Kurdish autonomy. In other words, this new experi­
ment was carried out by the very people who opposed it. The way in which Cox expressed his 
opposition to the return of Mahmud and Noel and his determination to incorporate Southern 
Kurdistan into Iraq in their absence is perceived by Olson as the beginning of the domination 
of the policies o f "the officials on the spot” over those o f "the distant capital”.58
One of Cox’s measures to obstruct the formation process of the second Kurdish Gov­
ernment was his introduction of the Said Taha scheme. Initially and before Mahmud’s return, 
this scheme was based on the creation of an autonomous entity in Sulaimaniya and Rowan- 
duz under a Kurdish governor.59 These two regions had been the scene of continuing anti- 
British activities and never ceased to be a constant source of irritation to the British authorities 
in Mesopotamia after June 1919. By projecting Said Taha as the ideal alternative, Cox sought 
not so much the containment of the growing Kemalist threat as preventing Mahmud from 
returning as governor. The lack of support for Said Taha as ruler of a new Kurdish province, 
while Mahmud was on his way to Southern Kurdistan, forced Cox to modify his scheme by 
confining it to Rowanduz and its surroundings. Cox asked London to grant Said Taha -who
56* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 2 July 1922, F0371 /7781, PRO.
57* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 5 July 1922, F0371/7781, PRO.
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arrived on 6 November 1922- money, ammunition and Kurdish volunteers to suppress the 
Kemalist-instigated troubles. The strengthening of Said Taha’s position would give Cox con­
siderable advantages with regard to his foiling of the experiment in Kurdish autonomy. Firstly, 
by ending British troubles in Rowanduz, Cox would be in a strong position to resist any politi­
cal concession asked for by the Kurdish nationalists, led by Mahmud. Secondly, Said Taha 
would be used as a rival nationalist figure to undermine Mahmud’s influence, thus generally 
dividing the Kurdish nationalists and the Southern Kurds. C.J. Edmonds, who served as the 
Political Officer in Southern Kurdistan, revealed that the Said Taha scheme aimed principally 
at undermining Mahmud’s position.6o Cox himself admitted that one of the main reasons for 
the scheme was to counter the ”pretensions” of Mahmud,ei namely that he was indispens­
able. Mahmud was also aware of the British authorities’ motive behind the Said Taha scheme 
and was probably confused by this contradiction in British policy. On the one hand, he was 
brought back to Southern Kurdistan to form a second Kurdish government, with a view to 
containing the Kemalist threat and re-establishing peace and order. On the other, the British 
authorities used Said Taha to undermine his position among the Southern Kurds. It was 
natural then that Mahmud’s confusion was transformed into utter disillusionment, given his 
negative past experience with Col. Wilson during the time of his first Government.
The formation of the second Kurdish Government was a gradual process, dictated by 
the course of events. Before Mahmud’s return, the British authorities in Mesopotamia were in 
disarray as the growing deterioration in the Kurdish situation forced British officials to leave the 
Sulaimaniya division, Rowanduz and other Kurdish areas. To fill the ensuing power vacuum, 
the Kurdish nationalists took over the local administration in the Sulaimaniya division. Whereas 
Cox and his officials reported to the Colonial Office that they had made this arrangement, 
Helmi states that it was the Kurds who took the initiative in forming the Kurdish National Coun­
c ils  Given the hasty way in which British officials left Sulaimaniya, the domination of the natio­
nalists over the Council and Mahmud’s decision to turn it into a Kurdish government, the latter 
version seems to be more accurate. Being Mahmud’s representative, Sheikh Qadir was elec­
ted by the Kurds as the president of the Kurdish National Council, which appointed heads of 
police, treasury, customs, etc. The Kurdish nationalists expressed their willingness to contain
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Kemalist influence by arresting three pro-Turkish notables and asking for the maintenance of 
a close link with the British High Commission in Baghdad. 63 According to British reports, the 
Kurdish Council was successful in its main tasks of providing stability in the Kurdish areas both 
inside and outside of its direct control, such as Pizhder and Khushnawati.64 All these develop­
ments reduced the influence of the Kemalists, who tended to capitalise on instability. The Iraq 
Intelligence Report highlighted the favourable changed in the Kurdish situation:
a reign of licence under Kurdish Sheikhs or Aghas makes a stronger appeal than the Kemal- 
ists can rival, unless they can back propaganda with force... In [the] Kirkuk division, events 
in Sulaimaniya have aroused no demonstration of hostility to [the British] Government 
among the Kurdish tribes, many of whom are supporters of [the] Sheikhans [i.e. Mahmud’s 
relatives] and will presumably be gratified by the return of Sheikh Mahmud.es
Following his return in early October, Mahmud capitalised on these political developments to 
create an autonomous Kurdish entity under his rule. His rejection of a new title as the head of 
the Kurdish National Council in favour of his old title as governor of Kurdistan, 66 his creation of 
a Kurdish army with the help of Kurdish officers and adoption of a national flag illustrate that 
Mahmud’s main ambition was to be a national ruler rather than a local chief.
These measures, which encountered no British opposition, created a strong impres­
sion among the Kurdish nationalists that Britain, at last, accepted the idea of a separate South­
ern Kurdistan under Kurdish rule. Noel described how Mahmud’s arrival in Sulaimaniya led to a 
nationalist upsurge, and how Kurdish support for his Government exceeded the boundaries 
of the Sulaimaniya division to include Arbil. All Kurdish tribal leaders of the Kifri district were 
present at Sulaimaniya, where they asked for an early date for the holding of elections "so that 
they may give publicity to their intention of declaring for Sheikh M ahm udThe Zanganah and 
Talabani Kurds all declared their support for the Kurdish Government led by Mahmud. In the 
space of a few days, other Kurdish tribes in Kirkuk and Arbil professed similar inclinations. For 
his part, Mahmud sent deputations to Kirkuk, Kifri and Arbil to mobilise the Kurds for the cause 
of an independent Southern Kurdistan.
The rapid developments in Southern Kurdistan following Mahmud’s return did not 
please the British authorities in Mesopotamia. They interpreted the declaration of Kifri’s popu­
lation of their allegiance to the Mahmud leadership as a manifestation of disorder, 67 and similar
63* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 9 September 1922, F0371/7781, PRO. 
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criticisms were levelled at Kurdish support for the Kurdish Government in Arbil. Edmonds, 
who reported that the Kurds of Kirkuk were won over to Mahmud, feared that the Dizai Kurds 
in Arbil would demand unification with the autonomous Kurdish region. 68 He warned against 
the “increasing” influence of Mahmud, who represented extreme Kurdish nationalism.69 
Kurdish support for the autonomous movement was also rapidly increasing in Rania, Halabjah, 
Khushnawati and other Kurdish areas. Encouraged by the overwhelming Kurdish support for 
an independent Southern Kurdistan, Mahmud asked Cox to hold a referendum similar to that 
of Mesopotamia in 1921. In retrospect one can see that what Mahmud asked for did not con­
tradict the Colonial Office’s original position, namely that the Southern Kurds should be 
allowed to freely decide their own future.
The Reversal Of The British Policy From Separation to Incorporation
Given the considerable popularity which autonomous Kurdish rule enjoyed among the Kurds 
and its success in restoring stability to many Kurdish areas in a very short period, Britain’s deci­
sion to incorporate Southern Kurdistan into Iraq seemed incompatible with its desire for a 
stable Southern Kurdistan. There were three main reasons why Britain eventually decided to 
extend Arab rule to the Kurdish areas against the wishes of the population. Firstly, from the 
very beginning, the Kurdish Government of Mahmud faced hostile attitudes from Cox and 
Henry Dobbs, the Acting High Commissioner, who were determined to end the experiment of 
Kurdish autonomy. Secondly, in October 1922 Winston Churchill was no longer the Colonial 
Secretary in the wake of the collapse of the coalition Government of Lloyd George. The new 
Colonial Secretary, Leo Amery, was unfamiliar with Kurdish affairs and he therefore had no 
concrete approach to Southern Kurdistan’s situation, unlike his predecessor. Thirdly, the start 
of the Lausanne conference in November 1922 did not help the cause of the Southern 
Kurds as the new Conservative Government of Bonar Law in Britain was determined to reach a 
peace agreement with Kemalist Turkey by offering some concessions. It was necessary that 
Britain should not make Kemalist Turkey feel that Southern Kurdistan might pose a serious 
threat to its security and territorial unity. Under these circumstances, the incorporation of 
Southern Kurdistan into Iraq and the containment of Kurdish nationalist aspirations emerged 
as the only option to reassure the Kemalists of British intentions.
68* C.l. Edmonds, Note on the Kurdish Situation, 4 January 1923, -in- Shuckburgh, Colonial Office, to 
Osborne, Foreign Office, 25 January 1923, F0371/9004, PRO.
69* HR, No.1,1 January 1923, F0371/7772, PRO.
182
Mahmud’s initial success in mobilising the Kurds for an independent Southern Kurdi­
stan was unwelcome news for Cox, who Intensified his efforts to contain the Kurdish national­
ist movement. To achieve this objective, he was active on two fronts: London and Southern 
Kurdistan. Apart from the Said Taha scheme, Cox and his subordinates castigated doubt on 
the reasons why the Kurdish Government of Mahmud was popular among the Southern 
Kurds. The desire of Kurdish tribes to avoid paying taxes and Kurdish antipathy to the exis­
tence of a real government were, in the view of the British Divisional Adviser in Kirkuk, the only 
reason why Mahmud was popular.70 in his reports to London, Cox emphasised Mahmud’s co­
operation with the anti-British Kurds and his increasing contacts with the Kemalists, who 
brought him under their control. There is no evidence to suggest that Mahmud established 
his contacts with the Kemalists before the deterioration in relations between the Kurdish Gov­
ernment and the British High Commission in Baghdad. Mahmud’s contacts with the Kemalists, 
as Helmi shows, started after Cox rejected the demands of the Kurds for the holding of a refer­
endum to decide Southern Kurdistan’s future in the manner of Mesopotamia, and after it 
became clear that Cox was determined to bring the Southern Kurds under Arab rule against 
their will. British records show that Cox promised to send Mahmud arms, ammunition and pos­
sibly aerial assistance as well as 200 levies, but nothing of this promise materialised. More­
over, Cox ordered the return of those Kurdish officers who had accompanied Mahmud when 
returning to Sulaimaniya. These Kurdish officers were helping Mahmud to create a Kurdish 
army. Helmi asserts that Mahmud wanted to fight the Kemalists, but he was not in a position to 
do so because of the lack of material aid from the British.71
Several developments were responsible, in Helmi's view, for the deterioration in Mah­
mud’s relations with the British. Firstly, the British offered Mahmud no military or financial assis­
tance necessary for the expulsion of the Kemalist elements from Southern Kurdistan. Sec­
ondly, after its liberation from the Kemalists, the British refused to hand over Keuisenjaq to 
the Kurdish Government unless Mahmud drove the Kemalists out of Rowanduz.7 2  Thirdly, 
Mahmud interpreted the reluctance of the British to be directly involved in the fighting against 
the Kemalists as a sign of their willingness to give up Southern Kurdistan, if they were placed 
under more Kemalist pressure. By contrast, the Kemalists intensified their military and propa­
ganda activities and seemed far more determined than the British to get hold of Southern Kur-
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distan.73 For all these reasons, and given British unwillingness to support an independent 
Southern Kurdistan, Mahmud contacted the Kemalists, who at that time promised generous 
Kurdish autonomy within Turkey, but the Kemalists never trusted Mahmud because he was a 
Kurdish nationalist. As soon as the Kurdish Government was established, the Kemalists orga­
nised a propaganda campaign against Mahmud. 7 4  When Mahmud contacted the Kemalists, 
Euzdemir, the commander of Turkish irregulars in Southern Kurdistan, did not trust his 
motives and refused to support his rebellion.75
What appears from Helmi’s interpretation of these developments is that Mahmud 
sought to keep open his options, unless the British showed strong willingness to accept a 
separate Southern Kurdistan under his rule. Accordingly, he sought to prove that he held the 
balance of power in Southern Kurdistan. Mahmud was reported to have said “in terms scarcely 
veiled that he could at any time have turned out the Turks, if he had chosen to do so, but he 
deliberately refrainedVe But in the absence of concrete British guarantees for an indepen­
dent Southern Kurdistan, if the Kemalist threat was defeated, Mahmud saw no point in fight­
ing the Kemalists on behalf of the British or the Arabs. Instead, he endeavoured to make the 
most of British troubles in Southern Kurdistan to achieve his nationalist aims. The British offi­
cials were aware of his tactics, Edmonds highlighting how Mahmud used the Kemalist pre­
sence in Rania as a lever to “extort concessions” from the British.77
On the other hand, Cox focused his efforts on winning Kurdish support for Feisal’s 
rule. From the very beginning, Cox closely co-ordinated his policy in Southern Kurdistan with 
Feisal and his Arab Government. The main objectives were to politically isolate Sulaimaniya 
from other Kurdish areas by registering primary electors for the Arab Constituent Assembly78 
and to economically stifle the Kurdish Government by making the Kurdish areas pay taxes to 
the Arab Government in Baghdad. The registration for the proposed elections included Kurd­
ish areas (such as Kirkuk and Kifri) that voted against Feisal in the referendum of 1921, and 
expressed their clear desire to come under Kurdish rule. It was Cox’s pro-Arab measures 
which alienated Mahmud, who began to take independent political initiatives without consult-
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ing the British authorities in Baghdad. On hearing that the elections for the Arab Assembly 
would include Southern Kurdistan, and that a Kurdish referendum would not be held, Mah­
mud declared himself king of Southern Kurdistan in late October:
From today, I have taken in my hands the tiller of the state and assured responsibility for the 
protection of of the independence of Kurdistan. It is my hope that you will all work and strive 
for the perpetuation of this glorious day and for the welfare of the progress of the nation.
KurdsI Now is your opportunity to labour unitedly as one family for the consolidation and pro­
tection of the national rights which we have won.79
Through this step, Mahmud probably sought to step up pressure on the British to meet Kurd­
ish demands for an independent and a separate Southern Kurdistan. In November 1922, 
Mahmud sent a Kurdish deputation to Baghdad to ask Cox to hold an election for the second­
ary electors in order to form ' the nucleus of a Kurdish National Assembly to settle the ques­
tion of the future of the Kurdish state and the form of government best suited to the Kurds”.so 
The deputation also asked for official and public British recognition of the Kurdish Govern­
ment and the independence of Southern Kurdistan.si Cox refused to hold any free elections 
in the Kurdish areas, 02 and instead of a free election he demanded that the Kurdish national­
ists moderate their demands, while promising that he would recommend to London and the 
Government of Iraq that “the right of Kurds within Iraq to set up a national government should 
be officially recognised”.*  Cox must have remembered how the majority of Southern Kurds 
had rejected Feisal and Arab rule in the 1921 referendum, and that the holding of another 
referendum or elections would most likely result in overwhelming Kurdish support for Mah­
mud and his Government. Indeed, Cox’s subordinates in Southern Kurdistan advised against 
asking public opinion in areas, such as Kifri, as to their attitudes towards Feisal.84
Given the contradiction between Kurdish political aspirations and Cox’s plans for an 
incorporated Southern Kurdistan, a clash between the Kurdish nationalists and the British 
authorities in Baghdad was inevitable. In response to Cox’s rejection of his demand for the 
extension of Kurdish rule to Rania and Keuisenjaq, which were administratively part of Sulai­
maniya, 85 Mahmud purged all Kurdish officials who were suspected of being loyal to the Brit-
79* Ibid, Extract From Bank-i-Kurdistan, the official newspaper of the Kurdish Government. 
80* Ibid.
81* HR, No.22,15 November 1922, F0371/7772, PRO.
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ish.se On 20 November, the Kurdish Government asked the British to prevent the officials of 
the Arab Government from taking taxes from Kurdish areas until the boundary between the 
two countries had been settled. At the same time, Kurdish officials began to collect taxes from 
the Kurdish areas in spite of Cox’s opposition.87 The Kurdish Government in particular resis­
ted Arab attempts to impose taxes, especially on Kurdish tobacco, which was the most impor­
tant source of revenue.
The turning point came in October 1922, in the wake of the disintegration of Lloyd 
George’s coalition Government and Churchill’s losing his position as Colonial Secretary. Cur- 
zon, who retained his position as the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the new Conser­
vative Government, considered Cox’s incorporation alternative as an ideal means of keeping 
British control over Southern Kurdistan’s potential oil fields. At the Lausanne conference, 
Curzon repeated all Cox’s political, economic and strategic justifications for the need to incor­
porate Southern Kurdistan into Iraq, warning the Kemalists against holding a referendum 
because “the Kurds would doubtless vote for an independent Kurdistan ”.88 Moreover, unlike 
his predecessor, the new Colonial Secretary, Leo Amery, did not possess strong views on 
Kurdish affairs. Thus, with the disappearance of Churchill from the picture, the alternative of 
Southern Kurdistan’s incorporation into Iraq came to the fore. The first action of the new Brit­
ish Government was to sanction Cox’s scheme for an autonomous Southern Kurdistan within 
Iraq.
The timing of the confrontation between the British authorities in Baghdad and the 
Kurdish nationalists was not favourable to the latter because it coincided with the inauguration 
of the Lausanne conference. It must be remembered that one of the reasons the Kemalists 
laid their claim to Southern Kurdistan stemmed from the fear that Britain would establish it as 
an independent entity, which would pose a serious threat to the territorial integrity of the new 
Turkey, where the Northern Kurds formed the second largest ethnic grouping. As Ernest 
Main points out, the British were aware that Southern Kurdistan was crucial to the security of 
both new state of Kemalist Turkey and Arab Iraq. 89 Given these Kemalist fears, Curzon must 
have considered the adoption of Cox’s incorporation alternative as a clear message to the 
Kemalists that it would not threaten Turkey’s security through the establishment of a separate
86* Ibid.
87* Ibid.
88* Curzon’s Reply to Ismet Pasha, Respecting Mosul, No.1, 23 January 1923,371/9058, PRO.
89* Ernest Main, Iraq from Mandate to Independence (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1935), p. 133.
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Southern Kurdistan. Moreover, it became easier to argue that Southern Kurdistan should be 
part of Iraq by referring to the Mesopotamian mandate as evidence of the fact that the three 
Wilayets of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul had always been treated both politically and admin­
istratively as one unit by Britain. As soon as the Lausanne conference started, it was important 
that Britain should settle Southern Kurdistan’s future. Accordingly, a joint British-Feisal 
declaration was issued which granted the Kurds living within “the boundaries” of Iraq the right 
to form a local government as they desired.90
Ironically, Cox described the announcement of his scheme as a consolidation of 
Kurdish nationalism, even though his scheme merely covered the Sulaimaniya region. He 
hoped that the declaration of local autonomy would split the Kurdish nationalists into two 
groups: “the more enlightened Kurds" and “the more ignorant and fanatical elements“ led by 
Mahmud.91 Granting local autonomous status to Sulaimaniya became, as Mahmud was duly 
informed, the only basis for any negotiation with the Kurdish nationalists. Beyond this issue, 
Cox was not willing to negotiate with Mahmud, who quickly rejected the scheme of local auto­
nomy. In the face of both Cox’s determination and refusal to negotiate with the Kurdish Gov­
ernment’s delegates, Mahmud and his supporters revolted for the second time against the 
British authorities, hoping to achieve their political objectives by force. The prospect of an 
unstable Southern Kurdistan, while Britain and Turkey could not settle its future, was probably 
the reason why Leo Amery expressed some hesitations about the inclusion of Southern Kur­
distan in Iraq’s forthcoming elections, as proposed by Henry Dobbs, the new High Commissio­
ner:
Case of [thejlraqi Government in [the] event of Mosul’s boundary question being referred 
hereafter to arbitration, may be to some extent weakened by Kurdish vote against participa­
tion in [the] elections. It is essential., in view of explicit assurance given in Parliament on 11 
July last [year] by my predecessor., that we should give Kurds [a] real opportunity of deci­
ding for themselves what is to be their attitude. 92
Dobbs, who followed in his predecessor’s footsteps, dismissed any danger that might result 
from Kurdish participation in the elections, and went ahead with the implementation of the 
incorporation alternative. 93 He also refused to talk with Kurdish nationalists -led by Mahmud- 
on major political issues such as granting the Southern Kurds an opportunity to decide their
90* HR, No.1,1 January 1923, F0371/7772, PRO.
91* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 16 November 1922, F0371/7782, PRO. 
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future freely.9 4  Southern Kurdistan’s incorporation into Iraq was symbolised by including most 
of Southern Kurdistan in the Iraqi elections in the autumn of 1923.
Conclusion
The deliberate use of gas bombs and air raids against civilian targets in the period 1922-1925 
were clear indications of British desperation to quickly restore stability to Southern Kurdistan. 
Britain needed to create the impression -when negotiating with the Kemalists over the issue 
of the Mosul Wilayet- that the situation in Southern Kurdistan was quiet, and that the South­
ern Kurds were content with Arab rule. Violent methods were the only way to decisively 
defeat Kurdish insurgents led by Mahmud, and to prepare the way for the imposition of Arab 
rule over Southern Kurdistan. Reaching peace with Kemalist Turkey as soon as possible at 
the Lausanne conference was an important factor in influencing Britain’s decision on the 
future of Southern Kurdistan. With the disappearance of the prospect of a Kemalist invasion 
from the north, there was no longer any need to turn Southern Kurdistan into a strategic buf­
fer to protect Mesopotamia from Kemalist Turkey. With the decline in strength of the Kurdish 
nationalist movements in Northern and Eastern Kurdistan, the presence of a Kurdish Govern­
ment in Southern Kurdistan became an obstacle to Britain concluding a new peace treaty with 
Kemalist Turkey, as the latter firmly opposed any form of Kurdish self-government.
The prevalence of Cox’s incorporation alternative over that of a separate Southern 
Kurdistan between late 1922 and mid-1923 can be attributed to several factors. Firstly, Cox 
was an important element in influencing the course of events in Southern Kurdistan. He , in 
his capacity as High Commissioner, was the channel through which the Colonial Office had to 
implement its Kurdish policy and receive information on the Kurdish situation. Cox, who had 
long experience in imperial affairs, having served in India, Persia, the Persian Gulf and Meso­
potamia, built on what his predecessor, Wilson, bequeathed to him in terms of political and 
administrative arrangements in Southern Kurdistan. He also adopted Wilson’s tactics, and pre­
sented similar political, economic and strategic arguments to support his position. It is reason­
able to assume that it was not in Cox’s interest to accurately report anything that might weaken 
the basis of his views on Kurdish affairs or to eagerly implement Churchill’s recommendations. 
By virtue of his position as the High Commissioner responsible for the implementation of the 
new British policy of indirect control and with the help of his like-minded civilian subordinates
94* Acting High Commissioner to S/S, 15 June 1923, FO371/9014, PRO.
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and military officials, Cox was in a stronger position than anybody else to influence political 
developments in Southern Kurdistan. Just as Wilson destroyed the first Kurdish Government 
and pre-empted the emergence of a separate and autonomous Southern Kurdistan in 1918- 
20, so Cox destroyed the second Kurdish Government and pre-empted the emergence of a 
separate and an autonomous Southern Kurdistan in 1921-23.
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The formation of the Iraqi state in place of the old British administration was not a straight for­
ward process, given the fact that the British had not experienced a similar situation before, at 
least, not in the Middle East. Firstly, the Iraqi state still had no well-defined international boun­
daries -especially in the north and north-west- when the British appointed Feisal king of Iraq in 
1921. The delimitation of these boundaries was not purely a political matter, but also financial 
and strategic. In other words, the delimitation of Iraq’s boundaries was to be executed in such 
a way that Britain would be in a position to withdraw its imperial forces, with a view to ending its 
military expenditures in Mesopotamia. Secondly, to end all its other financial commitments, 
Britain wanted the young Iraqi state to be economically self-sufficient in developing its own 
institutions, such as the army and the police. Finally, the Sunni Arabs, on whom the success 
of the new experiment of indirect control depended, were numerically inferior in comparison 
with the Shi'is, and therefore, it was crucial for Britain and Feisal to find a means to redress this 
critical sectarian imbalance. Given all these British strategic, economic and political concerns, 
this chapter shows how Southern Kurdistan took on a new importance after the establishment 
of the Iraqi state and how it decisively influenced Britain’s decision to incorporate it into the 
Arab state. Emphasis will be placed on the way in which Britain’s own strategic, economic and 
political interests converged with those of its client state in Mesopotamia
Arab Territorial Ambitions Versus Kurdish Nationalist Aspirations
i- Jeisal, <Che boundaries O f <the Sfraqi S tate And T fic  Political Status O f South­
ern Kurdistan
The territorial claims of the Sharifians and their Sunni Mesopotamian followers to Kurdistan 
paralleled those of the Kemalists in Turkey and the ultra-nationalists in Persia. Each force 
aimed to consolidate and expand its control in Kurdish areas at the expense of the nationalist 
aspirations of the Kurds, as well as each other. When the British established an Arab Council 
of Ministers in late 1920 with a view to its functioning as the nucleus of the Iraqi state, one of 
its first decisions was to include in the Iraqi electoral law all the Kurdish divisions of the old Brit­
ish administration. 1 The Council adopted a calculated step in restoring the old Ottoman admin-
1* MIR, No.4, 31 December 1920, F0371/6348, PRO.
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istrative system instead of the fourteen divisions of the British civil administration, which had 
been drawn on ethnical and tribal lines.2 The Kurdish division of Sulaimaniya would be relega­
ted to the status of a district. The report of the Ministry of Defence, under Ja'fer Pasha, a Shar- 
ifian follower, considered Southern Kurdistan as falling within the ‘natural boundaries”of Iraq, 
whose defence should be guaranteed by Britain against foreign aggression.3 The Arab Coun­
cil took it for granted that Southern Kurdistan was an integral part of the Arab state, regardless 
of Kurdish wishes and the terms of the 1920 Sevres treaty. As Southern Kurdistan’s future 
was an unresolved issue, London did not support the Arab Council’s unilateral decision. This 
uncertainty about Southern Kurdistan’s ultimate future continued, even when London deci­
ded to appoint Feisal as king of the new Arab state in Mesopotamia. London informed Feisal, 
before his departure to Iraq, that it had not defined the boundaries of his new Arab state, and 
he accepted this situation without expressing any objection.4 From the British viewpoint, 
defining the Mesopotamian boundaries -especially to the north and west- was very premature 
and should depend on the clarification of the situation in the region, including the future of 
the Sevres treaty and the geographical size of both French Syria and the new Turkey. The 
determination of Iraq’s northern, southern and western boundaries was one of the main tasks 
of the newly-formed Middle East Departments
As soon as it became evident that he would be installed as king of Arab Iraq, Feisal 
raised the issue of Iraq’s northern frontiers by pressing Britain to immediately bring Southern 
Kurdistan under his rule. He even laid claims to several western Kurdish areas which he had 
previously considered to be Arab when he had been the ruler of Syria. Feisal’s territorial claims 
on Ottoman Kurdistan, which dated back to his father’s wartime correspondence with Britain, 
went far beyond what the Arab Council had demanded. These claims are clearly illustrated by 
the way Feisal defined the north-west boundaries of the new Iraq:
First North of Euphrates: Jezirah-ibn-Omar and Nisibin should... both [be] included in Iraq 
and that frontier following central course of that river to its junction with Euphrates, should 
run from Jezirah to Nisibin thence south-ward to [the] bank of Khabour.e
The cornerstone of Feisal’s approach was that Britain should consider the Kurdish situation in 
light of the fulfilment of Iraq’s military, economic and political needs, as well as the mainte-
2* Philip Ireland, Iraq: A Study in Political Development, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1937), p.296.
3* MIR, No.9,15 March 1921, F0371/6348, PRO.
4* Minute of the Meeting of the Eastern Committee On November 3, Regarding Policy in Kurdistan, 
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5* Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World, p.93
6* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 12 February 1922, F0371/7781, PRO.
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nance of local Arabs’ good will towards him and his British patrons. Moreover, he presented 
British interests as being identical with Arab territorial ambitions in Ottoman Kurdistan, when 
the British-Turkish dispute oyer Southern Kurdistan’s future came to a head after 1920. To 
contain the Kemalist threat, Feisal and his Sunni entourage in Baghdad went so far as to sug­
gest the luring of the “ Northern Kurds to join an autonomous Kurdistan under suzerainty of 
Iraq”!  At the same time, Feisal warned the British against the danger that a united Kurdistan 
would pose to their interests in Mesopotamia. To pre-empt that development, Feisal invited 
the British to immediately determine the status of Southern Kurdistan by its inclusion into his 
Arab state.s London, which lacked the necessary military and financial resources to consoli­
date its own influence (let alone satisfy Feisal’s excessive ambitions), refused to take any 
expansionist step in Kurdistan. The Colonial Office continued to oppose Feisal and his Sunni 
entourage’s demands for Southern Kurdistan’s incorporation until the end of 1922, on the 
grounds that they contradicted its policy of encouraging “Arab nationalism not Arab imperial­
ism".9
ii- The 1921 Referendum On Mesopotamia
The holding of a referendum on his candidature for the newly-created Iraqi throne in the sum­
mer of 1921 presented the ideal opportunity for Feisal to bring Southern Kurdistan under his 
rule. He was able, with the tacit support of the British authorities in Baghdad, to persuade the 
Colonial Office to allow the participation of the Southern Kurds in that referendum, hoping to 
obtain convenient results that might be used as justification for Southern Kurdistan’s incor­
poration into Iraq. The referendum was a fraudulent experiment, as British advisers and pro- 
British Mutassarifs made every effort to ensure Feisal’s victory. It was these officials who 
expressed the opinion of most divisions, summoned meetings and declared results. The 
referendum rules were very simple and took the form of a petition (Madhbata):
We, the undersigned, resident of Nahiya/Mahala , in Qada/Town of- , in the Liwa of-
   /73ye heard, understood and fully considered the above Resolution of the Council of
State, and it results that- express themselves in agreement therewith, and profess their
allegiance to Amir Feisal, while have signified their dissent .10
Given the British decision to install Feisal as king -regardless of local wishes- and the boycott
7* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 15 August 1922, F0371/7800, PRO.
8* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 23 September 1921, F0371/6347, PRO.
9* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 25 October 1921. F0371/6347, PRO.
10* MIR No.18,1 August 1921, C0730/4, PRO.
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of the Shi'is and their traditional leaders, the results of the referendum cannot not be consid­
ered as a true expression of the people’s wishes/either in Southern Kurdistan or in Mesopo­
tamia. As Philip Ireland shows in his examination of the way in which the referendum was car­
ried out that in the Basra division, "selected representatives" of the local people were called in 
groups to make their declarations in the presence of an Election Committee. 11 Local notables 
often presented British officials with two petitions on behalf of one area: one was against Fei­
sal, the other in favour. It was up to British officials to choose the petition they wanted.
Originally, the referendum served two political purposes. Firstly, it was an attempt to 
give some legitimacy to Feisal’s ascendancy to the Iraqi throne. Secondly, the British Govern­
ment sought to convince the British Parliament that the Mesopotamian situation was under 
control, and therefore, there was no need for Britain to disassociate itself politically from the 
country in the wake of the bloody 1920 rising. Feisal, like Cox, sought to use the referendum 
for another purpose, namely, as a means of bringing Southern Kurdistan under direct Arab 
control. Initially, the referendum concerned only the Mesopotamian Arabs and not the South­
ern Kurds. By extending the referendum to Southern Kurdistan, however, Feisal hoped to 
obtain convenient results that would enable h im to incorporate the Kurdish areas into the 
Iraqi state. Thus the desired results of the referendum would not only disarm the Kurdish 
nationalists in a political sense, but would also forestall any development towards the forma­
tion of a separate Southern Kurdistan. Despite an early decision to keep Kurdish affairs separ­
ate from those of Mesopotamia, the Colonial Office agreed to allow the three predominantly 
Kurdish divisions of Sulaimaniya, Kirkuk and Mosul to take part in the referendum, if the local 
Kurds so wished.
In the Sulaimaniya division, where the Kurdish nationalists were able to make local 
Kurds understand the real purpose of the referendum, the Kurds unanimously rejected the 
idea of participation, let alone voting in favour of Feisal’s Arab rule. Thus, one third of South­
ern Kurds did not take part in the referendum. In the Kurdish divisions of Kirkuk and Mosul, 
where the activities of the Kurdish nationalists were restricted, British sources reported that 
local Kurds took part in the referendum. Despite the crudity of the referendum, important 
points can be derived from its results insofar as they concerned Kurdish attitudes towards 
Arab rule. The local Kurds living within the districts of the Mosul division such as Amadia, Sin- 
jar, Aqra, Dohuk and Zakho, were reported to have voted in favour of Feisal and Iraq. The 68
11* Ireland, Iraq: A Study in Political Development, p.332.
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petitions that represented this division, however, showed that these Kurds wanted -apart 
from the protection of their rights regarding education, government, the law an so on- to retain 
the right to join Northern Kurdistan in case it became an independent state. This reveals, at 
the very least, how ill-informed these Kurds were about the political implications of the refer­
endum. Once they accepted Feisal as their ruler, there was no way that they could join any 
Kurdish state in the future. These Kurds seemed to consider Feisal’s rule as a temporary 
arrangement pending other developments in Kurdistan. Moreover, given the existence of 
local Kurdish rebellions in most of the above mentioned Kurdish districts, one can dispute the 
idea that the majority of local Kurds participated in the referendum. The political disorder and 
local rebellions against the British in these Kurdish districts were incompatible with the British 
reports that the Kurds of the Mosul division were unanimously in favour of Feisal, or that the 
submitted Madhabatas reflected the opinion of the majority. These Kurdish districts did not 
desire British control, let alone Arab rule. Indeed, when Co. Wilson held a plebiscite in 1918- 
1919, the local Kurds in the Mosul division voted overwhelmingly against Arab rule.12
The population of the Kirkuk division were reported to have voted against both Feisal 
and the incorporation into Iraq. There were 21 petitions against and 20 in favour of Feisal, 
though a number of petitions were not completed. The anti-Feisal petitions mostly stated that 
they were signed by people who were “not Arabs”, and therefore, they “prefer[edj to wait and 
see what independent Kurdistan is going to be like”. 13 At unofficial meetings in Kirkuk, the 
participants decided that if Feisal became king they would “demand union with Kurdistan”. 14  
Kurdish (and even some Arab) notables told a British adviser in a private conversation that 
“they did not want Feisal or an Arab government".15 The Turkoman community wanted noth­
ing but inclusion in Turkey, whereas all the Kurdish areas, which formed the majority of the 
division, asked for a Kurdish government. ie The very fact that only 261 out of 31,269 people 
in this division were in favour of Feisal and the inclusion into Iraq, demonstrates how British 
officials on the ground could manipulate the results by declaring that the difference between 
those who were in favour of Feisal’s Iraq and those who were not, was just one petition. In his 
analysis of the referendum results, Ireland shows that British officials arbitrarily declared
12* Ireland, Iraq: A Study In Political Development, p. 168. 
13* HR, No. 19,15 August 1921, F0371/6353, PRO.
14* Ibid.
15* Ibid.
16* Ibid.
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unanimity instead of “ majority'  when announcing the results in a town or a district. 17 What can 
be safely deduced from this referendum is that, despite all Cox’s political efforts in support of 
Feisal, the vast majority of the Southern Kurds rejected Feisal and Arab rule. The results of 
the referendum in Southern Kurdistan clearly disappointed Feisal, who intended to use them 
as evidence of unanimous Kurdish support for Arab rule and the incorporation of Southern 
Kurdistan into Iraq.
Following the referendum and the establishment of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq, 
Feisal continued to dissuade London from the idea of holding a separate referendum in 
Southern Kurdistan so that the local Kurds could directly decide their political future. His argu­
ment was that the holding of another referendum would cast huge doubt upon the "validity” 
of the first referendum in Mesopotamia. 18 Feisal closely co-ordinated his efforts with Cox in 
getting the inclusion of Southern Kurdistan into the electoral law for the Arab National 
Assembly.i9This step was taken at a time when tension was reaching a peak in Kurdish areas, 
accompanied by unceasing Kurdish demands for the return of Mahmud and Kurdish Govern­
ment. When the Colonial Office finally decided to bring Mahmud back to Sulaimaniya in order 
to calm the situation, Feisal strongly opposed the move. He apparently feared that Mahmud 
might be able to fill the existing political and military vacuum resulting from imminent British 
withdrawal by establishing a workable Kurdish administration. While Mahmud was on his way to 
Sulaimaniya, Cox arranged a meeting between him and Feisal. Although British sources said 
nothing about the reasons for the meeting, it is very likely that Feisal hoped to persuade Mah­
mud to declare his allegiance to him and thus accept Southern Kurdistan’s incorporation into 
Iraq. The absence of any statement suggests that nothing came out of the meeting; Mahmud 
would not recognise Feisal and Arab rule, nor would Feisal accept a separate Southern Kurdi­
stan.
The formation of the Conservative Government in London in October 1922 led (as 
explained in chapter six) to the relegation of the alternative of a separate Southern Kurdistan 
to the background and the coming to the fore of the incorporation alternative. Against this 
background, Feisal worked closely with the British High Commission in Baghdad in December 
1922 towards producing the so called British-Feisal declaration for local Kurdish autonomy:
HBMG and the Government of Iraq recognise the rights of the Kurds living within the boun­
daries of Iraq to set up a Kurdish government within these boundaries and hope that the dif-
17* Ireland, Iraq; A Study In Political Development, p.332.
18* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 5 January 1922, F0371/7780, PRO.
19* HR, N0 .8 , 15 April 1922, F0371/7771, PRO.
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ferent Kurdish elements will, as soon as possible, arrive at an agreement between them­
selves as to the form which they wish that that Government should take and will send 
responsible delegates to Baghdad to discuss their relations with HBMG and the Government 
of Iraq.20
Feisal hoped through this declaration to undermine Mahmud’s position among Kurdish natio­
nalists by dividing them into moderates -who would accept local autonomy- and the extremists 
-who wanted a separate Southern Kurdistan. The abandonment of the project of Kurdish 
autonomy a few weeks later reveals that the British-Feisal declaration was nothing more than a 
tactical manoeuvre by Feisal, who, like Mustafa Kemal in Turkey, had no intention of imple­
menting it.
The Establishment Of The Iraqi State And Its Political Implications For The 
Future Of Southern Kurdistan
i-  The R equirem ent O f Successful T ransition  Jrom  D irect To in d ire c t tfritis h  
C ontrol
The British policy of indirect control depended on the successful implementation of two inter­
connected political measures: the establishment of an Arab state in Mesopotamia and Feisal’s 
candidacy for the Iraqi throne. In view of its acute financial problems and internal political pres­
sure for British withdrawal from Mesopotamia, London could not afford any delay in imple­
menting its new policy. In Churchill’s words, Feisal offered London the “cheapest solution" to 
its Mesopotamian problem.21 Other political questions, which London was supposed to deal 
with, were postponed in order to devote all attention to the establishment of the Mesopota­
mian state under Feisal. One of these important questions was the fate of Southern Kurdi­
stan, whose ethnic boundaries with Mesopotamia were on the verge of being defined. The 
following Colonial Office minute illustrates the inter-connection between the political affairs of 
Mesopotamia and Southern Kurdistan:
no final decision should be taken on our Kurdish policy [i.e. demarcation of Arab-Kurdish 
boundary] until... Cox had an opportunity of discussing the matter with Feisal... A step in the 
wrong direction might have disastrous results, which would not be confined to Kurdistan. We 
are engaged in a very delicate political transaction in Mesopotamia and cannot afford to take 
any unnecessary risks and it is most important that, when we arrive at a decision on our 
Kurdish policy, it should be the right one.22
Against this background, Churchill informed Cox that the political priority was to “make certain 
of the early choice of Feisal" as king of the new Arab state, and that “other questions should
20* HR, No. 1,1 January 1923, F0371/7772, PRO.
21* Report on the Middle East Conference Held in Cairo and Jerusalem, F0371/6342, PRO, p.36. 
22* Colonial Office Minute No.31558, 23 June 1921, CO730/2, PRO.
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come after”, 23 including Southern Kurdistan’s future. The immediate effect of this postpone­
ment of fresh British measures in Southern Kurdistan was to create a new source of pressure 
that was to influence the direction of British Kurdish policy. In other words, Britain’s need to 
carry out a smooth and speedy transition from direct to indirect control placed Feisal and his 
Sunni entourage in such a position that they would become an effective player in Kurdish 
affairs. The latter were quite aware of London’s pressing need to end its financial burdens in 
the Middle East and made the most of its sensitivities about issues relating to the security, 
economic viability and political stability of the new state, so as to persuade the British policy 
makers that, for a number of reasons, Southern Kurdistan’s incorporation into Arab Iraq was a 
necessity. The emergence of Feisal and his Sunni entourage as a political force in favour of an 
incorporated Southern Kurdistan also helped to strengthen Cox’s hands vis-£-vis the Colonial 
Office.
The issue of Southern Kurdistan’s fate was deliberately incorporated by Feisal and his 
Sunni entourage into the internal politics of the new Arab state as soon as it came into exis­
tence. As Feisal was a foreign ruler, who had neither a legitimate ground for ruling the country 
nor a mandate from local Arabs, he depended on the support of a number of Sunni Arab offi­
cers. Apart from having long-held territorial ambitions in Ottoman Kurdistan, Feisal wanted to 
turn himself into a champion of the issue of Southern Kurdistan’s incorporation into Arab Iraq 
in order to cement his alliance with these Sunni Arabs. He, simultaneously, sought to create a 
personal popularity among the Arab population by projecting himself as a true Iraqi, who was 
unwilling to let part of his country break away. The common stand on the issue of Southern 
Kurdistan’s future made the bond between Feisal and the newly-emerging Sunni political- 
military caucus in the new state much stronger, and it became a new political factor that -to 
some degree- influenced the direction of Britain’s Kurdish policy by hindering any real progr­
ess towards the establishment of an autonomous and a separate Southern Kurdistan. Cox 
warned against the outlining of the ethnic boundary between a separate Southern Kurdistan 
and the Arab state, which the Colonial Office contemplated thus:
More extreme Arab nationalist elements would greatly resent our action, and, it will be 
opposed and apdTonly accepted under protest by Council of State... [The] Arab kingdom, 
which one day will have to stand alone, from a strategic point of view, is being given inde­
fensible frontier. Arab nationalists are very much alive to this points
Feisal focused on questioning Britain’s long-term commitments to the defence of
23* S/S for the Colonies to High Commissioner of Iraq, Priority, 9 July 1921, F0371/6552, PRO.
24* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/St for the Colonies, Part One, 24 June 1921, F0371 /6346, PRO.
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Southern Kurdistan from outside aggression, to guarantee Iraq’s security from Turkish attack 
via that area, and to take responsibility for preventing disorder in Southern Kurdistan, which 
he described as posing a danger to Iraq. 25 Feisal implied that the alternative of Southern Kur­
distan’s incorporation into his Arab Kingdom would solve British anxieties about using an inex­
pensive means to protect its interests in Mesopotamia. Whether it was imaginary or real, Feisal 
wasted no time in presenting any political or military development as a threat to his infant king­
dom, and therefore ultimately, to British interests. He defined, for example, the sole objective 
of the 1921 French-Kemalist treaty as being to defeat both British policies and Arab nationalist 
aspirations.2e He referred to the danger the treaty presented to Iraq’s security by highlighting 
the fact that it had given the Kemalists a strong impetus to continue their intrigues and hostile 
propaganda against Iraq. To counter the Kemalist danger, he pressed London for "a definite 
pronouncement” and "a clear reply” on the problem of Iraq’s defence. 27 in other words, if Bri­
tain was not prepared to accept full military responsibility for the preservation of Iraq’s borders, 
Feisal demanded that he had to have "a determining voice in the decision as to what these 
borders are to be”,28 i.e. the northern edges of the Mosul Wilayet. His anxiety about the threat
that the Kemalists posed to Iraq through Southern Kurdistan was shared by Cox and British 
military personnel in Mesopotamia.29
Another political consideration used by Feisal and his Sunni entourage to justify their 
claims to Southern Kurdistan was that the establishment of an independent Southern Kurdi­
stan would encourage Arab areas in Mesopotamia, especially Basra, to demand similar political 
status from the British Government. Cox, who voiced Feisal’s fears, warned Churchill against 
the idea of establishing a separate Kurdish entity in Southern Kurdistan because it would set 
an example for other communities, such as the Turkoman and Assyrian-Chaldeans, to follow. 
He argued that “if Sulaimaniya was allowed to separate, Basra and other communities would 
want to follow suit and it would be difficult to argue with them”. 30 The existence of this state of 
affairs in Mesopotamia highlights the fragility of the foundations on which the British were 
building a national state in that country. As British records show, when local Arab notables in 
Basra were asked by the British to express their views on the establishment of a united Arab
25* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 25 October 1921, F0371/6347, PRO.
26* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 18 November 1921, F0371/6347, PRO.
27* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 12 November 1921, F0371/6347, PRO.
28* News Summary For The Period Ended 11th November 1921, CO730/7, PRO.
29* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 21 November 1921, CO730/7, PRO.
30* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 5 June 1921, CO730/2, PRO.
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state by merging the Baghdad and Basra Wilayets, they initially opposed the scheme. These 
notables had no desire to be ruled from Baghdad by Feisal and his “Baghdadi officers". Even 
when they were finally persuaded by the British to accept the scheme, they insisted on enjoy­
ing “special treatment" in the form of a local autonomy. This would entail the formation of a 
special legislative assembly, an army and a police force for Basra.31 Initially, Churchill contem­
plated the idea of local autonomy for Basra within Iraq. But the British authorities in Baghdad 
showed no interest in the idea of a federal Mesopotamian state and it was therefore ignored. 
The importance of the use of force in building an Arab state is clearly illustrated by the insis­
tence of British officials in Baghdad on retaining British imperial forces in the country. They 
feared that the premature withdrawal of British forces would not only encourage a Kemalist 
invasion, but also be interpreted throughout Mesopotamia as “a sign of weakness and proof 
of indecision on London’s part”.32 Consequently, Mesopotamia would move towards further 
disintegration rather than political unity.
Britain’s urgent need to conclude a bilateral political-military treaty with Feisal to finalise
the basis of the relations between London and Baghdad was used by the latter as a means of
exerting pressure on the former. In other words, in return for Britain’s acceptance of Southern
Kurdistan’s incorporation into Iraq, Feisal would work towards the successful conclusion of
that treaty. At the same time, he sought to persuade London that if this treaty recognised
Southern Kurdistan as part of Arab Iraq and thus satisfied Arab public opinion, it would have a
deterrent effects on the Kemalists.33 Cox reported Feisal’s views to Churchill as being that:
Turkey will see the gamble is up so far as Iraq is concerned, once she realises that the coun­
try has become an independent and united people hostile to Turkey and in treaty with us... 
[Accordingly] Feisal urges speedy conclusion of [the] Treaty on [the] above grounds
To mobilise Arab public opinion behind their demand for the inclusion of Southern Kurdistan 
in Iraq, Feisal and his supporters waged a propaganda campaign throughout the duration of 
the Allied talks with Kemalist Turkey on the conclusion of a new Turkish peace treaty. They 
made clear that the results of these talks would have fateful effects on present and future Brit- 
ish-lraqi relations and general Arab attitudes towards Britain, al-lraq, a pro-Feisal newspaper, 
wrote that:
the Arabs are convinced that there is no other nation so sympathetic to Arab aspirations as 
Great Britain.., There is no doubt that His Excellency [i.e.Cox] will strive for the consolida- 
tion of the relations between Iraq and Great Britain. Iraq al-Arabi is, before all things, the 
31 * High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 29 June 1921, CO730/2, PRO 
32* S/S for Air, Memorandum,16 November 1922, F0371/7772, PRO.
33* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 1 February 1922, FO371/7780, PRO.
34* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 4 February 1922, FO371/7780, PRO.
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friend of Britain but also a nation with a deep love of freedom and believes that mutual 
advantage is the basis on which to protect her relations with Iraq and respect for for the opi­
nion of the Iraqi people and the encouragement of national feeling within [the] country. 35
While the Colonial Office desired to see Southern Kurdistan outside Arab rule, its principal aim 
of not hampering Feisal’s candidature and the transitional process of from direct to indirect 
British control in Mesopotamia made it extremely difficult to ignore Arab opposition to the idea 
of a separate Southern Kurdistan. This state of affairs, coupled with the holding of the Lau­
sanne conference, ultimately tipped the balance in favour of Cox and Feisal’s incorporation 
alternative.
ii- S ectarian  P o litics  A nd Southern K urdistan's in c o rp o ra tio n  in to  *Che ir a q i  
S ta te
The three Ottoman Wilayets of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul shared no common political, eco­
nomic or cultural identity under Turkish rule. All these three Wilayets (as chapter four illustra­
ted) were distinct in terms of their ethnic-religious composition as well as their political, econo­
mic and cultural orientations. The effects of the First World War were to accentuate -rather 
than weaken- these contradictory economic, cultural, ethnic and religious features among the 
communities of the three Wilayets by the crystallisation of contradictory political aspirations. In 
Southern Kurdistan, for instance, the Kurdish nationalists opted for a separate Kurdish entity 
and were politically orientated towards their brethren in Eastern and Northern Kurdistan. In 
Arab Mesopotamia, the situation was totally different. On the one hand, sectarian-religious 
affiliations counted more for the Shi'i Arabs than their ethnic origins. The members of Shi'i 
elite, unlike the Sunnis, played no part in the so called Arab revolt led by Sharif Hussein. As 
Ireland argues, to the Shi'i clergy the term ‘nationalism’ meant the establishment of an Islamic 
state.36 As a whole, the Shi'is put up notable resistance to the British invasion of Mesopota­
mia. Afterwards, they played a major part in opposing the imposed British rule, which led to the 
bloody 1920 rising. Other tiny ethnic-religious communities adopted a different position on 
the issue of their future. The Jewish community was suspicious of the establishment of an 
Arab state under a Sharifian ruler, whereas the Turkomans and Assyrian-Chaldeans opposed 
the establishment of both Kurdish and Arab states. The former desired absolutely the return 
of Turkish rule, while the latter sought British help to establish their own national state in Kurdi-
35* Al Iraq, No.89,12 January 1923 -in- II R, No.3,1 February 1923, F0371/7772, PRO. 
36*lreland, Iraq: A Study in Political Devebpment, p.246.
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stan.
For their part, Sunni representatives in Baghdad and Basra did not want any political 
arrangement that would place them under the rule of the Shi'i majority. Instead, they preferred 
either the continuation of the British administration or the establishment of an Arab state 
under a Sunni ruler, regardless of his ethnic identity, such as Burhan al-Din, the son of Abdul 
Hamid.37The Naqib (Sunni religious leader) of Baghdad, Abdul Rahman al-Gaylani, represen­
ted the first alternative, whereas Said Talib of Basra represented the latter. Initially, these Sun­
nis were afraid of Sharifian rule because they mistakenly thought that the Sharifian family 
would tolerate Shi'i hegemony over the would-be Arab state.38 According to Gertrude Bell, 
the Naqib of Baghdad said that
I would never consent to the appointment of the Sharif or of his son as Amir. The Hejaz is one 
and Iraq is one; there is no connection but that of the faith... I would rather a thousand times 
have the Turks back in Iraq than see the Sharif or his sons installed here.39
It was only a few Sunni officers, mostly Baghdadis, who helped to forge the pragmatic political 
link between the interests of the Sunnis and those of the Sharifians, on the one hand, and 
between the Feisal-Sunni bloc and British authorities in Baghdad, on the other. These Meso­
potamian Sunnis had joined the Sharifian forces during and after the war and accompanied 
Feisal during his short-lived rule in Syria. 4 0  Henceforth, they had been advocating the Shari­
fian cause through the establishment of an Arab state under a Sharifian ruler. For them such a 
ruler enjoyed two essential virtues, firstly being Arab, and secondly, being Sunni. He would, 
therefore, maintain the continuation of the long Turkish tradition of Sunni domination over the 
country’s destiny. Subsequent political developments in Mesopotamia from 1920 onward ver­
ified these conclusions, as the Sunni elite controlled all Iraqi Governments, the army and the 
civil service.
Such a promising prospect of continuing their old domination was the reason why the 
Sunni notables of Mesopotamia and those of the town of Mosul, in particular, embraced the 
Sharifian cause. Consequently, a political alliance emerged, which was based on mutual inter-
37* R.W. Bullard, Colonial Office Minute No.14659,4 April 1921, Notes on MIR, N0 .6 , 31 January 1921, 
CO730/1, PRO.
38* Ibid.
39* Elizabeth Burgoyne, Gertrude Bell, From Her Personal Papers, 1914-1926, (London: Ernest Benn, 
1958), p. 10.
40* Ironically, apart from Nuri al-Sa'id, all Baghdadi officers fought alongside the Turks in the early 
stages of the war. For instance, Jafer Pasha joined the Sharifian side after being captured by the Brit­
ish.
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ests between the British authorities, Feisal and the Sunnis. On the one hand, Feisal, who was 
not Mesopotamian and lacked a legitimate claim to the Iraqi throne, desperately needed -apart 
from the British- an internal political force through which he could maintain his rule. The Sunni 
Arabs assumed this role. They, in return for their loyalty and support, expected total domina­
tion over the new state’s institutions, such as the government, the civil service and the army. 
The enthusiasm of the Sunni Arabs in Mesopotamia and in exile to participate in the trans­
itional process from direct British control (which was characterised by the existence of British 
administration and the presence of imperial forces) to indirect control (which was characterised 
by the establishment of the Iraqi state under a British mandate) stemmed from their desire to 
influence British Mesopotamian policy in terms of filling the existing vacancies in the new 
native administration. Ja'fer Pasha, the first Acting Defence Minister after the establishment of 
the Iraqi state, looked on the issue of filling new posts created by the establishment of the 
native administration from a purely sectarian perspective. He called on the British to exclude 
the tribal Sheikhs (who were mostly Shi'is) from taking administrative posts in their localities, 
except in the holy towns of Najaf and Karbala, arguing that they were unqualified.41 Most 
importantly, the Sunnis resisted the idea of establishing a separate representation for the 
tribes in the would-be National Assembly, for it would inevitably turn the Shi'is into a strong 
political force. Ireland reveals how the Shi'i politicians criticised the Arab Council of State 
because it contained no Shi'is among its members. Only after Cox’s interference did the 
Sunni dominated Council allowed one Shi'i to act as Minister for Education.4 2  Ironically, this 
outright sectarian position on the political life of the new state by the Sunnis sharply contradic­
ted their pan-Iraqi rhetoric, which they used to justify their demand for Southern Kurdistan’s 
incorporation into Arab Iraq.
Apart from some help, which was rendered by a few Sunni military and civilian ele­
ments, the establishment of the Iraqi state was exclusively a British undertaking and was car­
ried out in the absence of any Mesopotamian-wide political movement or a solid material infra­
structures This Sunni help coupled with the Shi’i resistance to the British during and follow-
41* Note on Mesopotamia.., op. cit. This was the origin of the myth that Shi'is were unsuitable to enter 
the most sensitive spheres such as the state bureaucracy, government and army, which has become 
the point of departure for some researches, such as Ireland, Iraq: A Study in Political Development, and 
Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutbnary Movements of Iraq, Vol.I, (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1978).
42* Ireland, Iraq: A Study in Political Devebpment, pp.297-298.
43* See for example Liora Lukitz, Iraq, the Search for National Identity, (London: Frank Cass, 1995).
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ing their occupation of the country, made the British authorities in Baghdad desire the estab­
lishment of a covert sectarian state by excluding the Shi'is from holding key governmental, 
civilian and military positions in line with the old Turkish tradition of Sunni domination over the 
Shi'is. Given this sectarian nature of the newly-established Iraqi state, the incorporation of 
Southern Kurdistan into Iraq, with its substantial Sunni population, had additional political 
value, which was to redress the numerical balance between the Shi'is, who formed the major­
ity of the population, and the Sunnis, who were the minority (See| this page for the
Sectarian-religious distribution in the three Wilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra).
(The population of Mesopotamia (including Southern Kurdistan)
The population of Mesopotamia was 2,849,282, according to a British census taken in 1920 
and,
in terms of religious and sectarian composition was made up as follows:
Sunni Shi'i Jewish Christian Other Religion Total
Basra 42,558 721,414 10,088 2,551 8,989 785,600
Baghdad 524,414 750,421 62,565 20,771 2,133 1,360,304
Mosul 579,713 22,180 14,835 55,470 31,180 703,378
Total 1,146,685 1,494,015 87,488 78,792 42,302 2,849,282
The Figures for Mosul include the population of the Kurdish area of Sulaimaniya, viz., 155,000 
of whom all but 1,100 are Sunnis.44
It suited Feisal to play the sectarian card in order to strengthen his position in the
country where he lacked popular support, especially among the Shi'i majority, who were far
more loyal to their traditional religious leaders than to the Effendis (intellectuals). He also used
sectarianism as another argument for the incorporation of Southern Kurdistan into his state.
Cox reported that Feisal:
emphasised that the question of Kurdistan had further aspect for him as king of Iraq, which 
had probably not been fully considered by us [the British], This was the question of prepon­
derance of Sunnis or Shi'is with special reference to the question of constitutional assembly 
shortly to be convoked. As we aware, there was already technical and numerical preponder­
ance of Shi'is and excision of a large slice of Sunni districts of Iraq out of state and exclu­
sion of their representatives from national assembly, would place Shi'is In a very strong 
position and filled him with misgivings.45
In reporting Feisal’s views, Cox, who shared the idea of the importance of sectarian politics to
44* Colonial Office List (London: Waterlow & Sons Limited, 1921).
45* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 23 September 1921, F0371/6347, PRO.
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British political interests, urged Churchill to look into the political implications of any Kurdish
participation in the future Iraqi National Assembly, which he considered as vital:
It would be a reasonable course to work for the inclusion of the Kurdish districts [i.e. in 
Mosul, Kirkuk and Sulaimaniya division] and their participation in [the] National Assembly 
on conditions of local assent and special supervision by [the] British officers and, if 
necessary, by [the] High Commissioner.46
The sectarian Importance of Southern Kurdistan to Iraqi politics coincided with sharp tension 
between the Feisal-Sunni bloc and the traditional Shi'i leaders .47 it resulted in the expulsion 
of the latter from the country, probably to weaken their influence during the coming elections 
for the new National Assembly. Ultimately, the British authorities and the Sunni elite played 
the same card in the game of maintaining their influence. On the one side, the British used 
the sectarian instrument to rule the country through the Sunni minority, who, because of their 
numerical weakness vis-a-vis the Shi'i majority, would depend on British support and thus 
would remain loyal. On the other side, the Sunnis would keep unchallenged their hegemony 
over the state and its institutions by playing off the Shi'is against the Kurds.
The Incorporation Of Southern Kurdistan Into The Newly Established Iraqi 
State: Oil-Economic Considerations
For mainly strategic reasons, Britain began to expand its political and economic influence to 
territories, where oil was known or believed to exist and, if possible, to exclude other Powers 
from having any political or economic influence in such areas. Between 1900 and 1914, as 
chapter one showed, Britain was deeply involved in intensifying international rivalries with 
other Powers in order to obtain oil-related concessions in the Asiatic territories of the Ottoman 
Empire. The effect of the outbreak of the First World War was to underline more then ever Bri­
tain’s need to obtain oil, by controlling either the sources or suppliers of oil. In order to have 
formal control over the whole of the Mosul Wilayet, where oil was known to exist, British forces 
occupied Mosul. From then onward, the British Government worked diplomatically towards 
preparing conditions for turning their de facto control over Mosul into a de jure one. The first 
step in the direction of finalising British control over the Mosul Wilayet, as chapter five illustra­
ted, was the success of the British Government in altering the terms of the 1916 Sykes-Picot 
agreement. This enabled Britain to take over the French sphere of influence in the Mosul 
Wilayet in return for a 25% French share in the TPC. To forestall any American support for 
46* Ibid.
47* It is worth noting that the same Shi’i leaders were mobilising the Persian people against Britain’s 
growing political and economic control over Persia following the First World War.
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Turkish claims to Mosul, Britain also granted America a 25% share in the TPC. Allowing the 
Americans and the French to have a share in the TPC would help Iraq to exploit the oil fields of 
the Mosul Wilayet as early as possible, without facing international complications.
The issue of oil took on another important dimension after 1918 as a consequence of 
the need to create a financially self-sufficient British -and later native- administration in Meso­
potamia. Col. Wilson first raised the issue of the importance of oil when seeking to persuade 
the British Government to immediately deal with the issue of oil concessions in the Wilayets of 
Mosul and Baghdad. He was particularly concerned with the prosperity of the existing British 
administration. As oil resources were Mesopotamia’s main asset, he argued, they should be 
treated as its only guarantee for obtaining the loans necessary to materially develop the coun- 
try.48 Therefore, he wanted his administration, rather than commercial companies, to control 
this asset. The creation of a solid material infrastructure, while establishing an Arab state in 
Mesopotamia, was still an important issue faced by the British Government. In the absence of 
other material resources, and due to the prevailing economic backwardness of Mesopotamia, 
oil became important politically for the viability and long-term survival of the newly emerging 
Iraq state. The establishment of this state once more brought to the fore the question of 
developing the potential oil resources of the Mosul and Baghdad Wilayets for the benefit of 
the native Government in Baghdad.
The material security of the Iraqi state was of special concern for British officials in
Mesopotamia, notably Cox, who, like Col. Wilson, linked the survival of the local administration
to a speedy exploitation of the potential oil wealth of the country:
An Iraqi Government has been established, which though not yet able to stand alone, is 
rapidly consolidating and requires that the resources of that country be developed... Oil has 
been struck at Naft Khanh*9 and though not yet in paying quantity, prospects are bright. If 
this oil could be worked to the benefit of the Iraqi state, the effect would be excellent politic­
ally and economically... The provision of cheap fuel would undoubtedly change the face of 
the railway problem and give a great impetus to agricultural development and the purchase 
of machinery.so
The need for the speedy strengthening of the new state so as to enable it to stand on its own 
feet added a new economic dimension to Cox’s and his subordinates’ argument that the 
incorporation of Southern Kurdistan, with its potential oil resources, was an economic necess­
ity for Iraq. The concerns of British officials on the ground about the need to make Iraq into a
48* India Office Conference, No.56571 & 27792, 8  April 1919, F0371/2095, PRO.
49* Naft Khanh was a Kurdish area, which had been part ofjjart'dfPersia, before being transferred to 
British administered-Mesopotamia after the end of the War.
50* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 25 December 1921, CO730/8, PRO.
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self-sufficient new state was shared by the Colonial Office, as it became unmistakable that the 
entire policy of indirect British control depended on the ability of the new state to maintain a 
strong and a viable material infrastructure. Shuckburgh, for instance, recognised the impor­
tance of finding new sources of revenue for the Iraqi state, which were, unlike land taxes, “the 
least likely to be affected by political changes and disorder”, such as customs and tobacco 
excise.51
It should be remembered that the policy of replacing direct British control with indirect 
control, as it was embodied in the establishment of an Arab state, did not only aim to end Brit­
ish financial commitments, but also to retrieve as much of Britain’s expenses to date in Meso­
potamia as was possible. In other words, the British hoped that the Iraqis would pay for the 
cost of railways, ports, roads, bridges, telegraphs and other modern facilities, which they had 
constructed during and after the First World War. The terms of the 1924 British-lraqi financial 
agreement, which were based on the October 1922 agreement, required the Iraqi Govern­
ment to pay by instalment the cost of public improvements undertaken by the British occupa­
tion authorities during the period 1914-1921. This amounted to about £7,000,000. London 
refused to turn these facilities over to the Iraqi Government without payment, though it waived 
its claims to 94,009,540 Indian Rupees due in payment for public works and utilities. In this 
context, William Stivers highlights the paradox in British policy towards the financial affairs of 
the new Iraqi state. 52 On the one hand, Britain wanted the Iraqi Government to pay the cost of 
various projects undertaken by the British, which formed a heavy financial burden, while, on 
the other, Britain wanted Iraq to be an economically self-sustaining unit, which was the corner­
stone of the new policy of indirect control. According to these considerations, the incorpora­
tion of Southern Kurdistan into Iraq would help the latter to sustain itself without depending 
on any British financial assistance. Britain even helped the Iraqi Government to obtain satisfac­
tory deals from the issue of oil concessions in the autumn of 1923. The new Colonial Secre­
tary, Leo Amery, referred to Britain’s dual concern, namely to maintain both the private oil 
interests of the British and to make the Iraqi state benefit adequately from the oil 
concessions.53
The need to pay the British for the public works and the need to finance the Iraqi state 
51* Shuckburgh, Colonial Office, 15 July 1921, C0730/2, PRO.
52* Stivers, Supremacy and Oil: Iraq, Turkey and the Anglo-American World Order, 1918-1930, p.88. 
53* Colonial Office to High Commissioner, Baghdad, 4 August 1923 & Memorandum of Meeting Held at 
the Colonial Office 7 September 1923, in Stivers, p.88.
206
without depending on British financial assistance were the early heavy tasks facing Feisal and 
his Arab Government. The 1922 agreement between Britain and Feisal stated that the Iraqi 
Government should accept full responsibility for the maintenance of internal order and the 
defence of the country from foreign a g g r e s s io n .5 4  The Iraqi Government was required to 
devote 25% of its annual revenue to the maintenance of the native army and reserves. From 
the start, Feisal and his Arab Government urgently needed to find new financial sources to 
increase the young state’s revenue so that it could adequately develop its principal institu­
tions, such as the army and the police. In these circumstances, it was natural that they focused 
their attention on the exploitation of the potential oil wealth of Southern Kurdistan. As early as 
December 1922, the Iraqi Council of Ministers began to discuss the question of the Mesopo­
tamian oil fields and the disposition of oil shares. It eventually adopted a resolution, which sta­
ted with implicit reference to the oil of Southern Kurdistan that:
the Iraq Government is unable to agree to any ex parte negotiations, which may take place 
in connection with the natural resources of the country, or to recognise any decision taken 
without its consents
Feisal and his Government informed London of their intention to seize the existing opportun­
ity for an early development of the potential oil fields to secure for Iraq "a substantial 
revenue".56 In his response to the issue of exploiting oil resources, Churchill made clear that 
he did not object to the granting of concessions by the Iraqi Government, except for those 
which were based on “pre-w ar claims". S7 This meant that Iraq could not count on the oil of the 
Mosul Wilayet. The growing need for money forced the Ministry of Finance to urge the Iraqi 
Government to allow the development of the oil bearing regions of the country by the TPC. 58 
Against this background, Feisal endeavoured to persuade Britain to open a discussion on the 
question of the old and new oil concessions in the Mosul Wilayet. But Britain viewed the pre­
sent time as inappropriate, given the uncertainty of the future of the Mosul Wilayet.59 It feared 
that any British exploitation of the oil of the Mosul Wilayet might give America and France the 
impression that its rejection of the Turkish territorial claims was motivated by oil considerations.
It was clear to Feisal and his Arab Government, on the one side, and Cox and other 
British officials on the other side, that the incorporation of Southern Kurdistan would bring
54* Ernest Main, Iraq from Mandate to Independence, p.60.
55* HR, No.24,13 December 1922, F0371/7772, PRO.
56* Weakley, Minute No. 12708,13 December 1921, F0371/6364, PRO.
57* S/S for the Colonies to High Commissioner for Iraq, 30 January 1922, F0371/7782, PRO.
58* HR, No.3,1 February 1923, F0371/7772.PR0.
59* Ibid.
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economic advantages for the Iraqi state. Cox supported the Iraqi Government’s position on 
the imposition of excise on Kurdish tobacco, which he considered to be a “staple crop" and 
“an important source of revenue capable of expansion". 60  Accordingly, Cox asked London to 
protect Kurdish tobacco by prohibiting the import of foreign tobacco. He hoped that this 
would lead to the creation of a local tobacco industry and bring in “large revenue” to the Iraqi 
Government. His successor, Henry Dobbs, who was described by Bell as having a “mature 
experience in fiscal matters" due to his involvement in the financial affairs of the new state,ei 
re-asserted the importance of Southern Kurdistan’s tobacco for the Iraqi economy. The 
necessity of finding new financial sources for the Iraqi treasury was clearly demonstrated by 
the short-lived rivalry between the Kurdish Government of Mahmud and the Arab Government 
for control of the land revenue in Southern Kurdistan, as well as the excise on Kurdish tobac­
co. Many Kurdish regions refused to pay taxes to the Iraqi Government, as they rejected Arab 
rule. The question of exploiting oil and taxation gave the incorporation argument another 
important dimension, in that the inclusion of Southern Kurdistan into Iraq was an economic 
necessity if Britain sought an economically stable Iraqi state in the long run. Indeed, from 1927 
onward, the Iraqi economy increasingly depended on the oil of Southern Kurdistan as the 
country’s main source of income.
The Incorporation Of Southern Kurdistan Into The Newly Established Iraqi 
State: Strategic Considerations
The British occupation of the three Wilayets of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul in the period 1914-
1918 was largely motivated by two strategic considerations. Firstly, in order to maintain the
security of the sea-route to India against hostile Powers, Britain needed to further consolidate
its position in the Gulf region by controlling Mesopotamia. Secondly, the occupation of the
three Wilayets would enable Britain to control the strategic land-route to India, i.e. London,
Constantinople, Mosul Baghdad, Kum or Isfahan to Quette. Following the First World War, by
virtue of becoming part of the Empire air-route:
It is understood that Baghdad is regarded as a vital point in the air route to the East.
Already, a regular air service runs between Baghdad and Egypt. The fortnight air mail, which 
has been in existence for over a year, has reduced the distance between Baghdad and Lon­
don to 10 or 11 days. 62
The air force was gradually becoming another effective method of protecting India. The impor-
60* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 2 2  June 1921, C0730/2, PRO.
61* Lady Gertrude, The Letters of Gertrude Bell, Vol.l, (London: Ernest Benn, 1927) pp.508-509.
62* Cabinet Committee On Iraq, No. I.R.O. 3,11 December 1922, F0371/7772, PRO.
208
tance of strategy insofar as Mesopotamia was concerned was repeatedly emphasised by the 
British military and civilian circles in London and Baghdad when the Iraqi state was formed. 
Now British strategic interests became inevitably interconnected with the military viability of 
the new Iraqi state. Furthermore, new factors came into play to underline that interconnection, 
most notably the Kemalist accession to power in Turkey. The question of the growing Kemal­
ist threat and unceasing Turkish claims to Southern Kurdistan constantly raised the issue of 
re-defining British objectives in Mesopotamia and the ideal way to achieve them under the cir­
cumstances. The ultimate aim of Britain was to find a political formula which would enable it to 
fortify its long-term position in Mesopotamia, without entailing unwanted financial and military 
commitments. The subsequent replacement of direct British control by an Arab administration 
depended on how Britain would provide for the security of its client state in Iraq.
Under these conditions, the need to consolidate Iraq’s security vis-&-vis a revisionist 
Turkey helped to accentuate the strategic importance of Southern Kurdistan. The latter for­
med, with its high mountains and deep valleys, a natural defensive zone that was inexpensive 
to defend. These distinctive features would dramatically minimise Britain’s military commit­
ments as well as Iraq’s defence cost. Southern Kurdistan could also offer other facilities, not­
ably the replacement of the imperial forces with local Kurdish recruits to defend the country. 
The strategic dimension of the British problem in Mesopotamia, as chapter six illustrated, was 
the driving force behind Churchill’s idea of establishing Southern Kurdistan as a separate 
zone, with a view to consolidating the security of the Iraqi state. At his meeting with Feisal, 
Hubert Young expressed the Colonial Office’s views in relation to the way in which the secur­
ity and interests of Iraq could be maintained, without bringing Southern Kurdistan under Arab 
rule:
To Iraq, friendly Kurdistan was vital as being potential shield against Turkey and partner with 
Iraq in common interest or, alternatively, only menace in itself but screen for the channel of 
external aggression. To Kurdistan, the friendship of Iraq was vital as containing chief, if not 
only outside market and being only outlet to the sea. Without considering outside factor, 
community of interests alone should lead to close cooperation and friendly relations 
between these two areas, each of which was at the mercy of the others
By the time the Lausanne conference was under way, it became clear that the option 
of Southern Kurdistan’s separation should be abandoned, not only because of Feisal’s oppo­
sition, but most importantly, because of its unwelcome political effects on Britain’s long-term 
relations with Turkey and Persia (detailed in chapter eight). This brought to the fore other 
alternatives, such as giving all Southern Kurdistan to Turkey, partitioning it between Arab Iraq 
63* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 25 October 1921, F0371/6347, PRO.
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and Turkey or incorporating it as a whole into the Arab state of Iraq. The decisions of the 1921 
Cairo Conference in relation to the transitional process from direct British administration to 
Arab government were based on the assumption that Mesopotamia would not encounter any 
external threat during and immediately after this period. It was thought that neither the Royal 
Air Force (RAF) nor the remaining British garrison in Mesopotamia would be in a position to 
deal effectively with any external attack.64 in view of its urgent need to cut down its military 
expenditure, London was, every time Feisal raised this question, extremely reluctant to guar­
antee Iraq’s security from external attack. The task of the remaining British garrison was the 
maintenance of internal order in Arab Mesopotamia, whereas the RAF, with the help of Assyr­
ian and possibly Kurdish levies, was entrusted with the same task in the Kurdish areas. The 
levies were expected to replace the evacuated British posts in Southern Kurdistan. The per­
iod after the Cairo conference, however, showed no sign which might suggest that Mesopo­
tamia was free from external threat as the Kemalists zealously continued their military and pro­
paganda activities in Southern Kurdistan. The implementation of the withdrawal decision, 
before making a peace treaty with Kemalist Turkey, caused considerable uneasiness among 
the British military and civilian personnel in Mesopotamia.65 Cox argued that *the evacuation of 
Tel Afar, Aqra and Zakho would render impossible the retention of Mosul and the rest of the 
Wilayef.ee  Hence, the military vulnerability of Iraq could only be eliminated if Southern Kurdi­
stan was incorporated into Iraq. Thus, Cox, like Feisal who wanted Britain to establish a strate­
gic frontier for his state in the north, added a strategic dimension to his argument that the 
incorporation of Southern Kurdistan into Iraq was vital.
As Britain was not in a military position to make Turkey accept a peace agreement, and 
because it also lacked diplomatic leverage (such as the support of its Allies for its position), 
Curzon raised among British civil and military circles the idea of a compromise with Kemalist 
Turkey. This would entail a modest rectification of the old boundaries of the Mosul Wilayet in 
favour of Kemalist Turkey. It was hoped that the resulting peace with that country would be an 
ideal means to maintain Iraq’s long-term security while evacuating the British garrison. The 
trouble with this alternative was that territorial concessions in Southern Kurdistan (apart from 
inviting the Kemalist Turks to press for more territorial concessions) would place Turkey in a
64* Colonial Office, Middle Eastern Committee, Fourth Minute by Shuckburgh, 4 November 1921, 
F0371/6347, PRO.
65* Colonial Office, Middle Eastern Committee, First Minute by Shuckburgh, 5 May 1921, F0371/6344, 
PRO.
66* Ibid.
210
strategically strong position ws-ei-ws Iraq. In other words, if Britain returned the Zakho and 
Amadia districts to the Turks, the latter would always pose a direct threat to the remainder of 
Southern Kurdistan where oil existed. If it was decided to surrender the whole of Southern 
Kurdistan, with its considerable size of 88,000 Sq. Km. and population of 700,000, the 
Kemalist Turks would be placed within 150 miles of Baghdad. The Chief of the Air Staff poin­
ted to several potential military and political consequences if Britain gave up the Mosul 
Wilayet. Firstly, the Arabs would consider the surrender of that Wilayet as a "British defeat” 
and thus Britain’s political credibility in Mesopotamia as a whole would be weakened. Second­
ly, Feisal would feel that his position was compromised by the British in proportion to the 
undermining of the security of his state. Thirdly, the British would be forced into increasing 
their garrison in Baghdad,67 as Turkish control over Southern Kurdistan and Mosul meant 
depriving Iraq of "a portion of the buffer zone”. 68 Like the Chief of Air Staff, the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff and the Colonial Office were unanimously against withdrawal from 
Southern Kurdistan before making peace with Kemalist Turkey:
Sooner or later, we should be bound to admit Turkish influence up to edge of plains and 
should, thus, be cut off from national line of communications between Mosul and Baghdad, 
which runs via Kifri-Kirkuk-Altun Kupri and Arbil.. IA/hole length of our Baghdad-Mosul com­
munications for some 200 Miles, would be flanked by turbulent hill country. Our Communica­
tions could be out at any time and in fact retention of Mosul from a military point of view, 
would be rendered impossible.. Cession of Kurdish country would similarly endanger impor­
tant line of communication between Baghdad and Persia via Qizi! Robat and Khaniqin.. Con­
siderable reinforcements to existing garrison would become necessary, if position was to be 
maintained.. If accepted by the Turks, it would be merely as a first step towards further 
expansion, which would inevitably lead to our abandonment of the whole of Mosul with all the 
consequences which that would entailfis
The failure of the Mesopotamian policy, the British feared, might lead to other consequences, 
such as ending a British presence at the head of the Gulf, which in turn would represent a 
threat to India and imperial trade,70 as well as incurring Arab hostility and strengthening Bol­
shevik influence in Persia.71
The new Turkish peace settlement at Lausanne in 1923 ended all British worries 
about a Kemalist invasion of Mesopotamia, at least in the foreseeable future. What remained 
unresolved was the way in which Britain could keep a stable Southern Kurdistan within Iraq.
67* Cabinet Committee On Iraq, No. I.R.0.1st, 8  December 1922, F0371/7772, PRO.
6 8 * Annexure i, Lord Curzon’s Tentative Proposals Regarding Cession of Portion of Kurdistan, Lau­
sanne, 6  December 1922, F0371/7772, PRO.
69* Annexure ii, Lord Curzon, Lausanne, 8  December, F0371/7772, PRO.
70* Cabinet Committee On Iraq, No. I.R.0.2nd Conclusion, 12 December 1922, F0371/7772, PRO. 
71* Foreign Office Memorandum on the Political Consequences of British Withdrawal from Iraq, 15 
December 19220, F0371/7772, PRO.
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British experiences in Kurdish areas showed that resorting to ground action was very costly, 
both in terms of men and money. The intensive use of the RAF through what was known as 
the Scheme of Air Control, emerged as the most effective way to pacify Southern Kurdistan. 
The air force, as Ernest Main points out, represented the cheapest and quickest means of re- 
imposing British or Iraqi control over Southern Kurdistan, 72 which suited its geographical real­
ities and social characteristics, i.e. being mountainous country and having a population that 
was accustomed to guerrilla warfare. It also allowed Britain to dispense with the stationing of a 
large garrison in Mesopotamia to maintain internal order. The Scheme of Air Control was 
based on previous British experiences in the period 1919-1920, when the RAF had raided 
several rebellious Kurdish areas. Under this scheme the general practice was to constantly 
bomb civilian targets such as villages and towns. The ensuing disruption to social and econo­
mic life would break Kurdish resistance. In 1921, the Air Ministry representative reminded the 
Colonial Office that “the suppression of disorder, in conjunction with levies, was already one 
of the functions of the Air Force in Kurdistan, as in Iraq proper".73 After 1922, the role of the 
RAF took on an important political aspect during the process of implementing the incorpora­
tion of Southern Kurdistan into Iraq against Kurdish will.74 At one point, Churchill had 
opposed the bombardment of civilian Kurdish targets by the RAF. Yet, such actions not only 
continued but actually escalated, when the RAF resorted to gas bombs. Such bombs had 
never been used before by any Power against local rebellions, let alone civilian targets. The 
history of the Kurdish question in Iraq between 1923 and 1943 shows that without the use of 
RAF in suppressing Kurdish rebellions, Southern Kurdistan’s incorporation into Iraq would 
have not been imposed nor could it have lasted, as Britain was determined not to use its 
ground forces to keep order. Even though the effective use of the RAF against Kurdish 
rebellions gave the Iraqi state time to build its own ground and air forces, it remained incapable 
of controlling Sguthern Kurdistan on its own. Thus, the emerging dual British-Arab military 
control -in the form of an Arab ground force and a British air force- was the only arrangement 
capable of keeping political stability in Southern Kurdistan after 1923.
72* Ernest Main, Iraq from Mandate to Independence, 114.
73* Shuckburgh, Middle Eastern Committee, Fourth Minute, 4 November 1921, F0371/6347, PRO. 
74* David E. Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: the Royal Air Force, 1919-1939, (Manchester: 
1990). This work thoroughly examines the role of the RAF in keeping Southern Kurdistan under British 
and Iraqi control by suppressing successive Kurdish revolts in the Twenties and the Thirties.
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Conclusion
When the British Government decided to establish an Arab state in 1920, it was not in its plans 
to incorporate Southern Kurdistan into Iraq. The forrhation process of the Iraqi state, which 
started in late 1920 and continued for the next three years, was not as straightforward and 
smooth as the British initially thought it would be. From the very beginning, it raised issues 
vital to the military, economic and political viability of the new Iraqi state. The growing Kemalist 
threat to the British position in Mesopotamia compellingly drew Britain’s attention to the need 
not to overlook the necessity of constructing Iraq as a viable military unit. By underlining the 
issue of Iraq’s short and long-term security among British officials in London and Mesopota­
mia, the Kemalist threat was the most important factor influencing the ultimate decision to 
place Southern Kurdistan under direct Arab rule, rather than establishing it as a separate politi­
cal entity. In other words, in view of Britain’s irrevocable decision to withdraw its imperial garri­
son and the frailty of the newly-established Arab army, the inclusion of Southern Kurdistan 
into Iraq became necessary, as the former constituted a natural defensive belt for the latter 
against foreign invasion.
Southern Kurdistan was as important to Britain as it was to its client state of Iraq. From 
the economic point of view, the value of Southern Kurdistan was two fold. Firstly, Britain 
sought to impose its control through its client state over the potential oil fields of Southern 
Kurdistan. This would enable Britain to secure valuable oil supplies for the British navy, espe­
cially under war conditions. A separate Southern Kurdistan or its return to Turkish control 
would probably mean that Britain could no longer control the oil fields on a secure and long­
term basis. Secondly, the British were aware of the vital importance of establishing an Arab 
state that would be financially self-sufficient, if they were to realise their main aim of ending 
their heavy financial burdens in Mesopotamia. Feisal and his Arab Government were also alive 
to the importance of potential Kurdish oil as a valuable and reliable source of income to the 
Iraqi state which could pay for the rapid development of its military and civilian institutions. It 
was natural then that British economic concerns converged with those of Feisal and his Gov­
ernment, which were to merge Southern Kurdistan’s economic life with Iraq’s.
The political importance of Southern Kurdistan to the newly-established Iraqi state 
reflected, in the eyes of British officials in Mesopotamia, their desire to perpetuate the tradi­
tional policy of divide and rule. Such a desire was a direct consequence of past British exper­
ience in Mesopotamia between 1918 and 1923, when the Shi'is under their religious leader­
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ship resisted British direct rule and refused to participate in the formation process of the Iraqi 
state under British supervision. Therefore, it did not suit British interests to see the Shi'is for­
ming the overwhelming majority in the new Iraqi state, while the Sunni Arabs constituted a 
small minority. From the British point of view, placing the Sunni Kurds under Arab rule would 
help to reduce this critical sectarian imbalance in the political life of the new Iraqi state. More­
over, it was in the British interest to have social and cultural diversity and the emergence of a 
disharmonious society based on powerful communal identities, which would prevent the 
emergence of an Iraq-wide nationalist movement capable of challenging British influence in 
the country. At the same time, Feisal, who lacked popular support and only enjoyed the back­
ing of the Sunni military and political elites, also valued the Southern Kurds as an important 
means of reducing considerably the Shi'i majority which did not support him. It was natural 
then that the political concerns of Feisal and his Sunni entourage converged with those of the 
British officials in Baghdad. In retrospect, the incorporation of Southern Kurdistan into the 
Iraqi state was imposed on the Southern Kurds, who refused to participate in the formation 
process of the Iraqi state or consent to Feisal’s rule. The Kurdish opposition to the imposition 
of Arab rule over Southern Kurdistan never ceased, and expressed itself in a number of 
armed revolts during the twenties, thirties and forties.
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The Sevres treaty was a still born. It terms were not implemented largely, because of the grow­
ing strength of the Turkish nationalists led by Mustafa Kemal who firmly opposed the imposed 
Turkish peace settlement. Their on-going revolt in Anatolia against foreign control over 
Turkey offered an opening for the spread of Bolshevik influence in the Middle East, especially 
when Russian Armenia was Sovietised by the Red Army in December 1920. In the meantime, 
France and Italy, Britain’s principal Allies, gradually changed their attitudes towards the Kemal­
ists and began to advocate accommodation with them instead of confrontation.
This chapter focuses on these regional and international developments and analyses 
the extent to which they affected Britain’s Kurdish policy between summer 1920 and summer 
1923. It must be remembered that without reaching a peace agreement with Kemalist Turkey, 
either by force or by peaceful means, a successful implementation of the new policy of indir­
ect control was widely judged as unrealistic by British policy-makers at the Foreign Office and 
at the Colonial Office. As this chapter explains, resorting to peaceful means or force by the 
British would have direct effects on their approach to the Kurdish situation, given the exis­
tence of political instability in Northern and Southern Kurdistan. This chapter illustrates how 
Britain and Kemalist Turkey took into consideration the existence of this state of affairs in Kur­
distan, when attempting to achieve their main objective, i.e. controlling Southern Kurdistan. 
Meanwhile, the Kurdish nationalists unsuccessfully endeavoured to exploit the unresolved 
difference between the British and the Kemalists to achieve their political aspirations.
Kurdish Nationalists, Britain And The Kurdish Situation Immediately After 
S&vres
*- post-Sevres Activities O f The Kurdish Rationalist Movem ent
The Kurdish nationalists expressed unfavourable reactions to the Sevres treaty because they 
did not consider its terms on Kurdistan to be either satisfactory or applicable. Said Taha was 
one of those Kurds who was "sceptical* about a successful implementation of the Sevres 
terms, especially when the proposed Allied commission was not supported with force to do its 
task in Kurdistan.i Instead of awaiting the application of the Sevres treaty, the Kurdish natio­
nalists took several initiatives to achieve their political aspirations. Apart from a minority that did
1* Shuckburgh, India Office, Urgent, 15 December 1920, F0371/5069, PRO.
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not trust the Allies and believed that the safest option was to co-operate with the Kemalists to 
obtain local autonomy for the Kurds, the majority of Kurdish nationalists still considered British 
support, either material or moral, to be an important factor in the success of their efforts. The 
latter believed that British support could be obtained only if the Kurds were capable of exploit­
ing the differences between Britain and Kemalist Turkey.
In Diyarbekir, Kurdish notables, former army officers and civil servants were engaged 
in organising an armed movement for an independent Kurdistan. They established connec­
tions among Kurdish nationalist circles in Constantinople, Kharput, Bitlis and Diyarbekir. The 
organisers of the movement were very anxious to establish direct contacts with the British 
authorities in Mesopotamia.2 To approach London with a united front, the two Kurdish natio­
nalist factions in Constantinople, the moderates and the extremists, came together and estab­
lished a new political organisation, with Abdul Qadir as President and Emin Bey Bedirkhan as 
Vice President.3 At the same time, Said Taha, Simko and other Kurdish leaders decided, after 
a series of meetings, to establish a Kurdish confederation along the old Ottoman-Persian 
frontier, while soliciting British support.4 The idea of establishing a Kurdish confederation, so 
it was thought, would be appealing to Britain, given its concern about future Kemalist and Bol­
shevik offensives against Mesopotamia through Northern, Eastern and Southern Kurdistan. 5 
Similar suggestions were presented by other Kurds such as Hamdi Pasha, the former Otto­
man Minister of Marine.e What encouraged such hopes among these Kurdish nationalists 
seems to have been the Bolsheviks’ occupation of Baku and their advance towards the Turk- 
ish-Persian frontiers. Indeed, in the wake of these developments, Simko approached the Brit­
ish in Mesopotamia, arguing again that because Persia was powerless in Eastern Kurdistan, 
British support for his movement would help to contain any Bolshevik advance and Kemalist 
threat to Southern Kurdistan.7
Little is known about the attitudes of the Bolsheviks towards the Kurdish question for 
the period 1920-1923. It can, however, be said that they paid some attention to Kurdish
2* High Commission, Mesopotamia, 17 November 1920, FO371/5069, PRO.
3* Ryan, Memorandum, Constantinople, 23 December 1920, F0371/6346, PRO.
4* Kurdish tribal confederations and tribes involved in this scheme were from Northern and Eastern Kur­
distan such as Shikak, Hakari, Haidarani, Herki, Begzadah, Atrushi. Memorandum from Civil Commis­
sion, Baghdad, to Under S/S for India, 8  October 1920, FO371/5069, PRO.
5* Shuckburgh, IO (No.8580, Urgent) 15 December 1920, FO371/5069, PRO.
6 * Ryan, Memorandum, Constantinople,23 December 1920, F0371/6346, PRO.
7* Memorandum from Assistant Political Officer, Rania, to Political Officer, 20 July 1921, F0371/6347, 
PRO.
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affairs in line with their Middle Eastern strategy of influencing the political movements of the 
new nationalities, with a view to using them against British imperial interests in the region. 
Despite the fact that British sources made direct references to the constant Bolshevik propa­
ganda against Britain in Kurdistan, no pro-Bolshevik grouping or Bolshevik-orientated leaders 
emerged inside the Kurdish nationalist movement. This might be attributed to the anti- 
religious stance of the Bolsheviks, which the British extensively publicised in Persia and the 
former Ottoman Wilayets. It is known that at the First Conference of Peoples of the East, 
which the Bolsheviks organised in Baku on 1 September 1920, eight Kurdish delegates 
attended.e However, there is no information recorded about these Kurds, that is to say, whe­
ther they were mere nationalists or pro-Bolsheviks. Given the existence of Kurdish communi­
ties in Russian Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, these Kurds probably came from these 
regions.The Bolsheviks probably thought of turning such Kurds into a socialist or a pro- 
Bolshevik nationalist party if circumstances required, as they did in Persia and Turkey. After 
the Sevres treaty, an autonomous Kurdish entity was established in the Caucasus in accor­
dance with Lenin’s instructions. But, the most important means through which the Bolsheviks 
attempted to influence the Kurdish situation was by their encouragement of the Kemalists to 
grant the right of self-determination to the non-Turkish nationalities, such as the Kurds and 
the Arabs. They hoped to pre-empt British attempts to use the nationality question as a 
means of consolidating their position in regions surrounding Russia’s southern frontiers. Gen­
erally, the Kurdish nationalist movement remained politically and ideologically unsusceptible 
to Bolshevism.
Western -and especially British support- whether it was material or moral, was still 
viewed by the Kurdish nationalists as essential for the success of their efforts to mobilise the 
Kurds around the idea of Kurdish independence and to defeat stronger opponents, i.e. the 
Turks and the Persians. Despite that, many Kurdish revolts, varying in scale and intensity, 
broke out without receiving outside material or moral support. An anti-Kemalist revolt broke 
out in the Kurdish areas to the east of Sivas.9 In Dersim, local Kurds had openly been in a state 
of revolt for a year. Other local revolts had occurred in Diyarbekir, Nisibin, Hakari and Mardin for 
some time, while the Kurds of Mush controlled their town .10 The most important development 
was the Kurdish uprising in the autumn of 1921, which embraced Diyarbekir, Dersim, Van and
8* Edward H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol.lll [London: Penguin Books, 1971], p.262.
9* Rumbold to Curzon, Confidential, 18 May 1921, F0371/6346, PRO.
10* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 8 August 1921, F0371/6346, PRO.
217
Bitlis. Apart from asking for a British mandate, the leaders of the uprising informed Britain that if 
they were assisted, they would turn Northern Kurdistan into a buffer against Bolshevism and 
Kemalism. Beside needing one or two British officers such as Maj. Noel, the Kurds asked for 
two mountain guns, a few machine guns, 5,000 rifles, some ammunition and most importantly, 
a passage for supplies through Southern Kurdistan.
In the same period, Greece promised the nationalist Kurds military aid, if Britain 
allowed its passage through Mesopotamia.11 According to Olson, the Greek High Commissio­
ner in Constantinople provided Emin Ali Bedirkhan and Abdul al-Rahman with fund when the 
two visited Cairo, and that Emin’s son drafted proclamations in Kurdish in collaboration with 
the Greeks. Olson also names Kurd Mustafa Pasha as one of those Kurdish nationalists who 
established contacts with the Greeks and the Armenian nationalists. 12 Kurd Mustafa Pasha 
sought to win British support for an independent Southern Kurdistan that could help mobilise 
local Kurds against the Kemalists. The Kurdish nationalists increasingly paid attention to the 
Greeks, who seemed to be serious in their intention to support all efforts as a means of wea­
kening their Kemalist enemy. Probably the Kurdish nationalists hoped that their action would 
persuade Britain to give aid and political support, once its ally, Greece, was involved in Kurdish 
affairs. This could be the reason why Emin Ali Bedirkhan informed the British of the existing 
Kurdish contacts with the Greeks, with a view to organising a Kurdish movement against the 
Kemalists. Andrew Ryan of the British High Commission in Constantinople reported that Emin 
Ali asked if Britain would allow him and other Kurds to go to Mosul in order to set up a Kurdish 
organisation in the British-controlled Southern Kurdistan as a prelude to the Kurdish revolt. 
As London still hoped that it could make peace with Kemalist Turkey, it not only refused to 
grant either military assistance or to allow the Greeks to send their aid to the Kurdish national­
ists through Southern Kurdistan, but also hoped that the Kurds would not submit to such sug­
gestions.^ Yet Kurdish appeals for British help did not stop, and continued until the conclu­
sion of the 1923 Lausanne treaty. These appeals often warned against future Kemalist mas­
sacres of the Kurds, if the latter were left to their own devices.
After Sevres, the intention of British officials in London, as in Mesopotamia and Con­
stantinople, focused on the growing Kemalist and Bolshevik threats. These threats made it 
very difficult for Britain not to reconsider their Kurdish policy, especially in Southern Kurdistan;
11* Cox to Churchill, Very Secret, 28 October 1921, F0371/6347, PRO.
12* Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, p. 64.
13* RumtX)ld to Curzon, 31 May 1921, F0371/6346, PRO.
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otherwise, it would face the prospect of losing not only Southern Kurdistan but also Mesopo­
tamia. The need to take new initiatives in Kurdistan was first felt by the India Office, which 
raised the question of the appointment of a Kurdish governor for Southern Kurdistan, in 
response to what was perceived as an anti-British alliance between the Kemalists and the Bol­
sheviks. 14 As the political situation became more alarming, the India Office raised the question 
of undertaking a new, broader initiative, based on the formation of a British-sponsored Kurd­
ish confederation in the Kurdish areas along the old Ottoman-Persian frontier in Northern and 
Eastern Kurdistan. 15 Montagu urged London to respond to Said Taha’s overtures for the 
establishment of a Kurdish confederation under its auspices, and to ignore the unfeasible 
terms of the Sevres treaty. He suggested that
as a preliminary step, Major Noel should be instructed to proceed at once to Mesopotamia and 
place himself at the disposal of the High Commissioner, with a view to open communication with 
the leading Kurdish chieftains on the Northern frontiers of the occupied territory and reporting at 
once to Mesopotamia on the general trend of local feeling in these regions and, in particular, the 
prospect of carrying to a successful issue the policy advocated by Said Taha of forming a Kurd­
ish confederation under British auspices.is
This did not mean, however, that Montagu was willing to involve Britain in serious military com­
mitments, which was why he rejected the idea of giving British ammunition to Said Taha. 17 His 
idea of using Maj. Noel was preconditioned by the degree of intimacy in Kemalist-Bolshevik 
relations and the Armenian situation, both of which considerably affected the British strategic 
position in Southern Kurdistan and Mesopotamia.1 8  The only voices in favour of the Said Taha 
project and all that it entailed were those British officials serving in the Kurdish areas. 19
ii- B ritain 's A ttem pts ‘to  im plem ent A  M odified Version O f ‘the ‘term s O f cthe  
Sevres ‘tre a ty  On Kurdistan
The idea of reaching an agreement with Kemalist Turkey on implementing the Sevres terms 
on Kurdistan to the letter -as Hubert Young once suggested- was inconceivable to London 
because the prospects of an independent or an autonomous Kurdistan would considerably 
undermine Britain’s position in Mesopotamia. Young’s suggestion consisted of one year tem­
porary Turkish rule over Northern and Southern Kurdistan, during which the Kurds would
14*S/S [for India] to High Commission, Baghdad, 27 October 1920, FO371/5069, PRO.
15* S/S to High Commission, Baghdad, 26 November 1920, FO371/5069, PRO.
16* Shuckburgh, India Office, Urgent, 15 December 1920, FO371/5069, PRO.
17* Ibid.
18* Ibid.
19* Political Officer, Mosul, to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, Confidential, 21 September 1920, 
FO371/5069, PRO.
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decide on whether to establish an independent Kurdistan or an autonomous Kurdistan within 
Turkey.2 0  Instead, London sought to finalise the partition of Kurdistan, whose basis was laid 
down in 1920 when Southern Kurdistan was included in Britain’s Mesopotamian mandate and 
Western Kurdistan in France’s Syrian mandate. At the London conference (21 February-12 
March 1921), apart from Britain and its Allies, two Turkish delegations participated, one repre­
senting the Ottoman Government, the other the Turkish rebels led by Mustafa Kemal. At this 
first post-Sevres conference, which dealt with the Turkish settlement, Britain made the first 
adjustment in the Sevres terms concerning the idea of Kurdish self-determination. The 
Kemalists were presented with a compromise scheme, which stated that
in regard to Kurdistan, the Allies will be prepared on condition of facilities for local autonomies 
and adequate protection of Kurdish and Assyrian-Chaldean interests, to consider a modifica­
tion of the Treaty in a sense in conformity with the existing facts of the situations
This meant the abandonment of Kurdish self-determination, unlike the position of the Arm­
enians, who would still have such a right to establish their own national state. 22 The idea of 
involving the League of Nations and an Allied High Commissioner to supervise the implemen­
tation of Kurdish autonomy was dropped because of French and Italian opposition. 23 More­
over, as the Kurdish proposals applied only to the Kurdish territory to the north of British- 
controlled Southern Kurdistan, 2 4 the idea of a united Ottoman Kurdistan, whether under Brit­
ish or Turkish control, was disregarded altogether. These sudden concessions reflected not­
able political changes in the regional situation, stemming from firstly the growing strength of 
the Kemalists; secondly, disagreement among the Allies over the question of how to deal with 
the Kemalists; thirdly, the pressing need to prevent the formation of a Kemalist-Bolshevik 
alliance against British interests; and finally, the failure of the scheme for a united Armenian 
state.
The compromise scheme, which was eventually rejected by the Kemalist delegation, 
meant that Britain would lose its political influence in Northern Kurdistan, an area which was 
still of some importance for the security of its position in Southern Kurdistan. This might 
explain why Montagu criticised the London conference’s position on the nationality question. 
He demanded a declaration that would show the Kemalists and the concerned nationalities
20* Young, Colonial Office Minute No.21102,29 April 1921, CO730/1, PRO.
21 * Shuckburgh to Churchill, Cairo, 15 March 1921, CO730/1, PRO.
22* Foreign Office to Rumbold, Constantinople, 11 March 1921, F0371/6467, PRO.
23* Curzon, Paris, 23 March 1922, F0371/7858, PRO.
24* S/S for the Colonies to Cox, Cairo & Acting High Commissioner, Baghdad, 17 March 1921, CO730/1, 
PRO.
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the determination of the Allies to do what was in their power to implement the minority provi­
s io n s ^  in spite of the Foreign Office’s acceptance of Montagu’s views on the need for an 
Allied declaration on the execution of the new scheme’s provisions concerning the national 
minorities -such as the Northern Kurds-26 nothing of the sort materialised. Neither the League 
of Nations nor Britain’s former Allies were willing to take any political responsibility. The effect 
of the failure of the London conference was to make the British approach to the Kurdish situa­
tion even more cautious and defensive, and it did not result in greater British support for the 
efforts of the Kurdish nationalists in Northern Kurdistan, contrary to Olson’s argument. 27 
Thus, from 1921 onwards, the Kurdish question began to lose its international dimension and 
take on an ever more internal one.
Defensive Versus Offensive Approach To Northern Kurdistan: Britain And 
The Containment Of The Kemaiist Threat
1-  he A ttitu d es  O f he B ritish  High Commissions 9# t And Constantino­
p le
Following the Cairo conference of March 1921, the protracted and covert military activities of 
the Kemalists against Mesopotamia, coupled with political instability in Southern Kurdistan, 
caused considerable anxiety among British civilian and military personnel in Baghdad. They 
feared that any British withdrawal under such conditions would encourage the Kemalists to 
invade Mesopotamia through Southern Kurdistan. Accordingly, while asking London to inten­
sify its efforts to make peace with Kemalist Turkey as early as possible, Cox advocated that if 
Britain failed in its efforts, it should resort to an offensive approach to force the Kemalists to 
stop their hostilities, and agree to a new peace treaty that would recognise Southern Kurdi­
stan as part of the new Iraq. Cox’s offensive approach, which enjoyed the backing of British 
civilian and military personnel in Mesopotamia as well as Feisal,28 was largely based on the idea 
of giving British support to Northern Kurdish nationalists in their struggle with the Kemalists. 
Cox reminded the Colonial Office that in autumn 1920, the British Government carefully con­
sidered the idea of an8active stimulation” of a Kurdish revolt in Northern Kurdistan.2 9  This 
idea, Cox pointed out, was abandoned because of the non-existence of vital preconditions
25* Memorandum from Montagu to Curzon, 23 April 1921, F0371/6469.PR0.
26* Adam, Foreign Office Minute on Montagu’s Memorandum, 26 April & Foreign Office to Montagu, 29 
April 1921, F0371/6469.PR0.
27* Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, p.65.
28* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 21 November 1921, CO730/7.PRO.
29* High Commissioner for Mesopotamia to S/S for the Colonies, 21 June 1921, F0371/6346,PR0.
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for a successful Kurdish revolt such as a temporary British occupation of Jezirah-ibn-Omar. 
Moreover, the India Office opposed the idea of arming the Kurds, fearing far deeper British 
involvement in Kurdish affairs. The conditions seemed different in Cox’s eyes in June 1921. 
He argued that if the London conference led to the outbreak of “ open hostility with Kemalist 
Turkey, Britain would be in a position to support the Kurds, who should be informed about the 
nature and the extent of British help.3 0  He did not elaborate, however, on how Britain could 
help the Kurds.
In August, Cox seemed more determined to persuade London to take the initiative as
the movement for Kurdish independence, which was favourably disposed towards Britain,
was gathering momentum:
If proposition develops along these lines, it must sooner or later involve a breaking away of 
Kurdish districts from Persia and Turkey respectively. Altered attitude[s] of the Persian Gov­
ernment towards Great Britain and recent Turkish defeats in Anatolia suggest that considera­
tions, which would formerly have prompted us to discourage such a movement, have lost for 
the time being much of their importance... Unless instructed to contrary, therefore, I propose, 
while refusing formal intercourse with Kurdish chiefs beyond our borders to use opportunities 
of ascertaining their intentions and to take promptly such actions [as] may be necessary to 
ensure the safety of frontier of Iraq. 31
To reinforce his argument for an active British role in the affairs of Northern Kurdistan, Cox 
argued that, whether Britain intervened or not, it would be accused of “complicity”, in any anti- 
Kemalist revolt among the Kurds. 3 2  The increasing toughness of Cox’s line was in proportion 
to the intensity of the Kemalist threat. The more the Kemalists seemed to increase their threat 
to the British position in Southern Kurdistan and Mesopotamia, the more Cox favoured an 
offensive approach. It should be emphasised that Cox presented his idea of using Northern 
Kurdish nationalists as an alternative to Churchill’s idea of using Southern Kurdish nationalists 
as a means of defeating any potential Kemalist advance across Southern Kurdistan. Cox also 
wanted to use Simko to check Kemalist influence in Eastern Kurdistan, and to carry through 
the repatriation of Christians to Urmia.33 A number of British officials serving in Southern Kurdi­
stan shared Cox’s opinion. The Political Officer of Sulaimaniya, H.A. Goldsmith, considered 
Simko’s influence “an effective barrier” between Kemalist-controlled areas in Northern Kurdi­
stan and British-controlled Southern Kurdistan. He thus advocated a British agreement or
30* Ibid.
31* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 26 August 1921, F0371/6347.PR0. 
32* Ibid.
33* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 26 August 1921, F0371/6347.PR0.
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alliance with Simko.34 as the latter established his control over vast Kurdish areas along the 
Old Ottoman-Persian frontiers.
Against the background of Greece’s willingness to offer the Kurdish nationalists 
material support and the outbreak of Kurdish revolts in Diyarbekir, Dersim, Van and Bitlis in 
autumn 1921, Cox suggested to Churchill the dispatch of British volunteers and free passage 
of supplies -other than weapons- to the Kurds. London rejected Cox’s suggestion, emphasis­
ing the need to avoid any British involvement in Northern Kurdistan’s affairs which might 
aggravate an already tense situation. Accordingly, the British High Commission in Baghdad 
informed the Kurdish nationalist leaders that Britain would not support their revolt because it 
sought peace with the Kemalists. Khalil Bedirkhan, one of the Kurdish nationalists, was told to 
leave Baghdad, lest his presence roused the suspicion of the Kemalists about British involve­
ment in Northern Kurdistan’s affairs.35 in the face of continuing intransigence from the Kemal­
ists, and the prospect of a backlash which might result from Kurdish disillusionment with Brit­
ish attitudes, Cox again asked Churchill in December to re-examine the idea of giving British 
support to the Northern Kurds. He feared that if Britain continued to adopt a neutral stance 
towards the Kurdish situation while the Kemalists had no desire to stop their hostile activities 
in Southern Kurdistan, it would not only lose its prestige among the Kurds, but also incur their 
anger:
While we are, thus, restrained by [the] prospect of negotiations for peace from taking active 
measures to combat the Kemalist menace, [the] same cause is producing an entirety opposite 
effect on [the] Kemalist policy, with [the] result that at a time when our attitude of passivity 
offered them every opportunity of successfully so doing, [the] Kemalists are redoubling their 
efforts against us. It is my duty, I feel, to draw attention to danger, lest our present policy of 
withholding all encouragement from Kurds, at a time when [the] Kemalists are making a strong 
bid to win them over, may notwithstanding all our efforts result in antagonising Kurds and virtu­
ally throwing them into arms of Kemalists.36
In Cox’s view, as long as that peace treaty was out of Britain’s reach, then it could not afford to 
lose the Northern Kurds to the Kemalists, who would definitely use them as a means of 
achieving their original aim of controlling Southern Kurdistan and possibly Mesopotamia. 
Cox’s attempts to persuade London to exploit the anti-Kemalist attitudes among Northern 
Kurdish nationalists continued until early 1923, when the Lausanne conference was well 
underway.
34* Secret Memorandum from Political Officer, Sulaimaniya, to High Commissioner, 29 July 1921, 
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In contrast to its counterpart in Baghdad, the British High Commission in Constantino­
ple supported the conciliatory approach of the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office towards 
the Kemalists, hoping to achieve peace as soon as possible. It, therefore, opposed any esca­
lation in British-Kemalist tension through British involvement in the affairs of Northern Kurdi­
stan. Like his predecessor De Robeck, Adm. H. Rumbold and the British General Staff Intelli­
gence in Constantinople were in agreement that in order to use the Kemalist forces as an 
instrument for containing the growing Bolshevik influence, Britain should be willing to adopt a 
conciliatory policy towards Turkey by radically modifying the terms of the Sevres treaty.3 7  
Otherwise, it was argued, any change in Britain’s neutral stance towards the Kurdish-Kemalist 
conflict would pre-empt successful British-Kemalist negotiations. 38 Rumbold, who reported 
the excitement that the holding of the London conference created among Kurdish nationalist 
circles, discouraged requests made by Kurdish leaders to forward their telegram to the confer­
ence in order to explain their position on the Kurdish question. 3 9  Having said that, the British 
officials in Constantinople did not totally ignore the Kurds as a potential political card. If Britain 
continued to face intransigent Kemalist attitudes or was forced to respond to the anti-British 
activities of the Kemalists and the Bolsheviks in Kurdistan, it would still be able to use the 
Kurdish nationalists as a means of containment.40 This policy would be executed without com­
mitting Britain either politically or militarily to the Kurdish cause.
/* - ChurchiU's Defensive Approach  T o  T f ic  A ffa irs  O f flo rth e rn  K urdistan
In contrast to Cox, Winston Churchill, the Colonial Secretary, was in favour of a conciliatory 
policy towards the Kemalists. His approach required no British support for, or association with, 
the Kurdish nationalists and their anti-Kemalist efforts to end Turkish rule in Northern Kurdi­
stan. Churchill feared that the adoption of hostile attitudes towards the Kemalists in support of 
national minorities such as the Kurds, would have unfavourable strategic consequences for 
Britain in the Middle East. He warned that the idea of supporting the Kurds or the Greeks 
against the Kemalist forces would result in a Kemaiist-Bolshevik alliance directed against Bri­
tain. Churchill’s position on the affairs of Northern Kurdistan, which can be termed as defen­
sive, should be considered as an extension of his views on the future of Southern Kurdistan.
37* Rumbold, Constantinople, 4 January 1921 & Cabinet Meeting, 20 January 1921, F0371/6464, PRO. 
38* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 20 December 1921, F0371/6481, PRO.
39* Rumbold, Constantinople, 2 March 1921, F0371/6346, PRO.
40* Rumbold, to Curzon, 29 December 1920 & Ryan, Constantinople, 23 December 1920, F0371/6346, 
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Here, he advocated a separate Kurdish entity to protect the newly-emerging Iraqi state from 
Kemalist and possibly Bolshevik threats. By contrast, Cox’s offensive approach sought to 
transfer the sphere of containment of the Kemalist threat from Southern Kurdistan to North­
ern Kurdistan. The former approach would expose Kemalist Turkey, not Britain, as the aggres­
sor for violating the terms of the 1918 Mudros armistice, which had placed the Mosul Wilayet 
under British control. Moreover, it would prevent Britain from risking both a major military invol­
vement outside its mandatory areas in Kurdistan and turning Kemalist Turkey into a perma­
nent threat to the British position in Mesopotamia.
The origins of Churchill’s views on the rising Kemalist movement go back to the per­
iod when he had been the Secretary of State for War (until February 1921). As far back as 
October 1919 he had argued that the anti-Turkish policy would lead to the spread of pan- 
Islamic feelings in India, fresh disturbances in Egypt, an increase in Arab unrest and a new 
round of Armenian massacres. Moreover/Britain would not be able to use" Mustafa Kem aland  
a reconciled Turkey as a barrier against the Bolsheviks”.41 The War Office under Churchill’s 
leadership considered Bolshevism the greatest danger in the Middle East and felt that Britain 
should therefore forestall any development that might lead to a Kemalist-Bolshevik alliance 
directed against British imperial interests in the region. The Kemalist nationalists, he stated, 
were not hostile to Britain, but to the partition of Turkey. So why should Britain antagonise 
them “solely for the benefit of alien and predatory races?”.42 After becoming the Colonial 
Secretary and, therefore, responsible for administrating mandated territories in the Middle 
East, Churchill pronounced the same views, which he shared with Lord Curzon and Edwin 
Montagu. Both Churchill and Curzon consistently opposed Lloyd George’s policy of support­
ing the Greeks at the expense of the Kemalist Turks. Lloyd George’s policy, they and the 
General Staff feared,43 would throw the Kemalists into the arms of the Bolsheviks. Neither the 
growing signs of moderation in France’s Turkish policy nor the arguments of his Cabinet col­
leagues persuaded Lloyd George to change his anti-Kemalist stance.
The existence of these contradictory views after the Cairo conference expressed an 
uncertainty common among the British officials at home and abroad as to the way in which Bri­
tain could fit in its attitudes towards the Kurdish situation with its broader policy in the Middie 
East,where the peace with Turkey and the containment of Bolshevism occupied a central
41* Martin Gilbert, Winston Churchill, Vol.IV, 1917-1922, (London: Heinmann, 1977), p.501.
42* Churchill, Memorandum on Military Policy In Asia Minor, 9 October 1919, CAB24/89, PRO.
43* Kent, Moguls and Mandarins, p. 103.
225
place. At the Foreign Office, C.J. Edmonds advocated a “modus vivendr with Turkey, 
whereas Forbes Adam argued in favour of a policy of physical force towards the Kemalists. 44  
The staff of the Colonial Office were generally in favour of Churchill’s position of non­
intervention in the affairs of Northern Kurdistan. Some officials at the Colonial Office even 
suggested a rectification of the frontier between Southern and Northern Kurdistan “as an 
inducement" to the Kemalists to stop their anti-British attitudes,45  which hindered the imple­
mentation of the new policy of indirect British control in Mesopotamia. Shuckburgh criticised 
Cox’s suggestion that Britain should back the anti-Kemalist efforts of the Northern Kurdish 
nationalists for fear that it would turn Turkey into an "eternal enemy" of Britain, while the suc­
cess of the new British policy towards Iraq required “a friendly T u rke f. He argued that an anti- 
Kemalist revolt in Northern Kurdistan would be a “a fiasco” and consequently worsen the Iraqi 
situation, rather than improving it.46 To him, Britain was neither in a position to adequately sup­
port the revolt of the Northern Kurds, nor able to accommodate Kurdish refugees if it failed.
The political situation in Northern Kurdistan and the state of the Kurdish nationalist 
movement were among the reasons why the British Government was unwilling to become 
embroiled in the affairs of Northern Kurdistan. It was convinced that the Kurdish nationalists 
were incapable of successfully leading an anti-Turkish revolt. A Colonial Office minute noted 
that "the lessons of the last few years are overwhelmingly against employing weak friends 
against powerful enemies, when we are not in a  position to give them adequate support”.47 
Any British involvement in Kurdish revolts was considered a dangerous gamble, and should 
only be adopted reluctantly and as a last resort, when other diplomatic options were totally 
exhausted. The idea of using the Kurds as a last resort was contained in Shuckburgh’s com­
ments on Churchill’s reply to Cox on the issue of supporting the Northern Kurds. He made 
clear that the Lausanne conference was the last chance for Britain to persuade the Kemalists 
to sign a new peace treaty. Otherwise, Britain would have to consider"whether advantage 
should be taken of the opportunity offered by the present temper of the [Northern] Kurds to 
obtain their co-operation against possible Turkish aggression”.48 The success of the Lau­
sanne conference in achieving a new Turkish peace agreement ruled out the question of Brit­
ish sponsorship of anti-Kemalist revolts in Northern Kurdistan, even though Southern Kurdi-
44* Edmonds & Adam, Foreign Office minutes No.4766,25/26 April 1921, F0371/6346, PRO.
45* Second Minute Middle Eastern Committee, Colonial Office, 12 May 1921, F0371/6344, PRO.
46* Shuckburgh, Colonial Office Minute of 10 November 1921, CO730/6, PRO.
47* Colonial Office Minute, 11 November 1921, CO730/6, PRO.
48* Shuckburgh, 21 February 1922, F0371/7781, PRO.
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stan’s future remained an unresolved matter between the two concerned parties: Britain and 
Turkey.
iii- <Tfte Conclusion O f *Che Causanne A greem ent A nd  9 ? s  im p lica tio n s  J o r he 
Kurdish Question
The history of the British position on the Kurdish question following Sevres is one of a steady 
retreat from both the principle of self-determination and the consideration of the question as 
an international one. The 1921 London conference was the first step towards relegating the 
Kurdish question to the background. A year later, the Kurdish question was again ignored 
during the course of the Allies’ negotiations on the Turkish settlement. Britain complained 
about the lack of Allied support for its position on the question of non-Turkish minorities. 49 At 
the second meeting, the Allies agreed, insofar as the position of minorities was concerned, 
that the League should appoint Commissioners to visit regions where ethnic and religious 
tensions were at their peak, such as Smyrna, Potus, Angora and Cilicia, so In none of the nine 
Allies’ meetings was there any direct or indirect reference to the Kurdish regions or the Kurd­
ish question. Curzon’s idea of extending the Commissioners’ power of supervision to non- 
Turkish Muslims, which would include the Northern Kurds, was not adopted.51 His speech in 
the House of Lords confirmed the Allies’ intention to exclude the Kurds from their discussion 
of the minorities question in Asiatic Turkey. 52 Soon after, Christian minorities such as the 
Assyrian-Chaldeans were also excluded from Point 6 of the final draft on the minorities ques­
tion because of French objections:
They [Allies] desire to provide for the protection and security of the various minorities whether 
Muslim or Christian or other races and creeds, who whether in Europe or Asia, find themselves 
placed in the midst of larger political or ethnic aggressions.53
What the Allies agreed on in their meetings became the basis for their approach to the ques­
tion of the national minorities at the forthcoming peace conference in Lausanne.
Lausanne was chosen for being a town in a neutral country, i.e. Switzerland. The con­
ference was, as Busch points out, the only post-war one in which the victorious Allies met with
49* Hardinge, Paris, 24 March 1922, F0371/7858, PRO.
50* A high commissioner was already appointed by the League Council, which passed a resolution in 
early 1922 in which it drew the Allies’ attention to the urgent need to secure the protection of minorities.
It expressed its readiness to co-operate with the Powers to secure the objects of Sevres.
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the defeated Turks on almost equal terms. 54 The agenda of the conference revolved around 
three major issues: the future of Thrace, Mosul and capitulations. Three Commissions were 
formed, and Curzon assumed charge of the important Territorial and Military Commission. 
Apart from the conciliatory attitudes of its former Allies towards Kemalist Turkey, Britain’s diplo­
matic activities at Lausanne were influenced by several ominous developments. September 
1922 witnessed the collapse of the Greek front in Asia Minor, which was followed by the 
advance of the Kemalist forces into Smyrna and the neutral zone around the Straits. The latter 
development was of special importance because the Kemalists directly challenged Britain. 
The ensuing Chanak crisis exposed the diplomatic and military weakness of Britain, when nei­
ther its former Allies nor its white Dominions wanted to fight the Turks .55 This crisis even 
played some part in the fall of Lloyd George’s coalition Government on 19 October 1922. The 
accession of the Conservatives to power on 23 October had immediate effects on the Kurd­
ish question, as they were in favour of a conciliatory policy towards Kemalist Turkey and had a 
totally indifferent attitudes towards the issue of the non-Turkish minorities. Lloyd George 
accused the Conservatives of having always been pro-Turk. Indeed, the new Conservative 
Government was determined to normalise British relations with Kemalist Turkey, hoping to dir­
ect the latter, if possible, against Bolshevik Russia. One of the ways to improve bilateral rela­
tions with the Kemalists was to put no emphasis on the problematic question of the non- 
Turkish minorities. In the new Government, Curzon was the only British policy-maker who 
retained his old job as Foreign Secretary. This was important because, as previously men­
tioned, he firmly supported the policy of improving relations with the Kemalists. In the 
absence of Lloyd George, who used to take independent initiatives behind his Foreign 
Secretary’s babk.se Curzon was freely able to pursue the new policy, which required Britain to 
pay much less attention to Greek interests, and most importantly, to the minority question in 
Asiatic Turkey. Indeed, Curzon, who favoured the incorporation of Southern Kurdistan into 
Iraq, conducted the most important rounds of the talks on the new Turkish peace settlement.
In the very early stages of the Lausanne conference in December 1922, the Allies 
granted the Kemalist delegation, according to Curzon, "a great concession" insofar as the 
Kurdish question was concerned. From then onward, it was to be considered as an internal 
question and not as a political or international one:
54* Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, p.365.
55* Kent, Moguls and Mandarins, p. 100.
56* Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, p.360.
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Departing from precedent of all European minority treaties... to the extent of excluding Muslim 
minorities from all articles of minority section of treaty, including that article, which places 
guarantee for execution in [the] hands of [the] League of Nations.57
The Allies expected Kemalist Turkey to adhere to a general declaration regarding the protec­
tion and freedom of all non-Turkish nationalities without distinction of birth, race, language or 
religion. There was no direct reference to the minorities, apart from the Armenians. No role 
would be played by the League of Nations in implementing the"protection of minorities” 
terms, which entirely depended on the Kemalists’ good will. These concessions were accep­
ted immediately by the Kemalist delegation. It is important to point out that the terms of the 
Lausanne agreement on the protection of the national minorities were only concerned with 
Christian minorities, 58 and did not really affect the Northern Kurds. The inclusion of the natio­
nal minorities terms in the new Turkish peace settlement had, in effect, no real value, given 
the Kemalists’ determination to impose pan-Turkish cultural and political hegemony over all 
non-Turkish nationalities. These terms were little more than a sly attempt by the British and 
their former Allies to save face, having failed to force the Kemalists to accept a modified ver­
sion of the Sevres treaty. One of the most important aspects of the Lausanne negotiations 
was the agreement between Britain and Kemalist Turkey that the Turkish-Mesopotamian 
frontier should be determined by "friendly” talks within a period of nine months. If both parties 
failed to reach a frontier agreement, the dispute would be referred to the League Council. 
Meanwhile, Britain and Kemalist Turkey undertook not to use force or other means to change 
the existing status of the concerned territories, i.e. the Mosul Wilayet.59
From the very outset, the Lausanne conference had immediate effects on British 
Kurdish policy. With the inauguration of peace negotiations between the Allies and Kemalist 
Turkey, British policy makers -such as Curzon- began to question the wisdom behind the idea 
of sponsoring Kurdish nationalism in Southern Kurdistan as a way of containing the Kemalist 
threat. Supporting the Kurdish nationalists in Southern Kurdistan, let alone in Northern Kurdi­
stan, became a dangerous card to play, since it would rouse Turkish fears about British inten­
tions and thus jeopardise the course of the peace negotiations:
Is it advisable at the moment, when we are negotiating with the Turks [at Lausanne] and when 
the position of the Mosul Wilayet may come into question, to take action such as is suggested 
by the Colonial Office in the direction of consolidating a Kurdish national movement? In view of
57* Curzon, Lausanne, 30 December 1922, FO371/9058, PRO.
58* See Appendix: Section III: Lausanne Treaty of Peace with Turkey and Accompanying Straits Con­
vention and Declaration on the Administration of Justice, Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1923, 
Treaty Series No. 16, Cmd, 1929.
59* Section 1, Article 3, ibid.
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this situation and of the fact that the situation at Lausanne changes from day to day, it is 
rather difficult for the [Foreign Office] department to make any definite recommendations on 
the question.eo
The political conditions surrounding the Lausanne conference turned Mahmud and his natio­
nalist followers into a political liability for the British in Southern Kurdistan. Encouraging Kurd­
ish nationalism, the British found out, would weaken their efforts in keeping Southern Kurdi­
stan out of Turkish control, since it would make the Kemalists even more determined to pre­
empt the emergence of a separate Kurdish entity, which would always pose a serious threat to 
their territorial unity. By contrast, the incorporation of Southern Kurdistan into Iraq would make 
it politically much easier for the British to dismiss Kemalist accusations that keeping Southern 
Kurdistan outside Turkish control would endanger the security and territorial integrity of Turk­
ey. It was far easier for Curzon to present the incorporation of Southern Kurdistan into the 
newly-emerging Iraqi state as a logical outcome, given the inclusion of Southern Kurdistan in 
Britain’s Mesopotamian mandate. Indeed, to support his argument that Southern Kurdistan 
formed a natural part of Iraq, Curzon always maintained that the British occupied a “judicial 
position° in Iraq “qua mandatory*.ei In other words, as Southern Kurdistan was part of the 
Mesopotamian mandate, the British had a moral obligation to ensure its inclusion in the suc­
cessor state, i.e. Iraq. According to Rumbold, Lord Curzon stated at the Lausanne confer­
ence that:
the whole of [the] Mosul Wilayet should properly be included in [the] Iraqi state and ever since 
the armistice, HMG have regarded the northern frontier of the Wilayet as the de facto admin­
istrative frontier of the Iraqi stated
In these circumstances, the temporary withholding of British withdrawal from Southern Kurdi­
stan pending the conclusion of peace with Turkey, was designed, in Dobbs’ words, to provide 
Britain with a “valuable diplomatic weapon of fait accompli”.63 This was fundamental to the 
implementation of the merging process of Southern Kurdistan with the Iraqi state.
60* R.C. Lindsay, Foreign Office Minute No.130941,24 November 1922, F0371/7782, PRO. 
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International And Regional Considerations Influencing British Attitudes 
Towards The Kurdish Question, 1921-1923
i- <Che A ttitudes O f Britain 's Jorm er Allies
From the early 1921 onwards, the Middle Eastern situation witnessed a series of develop­
ments that posed direct threats to the British position in Southern Kurdistan and Mesopota­
mia. In the space of one week, Kemalist Turkey concluded two agreements with Britain’s for­
mer Allies, Italy and France, on 13 and 17 March 1921 respectively, coupled with a treaty with 
Bolshevik Russia on 16 March 1921. The importance of the first two agreements, from the 
British perspective, lay in the fact that France and Italy violated the terms of the Allied Tripartite 
agreement of 10 August 1920. The latter was an arrangement for facilitating the re­
organisation of the defeated Ottoman Empire by eliminating international rivalries. It provided 
for (1) international commissions on control, (2) obtaining commercial and transport facilities 
and concessions, (3) diplomatic assistance, (4) supervising railways, (5) defining the boundar­
ies of French and Italian zones of interest, (6) mandatory powers of territories detached from 
Turkey, (7) the Heracles coal-field, (8) the withdrawal of French and Italian forces and (9) the 
protection of minorities. The implementation or the non-implementation of the first six points 
and Point 9 affected both Britain’s position in Southern Kurdistan and its attitudes towards the 
remainder of the Kurdish areas.
Given direct French involvement in all post-war political and territorial rearrangements 
of the former Ottoman Wilayets, the Kemalist-French agreement was bound to have political 
and military implications for the British position in Southern Kurdistan and Mesopotamia. First­
ly, by unilaterally ending the state of war between France and Kemalist Turkey, the agreement 
amounted to a French recognition of the Angora Government, with whom Britain was still tech­
nically at war. Thus, Britain felt isolated and defensive vis-a-vis Kemalist Turkey, a country that 
was determined to restore Turkish rule to as many Ottoman territories as it could. Secondly, by 
giving back to Turkey certain Kurdish areas such as Jezirah and Nisibin, France practically 
abdicated from its responsibilities towards the protection of the non-Turkish minorities under 
the terms of the 1920 Sevres treaty.64 Finally, France abandoned its old obligations under the 
same agreement of 10 August 1920 -namely, to maintain troops in its zone of interests until 
the peace terms were executed by Turkey. 65 in other words, Britain sensed that it had 
become both militarily and diplomatically weaker vis-a-vis Kemalist Turkey. This meant that an
64* Curzon to the Count de Saint-Aulain, 5 November 1921, CO730f7, PRO.
65* Ibid.
231
early peace with Kemalist Turkey became much harder to achieve, given the intransigent atti­
tudes of the Kemalists, whose confidence was boosted enormously by their diplomatic suc­
cesses in March 1921.
British military personnel in Mesopotamia quickly voiced their concern about the 
unforeseen Kemalist-French agreement. They, when interpreting the effects of that agree­
ment on the British position in Mesopotamia, went so far as to suspect an anti-British conspir­
acy. According to them, the French, with Kemalist help, were plotting to expand their influ­
ence among the Kurds by establishing a great Kurdish confederacy under their patronage:
To begin with, the members are to be Barazi, between the Belikh and the Euphrates, the Mili, 
between the Belikh and the Jajjagahg Su. Later, the Kocher, Hajan. Miran and Kurds of Mardin 
are to be roped in and the final object to be aimed at is to extend French influence as far as 
Sulaimaniya. The movement is... directed against the British.ee
This explained, according to this interpretation, why the French “deliberately abandoned” 
most of their obligations towards Turkey under the terms of the Sevres treaty. This interpreta­
tion was inaccurate insofar as France’s intentions in Ottoman Kurdistan were concerned. 
France showed on every occasion its opposition to Kurdish nationalist aspirations, mistakenly 
believing that Britain sought a British-orientated Kurdistan in the form of an independent or 
autonomous state. Through its good relations with the Kemalists, France sought to consoli­
date its economic influence, and to weaken what it perceived as Britain’s national minorities 
card as a means of maintaining its influence. Accordingly, during the London conference in 
1921, France opposed League of Nations’ intervention in the question of the national minori­
ties and proposals to appoint a High Commissioner to supervise the interests of minorities 
such as the Kurds. 67 France suspected British involvement in all anti-Kemalist efforts by the 
Kurdish nationalists. This might explain, for example, why the French authorities refused per­
mission for Akram Bey, a Kurdish nationalist leader who was involved in the preparation of an 
anti-Kemalist revolt, to go to Diyarbekir via Beirut.68
The British thought that, from the strategic viewpoint, the transfer of the Kurdish 
areas of Nisibin and Jezirah-ibn-Omar from French to Kemalist control had immediate implica­
tions. These two Kurdish areas were of “great strategic importance in relation to Mosul and 
Mesopotamia” and that similar strategic importance applied to “the handing back to Turkey of 
the track of the Baghdad Railway between Tchoban-Bey and Nisibin”.w Against this back-
66* General Headquarter, Mes. EX.Force, 26 September 1921, F0371/6369, PRO.
67* Curzon, Paris, 23 March 1922, F0371/7858, PRO.
68* Rumbold, Constantinople, to High Commissioner, Baghdad, November 1920, F0371/6346, PRO.
69* Ibid.
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ground, Curzon informed the French, that, because of the threat to their position in Mesopota­
mia, the British would not remain indifferent towards the handing over of the track of the Bagh­
dad railway and the Kurdish areas of Jezirah-ibn-Omar and Nisibin to Turkey. 70 Indeed, both of 
these developments strengthened the military position of the Kemalists in areas cldse to the 
frontiers and thus made an imminent Turkish invasion of Southern Kurdistan an ever more 
likely prospect. In these circumstances, Britain understandably decided to keep its imperial 
forces in the out-posts in Southern Kurdistan, and to retain its responsibility for the defence 
of Mesopotamia, until peace with Turkey was established. The French-Kemalist agreement 
had, in the British view, other political implications for Southern Kurdistan. The British feared 
that French territorial concessions in Western Kurdistan would encourage the Kemalists to 
bring more pressure on them to give similar territorial concessions in Southern Kurdistan.71 
Furthermore, French recognition of Turkish rule over the Kurdish areas of Jezirah and Nisibin 
would lend legitimacy to Turkish claims to all Kurdish areas under British control. Despite all 
Paris’s assurances to London that no facilities would be given to Kemalist designs against 
Mesopotamia, and that there would be no war materials suppled to the Kemalists, 72  the impact 
of the Kemalist-French agreement evidently accentuated the cautious British approach to the 
Kurdish situation.
The period immediately before the holding of the Lausanne conference, from Sep­
tember to October 1922, witnessed increasing Kemalist determination to undo all the national 
minorities’ terms for Kurdistan and Armenia under the Sevres treaty. There were increasing 
rumours about a bilateral Kemalist-French understanding, involving French encouragement 
of the Kemalists in their efforts to control the Mosul Wilayet. The early Lausanne meetings 
between the Allies and Kemalist Turkey were held concurrently with the Paris negotiations 
over the question of German reparations. As Marian Kent points out, the ensuing sharp differ­
ences between British and French policies over that question -which subsequently led to the 
French-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr in January 1923- had enormous repercussions at the 
Lausanne conference, where the French (and the Italians) expressed conciliatory attitudes 
towards the Kemalist delegation. 73 This virtually put an end to Curzon’s strategy at the confer­
ence, which was mainly based on confronting the Kemalist delegation with a united Allied
70* Curzon to M. de Montille, 25 November 1921, C0730/7, PRO.
71 * Curzon to the Count de Saint-Aulain, 5 November 1921, CO730/7, PRO.
72* S/S for the Colonies to High Commissioner, 30 November 1921, CO730/7, PRO.
73* Kent, Moguls and Mandarins, p113.
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front.74
Against the background of potential French (and even American) support for the 
Kemalist position on Mosul, and an urgent need to implement the new policy of indirect British 
control, Curzon raised the question of granting the Kemalist side some territorial concessions 
during the Lausanne negotiations. In his view, if Britain decided to give territorial concessions, 
it had to choose between firstly, the cession of the whole or part of the Mosul Wilayet, includ­
ing Southern Kurdistan, and secondly, the cession of part or whole of Southern Kurdistan. 75  
It must be remembered that Curzon’s definition of Southern Kurdistan in this context was con­
fined to a portion of it. This territorial concession would arguably not affect Britain’s strategic 
position in Mesopotamia because it was “a long narrow strip of country, which would be most 
difficult for Turks to administer and [of] little value to them".76 The idea of granting the Kemal­
ists limited territorial concessions was unanimously rejected by the Colonial Office Committee, 
as well as the Chief of the General Staff and Chief of the Air Staff. They feared that from the 
military viewpoint, the Kemalist threat to Mesopotamia would be enormously increased by the 
weakening the latter’s strategic defences in Southern Kurdistan. From the political viewpoint, 
the Kurds and Arabs alike would oppose this idea, and consequently, turn against Britain. Fur­
thermore, Turkish interests were concentrated in areas situated on the southern edges of 
Southern Kurdistan, where the Turkoman elements lived, such as Arbil, Kifri and Kirkuk. 
Therefore, limited territorial concessions by Britain would not satisfy the Kemalists. 7 7  This 
debate shows how increasingly vulnerable the British position was in the post-Sevres period, 
and that even limited French territorial concessions in Kurdistan to Kemalist Turkey forced 
British civilian and military circles to re-examine their entire policy in Southern Kurdistan and 
Mesopotamia.
<7- Kemalist Turkey, g rita in  And hChe Kurdish Situation
As previously mentioned, Kemalist diplomatic victories in signing agreements with France and 
Italy, and a treaty with Bolshevik Russia, had immediate military implications for the British posi­
tion in Southern Kurdistan and Mesopotamia. It led to the growing belief among British military
74* Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, p. 121.
75* Annexure i, 7 December 1922 -in- Cabinet Committee On Iraq (I.R.0.1st) 8 December 1922, 
F0371/7772, PRO.
76*lbid.
77* Annexure ii, Curzon, Lausanne, 8 December 1922 -in- Cabinet Committee On Iraq (I.R.0.1st) 8 
December 1922, F0371/7772, PRO.
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officials both in London and Baghdad that a Kemalist invasion across the northern frontiers of 
Mesopotamia was a strong possibility. This belief was reinforced by the Greeks’ defeat at the 
hands of the Kemalists. Now that the forces of the Kemalists were no longer distracted by the 
Greeks and the Bolsheviks, they were in a far stronger position to devote their military efforts 
outwards to projects such as regaining the Mosul Wilayet. The Kemalists, according to a War 
Office memorandum, were emboldened by “the process of reducing" British forces in Iraq, fol­
lowing the ending of a British military presence in neighbouring Persia. 78 Britain was aware 
that all its former Allies, let alone Bolshevik Russia, desired a British defeat over the Mosul 
question because of their belief that if the Turks recovered Mosul -or preferably the whole of 
Mesopotamia- they would stand a good chance of exploiting the valuable oil-bearing potential 
of the country.7 9  To forestall any French and American support for the Turkish position on the 
Mosul issue during the Lausanne negotiations, Britain generously offered them each a 25% 
share in TPC. Curzon offered the Kemalists a similar share during the Lausanne negotia- 
tions.This offer was, according to Busch, part of Curzon’s strategy of trading off oil for Mosul.so 
The Kemalists rejected the offer and, as part of their strategy at the conference, attempted to 
persuade Britain to accept their control over Mosul, in return for breaking relations with the 
Bolsheviks.8i Mustafa Kemal used his close relations with the Bolsheviks as a lever against 
the Allies, particularly Britain. 82 He also made the most of the inter-Allied disagreement both 
before and during the Lausanne conference, 83 with the aim of strengthening Turkey’s diplo­
matic position.
The Kemalists’ own approach to the Kurdish situation also influenced Britain’s Kurd­
ish policy. The creation of pro-Turkish societies for co-ordinating anti-British propaganda, and 
the dispatch of Turkish irregulars to co-operate with Southern Kurdish rebels in their fight 
against the British presence were the principal tactics the Kemalists used to demonstrate that 
Britain was incapable of providing either a workable government or political stability in South­
ern Kurdistan. For this reason, and as the Southern Kurds had no desire to be ruled by the 
Arabs, the Kemalists would argue that their demand for the re-establishment of Turkish rule in 
Southern Kurdistan was justifiable. Apart from this argument, the Kemalists laid claim to
78* S/S for War, Memorandum, 21 November 1921, F0371/6347, PRO.
79* Cabinet (No. C.P.3566), 13 December 1921, F0371/6347, PRO.
80* Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, p.244.
81* Ibid,
82* Kent, Moguls and Mandarins, p. 103.
83* Ibid, pp.114-115.
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Southern Kurdistan on the grounds of the illegality of British control over Mosul. It must be 
remembered that the British forces captured Mosul a few days after the conclusion of the 
Mudros armistice on 31 October 1918, which ended the war between Turkey and the Allies. 
Clause 16 of the Mudros armistice provided for the surrender of the Turkish garrisons in 
Mesopotamia to the nearest Allied commander. From the Turkish viewpoint, this clause did 
not apply to the Mosul Wilayet, but to the Baghdad and Basra Wilayets. Turkish claims to 
Mosul were repeatedly made public whenever the Kemalists negotiated with the Allies. For 
instance, Jamil Bey, a senior member of the Kemalist delegation at the London conference, 
emphatically told Feisal that Turkey had no designs on its former Arab Wilayets and that it was 
willing to make a treaty on “the most generous terms*.m
Promising the Kurds local autonomy within Turkey was one of the Kemalists’ main tac­
tics in consolidating their political influence in Kurdistan. This would also help them to mobilise 
the Kurds in Northern and Southern Kurdistan against the British. In other words, the Kurds - 
southerners and northerners alike- would have every reason to support Turkish territorial 
claims to the Mosul Wilayet, as this meant the re-unification of Ottoman Kurdistan in the form 
of an autonomous entity. London was aware of, and alarmed by, the Kemalists’ Kurdish policy 
and, therefore, sought such a policy towards Southern Kurdistan that would foil all Kemalist 
attempts to win over the Southern Kurds.85 Thus, in spite of Cox and Feisal’s opposition, the 
Colonial Office decided on the re-establishment of another Kurdish government under the 
leadership of Mahmud in early autumn 1922, a step which was designed to frustrate the 
Kemalist efforts to consolidate their influence in Southern Kurdistan.
The Kemalists’ rejection of partial British concessions in Kurdistan in 1921 reflected 
their firm belief that Britain would become increasingly amenable to their pressure, following 
their considerable diplomatic and political achievements at both the international and domes­
tic levels. Indeed, in late 1921, the British told the Kemalists that they were willing to recog­
nise their control over Northern Kurdistan in return for the protection of Christian minorities. 
Even though this constituted a major departure from the terms of the Sevres treaty, the 
Kemalists rejected the proposal because it clearly implied that Southern Kurdistan would 
remain under the British mandate. The Kemalists optimistically awaited the right moment when 
the British would be forced to leave Southern Kurdistan, either due to financial problems or 
through Kurdish resistance, which they helped to stiffen by providing arms and officers. The 
84* Cornwallis, 24 February 1921, F0371/6467, PRO.
85* Message from Prime Minister to Mr. Churchill, 22 March 1921, F0371/6342, PRO
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Kemalists also drew their confidence from the opposition of the Southern Kurds to the impo­
sition of Arab rule over Southern Kurdistan. Given the inability of the Arabs to incorporate 
Southern Kurdistan into Iraq on their own, the Kemalists believed that they could easily step 
in to fill the political vacuum which would result from the withdrawal of both the British garrison 
and administration from the Kurdish areas.
Although the Kemalists were heartened by several military developments, such as 
their defeat of the Greeks and later the Armenians, they eventually signed a peace treaty with 
the British at Lausanne, without succeeding in extending their control to Southern Kurdistan. 
The future of the latter was to be settled through peaceful means, such as the intervention of 
the League of Nations. The question is why the Kemalists resorted to peaceful means to set­
tle Southern Kurdistan’s future, rather then forcing the British to go. There are two explana­
tions. Firstly, the Kemalists feared that the continuation of instability in Southern Kurdistan 
might worsen further the political situation in the Kurdish areas under their control. Indeed, a 
series of local Kurdish revolts between 1920 and 1923 showed that the Northern Kurds for­
med the most difficult internal obstacle to the Kemalist consolidation of their authority. In view 
of the continuing British-Kemalist confrontation and political instability in both Southern and 
Northern Kurdistan, the Kemalists feared that a different solution for the Kurdish question 
might come to the fore by turning Ottoman Kurdistan into an independent state. At least, the 
Kemalists probably thought that Britain was in a position to declare an independent Southern 
Kurdistan as a means of permanently weakening the security of the young Kemalist state -a 
prospect which would inevitably encourage the Northern Kurds to free themselves from Turk­
ish rule.
Under such conditions, it was natural that the return of Mahmud and the re­
establishment of his autonomous Government considerably alarmed the Kemalists, who inter­
preted these developments as a dear massage from Britain that if they did not end their hos­
tile activities, Southern Kurdistan would be eventually established as an independent state. 
These Turkish fears were expressed in an intercepted telegram from the Kemalist Govern­
ment to its representative at the Lausanne conference. The telegram drew the attention of 
the Kemalist representative, Ismet Pasha, to British plans to financially and politically 
strengthen the Kurds and to establish an independent Kurdistan, which would threaten Turk­
ey’s security.86 Mustafa Kemal’s five-day long speech in 1927 included details of Kurdish col-
86* Reof, Angora, to Ismet, Lausanne, 3 May 1923, F0371/9005, PRO.
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laboration with the British to establish an independent Kurdistan, with a view to undermining 
his movement. 87 The seriousness of the Kemalists’ fears manifested itself both in their deci­
sion to resort to peaceful means, immediately after the establishment of an autonomous Kurd­
ish government in Sulaimaniya, and in their refusal to support Mahmud’s subsequent revolt 
against Britain. Secondly, when a British counter offensive successfully began in Rowanduz - 
which was accompanied by heavy air bombardments of Kurdish rebellious areas- the Kurdish 
insurgents, who up to this point played an essential part in the Kemalist policy of destabilising 
Southern Kurdistan, stopped their activities and withheld their military co-operation with the 
Kemalists. As a consequence, the Kemalists lost their main instrument designed to exhaust 
the British militarily and financially, as well as undermining their political credibility not only in 
Southern Kurdistan but also in Iraq. In their interpretation of the British counter offensive, the 
Kemalists even suspected that the limited British offensive in Rowanduz was a prelude to a 
long-term policy of aggression in support of Kurdish nationalist aspirations. British reports 
from Constantinople show how the Kemalists were “greatly preoccupied" over the recent Brit­
ish military activities in the Rowanduz area, which was perceived to be “calculated to render 
acute the whole question of Kurdistan”.88
i l l -  Persia, g rita in  And e€he Kurdish S ituation
The Kemalist menace to Southern Kurdistan coincided with a tangible change in Persian atti­
tudes towards British influence in their country. The new nationalist Persian Government of 
Siphdar, which was formed following Gen. Riza Shah’s military coup on 21 February, wanted 
to end British political influence in Persia, especially in the south, where the British backed a 
semi-independent Arab entity in the province of Khuzistan. In the post-Sevres period, Bri­
tain’s political influence was considerably weakened by the withdrawal of its imperial forces 
from Persian territories under financial pressure and by the rejection of the Majlis (the Persian 
Parliament) of the British-Persian draft agreement, which would have granted Britain virtual 
political and economic control over Persia.89 Britain became even more amenable to Persia’s 
pressure as the latter concluded a friendship treaty with Bolshevik Russia on 26 February, five 
days after the military coup. Not only did this considerably improve the economic and diplo-
87* Mustafa Kemal, A Speech Delivered by G. Mustafa Kemal. op. cit.
88* Mr. Henderson, Constantinople, 6 May 1923, F0371/9005, PRO.
89* Rouhollah K. Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran: A Developing Nation in World Affairs, 1500- 
1941, (The University Press of Virginia, 1966), pp. 164-165.
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matic relations between the two countries, but it also led to the withdrawal of Russian forces 
from northern Persia.90 The Persian Government also dramatically improved its bilateral rela­
tions with its counterpart in Turkey, Persia’s historical enemy. Britain was increasing anxious 
about the prospect of an alliance between Persia and Kemalist Turkey, or even between Per­
sia and Bolshevik Russia, which would pose a direct threat to its position in India and the Mid­
dle East. Under these new circumstances, Britain could not run the risk of turning Southern 
Kurdistan into an autonomous entity because of the serious threat it would pose to Persian 
territorial integrity, especially Persian control over Eastern Kurdistan.
It was this Persian factor that always prevented Britain from entering into formal rela­
tions with Simko in Eastern Kurdistan. When, for instance, British officials in Mesopotamia 
contemplated the idea of using Simko’s influence as a barrier against both the Kemalists and 
the Bolsheviks, Churchill instructed Cox not to make any political arrangements with Simko, 
apart from those which were connected with the question of the repatriation of the Christian 
refugees to Urmia. 91 The Persian Government, which had earlier protested against British 
contacts with Simko, was informed of Churchill’s instruction.9 2  Even the project of repatriating 
the Christian refugees to their own lands in Urmia became impossible for the British to carry 
out in co-operation with Simko because of Persian opposition. The Persians perceived any 
political deals between Simko and the British as amounting to recognition by the latter of the 
authority of the former in the mutinous parts of Eastern Kurdistan. These examples show how 
the political developments in the post-S£vres Middle East made the British amenable to the 
political pressure of such a weak country as Persia.
At another level, Britain was aware that the Persian Government had its own expan­
sionist agenda in Southern Kurdistan, especially in the Sulaimaniya, Rowanduz and Auraman 
regions. Like Kemalist Turkey, Persia considered the British decision to withdraw from Meso­
potamia as an opportunity to obtain territory in Southern Kurdistan. This motive, along with 
Persian fears over the emergence of a separate Southern Kurdistan, could explain why the 
Persian Government granted logistical support for the military operations of the Kemalist irreg­
ulars in Southern Kurdistan. Cox frequently reported Persian complicity in Kemalist intrigues 
in Southern Kurdistan by providing Euzdemir, a local Kemalist commander, with officers and 
90* Ibid, pp.186-188.
91 * S/S for the Colonies to High Commissioner of Iraq, 22 November 1922, F0371 f7782, PRO. Said 
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ammunition to re-capture Southern Kurdistan from the British.9 3  Through this co-operation, 
Persia hoped to grab a share in Southern Kurdistan. Indeed, there was information on a Per- 
sian-Turkish understanding that, in return for its support for Turkey, Persia would be territori­
ally rewarded by the rectification of the Auraman frontier in its favour. 94 Although Persia stated 
that its co-operation with Turkey was limited to the suppression of the Simko movement, and 
that it was neutral in the existing Turkish-British conflict in Rowanduz, 9 5  the British were aware 
that Persian interest in the issue stemmed from territorial ambitions. In light of this Britain 
refused to allow the representatives of the Persian Government to attend the Lausanne con­
ference, where the Persians hoped to achieve some territorial gains in Southern Kurdistan. 90 
Ironically, the Kemalists had earlier supported Simko’s anti-Persian revolt, hoping to extend 
their political control to Eastern Kurdistan. The Persians were aware of the Kemalists’ desire to 
unite all parts of Kurdistan into one nominal autonomous entity under their rule. 97 British offi­
cials also reported that the Kemalists encouraged Eastern Kurds to declare independence 
from Mako to Kermanshah.98 Kemalist policy in Eastern Kurdistan also sought to pressurise 
Persia into not co-operating with Britain, and to foil its plans for the annexation of certain Kurd­
ish areas in Northern Kurdistan along the Turkish-Persian frontiers. It was under such condi­
tions of intrigue and counter-intrigue and contradictory territorial ambitions that the British had 
to cautiously conduct their Kurdish policy in the post-S6vres period.
Conclusion
Several developments influenced Britain’s position on Kurdish affairs after the conclusion of 
the Sevres treaty in August 1920. Militarily, Britain’s acute financial problems restricted the 
extent of its commitments in areas such as Mesopotamia and Southern Kurdistan. This con­
straint on military commitments had a direct political impact as Britain was no longer in a posi­
tion to force Turkey to end either its territorial claims and its threat to Southern Kurdistan, or 
respect the political and cultural rights of the non-Turkish nationalities under the terms of the 
S&vres treaty. Resorting to diplomacy was Britain’s main option for bringing peace with Turk-
93* Foreign Office Minute No.3020,11 April 1923, F0371/9004, PRO.
94* S/S, 1 February 1923, F0371/9004, PRO.
95* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 12 January 1923, FO371/9039, PRO.
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ey. This state of affairs and Britain’s desire to pre-empt a Kemalist-Bolshevik alliance rendered 
insignificant, in the eyes of the new Conservative Government, such issues as those of the 
future of the non-Turkish nationalities. Thus at the Lausanne conference, Britain gave com­
plete concessions to the Kemalists on the issue of the future of Armenia and Kurdistan for the 
sake of improving bilateral relations with Turkey. Pressures on Britain also came from other dir­
ections, such as the conflict of its interests with former Allies, the new disposition of the Per­
sian Government to end British influence in Persia and the political, economic and strategic 
requirements of establishing a viable Arab state in Iraq.
During the period 1920-1923, British policy was characterised by a gradual shift from 
the concept of Kurdish autonomy to that of maintaining the status quo by turning the de facto 
partition of Ottoman Kurdistan into de jure one. In other words, any modification or substitu­
tion of the Sevres treaty with a new peace settlement would have to provide for the retention 
of British control over Southern Kurdistan in return for recognising Northern Kurdistan’s sta­
tus as part of the new Kemalist Turkey. In parallel with this, Britain changed its early position on 
the Kurdish question, in that it no longer considered the Kurdish situation as having an inter­
national dimension, and maintained further that the treatment of the Kurds was the concern of 
the states of the region. This dramatic change can be seen when contrasting the terms of the 
1920 SSvres treaty with those of the 1923 Lausanne agreement. The former had elevated 
the Kurdish question to an unprecedented international level whereas the latter, by delibera­
tely omitting it, demoted it to an internal level.
The Lausanne conference constituted a watershed in British policy for the above 
mentioned reasons, and also tipped the balance in favour of the incorporation of Southern 
Kurdistan into the newly-emerging Iraqi state. The terms of the Lausanne agreement, insofar 
as they frustrated the political aspirations of the Kurdish nationalist movement, placed Britain 
in the same position as Turkey, Persia, Syria and Iraq. Prom then onward, these countries 
were to share similar worries about political instability in their respective Kurdish regions. 
Indeed, following the Lausanne conference, an explicit understanding emerged among 
these states, including Britain, that no party would take any step in its own respective Kurdish 
region, which might undermine the political stability or territorial integrity of other states. After 
settling the outstanding problem of the Iraqi-Turkish frontiers in 1926, Britain, Iraq, Turkey and 
Persia explicitly joined forces to vigorously contain the Kurdish nationalist movement when­
ever it manifested itself in armed revolts or secret political activities.
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One of the key points which this study has sought to underline is that owing to Kurdistan’s 
distinctive geopolitical position as a land-locked country situated among the Ottoman Empire, 
the Russian Empire and the Qajar Persia, the Kurdish question had an exceptionally important 
international aspect when compared with other contemporary questions such as the Arab 
one. The historical emergence of Kurdish nationalism, and its development as a new political 
force that sought to change the status quo, was not only conditioned by internal develop­
ments within Ottoman Turkey and Qajar Persia, but also by the Great Powers’ policies and 
interests in these two countries. Indeed, as this study has illustrated, the reactions of British 
policy makers to the Kurdish situation were subjected to a general imperial strategy that cov­
ered a vast area stretching from the frontiers of India in the east to Egypt and the Mediterra­
nean Sea in the west. Central to the success of that strategy was the maintenance of the Brit­
ish position in areas overlooking the sea and land routes to India. Every time Britain modified 
its general strategy, its position on the future of Kurdistan was accordingly affected. By divi­
ding it into several historical phases, this study has made it possible to chart the evolution of 
Britain’s interest in Kurdish affairs in line with its general imperial strategy in the Middle East 
between the middle of the Nineteenth Century and the early 1920’s.
The first phase covered the Nineteenth Century, and was characterised by the incom­
patibility of the political aspirations of the Kurdish nationalists for a separate and an indepen­
dent Kurdistan with Britain’s strategic interests. In this phase, Britain became interested in 
Kurdish affairs because of its concern for the territorial unity of the Ottoman Empire and Qajar 
Persia. These two countries were perceived by Britain as bulwarks against Russian southward 
expansionism towards the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf. In these circumstances, it 
was natural that Britain watched closely the rise of Kurdish nationalism and the serious threat 
that it posed to the heartland of the Ottoman Empire and the Qajar Persia. Given this danger 
to its strategic interests, Britain reacted negatively to the outbreak of armed revolts in various 
parts of Kurdistan in the Nineteenth Century, and backed the endeavours of the Ottoman 
and Qajar authorities to defend their heartland from internal and external threats.
The second phase covered the period between the end of the Nineteenth Century 
and the outbreak of the First World War. During this time, Britain regarded the growing Ger­
man political and economic influence in the Middle East, especially after the 1908 Young
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Turks revolt, as the main threat to its strategic, political and economic interests in the Ottoman 
Empire, Qajar Persia and the Gulf region. This phase was characterised, insofar as British 
interests in Kurdistan were concerned, by efforts to extend British political and economic 
influence to Southern Kurdistan, and by agreeing to place the volatile area of Eastern Kurdi­
stan under Russian political influence from 1907 onward, with a view to restoring political sta­
bility to the border areas that separated the Ottoman Empire from the Qajar Kingdom. In other 
words, Britain’s interest in Kurdistan became more direct and explicit, and its decision to 
establish -in the manner of other Powers- several consulates in Ottoman and Qajar Kurdistan 
reflected the extent of its growing interest in Kurdish affairs. In spite of the fact that the Young 
Turk Government was generally well disposed towards Germany, British policy makers still 
adhered firmly to the principle of preserving the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and 
accordingly opposed the political aspirations of any internal force that sought to alter the sta­
tus quo, such as the Kurdish and the Armenian nationalist movements.
The third phase covered the first three years of the First World War, and witnessed an 
unprecedented shift in the British position on the future of the Ottoman Empire and particu­
larly its non-Turkish Wilayets in Kurdistan, Mesopotamia and Greater Syria. This shift manifes­
ted itself in Britain’s abandonment of its long-held principle of preserving the territorial unity of 
the Ottoman Empire. The secret terms of the 1916 Sykes-Picot (Tripartite) agreement, in 
which Britain played a leading role, divided Ottoman Kurdistan politically and economically into 
various spheres of influence and control among the Allied Powers: Britain, Russia and 
France. There was also a strong possibility that Russia would bring Eastern Kurdistan under 
its direct political and economic control. The outbreak of the war offered Britain unpreceden­
ted opportunity to establish and consolidate strategically, economically and politically its posi­
tion in Southern Kurdistan, with a view to protecting the security of Mesopotamia and the Per­
sian Gulf. These two areas were vital to the security of India. Britain, however, remained, as 
before, unfavourably disposed towards the political aspirations of the Kurdish nationalists.
The fourth phase was characterised by the realisation by the British Government that 
many of the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement were no longer feasible as a basis for the 
new postwar order for the Middle East. Such British realisations reflected -apart from acute 
financial problems resulting from the long duration of the war- the changes in the international 
situation stemming from the Russian withdrawal from the war following the Bolshevik takeover 
in November 1917, and the entry of the United States into the war against Germany in April
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1917. One of the principal ramifications of these unforeseen developments was the decision 
of the British Government to control the whole of Southern Kurdistan by preventing the 
French from having a share in that area. The British decision to control Southern Kurdistan 
was largely motivated by strategic considerations, and aimed to consolidate the security of the 
British position in Mesopotamia, the Persian Gulf and to command the strategic land-routes to 
northern Persia across Southern and Eastern Kurdistan. Economic considerations played a 
far smaller part in influencing the British decision, even though Britain was aware of the poten­
tial oil wealth of Southern Kurdistan.
The fifth phase covered the years between the end of the First World War in Novem­
ber 1918 and the conclusion of the August 1920 Sevres treaty. Britain took the initiative in 
modifying the outdated terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement. As a result, Britain brought 
Southern Kurdistan into its Mesopotamian mandate, while France took Western Kurdistan. 
The would-be Armenian state was also to control a large portion of Ottoman Kurdistan. The 
remainder of the Kurdish areas were supposed to obtain autonomy, and then independence, 
if the Allies considered the local Kurds to be sufficiently qualified. Thus the main feature of 
this phase was that, although Britain partially recognised Kurdish nationalist aspirations, it still 
considered its interests to lie in the repartition of Kurdistan between British Mesopotamia, 
French Syria, and the would-be Armenian state. The most important factors influencing the 
British approach to the settlement of the Kurdish question at the Paris peace conference, 
were the containment of the growing Bolshevik threat, the holding back of France’s political 
and economic influence in Ottoman Kurdistan, the consolidation of the British position in 
Mesopotamia and the safety of Persian territorial unity.
The final phase coincided with the formation process of the Iraqi state under Feisal’s 
rule from 1920 to 1923, and was characterised by Britain’s efforts to turn the partition of Otto­
man Kurdistan into a de jure reality. Britain, even though it brought Southern Kurdistan under 
its mandate in 1920, did not decide whether to establish it as a separate entity from Arab 
Mesopotamia or to incorporate both countries into one state. This phase was ended with Bri­
tain’s decision to incorporate Southern Kurdistan into the Iraqi state against the Kurds’ will. 
This decision reflected a combination of British concerns for the strategic, political and econo­
mic viability of the young Iraqi state. The British, particularly those who served on the ground, 
were convinced that without the incorporation of Southern Kurdistan, the Iraqi state would 
not survive. From then on, Britain became explicitly opposed to the Kurdish nationalist move­
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ment and worked alongside Persia, Turkey and Iraq -the countries which partitioned Kurdi­
stan- towards frustrating Kurdish nationalist aspirations in favour of preserving the status quo.
Three major conclusions can be derived from the evolution of Britain’s interest in 
Kurdish affairs and its position on the Kurdish question, especially in the period 1918-1923. 
The first is the supremacy of strategic considerations over economic ones as the principal 
driving force behind Britain’s policy towards Kurdistan’s future. Kurdistan enjoyed a distinctive 
geopolitical position, and this was always the most influential factor conditioning Britain’s 
approach to the Kurdish situation. British reactions to the rising Kurdish nationalist movement 
must be seen within the context of a general strategy in the Middle East. This strategy 
revolved around Britain’s concern for the security of its Indian Empire, which was perceived to 
depend on the preservation of political stability in Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Persia and Per­
sian Gulf. Kurdistan’s economic value was always of secondary importance to British policy­
makers in comparison to its strategic value. The historical roots of Britain’s interest in Kurdish 
oil go back to the turn of the Twentieth Century, when oil began to be increasingly used by 
the navies of the Great Powers. Ultimately, it became vital for important sea Powers such as 
Britain to have free and direct access to oil supplies and reserves at all times.
The evolution of British interests in Kurdistan was largely a response to the changes 
in the regional situation in the Middle East, resulting from the decay of the Ottoman Empire 
and the Qajar Kingdom, which in turn brought about growing external interferences in their 
political and economic affairs. From the mid-Nineteenth Century onwards, the Middle East 
had become the scene of a steady intensification in the rivalry among the main European 
Powers for the imposition of their political and economic control. Insofar as Kurdistan was con­
cerned, Britain perceived Czarist Russia as the main danger that needed to be contained in 
the Nineteenth Century and the early Twentieth Century. Thereafter, Germany replaced Rus­
sia as the main political and economic rival to Britain in the heartland of the Ottoman Empire 
and Persia. Following the First World War, apart from France’s imperial ambitions, the new Bol­
shevik Russia posed the most serious political and ideological threat to the British position in 
the Middle East, and accordingly, British policy makers reviewed British interests and objec­
tives in the Turkish peace settlements of 1920 and 1923.
Secondly, the lack of a well-defined policy on the part of the British Government, and 
its noticeable unfamiliarity with the Kurdish situation after the end of the First World War, 
enabled certain British officials on the ground to play a far more important part in influencing
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the future of Kurdistan than they could under ordinary conditions. Between 1918 and 1920, 
Col. Wilson, in his capacity as the Civil Commissioner, and Maj. Noel, in his capacity as the 
most important British expert on Kurdish affairs, played a crucial part in providing the British 
Government with much needed details about post-war Kurdish affairs. They not only coloured 
the views of the British Government on the Kurdish question, but also influenced the direc­
tion of political developments in British-controlled Southern Kurdistan between 1918 and 
1920. In the period 1921-1923, Percy Cox, the new High Commissioner, played a similar -if 
not more crucial- political part in determining the future of British-controlled Southern Kurdi­
stan when paving the way for its incorporation into the newly-emerging Iraqi state.
Lastly, this review of the evolution of British policy towards Kurdistan also reveals that 
in none of its historical phases were Britain’s strategic interests partially compatible with the 
nationalist aspirations of the Kurds, unlike those of the Zionist, Sharifian or Armenian national­
ist movements. There was always a clear contradiction between the requirements of a suc­
cessful British policy towards the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Persia and the political objectives 
of the Kurdish nationalist movement in all parts of Kurdistan. In the Nineteenth Century and 
up until the outbreak of the First World War, Britain supported the territorial integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire and Qajar Persia and was, therefore, opposed to Kurdish nationalism, which 
was perceived to as being a destabilising force. Britain was unwilling to deal with the maltreat­
ment of the Ottoman Kurds by the Turks at an international level, unlike the Armenians. When 
the war broke out Britain took the lead in the formulation of the secret terms of the Sykes- 
Picot (Tripartite) agreement, at the heart of which was the partitioning of Kurdistan between 
the principal European Allies: France, Russia and Britain. In the post-war period, Britain once 
more played an important part in translating the partitioning of Kurdistan into a reality under 
the terms of the 1920 Sevres treaty and the 1923 Lausanne agreement. Britain’s strategic 
and economic interests always concentrated on Southern Kurdistan because of its impor­
tance to Mesopotamia’s security and also its potential oil fields.
Given the last conclusion and the extraordinary circumstances that surrounded the 
emergence of the modern Middle East, it seems logical to raise the following question: can 
one hold the Kurdish nationalists responsible for the non-materialisation of an independent 
Kurdistan or the policies of the Great Powers, particularly Britain? To answer this difficult ques­
tion one must concentrate on the new political conditions resulting from the First World War. 
The end of the war marked the dawn of a new era in the history of the Middle East because of
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the collapse of the old-fashioned Ottoman Empire and Qajar Kingdom, with their multi-ethnic 
structures. On one side, the victorious Allied Powers -notably Britain- began to re-draw the 
new political map of the Middle East, so as to consolidate their strategic and economic posi­
tion in most of the former Ottoman territories such as Arabia, Syria, Mesopotamia and Ottoman 
Kurdistan, as well as Persia. On the other side, the political elites of the new nationalities such 
as the Kurds, the Arabs, the Zionist Jews and the Armenians, emerged to work towards the 
creation of national states for their respective nationalities by soliciting the support of the 
Allies.
In these exceptional circumstances, it was inevitable that the imperial interests of the 
Allied Powers, notably Britain, would have a decisive role in the political future of the new 
nationalities. Insofar as Kurdistan was concerned, Britain not only extended its control to 
southern Kurdish regions, but was also directly involved in all the treaties that led to the parti­
tion of Kurdistan among French Syria, British Mesopotamia and Turkey between 1920 and
1923. In other words, had the upholding of British interests required the the formation of a 
Kurdish state in the period 1918-1923, Britain would have been in a very strong position to 
take such a step, at least, in British-controlled Southern Kurdistan. There are a few notable 
examples, when the consolidation of British interests demanded the establishment of new 
states in the newly-emerging Middle East, such as Mesopotamia, Arabia and Trans-Jordan. 
Having said that, one cannot overlook the role of the Kurdish nationalist movement in the 
issue of the non-materialisation of a Kurdish state. This movement was politically divided lar­
gely because of the predominant tribal structure of the Kurdish society. Kurdistan, a country 
of mainly rough mountainous areas with a lack of sufficient roads, railways and other means of 
communications, tends itself to isolation and localism. What made matters worse was the 
implemented British policies on the ground, which focused on severing -rather than consoli­
dating- all political links between British-controlled Southern Kurdistan and the remainder of 
the Kurdish areas. Under such social, geographical and political conditions, it was extremely 
difficult to politically organise a Kurdistan-wide nationalist organisation with a united leadership 
and a clear strategy and programme. Consequently, the Kurdish nationalists were unable to 
influence as much as they would have desired the course of political developments that affec­
ted Kurdistan’s future.
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